UNIT 6 ANCIENT INDIAN CONCEPT AND NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

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6.1 INTRODUCTION

Philosophy is, in general, an interpretation of man and nature and its basis lies in the analysis, assessment and exposition of the process of knowledge. The word for philosophy in Sanskrit, viz., Darsanam, denotes that it is the science of 'thinking-consideration' - 'vicārasāstram'. Its contents are not mere speculation in regard to the duties of man or the varieties of life.

In India, there are six orthodox schools of philosophy which recognize the authority of Vedas as divine revelation. Those who did not recognize this authority were the Jains, Buddhists (heterodox) and materialists. The question of knowledge, its sources, validity and their trueness were discussed by these different schools of philosophy in great length.

Epistemology as a branch of philosophy centers around questions like 'What is knowledge?', 'What are the different sources of knowledge?', 'What is truth?', 'What is valid knowledge?', 'Is knowing different from knowledge?' and so on. Many more questions of this kind that are related to knowledge have been addressed by both orthodox and heterodox schools of philosophy.

There is much divergence of opinion among Indian philosophers concerning the nature and scope of Pramāṇa (source of knowledge). The number of Pramāṇas also is a topic on which wide differences of view exist among the schools. Most Indian Logicians, however, agree to accept three of them – perception (Pratyaksa), inference (Anumāna) and verbal testimony (Sabda) among the six pramāṇas. We shall discuss them in sequel: the epistemological considerations of materialists, orthodox and heterodox schools of philosophy and the validity of knowledge according to each school and their educational implications.
After going through this unit, you should be able to:

- explain different Pramanas;
- differentiate between the theories of knowledge of orthodox and heterodox schools of philosophy;
- explain the interpretations of anumāna by different schools;
- identify the valid source of knowledge;
- relate the theory of causation to theory of momentariness;
- state the limitations of theory of knowledge propounded by chārvaka school of philosophy;
- explain Syadvāda as the theory of judgement; and
- draw implications to education from different theories and sources of knowledge.

6.3 MATERIALISM: ORTHODOX AND HETERODOX PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS OF KNOWLEDGE

Two main areas of discussion about epistemology existed in the Classical and Medieval periods. The schools differed over the number of Pramanas, sources or bases of knowledge in spite of their contributions to a great extent to Indian Epistemology.

Indian Philosophy divides itself into three periods (1) the Vedic period, (2) the Upanishad period and (3) the post-Vedic period. The post-Vedic period is a systematic period which saw the development of the so-called orthodox systems. Of the systems of thought or darsanas, six became more famous than others, viz. Gautama’s Nyaya, Kanada’s Vaisēsika, Kapila’s Sāmkhya, Patanjali’s Yoga, Jamini’s Pūrva Mimamsa and Badarayana’s Uttara Mimamsa or the Vedānta. They are the Brahmanical systems, since they all accept the authority of the Vedas. These schools valued the spiritual experience as great when compared to intellectual reason. Those who did not recognize the Vedas were the Jains, Buddhists and Materialists.

The epistemological views of these different schools are discussed under separate sections in this module.

Chārvāka Materialist School’s Views of Knowledge

Even in India, where spiritual ideas dominate the culture, there were some who were skeptical of those ideals and held to a materialist view of the world, they were called Chārvāka, and their doctrine that this world is all that exists is called Lokayata.

The materialists did not believe in an after life and found sense perception to be the only source of knowledge, denying the validity of inference or general concepts. They focused on the senses and the four traditional elements of earth, water, fire and air. Consciousness for the Charvaka is only a modification of these elements in the body.

The epistemological doctrine of the Chārvāka school (materialism) is that perception (Pratyaksa) is the only means of valid knowledge. The validity of inference is also rejected. Inference is said to be a mere leap in the dark. According to this School, we proceed here from the known to the unknown and there is no certainty in this, though some inferences may turn out to be accidentally true. Induction is uncertain, and deduction is argument in a circle. The crude Chārvāka position in this regard has been vehemently criticized by all systems of Indian philosophy all of which have maintained the validity of at least perception and inference.
Orthodox Views of Knowledge

The Nyāyā and Vaishesika schools are primarily analytic and are therefore, more concerned with logic and epistemology than ethics.

a) The Nyāyā School: It was formed about the 4th Century B.C. with the Nyaya Sutras by Gautama. According to this school, knowledge comes from perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. Objects of learning are self, body, sense organs, sense objects, intellect, mind and activity.

The Nyāyā system of Philosophy is a system of atomistic pluralism and logical realism. It is allied to the Vaisheshika systems, which developed metaphysics and ontology. The Nyāyā Philosophy was developed by the orthodox Indian thinkers to invent a science of knowledge (Pramāṇāsāstra) sufficiently effective to fortify their arguments against unorthodox opponents. Consequently, the Naiyāyikas have gone in the history of Indian thought as highly original epistemologists and logicians. It is seen that the Nyāyā system has explored remarkably the domain of cognitive consciousness and determined the process by which it enters into a connection with the world of physical objects.

Nyāyā mentions four sources or Pramāṇas of knowledge: Perception (Pratyakṣa), inference (Anumāṇa), comparison (Upamāṇa) and the Vedic word (Tābda). Nyāyā argues that the outside world is known to us through the senses and the mind. It believes in the external things as reflecting their real nature when knowledge is true, and their unreal nature when knowledge is false. Consequently, for the Naiyāyikas, knowledge is the knowledge of things, and it constitutes the expression of reality (arthānubhava). Whatever its type, it is a natural response to the disposition present in human mind.

b) The Vaishesika philosophy: It is considered to be the oldest of the six orthodox schools. The Vaishesika sutras by Kannada were written shortly before Gautama’s Nyāya Sutras. The word Vishesa means particularity, and this philosophy emphasizes the significance of individuals. It recognizes three objects of experience as having real objective existence, namely substance, quality and activity, and three products of intellectual discrimination, which are generality, particularity and combination. Like the Nyaya School, this School also acknowledges perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony as the valid sources of knowledge.

c) Mimāmsā

Let us now consider the nature of knowledge according to Mimāmsā. The word Mimāmsā literally means ‘revered thought’ and was originally applied to the interpretation of the Vedic rituals, which commanded highest reverence. The Mimamsa philosophy is also very ancient, and the Mimamsa Sutra by Jamini was written about the 4th century B.C. According to this School, a cognition, which apprehends an object, cannot be intrinsically invalid. Memory arises from the impression of a priori cognition and therefore, cannot be treated as valid knowledge.

Kumārila defines valid knowledge as apprehension of an object which is produced by causes free from defects and which is not contradicted by subsequent knowledge. A valid cognition must fulfill four conditions:

1. It must not arise from defective causes (kāranadosarhi).
2. It must be free from contradiction. It must be self-consistent and should not be set aside by subsequent knowledge (bādhakajñāna - rahita).
3. It must apprehend an object which has not already been apprehended. Novelty is a essential feature of knowledge (agrhitagrahi). Memory is excluded from valid knowledge.
4. It must truly represent the object (yathārtha).
Ancient Indian Concept and Nature of Knowledge

The Mimamsa upholds a theory that all knowledge is valid by itself. It is not validated by any other knowledge. Validity of knowledge arises from the essential nature of the causes of knowledge. It is not due to any extraneous conditions.

