



BPYE-141

Block 4

INDIAN METAPHYSICS

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Block Introduction

This block is comprised of three units. Each unit presents a metaphysical problem. In this block you will study three metaphysical problems, namely, reality, causation, universal and particular. These problems represent three metaphysical questions, what is really Real? From where this universe originates? And what is the nature of the object?

Unit 12 “Theories of Reality” deals with the nature and criterion of reality in different schools of Indian Philosophy. This leads to the discussion of the differentiation of what is considered as real and what unreal. It also discusses the material cause of the world as real or unreal, and attempts to explain whether the empirical world is a real transformation/modification of the one ultimate reality or is it only an appearance.

Unit 13 “Theories of Causation” deals with the question related to the origin of this world/universe/life and also with the concept of causation in various Indian philosophical schools. Learner will study various explanation of the issue of causation given by various Indian philosophical schools and also the metaphysical presuppositions of those schools.

Unit 14 “Universals and Particulars” talks about the metaphysical concepts of universals and particulars in various Indian philosophical schools. What we actually perceive when we perceive something? What is the real nature of the object/individual? These are the underline questions on which the discussion of universal and particular will be focused in this unit.

UNIT 12 THEORIES OF REALITY*

Structure

- 12.0 Objectives
- 12.1 Introduction
- 12.2 Cārvāka Philosophy
- 12.3 Sāṃkhya Philosophy
- 12.4 Jaina Philosophy
- 12.5 Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy
- 12.6 Buddhist Philosophy
- 12.7 Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta
- 12.8 Let us sum up
- 12.9 Key Words
- 12.10 Further Readings and References
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12.0 OBJECTIVES

The objective of this unit is to enable students to understand the concept of reality as given by different Schools of Indian Philosophy. This unit will explain the concept of reality through two main points:

- The criterion adopted by the various Indian Philosophical Schools for ascribing the notion of reality to anything.
- The nature of such reality.

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12.1 INTRODUCTION

Indian philosophical schools are defined by their Metaphysical foundations and Epistemological principles. And it is claimed by some scholars that the metaphysical foundation of any philosophical school is what paves the way for their epistemology and other principles. Metaphysics can be regarded as being the main founding pillar of a school on the basis of which it constructs and establishes other concepts. Furthermore, Metaphysics and epistemology are so intrinsically interwoven that it is not possible to discuss one without taking into consideration the other.

The question ‘what is real’ may seem simple to answer in general. For instance, one can say that whatever is out there in the world (whatever we experience through our senses) is real, but on pondering over it philosophically, the answer given above does not appear to do full justice to the question. Discussing this question opens up many other layers of impending questions that demand further thinking, reflection and clarification. One problem which becomes evident is that of the gap between the subject (knower) as a receiver of all knowledge, and what is out there in the world (the known or the object of knowledge). That is, there exists an epistemic gap between what the ‘I’ (the knower) knows as a subject, and what the world out there is actually and truly like. This leaves us with questions about How this gap can be filled? What is the relation between the claim that what we perceive is certain knowledge, and the concept of reality? etc. The other problem is that of the relation between the existent and the real. All existent things are bound to exist in space and time, and some of the schools assert that what is limited by space and time cannot be called real, because for them reality is beyond the limits of space-time, while some other schools consider that what is existent can only be real, and some schools are of the view that both existent and non-existent entities are called real. The subject matter of this unit will be to define, discuss, and explain the concept of reality by addressing these issues and their explanations as given by different schools of Indian philosophy.

12.2 CĀRVĀKA PHILOSOPHY

Cārvāka philosophy is the materialist school of Indian Philosophy. The concept of reality of Cārvāka philosophy is based on a purely materialistic mechanism. For Cārvāka, the

external/material world which we can cognize through sense perception, is the only real world, apart from which there is no other realm of reality. Matter, therefore, becomes the only reality. What is not perceivable through sense perception, is not real because it cannot be verified empirically. Thus, Cārvāka's epistemology accepts perception as the only means of knowledge, and rejects inference, comparison, and verbal testimony as means of knowledge.

Cārvāka philosophy claims that this materialistic concept of reality and all other concepts linked and explained through it can be fully analysed in terms of four fundamental elements, which include— fire, air, water, and earth. All phenomena, including consciousness, can be explained as being the combination of these four elements. We all know that consciousness and matter are two distinct elements. The nature and defining features of consciousness are entirely different from matter. Now if Cārvāka philosophy admits matter as the only reality then how can it explain the existence and nature of consciousness? Do the upholders of this view even admit the existence of such an element called consciousness? The answer of the above question is given in affirmative, that is, yes they do believe in the existence of consciousness. They claim that consciousness is the result of the combination of these four elements in a definite proportion, just as red colour is produced by the combination of betel, areca nut and lime, similarly consciousness is produced by the combination of these elements. Red colour does not reside in any of these elements (betel, areca nut and lime), but it emerges when these elements combine, similar is the case with consciousness, for it does not reside in any of these four elements (earth, water, fire, and air) individually, but it emerges as a by-product of the combination of these elements. Since it is produced by the combination of these elements, it is subject to decay or end. Unlike Advaita Vedānta and Sāṃkhya systems which regard consciousness as an eternal and unchanging reality, Cārvāka philosophy does not accept consciousness as the ultimate reality, it is only an accidental property of matter (body) which is produced by the combination of elements, and perishes upon death. Death thus, is the end of life, and therefore any possibility of the existence of soul, or a permanent self, and transmigration of the soul are rejected by Cārvāka philosophy because these concepts are not verifiable through sense perception. Cārvāka did not attribute any eternal and supernatural characteristics to consciousness because they believed that it can be explained fully in terms of material and physical processes.

The radical materialism of Cārvāka philosophy rejects any notion which cannot be established with the help of sense perception. This is precisely the reason why they reject the idea of any kind of first uncaused cause of this world and the theory of causation in general. Since we cannot have the knowledge of the invariable connection of cause with effect (because it is based on inference, and inference is not accepted as a means of knowledge by Cārvāka philosophy), there is no chain of cause and effect, the order of things is due to their own nature, which is grounded in the observable world of senses only. That is why there is no need of any transcendental force to explain the theory of causation. Cārvāka philosophy does not provide any explanation for the manifoldness of the world in the form of a causation theory, they consider that the order of the things in the world and the world itself exists due to their inherent nature (*svabhāva*) and not because of any cause as such.

12.3 SĀMĀKHYA PHILOSOPHY

Sāṃkhya Philosophy presents a dualistic framework of reality. It accepts the existence of two fundamental elements as real, which co-exist independently/separately. These two eternal elements are *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*. *Prakṛti* is primordial matter, and an ever-changing, ever-active, dynamic principle which is the root cause of all manifestations, of all the dynamicity, and of all motion. Manifestation and dynamicity are inherent in a potential state in *Prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* itself cannot be caused by any other entity, and it is therefore called the uncaused first cause, which is responsible for creation and the manifolded nature of the universe. Before creation (evolution), *Prakṛti* remains in an unmanifest (*avyakta*) subtle state, which exists without any form, and it is the manifested form of the world through which we infer its existence. The manifestation of the world is not regarded as a new creation; the world is only an actualization of what was already inherent in the potential form in its root cause. *Prakṛti* transforms itself into the phenomenal world, by going through an actual transformation, an explicit materialisation of what was present in a latent form in it.

Prakṛti consists of three *guṇas*: *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, these three *guṇas* remain in a state of equilibrium (*sāmyāvasthā*), or a state of balance, where no *guṇa* dominates the other. Evolution takes place with the interaction/disturbance of these three *guṇas* of *Prakṛti*. But Sāṃkhya philosophy claims that being an unconscious element, *Prakṛti* alone cannot be the cause of

creation, some conscious principle is required in order to begin the process of evolution. For Sāṃkhya, matter alone without a conscious principle, or even consciousness alone without matter, cannot become the cause of the manifestation of the world. The unmanifest *Prakṛti* manifests itself as the physical world after coming into contact with the conscious being, this conscious being is *Puruṣa*. In Sāṃkhya system, both matter and consciousness are accepted as separately real entities. It means that matter or *Prakṛti*, and all its evolutes: intellect, ego, mind, five sensory organs, five motor organs, five subtle elements, and five gross elements are real in Sāṃkhya Philosophy. In this chain of evolution, *Prakṛti* is the only cause; *Puruṣa* is not involved in this process of evolution either as a cause or as an effect. Rather, *Puruṣa* is the knower, the witnessing agent, the spectator, and pure consciousness. The *Puruṣas* are many in number, but essentially, they are all alike. The multiplicity and differences refer to the number only, because their indispensable nature is pure consciousness. Now the question is how the relation between these two completely distinct substances; of which one is inactive and pure consciousness, and the other is active and unconscious; is possible. We can understand this relation by an analogy, magnet and iron are two completely distinct elements, but magnet attracts iron towards itself, similarly it can be said that there is a possibility of a real relation between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*. The second argument which is given regarding the relation of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* is that they are related through *saṃyoga* (by coincidence). Thirdly, according to *Sarvadarśanaśaṃgraha* of Mādhvācārya, there is a mutual expectancy between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*. *Prakṛti* as an object of enjoyment (*bhogya*) expects some enjoyer (*bhoktā*), and that enjoyer is *Puruṣa*. The *Puruṣa*, on the other hand because of the shadow of intellect upon it, forgets its true nature, and the realisation of the true nature of *Puruṣa* is possible by the discriminatory knowledge of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*, for this discriminatory knowledge, *Puruṣa* expects *Prakṛti*.