A need for explanation is felt only when knowledge fails to be valid. And its invalidity is inferred either from some defect in the instrument of knowledge or from a subsequent contradicting knowledge. If a rope is mistaken for a snake, the knowledge of the rope snake is invalidated by the subsequent knowledge of the rope. Though the invalidity of knowledge is inferred, yet knowledge itself is intrinsically presumed to be valid. Its validity is not subject to inference. Truth is normal; error is abnormal. Belief is natural; disbelief is an exception. The Mimamsa advocates the self-validity of knowledge both in respect of its origin (Upatti) and ascertainment (jnapti).

According to Badrayana, (Uttara Mimamsa and Vedanta) knowledge comes from the scriptures (Sruti) and other authorities (Smriti) though Sruti as revelation is identified with perception and Smriti as interpretation with inference. Scripture refers to the Vedas and Smriti to the Bhagavad Gita, Mahabharata and Laws of Manu. Reason, for Badrayana, must confirm to the Vedas, but it is nonetheless subordinate to intuitive knowledge, which can come from devotion and meditation. According to Sankhya, both the validity (Pramanya) and the invalidity (Aparamanya) of knowledge are self-evident. According to Nyaya-Vaishesika, both the validity and the invalidity of knowledge are due to extraneous conditions. According to Mimamsa, knowledge is intrinsically valid, though its invalidity is due to extraneous conditions. The Sankhya-yoga School maintains that both validity and invalidity are alike intrinsic to knowledge and this predicates opposite characters of it. It bases this view upon the postulate viz. that whatever manifests itself at any time has all along been latent there.

Heterodox School’s Views of Knowledge

Jainism and Buddhism are considered as heterodox schools of philosophy as they did not recognize the authority of Vedas as the orthodox system of philosophy.

Jainism classifies knowledge into immediate (Aparoksa) and mediate (Paroksa). Immediate knowledge is further divided into Avadhi, Manahparyaya and Kevala; and mediate knowledge into Mati and Shruta. Knowledge may again be divided into two kinds - Pramana or knowledge of a thing as it is, and Naya or knowledge of a thing in its relation. Naya means a standpoint of thought from which we make a statement about a thing. All truth is relative to our standpoint. Partial knowledge of one of the innumerable aspects of a thing is called ‘naya’. There are seven ‘nayas’ of which first four are called ‘Artha-naya’, because they relate to objects or meanings and the last three are called ‘shabda-naya’ because they relate to words. When taken as absolute, a ‘naya’ becomes a fallacy - nayabhasa.

Some of the most forceful critics of the epistemologists of the Nyaya and Mimamsa schools figured between the 4th and 9th Century AD in the Buddhist sect of Svantra – Vijnanavadinins. The Buddhist idealists (Vijnanavadins) used various arguments to show that perception does not yield knowledge of external objects distinct from the percipient.

a) First, the experience of a dataum and the datum itself occur simultaneously, but two supposedly different events occurring simultaneously cannot be distinguished and should be treated as identical.

b) Second, the external world supposedly consists of a number of different objects, but they can be known as different only because there are different sorts of experiences of them. Yet if the experiences are thus distinguishable, there is no need to hold the superfluous hypothesis of external objects.

c) Third, sense organs supposedly mediate between external objects and consciousness. For example, sensory experience during dreams, where it is feasible
to explain the existence of sensations as due to the inner workings of consciousness. The absolute evolves itself in a way, which makes individuals think that there is an external world. Through the debates they carried on with the realist Naiyāyikas and Mimāmsikas, the Svātantra - Vijnānavādins have tried to prove that both knowledge by perception and knowledge by inference reflect only ‘moments’ of existence, i.e. something eternally moving, something so fleeting that it is as if buoyed on an infinite expanse of nothingness. According to this School, no thing or idea can be and yet not-be in consciousness; nothing can exist and yet be not known. Material things are therefore, constellations of sensations, ideas or impressions, emerging as ‘moments’ of experience like points along the stream of some amorphous stuff. And just as things are along a flow, the consciousness that perceives them is in a flow too. The issues like, “If nothing in the field of our experience is really permanent or self-identical, how could we define an object,” “Where does an object exist?” were addressed in this School.

Such questions were of great significance to the Vijnānavādin. According to them, when an object is perceived or an impression is thought of, consciousness projects itself in the form of something positively “there outside”.

The subjectivist theories of the Vijnānavādins and of the Svātantra - vijnānavāda, therefore, that all things are mental constructions, indicate the quest for inward concentration in Buddhism. The theory states that consciousness constructs the world and is deceived by the construction that it falls into a realm of fantasy and believes it to be truly “there” and what is Svachitta or “of one’s own mind” is mistaken for being external to the mind. It is a universal deception, a māyā (illusion). And as long as this deception keeps the consciousness in bondage, no freedom is possible.

On the whole, it is seen that Buddhism admits perception and inference as the valid source of knowledge. While Nyāya affirms invariable concomitance between two things in inference (where there is smoke, there is fire), Buddhism pleads for causal relationship between two things. According to Nyāya, we can argue from effects to cause but Buddhism, admitting this, emphasizes that we can also argue from ‘things’ to ‘things signified’.

So we see there is much of divergence of opinion among Indian thinkers relating to the nature of knowledge and the sources of knowledge.

Check Your Progress

Notes: a) Write your answers in the space given below.
    b) Compare your answers with the one given at the end of the unit.

1. What is the basic difference between the orthodox and the heterodox philosophical views of knowledge?
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2. What are the six orthodox systems of thought?
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3. What is the difference between Nyaya and Buddhism with regard to inference as a source of knowledge?

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The sources of knowledge recognized by heterodox and orthodox schools are discussed in the following section.

### 6.4 PRAMĀNA (SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE – NYÂYĀ)

Pramāna is defined as a source or means of valid apprehension (Pramā). There are four different forms of valid apprehension (yathārtha anubhava), namely - perception, inference, analogy and verbal testimony. Vātsyāyana defines a Pramāna as a source or means of valid knowledge. According to the Nyāya School, a causal relation is discerned and ascertained between Pramā and pramāṇa on the basis of uniform agreement in presence and absence between the two. The former cannot arise without the latter and hence it is maintained that the latter is the source or cause of the former. The general definition of pramāṇa is suggested by the etymological meaning of the word itself. The word is derived by adding the suffix ‘lyut’ in the instrumental (karaṇa) to the root ‘mā’ with the prefix ‘pra’. The root ‘mā’ with the prefix ‘pra’ means to know rightly.

Valid knowledge (Pramā) is of two kinds - anubhava (presentative and smṛiti (representative or remembrance). The latter is the reproduction of a past perception. It is produced by the revival of an impression of an object previously known, and hence the instrument of remembrance cannot be accepted as an independent Pramāṇa - it is a form of invalid knowledge.

Anubhava or presentative knowledge is divided into Yathārtha or real or Ayathārtha or unreal. Of the two, the former is sound or valid (pramāṇa) as it exactly corresponds to the object really or it cognizes an attribute as belonging to an object which it really has. Such a valid form of knowledge needs a Pramāṇa or an instrument. Thus the knower (pramāṇā) and the object known (prameya), too, are causes of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). These are not considered as pramāṇa, because these are not instruments or the most efficacious ones of the causes of valid knowledge. According to the Nyāya school, there are four forms of such valid knowledge, namely - Pratyakṣa (perception), Anumāṇa (inference), Upamāṇa (knowledge derived through similarity) and Sabda (verbal testimony).

The Nyāya school defines pramāṇa as karana the instrument of valid knowledge. What is an instrument and how it is constituted? As stated already, a karana is distinct from Kārana. A Kārana is a cause, but any and every kārana is not karana or instrument. Only the most efficacious (sādhakatama) of all the causes is called karana or an instrument A cause, according to the Nyāya school, is an invariable, immediate and indispensable antecedent of an effect.

Valid knowledge, according to Nyāya, is a definite and assured cognition of an object. Doubt (samsaya), on the other hand, is the cognition of conflicting notions with regard to the same object. It arises when with regard to some perceived object; there is the suggestion of some conflicting alternatives, e.g., post and man. It is an incomplete or indecisive knowledge. It arrests all activities for the moment.
6.4.1 Number of Pramâna

The different schools of Indian philosophy are not unanimous on the number of means of knowledge. The Chârvâka School recognizes only one source of knowledge, viz. perception (pratyaksa). The Buddhist school recognizes two sources viz. perception and inference (anumâna). The Sâmkhya School recognizes three sources, viz. perception, inference and verbal testimony (sabda). The Nyâya School recognizes four, viz. perception, inference, verbal testimony and analogy (upamâna). The Prabhâkara School of Mîmâmsâ recognizes five, viz. the above four and presumption (artha-patti). The Bhatta School of mîmâmsâ recognizes six, viz. the above five and non-existence (anupalabdhi). The Paurânikas recognize these six sources and in addition, recognize necessary inclusion (Sambhava) and traditional hearsay (Aitihya) as the seventh and the eighth pramânas.

The leading exponents of Indian Philosophy are unanimous on discarding the last two, sambhava and aitihya. Sambhava, according to majority opinion, which enables one to be sure of fifty when hundred are guaranteed, is nothing more than an immediate inference. Aitihya, which consists of traditional hearsays like a spirit dwells in this banyan tree, is no pramâna at all until it is verified and when verified, it comes under verbal testimony. The Naiyâyikas firmly hold that there are four kinds of object of knowledge that are known by four distinct sources. Other sources of knowledge accepted by the Mîmâmsâ schools are either included in these four or are redundant.

i) Pratyaksa (Perception)

The word 'aksa' in Pratyaksa means the sense-organ and the word 'prati' means each of all the sense organs and as such the word means the function of each of the sense-organs in respect of its appropriate object. In view of its etymological meaning; the old school of the Nyâya defines perception in terms of sense object contact. Perception is a valid form of knowledge produced by the contact of an object with a sense organ. This means that perception is conditioned in its origin by the operation of the senses. In other words, the knowledge arises by contact of sense organs (indriya) with an object. Such contact is not the sole condition of perception, but it is its distinctive feature or extraordinary cause (karana) of perception. The actual process involved in perception is described thus: The self comes into contact with mind (manas); the manas with the senses and the senses with the object. The function of a sense organ in respect to its own object is described in two ways.

According to Vâtsyâyana, the senses may function to bring about a contact of itself with the object. Here the function is of the nature of contact, which brings about the cognition of the object. Secondly, the function may be of the nature of knowledge. Here the function consists in sense-cognition, which results in a judgement of the cognized object as desirable or undesirable or neither. But the function of the sense, either of the nature of contact or knowledge, is conditioned by sense-object contact. Hence the latter is called the instrumental cause of perception, as it immediately gives rise to the perceptual knowledge of that particular object. Taking sense-object contact to be an instrument of perception, Gautama defines it as follows: "It is a valid cognition which arises through sense-organ coming into relation with object and which is non-verbal, unerring and of the nature of indubious knowledge".

The modern school of Nyâya gives a new definition of perception. Visvanâtha defines it as: Direct or immediate cognition that is not derived through the instrumentality of any other cognition. Perception, according to modern school, is characterized by immediacy (sâksatkârâtvam) which is common to all perceptions. It applies to all cases of perception, human or divine. All human perceptions are characterized by immediacy alike. Even God's omniscience has the highest degree of immediacy conceivable. Therefore, according to the modern school, it is direct or immediate knowledge, not derived through the medium of some other knowledge. It excludes inference, which
is produced through the instrumentality of the knowledge of universal relation. It
excludes analogy, which is produced through the instrumentality of the knowledge of
similarity, verbal testimony that is produced through the instrumentality of the knowledge
of words. It also excludes memory, which is produced through the instrumentality of
previous apprehension.

ii) Anumana (Inference- Nyāyā)

Etymologically the word 'Anumana' indicates after knowledge (anu - after, māna
knowledge) and it follows perception. Gautama defines it as a specific form of
knowledge preceded by perception. The perception of the invariable relation between
the proban (linga) and the probandum (lingi) is a previous perception of such a relation
somewhere else. Again, there is a perception of the proban as invariably related to
probandum as it exists in the locus. Inference is defined as the knowledge of an
object (lingi) due to a previous knowledge of some sign or mark (linga). The process
of inference is explained as follows: A man first perceives smoke (linga) as invariably
related to fire in a place like the kitchen. This is the first perception of the proban.
Such a perception results in the reminiscent impression that smoke is pervaded by
fire. Later on, the man perceives similar smoke in some other place like a hill. The
second perception of the mark revives the reminiscent impression leading to the
recollection that smoke is “preceded?” by fire. The recollection in turn, is followed by
a further perception of smoke not simply as smoke but as the smoke, which is invariably
related to fire and exists in the hill. This is the last and the third perception of the
mark. This is followed immediately by the inferential knowledge of fire. The third
perception of the mark is the immediate cause (karana) of inference and is therefore,
called the instrument (anumāṇa - pramāṇa).

Constituents of Inference: From the definition of inference, it follows that there
must not be less than three terms in any inference. There are Paksa (hill), Sādhya
(lingi) and the Linga (hetu) which correspond respectively to the minor, the major and
the middle terms in western syllogism.

The Paksa (locus) - It is the subject under consideration or the substratum possessing
the Sādhyā (probandum) and the linga (proban). For instance, the hill is the paksa in
which smoke is perceived and fire is inferred.