Check Your Progress I

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit.

1. How does Cārvāka philosophy explain the manifoldness of the world?

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2. Why is Sāṃkhya philosophy called dualistic?

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12.4 JAINA PHILOSOPHY

Jaina Philosophy presents a pluralistic account of reality. This pluralism is realistic and relativistic in nature. It is called realistic pluralism because it accepts both matter (*pudgala* or *ajīva*) and soul (*jīva*) as separate but co-existing realities, and relativistic because it admits that all our knowledge is relative, whatever knowledge we get tells us only about a relative perception of a thing which we get from observing the object from a specific viewpoint, it is not possible to attain absolute knowledge of any object. Any object can be observed from multiple perspectives and viewpoints, and reality can be understood from any of these perspectives and references. Since it is not possible for us to know an object absolutely, or from all point of views, what we know is always relative and it represents only a particular aspect of that object. The theory of Reality of Jainism is called *Anekāntavāda* or the theory of many-ness of reality. Reality is multifaceted and complex in nature, a thing is real with its infinite characteristics (*anata dharmakam vastu*), and it is inclusive of a variety of viewpoints, in which one viewpoint may contradict with the other viewpoints. It is not possible for us to know or grasp reality fully from any single point of reference, therefore it is necessary to consider multiple aspects in order to attain a more complete understanding of reality.

According to Jaina philosophy, permanence is not the exclusive quality of being, it is inclusive of becoming, dynamism, and decay as well. Jaina philosophy accepts that a substance is real in having the characteristics of both permanence and change. That which has originated, which exists, and which undergoes destruction is called a substance. A substance is defined as the substratum of qualities and modes or modifications. Qualities are the permanent or essential characteristics of substance, and modes are the changeable characteristics of a substance. Qualities are inseparable from substance and this aspect of viewing substance with its essential qualities represents permanence, while modes are only accidental properties of substance and

thus, they symbolise change. Reality, therefore, is described as “unity in and through difference”, and this difference is said to be based on the point of reference of the knowing an object. The fundamental element of a substance like clay, denotes permanence, but modifications of clay into a jar, or any other forms, are always subject to change and destruction.

The Jaina concept of the multifaceted-ness of reality is connected with its epistemological and logical aspects whereby it is proposed that all our knowledge, and even truth, is always relative. Rather than giving a theory of any single, absolute truth, Jainism highlights the importance of considering different perspectives for understanding reality in a more comprehensive manner. This theory of relative knowledge is called *Syādvāda*, where the term *syāt* refers to “may be” or “somehow”. That is, any claim or assertion is true from within a particular context only, all truth-claims are conditional and relative; they are true somehow, i.e. they are true from one viewpoint, and when we see them from some other perspective then the truth value can be changed, the other perspective showing some other aspects may prove the above claim to be not true. Realization of the absolute truth is not possible with our limited means of attaining knowledge. All our judgements, therefore, are also relative because they are based on the ways in which we express them. *Syādvāda* presents a logical method for analysing the complex structure of reality by opening up multiple perspectives of viewing it, and through its metaphysics Jaina philosophy rejects the possibility of admitting only one, unconditional, and absolute reality.

Check Your Progress II

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit.

1. What is *Anekāntavāda*?

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12.5 NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA PHILOSOPHY

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems are known as the realistic schools of Indian philosophy. They are realistic, but not materialistic (like Cārvāka philosophy), because they admit the existence of

non-material substance like soul as independent and separate. Vaiśeṣika philosophy explains the nature of reality through the metaphysical categorisation of the concept of category (*padārtha*). Vaiśeṣika admits the existence of seven categories (*padārtha*; it is believed that the seventh category (*abhāva*) is added later), and these categories are considered as real entities. Substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, inherence, and non-being (*abhāva*) are seven categories given by the Vaiśeṣika School. Of these seven categories, substance, quality, and action possess objective existence in space and time (*sattāsamabandha*), while generality, particularity, and inherence are called self sufficient (*svātmasattva*), they are independent of space and time. These categories are the means for explicating the notion of existence. These *Padārthas* are entities that are knowable (*jnēya*) and nameable (*abhidheya*), and, according to Vaiśeṣikas, whatever is the object of knowledge (or can be known) and can be named is real (*sat*). These seven categories represent a complete analysis of all objects of knowledge. The categories are used to analyse and describe the characteristics and relations of all things in the world, they present a comprehensive framework for understanding the nature of reality and the status of existence and reality of the objective world.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy claims that the external/objective world exists independent of our perceiving or knowing it. All objects of our experience are considered as real, and these objects are made up of constituent parts/elements. These constituent elements are never produced because these are claimed to be eternal by the Vaiśeṣikas. These constituent elements are called atoms, and these atoms are the material cause of all objects, that is, they are the ultimate constituent cause of the physical world. The nature of an atom is indivisible, indestructible, and eternal, only the combination of atoms are produced and destroyed. These atoms possess inherent capacities which enable them to interact with each other and form compounds. These capacities are responsible for various combinations of atoms, and creation of the world is the result of combinations of these atoms. Both the cause of the world and the effect are regarded as real in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy, but effect is not real before creation because it is non-existent before creation. The atomistic theory provides a framework for understanding the nature of matter and the physical world, and the concept of categories presents a metaphysical classification of all objects of knowledge.

Check Your Progress III

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit.

1. What are the three characteristics of *padārtha*, according to Vaiśeṣika?

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12.6 BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

The Four noble truths of Buddhist philosophy are regarded as the central teaching of Buddhist philosophy. Of these four noble truths, the second and third noble truths (there is a cause of suffering, and, there is cessation of suffering) reveal the secret of every phenomena of the world. These two noble truths are based on the idea that origination is dependent on some causes and conditions. This doctrine of causation is known as the theory of dependent origination and it explains the nature of existence and the cause of suffering. This theory explains the nature and criterion of reality of Buddhism.

Reality is *catuṣkoti-vinirmukta*, and *prapañca-sūnya*, i.e., that which is free from all four kinds of categorisation (existence, non-existence, both existence and non-existence, and neither of these) is termed as real. Nāgārjuna accepts that reality transcends this scheme of categorisation and this criterion of reality is applicable to all conceptual schemes of Buddhist philosophy. For Nāgārjuna, all concepts fall in either of these categories of intellect and therefore they cannot be termed as ultimately real. If something is real then it must not be dependent upon any other thing, that is, it should exist independently, it should be devoid of any cause (*kāraṇa nirpekṣa*), or any cause-effect relation; but we see that the origination of everything in this world is dependent, that is, there is some cause of every existing object in the world, and because everything has a cause, therefore every object is termed as *svabhāva-sūnya*. It means that every object is devoid of its own inherent essence. An object can exist with its own *svabhāva* only if it exists independently; if it is self-created, but if some object originates from some other cause; if its existence is dependent, then that object cannot be said to exist with its own *svabhāva*. All things are inter-dependent and relative; they arise in dependence upon some causes and

conditions, therefore they cannot be considered as real. In this way, the Śūnyavādins claim that the phenomenal (*Vyāvahārika*) world is also *svabhāvasūnya* because its origination is dependent; and not only the phenomenal world, the *pārmāthika* (ultimate) reality is also described as a state of *śūnyatā*, because it transcends all the categories of intellect. This *śūnyatā* is not the same as the state of nothingness, it is the state that cannot be described or explained by the categories of intellect, and therefore it is indescribable.

For Vijnānavādin school of Buddhism, all phenomena of the world are construction of the mind and they do not exist independently. The world, which we perceive, is a construction of our own consciousness, rather than being an objective world. Vijnānavādins claim that what is causally efficacious is real. What is causally potent and possesses the capacity to produce the effect, that alone is real. And this reality, for the Vijnānavādins, is the existence of the ‘moment’ only.

We can know any object in two ways, these two ways of knowing are: *Svalakṣana* and *Sāmānyalakṣana*. An object which exists with names and forms and other categories of intellect, is said to exist with *sāmānyalakṣana*. But for the Buddhists, *sāmānyalakṣana* is not causally efficacious because it is only a mental construction, we name or cognise an object based on relations, or as an aggregate or chain of moments, and this process gives rise to conceptualisation of an object. An effect can be produced by an actual object and not by something that is only a mental construction. Thus, *sāmānyalakṣana* cannot be regarded as real. On the other hand, *svalakṣana*, or thing-in-itself can only persist in the existence of the moment (*kṣana*), and only a moment possesses the causal efficacy, which gives rise to another moment. Thus, it is the existence of a moment which is efficient (*arthkriyākāri*) and that which is efficient is a real entity. A moment causes another moment, only a moment possesses the capacity to perform some function (the effect is produced by the causal efficacy of the moment), and perishes after producing the other moment. Everything in this world, including physical objects and thoughts, arises and ceases in a momentary succession. This is called the doctrine of impermanence, or momentariness which asserts that moment alone is real and apart from it everything else is a mental construction. The defining characteristic of reality is that it is momentary; it perishes after being produced for one moment. Whatever we perceive or see is an aggregate of moments, an imperceptible change of these moments in succession becomes the cause of our perceiving any

object of the world. Permanence is not real, rather reality is defined as impermanence or change. This impermanence is considered as one of the fundamental truths of existence, and the existence of all phenomenal objects is considered only as a stream of momentary events.