The Sādhyā (probandum) - It is the object of inference or that which we want to
prove by means of inference. It is also called ‘Gamya’ because it is known with the
help of ‘Gamaka’ (mark) or Linga (possessor of linga). The Linga (mark) - It is the
reason of inference. It is also called ‘Gamaka’ because it is the indicator or hetu
because it serves as mark or Sādhanā because it the means of proving something
(Characteristics of valid reason).

iii) Sabda (Verbal Testimony - Nyāyā)

Sabda literally means verbal knowledge because by it, the meaning is verbally
communicated. It consists in the knowledge of objects derived from words or sentences.
Words or sentences constitute verbal statements. However, all verbal statements are
not valid. Hence, Gautama defines Sabda Pramāṇa as the statement of a reliable
person. In other words, verbal testimony is the communication from a trustworthy
person. Who is the trustworthy person (Āpta) and why is assertion (upadesa) is a
testimony (pramāṇa)? ‘Āpta’ is the one who possesses it. An Āpta or a trustworthy
person is the one who has the direct knowledge of an object and is motivated by
the desire of communicating the object as directly known by him. Hence a verbal
statement is valid when it comes from a trustworthy person who knows the truth and
speaks the truth about anything for the guidance of others. In other words, the validity
of verbal statements is based on the reliability of a person making a statement. But
the possibility of verbal testimony depends on understanding the meaning of a statement.

Unless the meaning of a valid statement is properly understood, there cannot be a true
comprehension of the object meant. Therefore, Sabda as a pramāṇa consists in understanding the meaning of the sentences or the assertion made by the reliable person. Analysing the process of verbal testimony we get the following steps:

First, there is the perception of the words of a sentence uttered by the trustworthy person. Second, there is the understanding of the meaning of words. This is called the Karana or the special cause of the verbal knowledge. The knowledge of words (padajñāna) leads to the knowledge of objects through the function (vyāpāra) of recalling the meaning of words.

There are two ways in which all verbal knowledge has been classified according to the Nyāya school. According to Gautama and Vātsyāyana, verbal knowledge is of two kinds, viz. ‘Drṣṭārtha’ or one relating to perceptible objects and ‘Adṛṣṭārtha’ or that relating to imperceptible objects. The former is limited to the sensible object attainable in this world while the latter relates to super-sensible object, which is attainable to the other world. This is the division of words of the ordinary persons and the seers. According to later logicians, there are two kinds of verbal testimony viz. Vaidika or the scriptural and Laukika or the secular. The former relates to the words of God. The Vedas are created by God and therefore, valid perfectly. The latter relates to the words of trustworthy persons and may, therefore, be true or false. In other words, scriptural testimony is the statement of the Vedas while secular testimony is the statement of human beings.

Upamāṇa (Comparison)

Upamāṇa or Comparison is the knowledge of the relation between a name and thing so named on the basis of given description of their similarity to some familiar object. For example, when we tell a city man that a wild cow is an animal like a cow and later on, in a forest, when he sees a wild cow he recognizes it as the wild cow. Then his knowledge of the wild cow is the outcome of conjunction with the knowledge of the cow. Hence the upamāṇa is just the knowledge of the relation between a name (here it is the wild cow and the object denoted by that name (the actual wild cow seen in the forest).

iv) Arthapatti (Presumption – Mimāṃsa)

It is an independent source of knowledge according to Kumārila Bhatta and Prabhākara. Both admit it as a distinct pramāṇa which cannot be brought under anumāṇa or sabda. It consists in the assumption of some unperceived fact in order to explain apparently inconsistent facts. The stock example of presumption is set forth thus: Devadatta is alive and he is not present in his house, we presume that he is elsewhere. The essential element in presumption is that a certain fact like Devadatta’s ‘being alive’ and ‘not being present in his house’ is unaccountable without presuming another fact like being outside his house. In presumption, we proceed from the knowledge of something to be explained to the knowledge of that which explains it. The means of presumption (karana) is the knowledge of the inner contradiction (anupatti) and its result is the reconciliation of the contradiction (upapatti). If Devadatta is fat and he does not eat during day, we presume that he must be eating during night, otherwise the inconsistency between ‘being fat’ and ‘not eating during day’ cannot be resolved.

v) Anupalabdhi (Non-apprehension – Mimāṃsa)

According to Kumārila Bhatta and others, non-apprehension is the sixth independent source of knowledge. It consists in the presentative knowledge of negative facts. In other words, negative facts are cognized by a special instrument (karana) called non-apprehension. Only positive facts are apprehended through positive sources like perception, inference, etc. but negative facts are apprehended through non-apprehension i.e., the absence of the jar on the ground is apprehended through anupalabdhi.
Kumārila argues that the concept of the emptiness of the container inevitably presupposes non-existence. He also refutes the Nyāya view that non-apprehension is the same as perception or inference. Negation is never perceived, for there is no sense-object contact in it. Our senses function only in the cognition of the ground, but we do not perceive the non-existence of the jar. It is also not reasonable to hold that the absence of the jar is a qualification and the ground is the qualified object. It is not possible to perceive the qualified object without perceiving the qualification. Negation cannot be inferred also for the invariable relation is not known there. Hence Kumārila concludes that non-existence is a distinct category which is cognized by non-apprehension only.

Check Your Progress

Notes: a) Write your answers in the space given below.
   b) Compare your answers with the one given at the end of the unit.

4. What are the sources of knowledge according to Indian philosophy?
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5. Difference between Vaidika and Laukika verbal testimony.
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6. What does Anupalabdhi (Non-apprehension) emphasize?
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6.5 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: ISSUES RAISED

Indian philosophy had its start in an inquiry about the nature of man himself, and the nature of universe is known only as part of the understanding of man’s own nature. The question of knowledge cannot be dissociated from the way of knowing. What is wanted is not mere knowing, but correct knowing, and there arises the need for a test of the knowledge whether it is correct or false. As we have seen in the preceding sections, there have been various schools of thought in India that have held different views about the ways of knowing and the tests for the correctness of the knowledge. In this section, some of the issues raised regarding the theories of knowledge by different schools are discussed.

As we have seen in the preceding sections, Chārvāka’s theory of knowledge is a thorough-going positivism, wherein the reality of whatever we perceive is accepted and those that cannot be perceived is rejected, perception as the only source of valid knowledge is accepted and the validity of inference is rejected.
According to Chārvākās, the major premise of an inference cannot be proved and so its validity cannot be accepted. Some of the questions raised regarding the classical example of inference are as follows:

a) How can we formulate the major premise unless we have seen all the instances of smoke? If we have not examined all the instances, how can we be logically justifiable in using the word “wherever”?

b) If we have seen all the cases in which smoke and fire are present together, we must have seen the present case, viz. the mountain also. Then what is the use of making an inference of fire from smoke when we have already perceived the fire in the mountain?

c) Inference is made possible by universal relation (vyāpti) obtaining between two facts or events.

d) The principle of causation is rejected, because it is not supported by sense perception.

   (i) The Chārvākā challenges the universal and invariable relation, as it is a mere guess work and lacks certitude. The universal relation involves infinite regress. Neither verbal testimony nor compassion are capable of establishing universal relation.