12.7 ŚAMKARA'S ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

Advaita Vedānta is a non-dualistic school of Indian Philosophy. Absolute reality according to Śamkara is that which cannot be contradicted, or negated by any other experience, that which is eternal and unchanging is called the absolute reality. That is, the condition for something to be real is non-contradiction or non-sublation, that which cannot be sublated in all three stages, waking, dreaming and deep sleep is real, i.e. reality is *trikāla-abādhita*. *Trikāla-abādhita* means something which transcends the limitation or boundaries of all these three states. Non-sublation implies the impossibility to transcend or eliminate one level of reality by any higher level of reality. Sublation, therefore, involves eliminating the lower level of reality/existence by a higher level of reality.

In the dreaming state, whatever we experience is a world created by of our own mind, the objects of dreaming state appear real as long as we remain in that dreaming state, but the existence of dreaming objects vanishes as soon as we come out of that dreaming state. We perceive various objects in the external world, we perceive an external world as well, we find ourselves as being situated in and limited by the boundaries of space and time; but the objects, our bodies, and the empirical world itself are transient, they are subject to constant change, and decay. And that which is constantly changing cannot be real according to Śamkara. Reality, for Śamkara is not bounded by the boundaries of space and time, and this is the reason why it is called omnipresent.

The nature of reality for Śamkara is non-dual. This non-dual reality is Brahman, which is eternal, unchanging, and pure consciousness. It is devoid of any relation. It is non-relational because relation presupposes the existence of at least two elements, i.e. it presupposes duality. We see that this duality or manifoldness is the nature of the perceptual world. The perceptual diversity of the empirical world is only an apparent reality. The manifestation of the empirical world is described as the superimposition (*adhyāsa*) of names and forms upon Brahman. The superimposition of attributes of one thing on another thing is called *adhyāsa*. The appearance of

the world is due to the imposition of names and forms on the ultimate reality. For example, to perceive snake mistakenly (because of being ignorant about the true nature of the rope as rope) in rope is superimposition of the attributes of snake on rope, similarly the manifoldness of the world and its objects are superimposed on Brahman. All categories of empirical knowledge are constituted by the distinctions of knowledge, knower, and known, the limitations (*upādhis*) of name and form are the reason for all differences. The state of non-difference can be attained by transcending all limitations because the nature of the ultimate reality is free from all three kinds of distinctions, i.e. knowledge, knower, and known. When we get true knowledge of rope as rope, the erroneous knowledge of snake disappears, that is, the illusion of rope is sublated by knowledge of rope as rope. Similarly, the apparent distinctions and multiplicity of the perceptual world vanishes when we get the knowledge of the true nature of the ultimate reality.

This manifoldness of the world is not an actual transformation of the Supreme Being (Brahman), this Supreme Being has the potency to appear as the world, but it does not undergo any actual change or transformation, as snake is not an actual transformation of rope. Brahman becomes the cause of the world through *avidyā*, and the world is only a *vivarta* (appearance) of Brahman. *Vivarta* here explains the relationship of Brahman and the empirical reality that we experience. Brahman is omnipotent, all-pervasive, and it manifests itself (as an appearance only) in different forms. The potency of Brahman is not limited to any particular form or attribute, but it is the source of all manifestations. Thus, the empirical world is only a *vikāra* (modification) of the omnipotent Brahman. But the world has practical reality, it is not completely unreal either. Advaita Vedānta argues that the world is neither completely real nor completely unreal. It is not unreal because it is experienced, and it is not completely real because its empirical reality is negated or sublated by the highest reality, i.e., Brahman.

It is believed that Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta accepts three levels of existence: 1. *Pratibhāsika sattā* or illusory existence as the dreaming state, 2. *Vyāvahārika sattā*, or the worldly existence, which is real at the practical/empirical level only; and 3. *Pārmārthika sattā* or absolute existence which is non-dual ultimate reality. The empirical world is real at *vyāvahārika* level. The two levels of existence i.e., *Pratibhāsika sattā* or *Vyāvahārika sattā* can be eliminated by the higher levels of existence, (for example, when viewed from the point of view of absolute reality, both

rope and snake will turn out to be unreal, though the existence of rope is real in the worldly plane of existence, and viewing snake in rope is only an illusory element that comes under *Pratibhāsika sattā*.) but the highest plane of existence cannot be eliminated or transcended by any other state of experience because this is the state of non-duality which transcends all phenomenal reality. Thus, when viewed from the perspective of absolute reality, all the states pertaining to the phenomenal world represent the degrees of unreality only, which ultimately culminate into the non-dual, absolute reality.

Check Your Progress IV

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit.

1. What is the criterion of reality according to Nāgārjuna and Śaṅkara?

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12.8 LET US SUM UP

In this unit we have tried to discuss the concept of reality of some important schools of Indian Philosophy. These schools of Indian Philosophy are known by different names depending upon what they consider as real and unreal. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Jaina, and Sāṅkhya systems are called realists because they consider the external world as real, even though there are differences in the conceptualization and categorization of this idea of reality, which is mainly reflected in how they view the notion of substance respectively. Considering matter as the only reality, Cārvāka philosophy is named as materialistic philosophy, and this school is the only materialist school in Indian Philosophy. Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara and Buddhism present an idealist view of reality, but here also we find differences in their methodologies, explanations, and the final outcome which has been named as the ultimate reality. The idea of reality has been explained by taking into consideration the nature and the criterion reality which is equivalent to defining the concept of reality itself, and consequently other epistemological principles in all schools as well.

12.9 KEY WORDS

Trikāla-abādhita : Reality, for Śaṅkara is *Trikāla-abādhita*, it is a state that transcends the limitation or boundaries of all these three states of waking, dreaming, and deep sleep.

Anekāntavāda : a theory of reality proposed by Jaina philosophy to comprehend reality from multiple perspectives, it states that reality has multiple aspects, and we cannot know all aspects of reality, what can be known are only some aspects of reality.

Kṣāṇikavāda : A theory of Buddhist philosophy which states that moment alone is real, the existence of all phenomenal objects is considered only as a stream of these momentary occurrences.

12.10 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

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12.11 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

(Note: Please elaborate your answers with the help of these hints.)

Check Your Progress I

1. Cārvāka philosophy explains the manifoldness of the world with the help of svabhāvavāda. According to this theory, the order of the things in the world and the world itself exists due to their inherent nature.
2. Sāṅkhya is a dualist philosophy, because it accepts two fundamental (and irreducible) substances (elements); Puruṣa and Prakṛti.

Check Your Progress II

1. Anekāntavāda is a theory which advocates that there are multiple objects and these objects have multiple aspects as well.

Check Your Progress III

1. The three characteristics of Padārtha are,
a) Sat, b) Jñeya, c) Abhidheya

Check Your Progress IV

1. According to Nāgārjuna, that which is free from all four kinds of categorisation (existence, non-existence, both existence and non-existence, and neither of these) is real.

According to Śaṅkara, the condition for something to be real is non-contradiction or non-sublation, that which cannot be sublated in all three stages, waking, dreaming and deep sleep is real, i.e. reality is *trikāla-abādhita*.



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UNIT 13 THEORIES OF CAUSATION*

Structure

13.0 Objectives

13.1 Introduction

13.2 *Swabhāvavāda*

13.3 *Satkāryavāda*

13.4 *Asatkāryavāda*

13.5 Let us sum up

13.6 Key Words

13.7 Further Readings and References

13.8 Answers to check your progress

13.0 OBJECTIVES

In this unit, theories of causation of Indian Philosophical schools have been discussed. The main objectives of this unit are,

- to present critical explanation on the fundamental questions and problems pertaining to the concept of causation in the metaphysical context,
 - to discuss the proposed solutions given by different Indian philosophical schools.
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13.1 INTRODUCTION

To see the world and to see it ceaselessly changing, to see the creation and destruction of things, leads us to the question of 'why' and 'how'. Theory of causation has been interpreted to prove the fundamental element (*Tattva*) of the world. Where did something originate from, how did it come, why did it come: all these questions - what is the cause, why something has a specific cause, and what is the nature of this cause; lies in this speculation. Theories of causation have been investigated to prove the fundamental element of the world. That is why the idea of causation, along with being a metaphysical concept, becomes the subject of epistemology and consequently of ethics as well. Generally, a cause is that which

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is invariable antecedent of effect; and an effect is result of the cause. The idea of cause and effect is a relational idea. Cause and effect are defined only by the expectation/anticipation of each other. For example, thread is the cause of cloth, and cloth is the effect of thread. The question, in the context of which causation theories in Indian Metaphysics have been explained is: whether 'effect' exists already in the 'cause' before creation or is it a completely new creation? That is whether cloth, before creation, is real or unreal in thread? The investigation of the theories of Causation is the idea resulted from this question.

In the tradition of Indian Philosophy, theories of causation have been used as a venture of Metaphysical contemplation. To prove different types of metaphysical establishments through different interpretation of theories of causation has been a method from tradition. Different explanations popular in Indian Metaphysics are vested in the core of explaining the fundamental element (*Tattva*). What is universe? What is the cause of it? How did it originate? The propensity to find the answers of such metaphysical questions is the core of various explanations of the concept of causation.

A common belief that is prevalent in *lok* (in common parlance) is that there is some cause, of every individual, object, incident etc., and therefore also this that all these are necessarily known as effects. When this common belief reaches to such a level that we begin to enquire about the root cause, think about its existence and its relation with the world, then explanation of causation theory becomes equivalent with the explanation of the fundamental element. The question of causation from which various forms of interpretation of causation have emerged in all Indian philosophical schools, is the question whether the transformation of the cause into an effect is fundamental/real or apparent? Some believe in the origin of 'Sat from Sat' (real from real), some believe in the origin of 'Asat from Sat' (unreal from real), some others believe that all are *Sat*, and some others are supporters of the origin of 'Sat from Asat' (real from unreal). We will start the investigation of causation with a theory which explains the diversity of the universe without any cause. This theory is *Swabhāvavāda*, propounded by Cārvāk.

13.2 SWABHĀVAVĀDA

Why is this world like this? When the answer of this question is given on the basis of the nature/*swabhāva* of things/objects and not by the explanation of any cause external to this world, this explanation is called *Swabhāvavāda*. To believe that the manifoldness of things is

inherent in their nature or *swabhāva* is *Swabhāvavāda*. It is Cārvāk's view that things are special by their very nature and not by any other reason. In relation to the knowledge of the objective world, Cārvāk's epistemological theory admits perception as the only *pramāṇa* or means of knowledge, and denies inference as a means of knowledge. Thus they cannot accept any chain of cause-effect in the explanation of causation on the basis of perception only. And as a result they accept *Swabhāvavāda*. In fact, *Swabhāvavāda* is not such a principle of causation, in which it has been thought whether or not the effect was present in the cause before its origin or not, but *Swabhāvavāda* is the explanation of the nature/*swabhāva* of the effect (object). It shows that there is no cause for the manifoldness of any effect other than the effect itself, because we have no knowledge of the invariable relation of the cause with any effect. Therefore, this manifoldness of object is not originated by any cause, but by nature/*swabhāva*. And thus *Swabhāvavāda* is the rejection of cause-effect theory, or the theory of causation. Fire is hot, water cool, air temperate; what is the cause of all this manifoldness? According to Cārvāk, their order is made by their own nature/*swabhāva*.

Check your progress I

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit.

1. What is the epistemological background of *Swabhāvavāda*?

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13.3 SATKĀRYAVĀDA

The idea of causation is given in the beginning of the foundation of any philosophy. The essence of *Satkāryavāda* lies in the idea that the effect is real or it exists in the cause before it is produced. And because effect is *Sat* (real)/existent in the cause already, thus actually there cannot be any new creation by the cause. The difference between *Satkāryavāda* and

Asatkāryavāda becomes pronounced with this main idea. *Asatkaryavadins* accept effect a new creation that originates from the cause. Even among the adherents of the basic idea of *Satkāryavāda*, there are differences in the explanations adapted in their philosophical foundations. Basically, Sāṃkhya and Advaita vedānta schools are the advocates of *Satkāryavāda* whose interpretation differs on the basis of the reality of origin. Sāṃkhya philosophy is called Prakṛti Pariṇāmavādin in its Satkaryavadin explanation, and Advaita vedānta is Vivartavādin.

13.3.1 Prakṛti Pariṇāmavāda

When a philosophy or philosophical foundation proposes this idea that the factors which are responsible for manifoldness of the universe are also present in the root/first cause of the universe; that philosophy is known as advocate of *Satkāryavāda*. *Satkāryavāda* means that effect is real/existent in the cause before its creation. Apart from name and form, there is nothing that is new in the creation of pot from clay. If we see in the context of the theory of causation, then Sāṃkhya and Nyāya philosophy are the only systems who consider creation as real. But even after accepting the creation as real, they both have completely different views about the effect originated. Sāṃkhya is realist school of philosophy; and therefore according to them this world is real and its cause is also real. Hence both the effect and the cause are real. In Sāṃkhya philosophy, the reason for the manifoldness of the world is the deficiency or excess of the three *guṇas* (*Sattva, Rajas, Tamas*). And where there is a state of equilibrium of these three *guṇas* that is called *Prakṛti*. This world is a modification of triguṇas, before the creation of the world all the three *guṇas* are present in *Prakṛti* in an unmanifested form and therefore *Prakṛti* is also named as ‘unmanifested’. Due to the closeness with *Puruṣa*, a disturbance arises in *Prakṛti* and as a result the unmanifest becomes manifest. In this way, the meaning of the origin of the world in Sāṃkhya philosophy is the manifestation of unmanifested. In this way, in Sāṃkhya philosophy, though the origin is real, the cause does not produce anything new in the form of effect. Looking at it in another way, this is not possible also, because *Puruṣa*, who is the cause of this whole universe, being passive in nature, does not play any active role in the manifestation of the unmanifested. *Puruṣa* cannot make any metaphysical change in effect by being close to *Prakṛti* in origin. In *Sāṃkhya* philosophy, some arguments have been presented for the establishment of *Prakṛti Pariṇāmavāda*.

1. A thing which is unreal in the cause cannot be produced. As there is no oil in sand, then oil cannot be produced from sand in any way.
2. A specific effect arises out of a specific cause. Therefore, there is a specific relationship between cause and effect, as a cloth is produced from the thread only, not from soil or sand. This means that there is a special relationship between the thread and the cloth. If the effect is considered unreal in the cause, then the cause should not be related with the effect.
3. If the origin of any effect is accepted from any cause, then anything can be produced from anything. For example, sand will start producing oil and pot will be produced from thread. But this does not happen; hence it is proved that only a particular effect is produced from a particular cause.
4. A specific cause has the power to produce a specific effect. No cause can produce infinite effects. The thread has the potential to produce the cloth only, not the pot.
5. Effect is inseparable from the cause, when the cause is real, then the effect must also be considered as real.

With these arguments, Sāṃkhya system proves that the effect is present in the cause before its origin and that it is as real as the cause. *Asatkaryavādins* have raised some objections to this theory of causation of Sāṃkhya and have argued that effect and cause are different because both serve different purposes. Sāṃkhya has resolved this problem by saying that some people, when they are separate, accomplish different purposes, but when the same people are together, they accomplish some other different purposes. For example, people carrying palanquins accomplish different purposes when they are separate and other different purposes when they are together. Similarly, when the threads are separate, they cannot cover the body, but when they are combined in the form of a cloth, they cover the body. According to Sāṃkhya, nothing fundamentally new arises in the creation of effect from cause. The *Prakṛti Pariṇāmavāda*, principle of Sāṃkhya is completely rooted in the fact that what is not real cannot be produced. Sāṃkhya's Satakryavāda is called Prakṛti Pariṇāmavāda and the meaning of *pariṇama* is: the existence of effect is of the same nature as of the cause.

Viśiṣṭādvaita philosopher Rāmānuja accepts this Satkaryavādin interpretation in the form of *Brahama-Pariṇāmavāda*. In Sāṃkhya School, whole world is accepted as the result of *Prakṛti*, but Rāmānuja has accepted it as a result of Brahman. Śaṅkara, while criticizing *Prakṛti Pariṇāmavāda* of Sāṃkhya, has argued that effect cannot be considered as the result

of cause because the form of the effect after creation is not contained in the cause before creation. In this way, we have to accept that real (*Sat*) is originated from unreal (*Asat*) which is against the theory of Sāṃkhya. He also considers *Brahama-Pariṇāmavāda* as inappropriate. According to Śaṅkarācharya, if world is the result of Brahman, then Brahman has to be considered as changing, and thus Brahman, which is *Sat*, will become *Asat*, which will result in the loss of the quality of being non-sublated in all three states (*trikalabādhita*, three states are: waking, dreaming, and deep sleep). Śaṅkarācharya criticizes *Brahama-Pariṇāmavāda* and *Prakṛti Pariṇāmavāda* and presents *Vivartavāda* as his theory of causation.

Check your progress II

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit.

1. Discuss the arguments presented by Sāṃkhya philosophy in favor of *Prakṛti Pariṇāmavāda*.

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13.3.2 *Vivartavāda*

For Śaṅkarācharya, reality is non-dual. Except this reality, which is non-dual, everything else which appears to be real, is due to avidyā or ignorance. The ultimate reality is only Brahman and this apparent world is appearing in Brahman due to ignorance and thus this world is a *vivarta* (appearance) of Brahman, not a real modification or a transformation. *Vivarta* is an apparent modification. Śaṅkarācharya has furthered this argument of Sāṃkhya that, that which is unreal in cause, cannot be real in effect by saying that if real does not originate from unreal, then how can name-form etc. can originate in its real form. Thus creation of the world from Brahman is not real, but it is only *vivarta*. It is same as the appearance of snake in rope. That is, when rope appears to be a snake, it can never mean that rope has been transformed

into a snake. Brahman is unchanging, and therefore real transformation is not possible in unchanging Brahman. This world is only an appearance in Brahman, world is not a real transformation of Brahman. Real transformation, modification, or transformation means conversion of milk into curd.