   (ii) The uniformities of experiences is also rejected. (For example, Is not fire hot always? Is not ice cold always?) Uniformities in nature prove the universal relationship between two things. They say that it is due to inherent nature or Svabhāva of things that they possess certain characteristics.

   (iii) According to Chārvākās, verbal testimony consists of spoken words which are heard through our ears. Since words suggest or mean things, but actually do not give us direct apprehension of the objects, they are not free from error.

Like the Chārvākās, the Buddhists also took up a position that the only way of correct knowing is through perception. They accepted natural deductions from direct perception also as a way of correct knowing like Chārvākās. But they differentiated between direct perception and inference as two distinct modes of knowing. The difference is, when some invariable concomitance is established between two events by direct perception, and then through such concomitance, we can infer the presence of one of them when the other is present. But Buddhism restricted the possibilities of such concomitance to the relation of cause and effect and the relation of the general and the particular. Thus if there is fire, we can infer that there is heat and when there is heat, we can infer that there is fire. There can be no establishment of such a concomitance between two events, one of which is absolutely outside the sphere of direct perception and as such they do not recognize things that can only be inferred, they do recognize any other mode of knowing also. For this reason, like the Chārvākās, they reject things like an enduring soul and the efficacy of rituals that bring about happiness in another world.

The Chārvākās and Buddhists were confined in their thought to the category of normal perception and inference. Things falling absolutely outside the sphere of such normal experience had no bearing on the thoughts of Buddhists and Chārvākās. It is here that there is a real difference between the Vedic and the Buddhist thoughts. Direct perception of the normal type found a place in both and reason of a particular group also found a place in both. But in the Vedic thought there was reason of another group and also direct experience of a super-normal nature.

The Nyāya and the Mimāmsa schools differed in their thoughts about inference. Considering Inference (anumāna) as the source of knowledge, the classical example cited in the preceding section is taken here for a discussion.

“There is fire on the hill because there is smoke on it”.
Smoke is ‘hetu’ or ‘linga’; the assertion that has been made (the hill in this example) is called pakṣa and the term fire is called ‘Sadhyā’. The Nyāya school holds that inference is made because of the invariable association (niyama) of the linga or hetu with sadhya and not because of specific conditions (essential identity, cause and effect).

For example, if it is held that the inference that ‘it is a tree’ because it is a pine is due to the essential identity (tādātmya) of tree and pine, then the opposite argument that it is a pine because it is a tree ought to be valid as well; for if it were a case of identity it ought to be the same both ways. The argument from tadut path (association as cause and effect) is also due to invariable association as cause and effect for it explains the case of inference of the type of cause and effect as well as of other types of inference, where the association as cause and effect is not available (eg. from sunset the use of stars is inferred). Now the question arises that since the validity of an inference will depend namely on the validity of the concomitance of sign (hetu) with the signate (~lidyi~), how are we to assure ourselves in each case that the process of ascertaining the concomitance had been correct and the observation of concomitance had been valid.

The Mimāmsa school held that if we had no knowledge of any such case in which there was smoke but no fire, and if in all cases smoke was perceived when there was fire, one can enunciate the concomitance of smoke with fire. But Nyāya holds that it is not enough that in all cases where there is smoke there should be fire, but it is necessary that in all those cases where there is no fire there should not be any smoke.

Among the intellectual processes employed for the establishment of truth, the formal inference that has been described in the proceeding paragraphs deserves the prominent position. Every theory has to be tested by the rules framed within the scope of this process. But this process does not exhaust the field for the play of the intellect in its quest for truth. There are other modes of knowing things deduced from a knowledge already derived. The essential nature of a formal inference is that there must be universal relation through whose medium such deductions are made. But there are other processes where some schools do not accept the medium of such a universal and they are brought under other forms of general inference bearing other names. What is wanted is that any theory must be based on observed facts, must not go against facts and must conform to some patterns of reasoning.

The most important process that comes within the pattern is what is called ‘presumption’ (Arthapathi). The Nyāya – Vaisēṣika school tries to bring this process also under the pattern of a formal inference with a universal included in it. But in the Mimāmsa school, this is recognized as a distinct and independent process. It brings a large number of cases within our day-to-day experience within this pattern of the process of valid knowledge. One of the examples as cited under source of knowledge is

1. A particular person does not eat by day and is found to continue fat; therefore, he eats at night.

2. A particular person known to be alive, is not in this house; therefore, he is outside.

Here is a process of knowing that is peculiar in nature. It is not a syllogistic inference with its ‘universal’. There is no verbal statement either. Still there is knowledge. This is what is technically called presumption (Arthapathi) in Indian logic. We do not always think in terms of syllogistic logic. We think in general terms, but general ideas must rest on some particular and when the particular is sublated, the general preposition cannot stand, for want of a particular to rest on. Therefore, another particular is presumed, to afford the general idea some resting place.

A statement like “there is no jar here,” means either that there is something other than a jar here or that the jar is elsewhere. Without one or the other of these two alternatives, a purely negative idea is impossible. Here the process of presumption starts. When one finds that the man whom he was looking for is not at home, there is other possibility
that he may be dead. As a matter of fact, Prabhākara, the founder of one of the two schools of Mimamsa, accepts such a stage in the process of 'presumption'. He says that the proposition of the man being outside is resorted to avoid the doubt regarding the other alternative of his being dead. But Kumārila, the founder of Mimamsa, does not accept this stage. According to Mimamsa, proposition is resorted to avoid the impossible stage of the mind having a negation as its object. They ask whether, when a valuable property is lost, the owner may resort to such a proposition and entertain the consolation that the property may be elsewhere.

Analogy (upamāna) is another process, which is recognized by all. But there is a difference of opinion whether it should be recognized as a distinct process or whether it may be brought under formal inference. There is also a difference of opinion regarding the final result of this process. Considering the example of a man hearing the name of a wild cow (refer to source of knowledge), the process is not mere perception. If he had seen a wild bull, without knowing that wild bull is just like a bull, he would not have known that animal is the wild bull. When he simply heard that the wild bull resembles an ordinary bull, then also he did not know what a wild bull is. This is the position taken up in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. There is a slight difference in the point of view of Mimamsa. When a man hears the statement that a wild bull is like a bull, he understands that the similarity of a bull exists in a wild bull. When he sees the wild bull later, he understands the similarity of a wild bull as existing in the bull, which he had seen in the village. At the time of seeing the wild bull, he was not seeing the same bull, which is in the village. So the knowledge of the existence of the similarity of the wild bull in the bull cannot be perception, since the bull is not in sight.

The Naiyāyikas are thorough realists and they do not regard the observation of similarity as being due to any subjective process of the mind. Similarity is indeed perceived by the visual sense but yet the association of the name in accordance with the perception of similarity and the instruction received is a separate act and is called upamāna.

Regarding the Sabda pramāṇa or testimony, it is considered that all knowledge derived from Vedas is valid, for the Vedas gave us right knowledge not of itself but they came out as the utterances of the infallible Isyāra. The Vaiśeṣikas did not admit Sabda as a separate Pramāṇa, but they sought to establish the validity of testimony (Sabda) on the strength of inference on the ground of its being the utterance of an infallible person.

What is called 'Authority' is not a special feature of any particular system of thought, either in religion or in philosophy in India. Organized social life demands the recognition of the three modes of knowing, the modes of direct experience, reasoning and authority. All logical thinking also demands the three-fold approach to the problem included within philosophy. When it is generally stated that the Charvākās recognized only direct experience, Buddhism included reason within the schemes of modes of knowing, the Vedic schools accept 'Authority' within the scheme of knowing. Direct experience and reasoning fall within one's own authority, while what is called 'Authority' is the authority of another person's experience. This experience of another is communicated through the medium of language. In the Mimamsa system it is definitely said that the subject matter of the system, namely, Dharma, is what can be known only from scriptural injunction. In the Vedanta also, it is said that the understanding of Brahman, the subject matter of the system has scripture as its source. What is meant by 'Authority' on which the two systems depend for a treatment of the subject matter? The authority may be a set of texts known as the Vedas, or the authority may be a distinct mode of knowing certain realities in the world. The Mimamsa and the Vedānta lose their claim as philosophy if it is the second alternative, they become super-rationalistic philosophy. In both there is a 'desire to know' what is identical with philosophy.

Regarding the Pramāṇa, 'Anupalabdhi (Non-apprehension) the Naiyāyikas like Kumārila admit that abhāva is a distinct category, but do not believe in non-apprehension as an independent source. According to them, negative facts are known either by
perception or by inferences as the correlate of negation is a subject of perception or inference. In negative judgements such as “there is no jar on the ground”, the ground as well as the negation of the presence of the jar are cognized. According to Vaisesika, negation is real, but is not re-cognized by a distinct source. It is cognized by inference. According to them, abhāva gives us the knowledge of such objects, which should have been perceived, if they existed. Abhāva is the non-perception of the object under special circumstance called ‘yogayanupalabdhi’. In short, the knowledge of abhāva arises from the non-perception of the apprehensible. Prabhākara does not admit abhāva as an independent category. He contends that the basis of negative proposition is the mere container, and ‘there is no jar on the ground’ refers to the empty floor. It is only a description of the form of cognition underlying negative statements and that abhāva is the cognition of the container. Kumarila refutes the above by saying negation cannot be inferred, for the invariable relation is not known here. Philosophically this process has little importance. It plays a very subordinate part in our day-to-day experiences too. It is dealt, within philosophy, only as a fact in the process of knowing and not on account of its importance. The case is quite different with ‘presumption’ which has as much importance in philosophy as inference itself, if not a greater importance. He concludes saying that non-existence is a distinct category, which is cognized by non-apprehension only.

The above issues raised regarding the source and theory of knowledge in different philosophical systems show us how knowledge has been given importance in our Indian Philosophy. The Nyāya and the Vaisesika realism, and the heterodox schools of subjective idealism have been engaged constantly in the examination of knowledge.

### 6.6 CONCEPT AND NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE – GYANA YOGA

In this section, the concept and some of the major features of the nature of knowledge according to Gyana Yoga is discussed.

#### 6.6.1 Gyan Yoga

This system of philosophy was founded by Patanjali, which shows the practical path leading to Viveka-jnana of the Śāmkhya. The Yoga Sūtra of Patanjali is the oldest textbook of the yoga school. It has four parts, of which the first explains the nature and aim of Śamādhi, or meditative absorption; the second explains the means of attaining this end. the third gives an account of the supernormal powers that can be attained through the yoga practices, and the fourth sets forth the nature of liberation. Patanjali systematized the conception of the yoga and set them forth on the background of the metaphysics of the Śāmkhya. In the early works, the yoga principles appear along with the Śāmkhya ideas. Yoga is intimately allied to Śāmkya. The Gita calls them one. Yoga means spiritual action and Śāmkya means knowledge; Śāmkya is theory; yoga is practice.

**Theory of Knowledge (Chitta)**

This school lays emphasis on the practice of yoga as a means to the attainment of Vivekājñāna (the doorway to liberation). Patanjali describes yoga as, “Yogaschittavṛttiṁrodah”. It means the stoppage of the modifications of chitta. Chitta includes buddhi, āhamkāra and manas. Chitta itself is unconscious but it has the power to reflect the Purusa and therefore, appears as if it is conscious. This reflection of Purusa in Chitta is the empirical self. Purusa is essentially pure consciousness. When it wrongly identifies itself with its reflection in the Chitta it appears to be undergoing change and modifications. The cessations of this modification lead to the realization of the true nature of Purusa. The yoga system holds that the cessation of
modifications of Chitta can be attained through meditation or concentration, which is also called yoga.

When through yoga and Viveka-Jnāna the Purusa in us realizes that it is completely separate from and is only a witness of the Prakriti, then Purusa steps into identify itself with its reflection in the Chitta. Thus, the light of consciousness of Purusa is withdrawn from the Chitta when all modifications of the Chitta are stopped through concentration or meditation. Thus yoga can also be said to be the return of Purusa to its original perfection.

According to this system, the modifications of the Chitta are of five kinds.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kinds of Chitta Modification</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chitta</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Cognition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wrong Cognition (viparyaya)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Verbal Cognition or Imagination (Vikalpa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pratyaksa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memory (Smriti)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anumāna</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sabda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Absence of Cognition or Sleep (Nidrā)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pramāṇa is called right knowledge as in it (a) Chitta through the sense, comes into direct contact with the external object and assumes its form, or comes into contact with internal mental emotions, here it is called Pratyaksa, (b) or the Chitta cognizes the generic nature of things through inference (anumāna) or (c) Chitta accepts the verbal testimony of a trustworthy man, (Sabda).

Viparyaya is wrong cognition or wrong knowledge e.g. the knowledge like that of a piece of silver is a non-metal.

Vikalpa is imagination like that of a hare’s horn which does not exist.

Nidrā is absence of cognition, but even in it there is mental modification, because after sleep we say, ‘I had a sound sleep’ and this knowledge can come only through some mental modification, as this is the source of all knowledge.

Smrti or memory is the mental modification through which we recollect the past experiences.

Chittabhumī

Yoga propagates five levels of mental functions or Chittabhumī. The difference in the mental levels or Chittabhumī are due to the predominance of the different gunas in the different Chittabhumis.

1. The first is the Kṣipta Chittabhumī. Here there is excess of Rajas guna. In this state, Chitta is in a dissipated condition and moves from object to object like a shuttlecock.

2. Mudhā is a mental condition due to the preponderance of Tamas. Here the mind is in a condition of sleep, ignorance, indifference and lethargy.

3. Viksipta is the mental state where Sattva guna predominates but at times Rajas guna also asserts itself. This is a condition of relatively pacified mind yet at times due to Rajas it gets distracted.

4. Ekāgra is the state of preponderance of Sattva in the mind. This is the state the mind becomes concentrated on the object of concentration or meditation.
5. Niruddha is also a state of the preponderance of Sattva in the mind. This is the highest Chittabhumī. Here the mental modifications are completely arrested, yet their latent impressions or Vāsanās remain. In this state, due to complete cessation of modifications of the mind there is complete absence of all knowledge including that of the object of meditation.