According to Śaṅkarācharya, when the ultimate reality is non-dual, then what will be considered the origin of what? Two things are required for origin, one to generate and the other to be generated. According to Śaṅkarācharya, there is a difference between cause and effect, effect does not exist without cause. Jewellery made of gold is not different from gold but gold is not of the same form as of jewellery.

Check your progress III

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit.

1. What is Vivartavāda?

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13.4 ASATKĀRYAVĀDA

The idea of *Asatkāryavāda* is against the central idea of *Satkāryavāda*: that which is not real in cause cannot arise. A theory which says that the effect is not real (existent) in the effect before creation, that is, creation is a new beginning, is called *Asatkāryavāda*. For example, the creation of pot from clay is a new creation, pot was non-existent before creation. This is the view of *Asatkāryavāda*, whose staunch supporters are Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Schools.

In *Asatkāryavāda*, creation of effect from cause is neither a transformation of mere form, and nor is it a manifestation from the unmanifested. This explanation of cause-effect relation defines effect as a new creation, a new reality. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools are realists Schools. They accept both cause and effect as real, but they do not accept effect as a real entity before

its creation. This realist explanation of cause-effect of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas lies in their metaphysical foundations. The meaning of *Asatkāryavāda* for Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is only that this pot-cloth etc. were not existent in their cause clay and thread in this form but it is a new creation. If we consider cause and effect non-different as per the interpretation of *Satkāryavāda*, then there will remain no importance of this element of effect. For Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the instrumental cause of this world is God, which participates in creation. In this way it can be said that the active participation of God in the process of creation is the main basis of making the effect a new creation. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika presents some arguments in favor to establish *Asatkāryavāda*:

1. If the cause and the effect are not different, then cause should not be needed to produce the effect from the cause. But this causal activity is required, thus cause and effect are different. The implication of being different and non-different is that effect being originated from the cause, Naiyāyikas accept effect as new creation, and new beginning means that what was not there in the cause is in effect.
2. If the effect is real in the cause, then the purpose of the effect should be fulfilled through the cause itself. Cause and effect both serve different purposes. That purpose which is fulfilled by effect is not accomplished by cause. For example, the body is covered only by a piece of cloth and not by threads. Hence there is a difference between cause and effect. This is the most important argument of Nyāya to prove *Asatkāryavāda*, which is also an essential feature of their philosophical School.
3. If the effect is considered to be real in the cause, then it would be meaningless to say that the effect is 'created' by the cause. Hence the effect is not real in the cause.
4. If the effect was real in the cause, then from where did the name and form which comes in the effect after its creation come? Therefore, effect is not a transformation of the cause but a new beginning.

According to the *Asatkāryavāda*, the effect is unreal in the cause prior to the activity between the efficient cause and the material cause. Nyāya is a realistic philosophy and is conventional in worldly activity (*lok vyavhāra*), on the basis of accomplishment of different purposes by any object, the difference of cause and effect has been rendered by *Asatkāryavāda*. According to *Asatkāryavāda*, the effect is unreal in the cause, so cause and effect are different; and because of their being different, the produced effect is new.

Satkāryavādins have raised objection to the *Asatkāryavāda* of Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas and said that if effect is not real in the cause, then why should the creation of a specific effect be accepted only from a specific cause? That is, if the thread is not real in the cloth, then the creation of the cloth should be considered due to any other cause like soil, but this does not happen, thus the effect is real in the cause. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, while resolving this objection, say that the meaning of *Asatkāryavāda* is not the creation of the unreal, but that what has been produced was non-existent in the cause before its creation. Nyāya Vaiśeṣika has discussed three types of absence (*Abhāva*) – 1. *Prāgbhāva* (absence before birth) 2. *Pradhvaṃsābhāva* (absence after destruction), and 3. *Atyantābhāva* (absolute absence). According to them, the fixed or specific cause of any effect is the same where that effect does not exist before creation (absence before creation). As the thread is absent in the cloth prior to its creation, so the thread is the cause of the cloth. But there is *atyantābhāva* (absolute absence) of cloth in the clay, so clay is not the cause of the cloth. Similarly, Those who support *Asatkāryavāda* rejects this statement of Satakāryavādins that ‘there is no absence of real/Sat and no existence/presence of unreal’, by clarifying that what is non-existent like son of a barren woman or sky-flower cannot be created by any cause.

Check your progress IV

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit.

1. Discuss the arguments presented by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in favor of *Asatkāryavāda*?

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13.5 PRATĪTYASAMUTAPĀDA

Buddhist Philosophy accepts momentary consciousness as the fundamental element and rejects the concept of atomism of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, *Triguṇa Prakṛti* of Sāṃkhya philosophy,

and Brahman of Advaita Vedānta. The aim of Buddhist Philosophy is to ponder over the question of suffering pervaded in the world and the path that leads to the cessation of suffering. This idea is presented in the form of Four Noble Truths. Buddhist metaphysics proposes that everything is impermanent, and brings the concepts of Momentariness and *Pratītyasamutpāda* to accomplish this idea. Everything is impermanent because everything is momentary. The appearance of any eternal reality is due to *avidyā*. The causation theory of Buddhist presents an explanation of cause which is different from *Satkāryavāda*, *Asatkāryavāda* and *Swabhāva*. Buddhists say that things do not arise by themselves, nor externally, nor without cause, but the origin of things is dependent.

Buddhist philosophers do not accept effect as a real entity (*Sat*) that exists in the cause. And also do not accept the simultaneous existence of cause and effect. That is, in *Asatkāryavāda*, it is necessary for cause and effect to exist simultaneously. While for Buddhists, effect arises only when the cause is destroyed. For Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, effect remains related with the cause even after it's being produced by *Samavāya* (inherence) relation with cause, but for Buddhists, cause is completely destroyed before the origin of the effect, and it is not related to the cause in any way. The causation theory of Buddhists is called *Pratītyasamutpāda* theory. *Pratītyasamutpanna* means – “This being that arises” and the idea that results from it is, “this does not come to be, when that (cause) is destroyed”. The reality is momentary, and every moment of reality is dependent on the presence of those moments which it necessarily follows in order to arise. One moment is destroyed only to create another moment. For example, when the seed is destroyed, only then the sprout arises.

Check your progress V

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit.

1. How *Pratītyasamutpāda* is different from *Asatkāryavāda*?

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13.6 LET US SUM UP

In the multifaceted study of Indian metaphysics, pondering over the theories of causation is the most important method of understanding any philosophical proposition. The above study is inspired by the purpose of describing the causation theory in the context of Indian metaphysics, as well as considering the questions, problems and possibilities related to them. Whether the cause is real or unreal before the origin of the effect, whether the transformation of cause into effect is real or apparent; in the speculation of these questions only, theories like *swabhāvavāda*, *satkāryavāda*, *asatkāryavāda* and *pratītyasamutapāda* have been discussed. In these explanations of causation, ideas related to the nature of the world, reality or unreality of the world, knowledge of the object world etc. are included that are propounded by particular philosophical establishment.

13.7 KEY WORDS

Swabhāvavāda : that explanation of causation for which manifoldness of the world lies in the nature/*swabhāva* of things.

Asatkāryavāda : that theory of causation according to which effect is unreal in cause before creation.

Satkāryavāda : that theory of causation according to which effect is real in the cause before creation.

Vivartavāda : that theory of causation according to which effect is not a real transformation of the cause, it is only apparent (*vivarta*).

Pratītyasamutpāda : that theory of causation according to which effect arises when the cause is destroyed.

13.8 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

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Stcherbatsky, *The Buddhist Logic*. Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass, 2008.

Online Resources:

<https://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.vaidya/courses/comparativephilosophy/s1/Causality-Samkhya-Buddha-and-Nyaya-by-J.-Shaw.pdf>

13.8 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check your progress I

1. In relation to the knowledge of the objective world, the epistemological theory of Cārvāk accepts perception as the only means of knowledge. Only that which is known through perception has existence. In this way, they cannot accept any causal chain in the explanation of causation on the basis of perception only, since knowledge of any relation between effect and cause is not possible by perception only. And as a result they accept swabhāvavāda.

Check your progress II

1.

1. A thing which is unreal in the cause cannot be produced.
2. A specific effect arises out of a specific cause. Therefore, there is a specific relationship between cause and effect.
3. Everything cannot be produced out of everything.
4. A specific cause has the power to produce a specific effect. No cause can produce infinite effects.
5. Effect is inseparable from the cause, when the cause is real, then the effect must also be considered as real.

Check your progress III

1. For Śamkarācharya, reality is non-dual. Except this reality, everything else is due to avidyā or ignorance. The ultimate reality is only Brahman and this apparent world is appearing in Brahman due to ignorance and thus this world is a *vivarta* (appearance) of Brahman, not a

modification or a transformation. Modification is the real transformation of an object into another, and *vivarta* is an unreal transformation.

Check your progress IV

1.

1. If the cause and the effect are not different, then cause should not be needed to produce the effect from the cause. But this causal activity is required, thus cause and effect are different.
2. If the effect is real in the cause, then the purpose of the effect should be fulfilled through the cause itself. Cause and effect both serve different purposes. That purpose which is fulfilled by effect is not accomplished by cause.
3. If the effect is considered to be real in the cause, then it would be meaningless to say that the effect is 'created' by the cause. Hence the effect is not real in the cause.
4. An argument is also given in favor of Asatkāryavāda that if the effect was real in the cause, then from where did the name and form which comes in the effect after its creation come? Therefore, effect is not a transformation of the cause but a new beginning.