6.6.2 The Jain Theory of Judgement

The theory of knowledge held by the Jainism is that of common sense realism and pluralism. The theory of Reality is many faced (anetāntavāda).

According to this theory, the different kinds of immediate and mediate knowledge that we possess about objects reveal that every object has many characters. Such partial knowledge about any one of the innumerable aspects of an object is called ‘Judgement’ by Jain. Every judgement that we pass is, therefore, true only in reference to the standpoint occupied and the aspect of the object considered. The standpoint about any object may differ on account of its Svarupa (own form), Svadravya (own matter) Svaksetra, (own place) and Svakāla (own time) and this happens in simple affirmative judgements. Similarly, in simple negative judgements difference may take place because a thing is not in its pararupa (other form), paradravya (other matter), parakṣetra (other place), and parakāla (other time). According to Jainism, the knowledge is classified as follows.

1. Immediate Knowledge
   i) **Avadhi**: Direct knowledge of things even at a distance of space and time. It is called Avadhi because it functions within the limits of space and time.
   ii) **Manahparyaya** is the direct knowledge of the thoughts of others (telepathy) which is limited to space and time conditions. Both Avadhi and Manahparyaya are called extra-sensory form of knowledge, as the soul is unaided by the senses or mind in obtaining direct knowledge.
   iii) **Kevala-jnana** is absolute, extraordinary and infinite knowledge. It is not limited by space, time or object and can be acquired only by liberated souls.

2. Mediate Knowledge
   i) **Matti** includes perceptual and inferential knowledge. Pure perception in the sense of mere sensation cannot be knowledge. Sensation to become knowledge must be given meaning and arranged into order by thought.
   ii) **Sruta** means knowledge derived from authority. The instruments of mati and Sruta knowledge are perception, inference and authority.

Knowledge, according to Jainism, may be again divided into two kinds viz. Pramana or knowledge of a thing as it is which is real and complete knowledge. Naya is the knowledge of a thing in its relation. It is relational and partial knowledge. There are seven Nayas which are divided into Artha Naya (related to meanings or objects) and Sabda-Naya (related to words). The Jainas elaborate the doctrine of Naya in order to show that several judgements or propositions may be true about the same object from
Knowledge in Education
different points of view. Even contradictory judgements can be true of the same
thing, provided it is admitted that there can be different viewpoints. In short, a partial
view of the innumerable aspects of a thing is called a Naya or a standpoint. It influences
our judgement and so a judgement based on the partial view is also called Naya.

Therefore, the Jainas say that every judgement (naya) should be qualified by some
word like 'somehow' (Syāt, i.e. in some respect), so that the limitation of the judgement
and the possibility of other alternative judgements from other points of view may
always be kept in mind.

The Jaina logic distinguishes seven forms of judgement. Each judgement, being relative,
is preceded by the word 'syāt' - probable, perhaps, may be etc. The Jaina theory of
judgement is called 'SYĀDVĀDA' or Saptā - bhangi - Naya. Saptā - bhangi - naya
means the 'theory of seven-fold judgement'.

1. Syādasti: Relatively, a thing is real.
2. Syādnāsti: Relatively, a thing is unreal.
3. Syādastica nāstica: Relatively, a thing is both real and unreal.
4. Syādavaktavam: Relatively, a thing is indescribable.
5. Syādātī ca Avaktavam ca: Relatively, a thing is real and is indescribable.
6. Syādnātī ca avaktavam ca: Relatively, a thing is unreal and is indescribable.
7. Syādātī ca nāstī ca avaktavam ca: Relatively, a thing is real, unreal and
   indescribable.

There is no universal and absolute position or negation, and all judgements are valid,
only conditionally. The relation of the naya doctrine with the Syādvāda doctrine is that
for any judgement according to any and every naya, there are as many alternatives as
are indicated by syādvāda. The validity of such a judgement, is therefore, only
conditional. If this is borne in mind when making any judgement according to any
naya, the naya is rightly used. If however, the judgements are made absolutely according
to any particular naya without any reference to other nayas as required by the Syādvāda
doctrine the nayas are wrongly used as in the case of other systems, and then such
judgements are false and should, therefore, be called false nayas (nayābhāsa).

6.6.3 Buddhist Theory of Causation
The Doctrine of Momentariness and the Doctrine of Effective Causation
(Arthakṛtyākāriyta).

The theory of dependant origination (Pratītya Samutpāda) of things is the spontaneous
and universal law of causation, which is known in Buddhism as dharma or dhamma.
This view holds that on getting the cause, the effect arises and the existence of everything
is conditional. This view according to Buddha is the middle view because it avoids the
extreme views namely that there is some eternal reality underlying all things and that
all is annihilated ultimately. The theory of universal change holds that all are in a flux.
The doctrine was developed later on and came to be known as the doctrine of
momentariness of things.

The law of karma holds the view "as you sow, so you reap". The doctrine of
momentariness of things not only results in no-self doctrine (Anattāvāda), but it also
gives rise to no permanent ultimate reality, spiritual or material. Buddhism holds that
the real is that which has capacity to produce some effect. The idea of causal efficiency
is, therefore, the criterion of existence. The criterion of existence or being is the
performance of certain specific actions; or rather existence means that a certain
effect has been produced in some way (casual efficiency). That which has produced
such an effect is then called existent or sat. Any change in the effect thus produced
means a corresponding change of existence.
Buddhism holds that the effects produced in us by objects at different moments of time may be similar but cannot be identical because each moment is associated with a new effect and each new effect thus produced means coming into being of a correspondingly new existence of things. If things were permanent there would be no reason why they should be performing different effects at different points of time. Any difference in the effect produced, whether due to the thing itself or its combination with other accessories, justifies us in asserting that the thing has changed and a new one has come in its place. The existence of a jug for example is known by the power it has upon our minds. If it had no such power then we could not have said that it existed. We can have no notion of the meaning of existence other than the impression a thing produced; this impression is nothing else but the power exerted by things on us. According to the theory of causation, we perceive the power of producing effects and define each unit of such power as amounting to a unit of existence. And as there would be different units of power at different moments, there should also be as many new existences, i.e. existents must be regarded as momentary, existing at each moment that exerts a new power.

6.7 COMMON FEATURES OF THE ANCIENT THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND ITS RELEVANCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION

Though there is a variance between the six orthodox schools regarding the sources of knowledge, it is a well-accepted fact that all schools have acknowledged Pratyaksa, Anumāna and Sabda as valid sources of knowledge. The knowledge through sense experience is considered to be the basic source even in other pramānas for further evidences and validation. The Nyāya School has added upamāna to the list, while Mīmāṃsā has added Arthāpathi and Anupalabdhi to the list. The latter two sources have been considered as less valid when compared to other pramānas.

Considering each of the Pramāna with its merits, let us examine for their relevance and implications for Education.