Check your progress V

1. Like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Buddhist philosophers also do not accept the effect as real in the cause. But the Buddhist philosophers do not accept simultaneous existence of effect and cause like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. That is, according to Asatkāryavāda, the simultaneous existence of effect and cause is necessary, while for Buddhists, effect arises only when the cause is destroyed. For Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, effect remains related to the cause even after it is produced from the cause by the relation of inherence (*samavāya*), but for Buddhists, the cause is completely destroyed before the creation of the effect, so it is not related to effect in any way.

UNIT 14 UNIVERSALS AND PARTICULARS*

Structure

- 14.0 Objectives
- 14.1 Introduction
- 14.2 Universal and Particular: An Overview
- 14.2 Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika
- 14.3 Mīmāṃsā
- 14.4 Bauddha
- 14.5 Jain, Advaita Vedānta and Sāṃkhya
- 14.6 Let us sum up
- 14.7 Key Words
- 14.8 Further Readings and References
- 14.9 Answers to check your progress

14.0 OBJECTIVES

The objective of this unit is to enable students to understand the concepts of universal and particular along with a general outline of these concepts in Indian philosophy in particular, through discussing the following issues:

- Concepts of universal and particular,
- Issues related to these concepts as given in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā and Buddhist philosophy.

14.1 INTRODUCTION

We experience through our senses that we are surrounded by objects, they look similar to us, or they have some characteristics similar to us. We see human beings like ourselves, non-human beings, or inanimate objects. You see an object, then you see another object, which is exactly the same as the first object. What do you think when you see so many similar objects? You think that all these things that are similar, are related to each other in one way or other, whether they are members of a class or group or there is something in all these objects that makes them similar.

You see an animal called a “cow”, you see another animal also called a “cow”. How are you able to call those two creatures by the term “cow”, what is there in them, that you are able to

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name them both as “cows”? Are we just calling both of them cows randomly, if so why we are not calling one a cow and the other something other than a cow (say, a horse)?

If there is something that is common to both of them, what is its nature, and then what is the relation of the individual object (i.e. the particular) with that common characteristic (Universal) found in both of them? How are the universal and the particular related to each other? What is the nature of the relationship between them? Where does that relationship come from? If we start thinking, we come across many such questions. Some of these questions must have come before you as well. Think of the time when we were growing up, when we would see an object and ask what it is, our elders would tell us that it is a table, then another object would come in front of us, we would ask what it is, we would be told that this is the table. The first object is also a table and this second object is also a table. So at some stage of our age we must have thought why these two are called tables and why the rest are not tables. We are going to discuss the same question we asked to ourselves or to someone else. This discussion has taken place in both Indian and Western philosophical worlds, and many times you will find parallels between them, but in this unit we will be concerned with the discussion done in some philosophical schools of Indian philosophy. But this limitation i.e. discussing only some philosophies should not be a limitation on understanding and thinking further on this debate.

14.2 PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR: AN OVERVIEW

An animal is eating grass. We see that and say that a cow is eating grass. Is the word cow used here only for that visible animal, and not for others? But we use the word cow for other similar animals as well. This means that those animals belong to a specific class, which we can name the class of cow. We refer to the animals belonging to that specific class by a common term - cow. Now the question is on what basis did that particular/individual object belong to that particular class (the class of cow)? Some of the answers we can have are:

- a) On the basis of similarity of shape (the shape or some characteristics pertaining to the form of that animal is identical or similar to other animals of that class),
- b) On the basis of identity (that animal is identical to other animals of that class),
- c) On the basis of a specific common characteristic/Quality (called *Sāmānya* or *Jāti*),
- d) On the basis of those animals producing a similar causal efficacy (this is called *Arthakriyā* in Buddhist philosophy) (in our example, production of milk, etc.)

These answers have their own problems, for example two animals called cows can be different in color and form, say, one black and the other white. The answer of being similar and identical becomes questionable when it happens. (However if we assume the similarity of specific formal features and not the characteristic of any shape, then the problem raised by different color and form will not come before us; as stated by Patañjali in the *Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya*, *Sasnāṅgul* (dewlap, Hoof etc.) is the shape of a cow, although then the problem may arise as to whether these characteristics of shape will be associated with a particular class only, and will remain the same in the future).

Similarly, another problem will arise for identity, such that if there is identity, then there will not be any difference between one cow and another cow, then to say that it is a member of a particular class would be meaningless.

If it is due to some specific quality, then the problem will arise as to where this quality comes from, whether it is before or after the birth of that particular individual. Be it before or after, then how does the relationship arise between them? Are the universal and the particular completely different, if they are completely different, how can the relationship be established, and if they are not completely different, then how can the particular be particular and the universal be universal?

If we take the answer of the produced act or effect or power, then it can be asked that from where it originates? Is the cause a particular or a universal related to particular? If it is particular, how can the same effect or power be produced from each such particular, and if the cause is universal, then why should not the characteristic of a particular class be accepted as universal?

From the above discussion we can understand how complex yet interesting a discussion it is. There have been different perspectives to see this discussion, and on the basis of those perspectives, different ways of seeing, understanding and solving the problem have arisen. Let us briefly look at some of the perspectives essential to our discussion:

1. Realism – Realism generally refers to that point of view which believes that the object (substance, meaning of the term) exists, and this existence is independent of the mind; that is, the existence of the object does not depend on our knowing of it. And we can know the object as it is. One form of realism is extreme realism, which holds that every substance is completely different from every other substance. Moderate realism, on the other hand, holds that substances are not absolutely different, but rather they are relatively distinct and relatively non-distinct, any substance is a different (relative) dimension of reality.

Extreme realism holds that individuals can be placed in a specific class and referred to or expressed by a term because there resides a universal in them (*jāti*). Realism regards universal as a substance, and for them universal is real and entirely different from particular. Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā advocate this form of realism.

Intermediate realism, on the other hand, holds that the universal is the universal characteristic of the particular. Ancient Jain philosophers accept this form of realism.

2. Idealism - Idealism believes that universals do not exist, that is, universals do not exist in the external world, but are only concepts of the human mind. Some Jain philosophers believe in this theory.
3. Nominalism - terms or names are universals, and names become universal by being used for various particulars. For example, the name cow becomes a universal when this name cow is used for various particulars/individuals. Jain philosopher Abhayadevasūri and Vijñānavādī Buddhist philosophers accept this view.

By now we have become familiar that there are many other types of universal-particular discussion and problems, such as, what is the nature of the universal and the particular? Are universal and the particular real or not? What is the nature of the relationship between them and how is the relationship established? Does a term directly denote or refer to universal and particular? And so on. Apart from the given context, our attention will be focused only on the metaphysical discussion, that is, on these questions like what is the nature of universal and particular and the relationship between them and the question of what or what kind of nature of that relationship?

Before giving an extensive dimension to our discussion, it is important to mention one point in general that most of the Indian philosophies have considered the particular (except Śāṅkara's Advaita Vedānta) as real (i.e. particulars have existence in the external world). Though there is a difference of opinion about the nature of the particular among them.

14.3 NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA

Nyāya Philosophy and Vaiśeṣika Philosophy are generally called allied systems of philosophy, both are realistic philosophies and they build their philosophical foundations on some similar presumptions. It is also believed that Nyāya Philosophy accepts the metaphysics of Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Universal and particular are among the seven substances of Vaiśeṣika philosophy (It is believed that Kaṇāda accepted only six substances, the seventh substance called absence (*Abhāva*) is accepted by the later Vaiśeṣika philosophers). Other substances are; Matter (*Dravya*), Quality (*Guṇa*), Action (*Kriyā*), Inherence (*Samavāya*) and

Absence (*Abhāva*). In this section, the discussion of universal and particular will be presented in a mixed form representing ideas of both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Schools.

Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika philosophy accepts that our experience tells us that the external world is independent of the mind, that is, the existence of the external world is not dependent on the mind (of the knower). The multiplicity and variety of experience or cognition shows that there is diversity in the external world. The possibility of experience or cognition shows that there is unity in the external world as well. Think if all the things are completely separate from each other, then will it be possible to cognize things. How do we understand something? Answer may be, On the basis of similarity or resemblance to another known thing and on the basis of dissimilarity or difference from another known thing. On the basis of this general understanding of our cognition, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy wants to tell us that a thing is both particular, that is, it can be compared with itself, and also general, that it can be compared with others. The uniqueness of the object or matter is called particular and the comparability or commonness is called universal. On the basis of this universal, the object becomes a member of a particular class.

14.3.1 Universal (*Jāti*), Particular, Upādhi (Accidental property)

Praśatapāda, the commentator of the *Vaiśeṣika* Sūtras, says about universal that universal is the unity which is cause of the identity of particulars and which is present in each of its particulars identically and completely.

With this definition, let us think on the words ‘teacher’, ‘student’, ‘Indian’ etc. When we call someone a teacher, it means that the individual is a member of the class called teachers. And that individual identifies himself with the other members of that class with respect to this fact. Similarly we can think about other given words or some other similar words.

Let us now think upon some more words like cow, table, man etc. We find that these words also represent classes of identity. If someone is called a human being, then there is something common in him, which is essentially found in others who are also called human beings, due to which they are called human beings, which can be called humanness.

But are the first set of words (teacher, student) and the second set (cow, table etc.) the same? This thought is natural, because both groups of words are identical or universal concepts. But Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy holds that the two are not the same, the first group refers to *upādhi*, and the second to universal (*jāti*). While universal is natural or given, *upādhi* is imposed. Someone is a teacher today, may not be a teacher tomorrow, but that individual will

exist as a human being. But the existence of a human being would be ceased if there would be no humanness.

To make this point more clear, Navya-Naiyāyika (new form of Nyāya philosophy presented by Naiyāyika Gangeśopādhyāya) says that universal is that which is permanent and inherent in many particulars. Thus we get the three essential characteristics of universal: 1. Common, 2. Eternal, 3. Inherent.

On the other hand, particular is temporary (perishable) and is not found in anything other than itself. We have found that the characteristics of universal and particular are very different, then the question arises that how universal is found in particular, that is, how is the relationship between the two possible, that is, how can they become related having extremely different characteristics or nature? The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophy argues that in the empirical world we do not find universal and particulars inseparable. And if something becomes common in both, then the particularity of the particular and universal will vanish; particulars and universals will become members of a particular class (because of something common in both), then particular will no longer remain particular, and a universal will have to imagine another universal, resulting in infinite regress (*anavasthā doṣh*, endless imagination).

14.3.2 Inherence (*Samavāya*): The Relation between Universal and Particular

Now the question arises: what is the nature of the relation between universal and particular? For this an eternal relation has been proposed by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School. The nature of inherence is something like this: “this subsists in that”, cowness (universal) subsists in cow (particular). In this, particular is the substratum of universal, and thus the universal is called substrata. Apart from universal and particular, the relation of inherence is also considered between cause and effect, whole and part. Inherence is an independent substance, but inherence is not connected with universal or particular, that is, inherence does not have any element of any of these. In order to be perceived, universal depends upon particular, but this does not mean that to be perceived is any condition for universal to inhere in particular. Because perception is possible only in sensible objects, and universal also inheres in objects that are not known through our senses (for example mind, soul, atom etc.). Keeping this difficulty in mind, apart from the idea of perception, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy has focused on the concept of causation (cause-effect). That is, to identify effect from cause and

its determinant. For example, earthness (jāti of earth) is the determinant of underlying cause of smell, and selfness is the determinant of the underlying cause of happiness, sadness etc.

Another argument to prove the class of universal is, that without universals cause-effect relationship between particulars is not possible at all. The relation of cause and effect does not only state that B is produced from A (or that there is an association between A and B now), but also that B will always be produced from A (or that there is an invariable association between A and B). If there would be no universal, anything will start arising from anything, anything would be the cause and effect of anything. But can we say that sesame oil can also be extracted from sand? (But you must consider what difficulties Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika would face if one effect will arise from multiple causes, and how the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas would confront them.)

14.3.3 Impediments of Universal*

So far we have discussed universal and *Upādhi*. *Upādhi* also consists of general characteristic, then why it is not universal, for this Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy discusses six obstructions, if any of these obstructions come, then that character is not called universal. These six obstacles/obstructions of universal are as follows:

1. *Vyakterbheda*: The attribute related to a single object is not called universal, such as *ākāśatva* (the sky is one and only one).
2. *Tulyatā* (Comparability): If two common words refer to the same thing, then they are not of different class of universals, such as ratness and mouseness.
3. *Sānkarya*: Hybrid-differentiative features that co-exist in one thing and exclude each other in another thing. Such as *Bhūtattva* (element) and *Mūrtattva* (limited dimension). (Note: Some Navya Naiyāyikas do not consider *Sānkarya* as an impediment).
4. *Anavasthā* (Infinite Regress): that from which infinite regress arises. Like universalness (on accepting the universal of a universal, we will also have to consider its universal, and this will continue till eternity).
5. *Rupahāni* (Destruction of own nature): A symptom that harms the essence, such as considering the universal of the particular, the essence of the particular will be harmed.

* For further discussion on this point, see, Raja Ram Dravid, *The Problems of Universals in Indian Philosophy*, pp. 22-29.

6. *Asambandha* (Non-related): The thing in which nothing can inhere (because universal is inherent in its substratum i.e. particular). For example, nothing can be considered inherent in *abhāva*.

(You have just come to know about inherence, it would be interesting for you to think why inherence cannot have universal? And what is the impediment in accepting universal of the relation 'inherence'?)

14.3.4 Types of Universal

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy divides universal into two types, 1. *Para Jāti* and 2. *Apara Jāti*. *Para Jāti* is the one that has widest pervasion. But synthesis is the only main function of universal. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika considers existence (*Sattā*) as the only example of *Para Jāti*. *Apara Jāti* is the one which has a little less pervasion, and it performs both the function of synthesis as well as analysis (differentiation). *Apara Jāti* is divided into two types, 1. *Parāpara Jāti*, 2. *Apara jāti*.

The pervasion of *Parāpara Jāti* is less than para jati and more than *Apara Jāti*, such as substance-ness. The pervasion of substance-ness is less than existence and more than earthness. In the same way, earthness is also a *Parāpara Jāti*. Would you like to think about the reason of this?

The pervasion of *Apara Jāti* is the smallest, that is, no jati comes below it. Like - Gotva, Humanness etc.

Although there is a hierarchy in the types of *jati*, it does not mean that one *jati* is included in another *jati* that is above it or it includes a *jati* lies below it. Different universals have different experience. And also that universal is not genus/race, but it is a common characteristic combined in many particulars, whereas genus/race is a class of those particulars.

At this point of the discussion, we finally come to a criticism whether universal participates fully or partially in the particular. If completely, then how will it be found in another particular, and if partially, then how will identity be established between two particulars? Let us find the answers to these questions in the realistic philosophy called Mīmāṃsā.

Check Your Progress I

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit.

1. Which are the obstructions of universal according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy?

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2. What characteristics of universal does Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika consider?
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14.4 MĪMĀMSĀ

Mīmāṃsā philosophy is also a realistic school of philosophy. You are also aware that there are two main schools of Mīmāṃsā philosophy, one of Kumārila (*Bhatta School*), and the other, of Prabhākara.

Kumārila believes that universal is a form. An individual gets its particularity through form. Similar cognition of different particulars arises through form. Every individual has dual nature, he has individuality as well as generality, from individuality the cognition of being a particular and from generality the cognition of universal arises. Individuality and generality are inter-dependent, one cannot exist without the other.

We get knowledge from words and we infer as well, Kumārila believes that this is possible by accepting the existence of universal. If universal would not exist, then both knowledge and inference arising from the word are not possible, because universal itself creates a general or universal relation between two individuals (or particulars). If two individuals are considered to be related to each other without any universal relation, then any effect can arise for any cause, and at any time, it will be random, that is, without any rule. But our experience negates this possibility.

Now the question comes whether universal is defined as sameness of form (same shape/form/shape of two particulars)? Kumārila believes that universal is not sameness of

form, if sameness of form is considered as being identical in some context, it will presuppose universal, and if being identical is not accepted, then sameness of form cannot be the basis of identical cognition. Kumāriḷa says that our cognition is “it is like that”, and not “it is of its form (*sārūpya*)”. This proves that universal is different from sameness of form.

Similarly universal is not a collective noun. For example, forest is a group of trees etc., but no tree can be called a forest. But the word “cow” is also used for every cow. Our verbal behavior itself proves that universal is not a collective noun.

Let us now consider another problem, how the cognition of universal arises. Kumāriḷa replies that every individual/thing has certain characteristics that place it in a class, and differentiate it from other classes. For example, cow's dewlap, hoof etc. But these particularities are not the characteristics of universal, if it would be so, then the cognition of universal is not possible without the cognition of quality. But this is not the case. Yes, it is certain that if these characteristics are missing, then that individual will not have that specific generality. For example, if an animal lacks dewlap and hoofs, then it will not have cowness, that is, it will not remain a cow.

Now let us consider the questions which we raised at the end of the section of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, whether the universal subsists in the particular wholly, or partly, etc.

Kumāriḷa believes that there are not only these two ways to “subsist”; wholly or in part. There is also a third way, being identical. For example, “cowness” remains only in dewlap-hoofed animals, because cowness is identical with dewlap-hoofed animals. This identity is due to the nature of the particular and universal that produces it. But it also does not mean that both universal and particular are the same, that is, there is no difference between them. There is identity (*abheda*) between universal and particular as well as difference. Kumāriḷa School says that the problem of whole-part arises when there is an extreme distinction between universal and particular. While our experience and verbal behavior tells that there is both difference and identity between the two, that is, there is a relation of identity in difference between them. The use of both the term ‘this’ and ‘cow’ to the same thing (animal) in “this is a cow” suggests that there is identity between them, and we also know that this and cow are not synonymous, so there is also a difference between them.