6.8 PRAMĀNAS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION

As you must have learnt, education aims at all round development of the child, which includes the development of sensory powers too. Since perception is the chief means of all knowledge, it is imperative on the part of education to aim at physical as well as intellectual development of child’s personality.

The Nyāya, being mainly a logical and analytical approach to the world holds that education should aim at sensory and intellectual training. Besides this, the school also aims at developing a good and a balanced life. Both cognitive as well as conative faculties are needed to be developed according to Nyāya’s concept of Education. A keen sense of observation and enjoyment therein is the main characteristic of an inquiring student. Since Nyāya’s analysis of perception is a foundational concept in the entire Indian system, the emphasis on the refinement of perception also leads to aesthetic values. The development of aesthetic values depends on all aspects of arts, which objectifies our emotions. The Nyāya’s concern for meaning through their epistemological doctrine proves that they loved symmetry, proportion, balance and harmony, and this trait can lead to aesthetic values on which depends the growth and development of a great edifice of culture and civilization of humans.
The analytical method used in Nyāya can have relevance to our methods of teaching. In subjects like Mathematics, analysis and synthesis are used which are the dimensions of inference. Problem-centred method can be used in teaching. Analogy (upamāna) is used in all comparative knowledge. Verbal testimony (Sabda) can include seminar, group discussion and lecture method. On the whole, deductive-inductive method, project method, symposium, dialogue and argumentation can be used as effective methods of teaching.

From Vaiśeṣika school, we can draw implications for science. Scientific attitudes can be developed with the proper education embodying all knowledge with reference to the physical laws especially. This school advocates that each field of knowledge concerned with the discovery of hidden laws of nature and man should constitute the curriculum. As Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika also believes in perception as the major source of knowledge. So all deductive methods including dialogue and lecture method should be acceptable. The aim of education according to Samkhya school is to evolve sattvic status of body, sense organs, manas and self-sense, because on these the outgrowth of sattvic intelligence depends. Different skills need to be developed which are based on the proper evolution of sense organs and the organs of actions, which are made of Tāmmātras (the quiescence of gross material elements). According to this school, the development of knowledge through sense organs, manas and self sense is aimed at. So the curriculum should be concerned with the knowledge of surrounding elements with which the body is sustained. Since the student in his initial stage must learn the meaning of taste, smell, touch, sound, form, etc. the topics pertaining to soil, water, light, air, etc. must be included in the school curriculum. Since evolution is the main theme of the samkhya system and prakrti in presence of purusa (consciousness) gives rise to divine forms of creation, a child who is an integrated whole of purusa and prakrti has also to evolve physically, mentally, emotionally, intellectually and spiritually.

Check Your Progress

Notes:  
a) Write your answers in the space given below.

b) Compare your answers with the one given at the end of the unit.

7. Differentiate between immediate knowledge and mediate knowledge according to the Jain theory of judgement.

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8. What is the theory of causation according to Buddhism?

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9. How do sources of knowledge according to Indian philosophy influence educational practice? Give two examples.

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6.9 LET US SUM UP

Epistemology is that branch of philosophy which investigates the origin, structure, methods and validity of knowledge. The chief aim of Epistemology are: How far can we know reality? How does knowledge originate and develop? Which is the valid source of knowledge? and so on. The different schools of philosophy starting from Vedic times have debated upon several issues of knowledge, their sources and validity. The orthodox schools (six systems of philosophy) and the heterodox schools have contributed to the theories of knowledge.

The Chārvaka School which is materialistic recognizes only perception as the valid source of knowledge. The Jaina philosophy believes that consciousness or Jñāna is the inseparable essence of every soul. The knowledge is categorized into immediate and mediate which are perceptual and inferential in nature. The Jain theory of judgment, which is also called Syādvāda, distinguishes seven forms of judgement. The Buddhist School of Philosophy admits perception and inference as the valid source of knowledge. It also emphasizes upon the causal relationship between two things. It did not believe in Vedic authority for valid knowledge. The theory of dependent origination explained the origin, experience and decay of things through the theory of natural causation.

The orthodox schools (Nyāya, Vaisesika, Samkhya, Yoga, Mimāmsa and Vedānta) differ in their interpretations about knowledge and their sources. The Nyāya school recognized Pramānas like Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Sabda and Upamāna, while Vaisesika also recognized the same pramanas. The Sāmkhya and Yoga philosophy also believed in perception, inference and scriptural testimony. The Mimāmsa school of philosophy adds two more pramana to the above, viz. arthapatti (postulation) and anupalabdhi (non-perception).

The sources of knowledge according to the Vedic schools and heterodox schools have certain relevance and implications for to education – content and methods of teaching which have been discussed in this unit.

6.10 UNIT-END ACTIVITIES

1. Provide some daily life instances where 'upamāna' is used as a source of knowledge.

2. Observe the instructional transaction taking place in different subject areas at the primary, secondary and higher education levels. Find out at least five instances at each level where the following sources of knowledge are used.
   a) Anumana
   b) Sabda
   c) Upamana
   d) Arthapatti
   e) Anupalabdhi

6.11 POINTS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What methods of teaching can be adopted in school education to develop effective sensory perception?

2. How can we develop the skill of inference in students?

3. Explore the ways in which we can train the students in scientific and analytical methods.

4. Identify the Verbal testimony as the source of knowledge and discuss the ways in which knowledge has been communicated.
5. Criticisms of Buddhist school of Philosophy about Vedic schools' viewpoints on knowledge.

6. Is 'Upamâna' relevant to our classroom teaching? In which contexts it is useful?

### 6.12 SUGGESTED READINGS


### 6.13 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

1. The Orthodox Schools of thought accept the authority of the Vedas while viewing the nature of knowledge but the Heterodox Schools of thoughts do not recognize the authority of the Vedas.

2. Nayaya, Vaisesika, Samkhya, Yoga, Purva Mimamsa and Uttara Mimamsa or the Vedanta.

3. The difference between Nayaya and the Buddhism with regard to inference as a source of knowledge is that the former affirms concomitance between two things in inference (When there is rain, there is cloud), while Buddhism argues for causal relationship between two things (There is rain because there is cloud).

4. The sources of knowledge according to Indian philosophy are perception, inference, verbal testimony, analogy, presumption and non-existence.

5. Vaidika or the scriptural verbal testimony is the statement of the Vedas and Laukika or the secular verbal testing is the statement of human beings.

6. Anupalabhi (Non-apprehension) emphasizes knowledge of negative facts. Negative facts are not perceived, for there are no sense-objects contained in them.

7. Immediate knowledge refers to direct knowledge of things while mediate knowledge includes perceptual and inferential knowledge. It also includes knowledge from authority.

8. The theory of causation according to the Buddhism stress that we perceive the power of producing effects and define each unit of such power as amounting to a unit of existence. Hence, any change in the effect thus produced means a corresponding change of existence.

9. The analytical method used in Nyâyâ is applicable to subjects like Mathematics. Verbal testimony (Sabda) and is used in seminar, group discussion and lecture method.