Unlike Kumāriḷa, Prabhākara believes in the same relationship of *Samavāya* between universal and particular as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. However, his view of *Samavāya* is slightly different from the view of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Prabhākara considers two types of *Samavāya*, *nitya* and *anitya*. *Nitya Samavāya* is between eternal substances/objects, and *anitya Samavāya* relation between non-eternal substances or an eternal and a non-eternal object. In

Prabhākara's view, there is a non-eternal (*anitya*) relationship between universal and particular. Universal is eternal, but particular is non-eternal. If we consider eternal relation between universal and particular, then even after the destruction of the particular the universal should be perceived.

Prabhākara differs from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika on another point. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that the *Samavāya* is of the expression of “subsists or subsists in”, e.g., potness is in pot. Prabhākara believes that for this to happen, first universal (*ghatattva*, potness) and particular (*ghat*, pot) should have different cognitions, then after it they should be cognized together, but we always find cognition of universal and particular together. Universal is not in particular, that is, particular is not the basis of universal. Rather, the relationship between universal and particular is the same as between substance and quality.

But have we yet given a proper answer to the question, how can any relation be established in any way between particulars which are different from other particulars (and are therefore particular)? That is, considering universal in a particular, is it not destroying the particularity of the particular? Some similar idea is given by Buddhist philosophy. Let us briefly look at this idea in the next section.

Check Your Progress II

Note: a) Use the space provided for answer.

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit.

1. What problem can be solved by the concept of identity in difference of Kumārila Bhatt?

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14.5 BAUDDHA

It can be said generally that Buddhist philosophy believes that the moment (particular) is the only reality, everything else is the imagination/ mental construction (*vikalpa*) of the mind, because the moment consists of causal efficacy, that is, a moment can cause the next moment.

Thus we find that universal or general is a creation (constructions) of the mind, because even universal is not causally efficacious,

The distinction between universal and particular can be considered on these grounds:

1. Particulars are causally efficacious, not universals.
2. Particular is the basis of difference, and universal is the basis of non-difference (identity). Difference and non-difference are not compatible, thus both cannot be found together in the same thing.
3. Determination of the particular is not possible, (because the particular arises and perishes; and permanence is a condition for determination, when there will be some kind of stability, then only its character can be determined).
4. The cognition of particular is not possible without the particular, but the cognition of universal does not require universal, rather it arises from the act of the mind. That is why nature of the existence of universal is empirical only (*Vyāvahārika*), not transcendental (*pārmāthika*). The nature of the existence of particular is transcendental.

But now the question is that we get the appearance of the cognition of universal (identical/similar cognition). In reality there is nothing in common or identical between particulars, this is because seeing the same causal efficacy, our mind imagines that there is something in particulars having similar efficacy that is the essence. “The similarity of these (particular) is not the similarity of matter, but similarity of producing the same or nearly the same effect.”

The view of Buddhist philosophy is that the direct cause of identical cognition is not particular; particular is the direct cause of sensation only. And the reason for this identical cognition is neither any other substance like universal. Rather, it is due to the remembrance of the conventional name through the sensation of the similarity of the causal efficacy of objects (recognition; this is that, or this is like that).

Now the question is how to understand this recognition? That is, how does this recognition arise? There are two types of recognition; First, this is that; second, this is like that. Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti rejects both these types of identity. Identity is only a construction of the mind. Then the question is how does the recognition arise? Dharmakīrti's answer is that the recognition arises due to the same causal efficacy. But the problem again arises that, if the cognition of same causal efficacy arises, so there must be some cause for it? In this regard, there is a Buddhist view that causal efficacy is not of positive nature, but it is negative, that is, it is the ‘negation of the opposite causal efficacy’ (*apoha*) in the object/individual. That's

why any identical cognition is only a construction of the mind, its basis is neither particular, nor do we have any need to imagine the element called universal.

Check Your Progress III

Note: a) Use the space provided for answer.

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit.

1. What is Buddhist criterion of reality?

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14.6 JAIN, ADVAITA VEDĀNTA AND SĀMKHYA : A BRIEF OVERVIEW

Jain philosophy considers matter as *Anantadharmaka*, that is, there are infinite attributes in matter. Matter is defined from one dimension in one way and as another way in another dimension. Hence our knowledge of matter is relative. In Jain philosophy, pure particular and pure universal are antithetical to experience. On seeing a cow, we find its identity or non-difference with other cows and its difference with non-cows (horse etc.). After seeing a cow with particular characteristics also, we can know it as a cow. Thus it is proved by experience that the universal and the particular are related to each other in such a way that neither of them can be known separately. Universal is an unchanging element of matter and particular is a changing element of matter. It is not inconsistent to find changeable and unchangeable elements or characteristics in the same substance, nonetheless it is necessary to have both these elements for existence.

Jain philosophers who believe in a relative difference and relative non-difference between the universal and the particular, presents their argument for this that the universal character of the particular relates it to other particulars, and the universal, remains in identity with particular because of having a particular identity.

But some Jain philosophers hold that universal is an identical transformation of particulars, i.e. universal is identical or similar to the characteristic or character of the particulars and is

as manifold as particulars. Universal is not a universal identity found in different particulars, nor is there any element of identity present in it. Universal is a concept and its identity with particulars is an imagination of the mind.

The Jain philosopher Abhayadevasūri believes that *jāti* is neither a universal (identical) character of particulars nor a similar character. Universals are there for particulars in the form of concepts and have no objective basis, neither in identity nor in similarity. This is a theory similar to nominalism.

For Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta, non-dual Brahman is the only reality and this is the ultimate reality. The Supreme universal appears as different names and forms due to ignorance (*Avidyā*). Like earthen pot, earthen stove, etc. are name-form modifications (having name and form) of clay. Clay is the only thing, in the absence of clay there cannot be an earthen pot etc. In Śaṅkara's philosophy universal and particular are modifications (name-form) of Brahman. Universal and particular exist in the empirical or practical world, but it is not ultimate reality. Universal is higher-ranking than particular, because it serves the principle of unity, i.e. provides unity to the particulars, that they are all cows, etc. In practical world, universals can be accepted as more real, although Brahman is the only reality, because Brahman is universally and unchangingly found in all three states (waking, dreaming, and deep sleep).

Sāṅkhya philosophy, while keeping similarity with the non-dualistic theory of Advaita Vedānta, does not agree on two points of the later, one, for Sāṅkhya, the universal reality is *Prakṛti* and not Brahman, and second, universal and particulars are (real) transformations (*Pariṇāma*), not (apparent) modification or *vivarta* of the universal reality.

14.7 LET US SUM UP

In the unit we have tried to briefly look at the concepts of universal and particular and the problems arising out of them in different philosophical schools of Indian philosophy.

While Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā consider the substance called universal as the cause of common cognition, the Buddhist philosophy (especially the Vijñānavādins) attribute it to the recognition/remembrance of the conventional name arising from the sensation of the similarity of causal efficacy.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā philosopher Prabhākara accept a substance called inherence (*Samavāya*) for the relation between universal and particular. Though in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view *Samavāya* takes the form of substratum-substrata, and in Prabhākara's it is in substance-quality form. Mīmāṃsā philosopher Kumārila Bhatta accepts the relationship of identity and difference between them. In Buddhism, no relation is accepted between particular and

universal, because particular is the only reality, universal is the construction of the mind, so the relation between them is also a construction of the mind.

For Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā, universal is the eternal substance having external existence and particular is the impermanent substance. In Jain philosophy, there are three views regarding universal, there is external existence of universal, second, universal is the concept of the mind, and third, universal is only a name. In Advaita Vedānta, the ultimate universal is non-dual Brahman, the rest of what we call universal and particular are just apparent transformations (modification) of Brahman and they have no transcendental/absolute existence. Whereas in Sāṃkhya the absolute universal is *Prakṛti*, and what we call universal and particulars are the transformations of *Prakṛti*.

We have also tried to raise a number of issues in the unit, and also to know how philosophical schools present the solution of those problems. Many problems are left unanswered for your thoughtful consideration, hope you will think on those issues.

14.8 KEY WORDS

Apoḥa : The Buddhist doctrine that holds that words denote objects (meanings) in a negative way.

Identity in difference (*Bhedābheda*) : The theory of Kumārila in which it is believed that there is difference as well as identity between universal and particular.

Inherence (*Samavāya*) : A substance in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, which is eternal relation between universal and particular, whole and part, matter and quality etc.

Particular (*Viśeṣa*) : Individuality of an individual.

Universal (*Jāti*) : Subsists in particulars, due to which those particulars can be placed in a class. This is also an eternal substance in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.

14.9 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

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14.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress I

1.

1. Unique (Vyakṛtibheda) 2. Comparability (Tulyatā), 3. Sāṅkaryā, 4. Infinite regress (Anavasthā), 4. Destructive, 5. Non-relation (Asambandha).

2. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika considers the following characteristics of universal:

A) common, B) eternal, C) inherence.

Check Your Progress II

1. Universal is pervaded partially or wholly in a particular caste. If it is present partly, then due to being a part, it cannot be called eternal, and due to being partly occupied, its full form is not attained by the particular. And if it is pervaded wholly then how will universal be pervaded in other particulars. The solution to this problem is possible with Kumāṛila Bhaṭṭa's idea of identity in difference. According to this concept, universal and particulars are not considered completely different, but both the elements of identity and difference are imagined between them.

Check Your Progress III

1. Reality in Buddhism is that which has causal efficacy.

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