UNIT 3 EMBODIMENT AND GENDER*

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3.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through the Unit, you will be able to:

- Understand the concept of gender and embodiment,
- Explicate about the various approaches to embodiment,
- Understand the journey of a female body through different stages of life, and
- Point out the nature of the underlining relationship between gender and body.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The Unit, Shall help you ponder on the various dimensions of 'body', most of which you may not be aware of. 'Body' is a basic concept used copiously in both the natural and human sciences. This unit shall also introduce you briefly to the various philosophical approaches to the body, including empiricism, idealism, existentialism and phenomenology, as well as the relationship between body and mind. The unit will help you as well to comprehend the correlation between embodiment and body image, the two most basic pillars of your understanding of gender. Merleau-Ponty's perspective on embodiment, has been discussed here because it is hooked upon the idea that concepts pertaining to embodiment shore up life experiences to promote research in important domains such as that of the body image, self-esteem, perception etc. We have also tried introducing you to Schilder's framework of psycho-sociology, which in turn will help you grasp the

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concepts of 'body' as perceived by women in both the orient and occidental cultures. Body frame and contours are supposedly believed to have an influence on the self-perception of the women. This however is not a stand-alone component but an imminent process that changes perennially her perception about herself and how others perceive her. Body image is therefore a malleable process that is constantly being challenged `throughout one's life span and is continually being constructed, destructed, and reconstructed. One's appraisal of her own body image has psychological bearings on the individual, especially in the case of women.

The unit thus deals with one of the most important episodes of socialization and how gendered socialization gathers momentum from the very beginning of your life. We are made to learn the ropes of gender socialization from the very prime of our life. The unit tries establishing the relation between our body and gender by bringing forth the fact that your gender is projected through your body. Therefore, you must confirm to the cultural and social practises of decking up your body. Body which you think is your most coveted possession actually belongs to the society and must therefore be 'socially embodied' properly to reinforce the cultural and stereotyped practices in vogue.

Studies on human body, if you notice had been quite prolific in Humanities and Social Sciences especially since the late 1970's. This might have been possible because of the contributions made by Foucault on the interrelationships between power, discipline, body and knowledge discourse. The body was made a versatile booty, one which could answer all most all kinds of inquiry and therefore subsumed as "the ontological and epistemological basis of almost all forms of inquiry" (Mascia-Lees, 2011: 1). However, the obsession with living body (embodiment) is nothing new. Philosophical discourses have always had aplenty discussions on body. You will be surprised to know that of all the important contributions phenomenology has made to philosophy, it is perhaps the theorization of the role of the body in living experience that is the most sizeable one. Not only in the pioneering works of classical philosophers like Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961),Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), *Max Scheler* (1874-1928), *Jean-Paul Sartre's* (1905-1980), but even in the the most recent works of Dan Zahavi, Shaun Gallagher, Heinamaa Sara, Sara Ahmed, Gayle Salamon, and Frantz Fanon, body take the centre stage.

3.2 THE RISING INFLUENCE OF BODY IN PHILOSOPHY: A CLASSICAL HISTORY

Body thus we find has a rich tradition encrusted in the classical philosophical platter. Let us take a look at the philosophers and their take on the body. Their conceptions of embodiment will help us comprehend their understanding of body as well as their expectations from body.

3.2.1 Husserl's idea of Body and Embodiment

For *Husserl*, the body cannot be perceived as an extended physical substance in contrast to a non-extended mind, but something more than it. It's a lived "here" from which all "there's" are "there"; the body as you can imagine is an agent in itself with independent set of senses and cognitions which can only be experienced by the experiencer. It is a first-hand experience solely gained by the embodied

person. You see young fellows, embodiment is actually a coherent system of movement which allow us to experience every moment of our situated, contextual and practical-perceptual life as something "more" than our current perspective could afford.

Please try to understand the birth of the idea of 'embodiment' through Husserl's germinating ideas who is believed to be one of its pioneers. Husserl went on to underscore a major presupposition concerning embodiment. Going against the received tradition, with its inclination to think in terms of the "psychophysical", where people try hard to tiethe "mind" to a material "body," he put to the fore a basic assumption that this body itself can be taken as a physical body *(Körper)* like any other spatial substance, with certain distinctive characteristics. What is essential is that as against a physical body *(Körper)*, there is another conception of body as that of a *lived* body *(Leib)*— as *my* body, *someone's* body, which can be experienced in a unique way by the embodied experiencer or individual. I hope you understand that young fellows, what is missing in naturalism are the body of embodiment. They only spoke of the mind-body relations with abstract psucho-physical traits that is more remote and less tangible. Husserl, on the other hand , spoke of the embodiment and personification which must not be taken physically, but as *directly experienced from within the core of one's self.*

However, we must understand that here Husserl is not challenging the right of scientific practice to deal with living bodies in causal terms as is done in the natural sciences like anatomy and physiology; in *Ideas 3* , he even spoke of a new science— somatology— that would bring together both physiological investigation of the material and spatial properties of the body as a living organism as well as the experiential investigation of lively and spontaneous firsthand, first-person somatic perception (for example, of having the sense of contact). But Husserl did clearly state the pre-suppositions governing physico-scientific perceptions, cognizing them for what they really are and what their limitations are, so that, he says, "we do not take for *true being* what is actually a *method."* Thus the mere fact that living bodies have from the very beginning been approached with natural methods should not prompt us to take the same old path of Cartesian dualism. Instead, appropriate and alternative modes of inquiry must be developed to do realize the real flavour of the body of direct experience.

3.2.2 Merleau-Ponty's Theory of Embodiment or Perspectivism

Let us now come to Marleau-Ponty's theory of Embodiment which is said to be perspectival.Merleau-Ponty'sperspectivism is naturally connected to his theory of his idea of body. Ponty tried presenting a "God's point of view", instead of the "people's point of view", an atheistic, embodied stance when it comes to the question of knowledge.Ponty's theory of embodiment provides us with a pair of lenses through which we internalize the objects and are able to develop a hold on them. But it is only partial we are never able to grasp the whole of it or say, achieve a perfect understanding of the object across space and time. We might well grow the misconception this is objective knowledge but to surprise this may only be relative and contextual knowledge.

Therefore,students,relativism has been an important aspect of Ponty. The question of whether we all see the same thing or whether what I see is only my image and not what others feel is quite dicey. This brings us to the problem of solipsism, and theory of inter-subjectivity. Rather than just subjective propositions,

perspectivism brings forward the inter-subjective world where we can participate and exchange dialogues with the external world. This inter-subjectivity is embedded in Merleau-Ponty's theory of embodiment. Here we play the role of actors as the whole world un-furls before us. The body-subject is the essential condition of knowing which embodies our perspectives and ways of looking at the world for we are mostly guided by our orientation in the world, and this helps create a reliable, precise and comprehensive image, which we can look upon to. Inter-subjectivity creates different sets of knowledge and therefore none of these sets are complete. Though we have access to knowledge, inter-subjectivity ensures that we have different images of the same corpus of knowledge in the cultural world. This does lead to certain gaps but; inter-relatedness of perspectives is always related to one another. Indeed, our cultural world shares many characters of the natural world. However, in connection to the latter, the cultural objects bear with themselves a more or less subjective character as objects created by human beings of a determinate community.

You can perhaps understand Ponty'sunderstanding of inter-subjectivity if you take take tobacco as an example. It is a perfect example of a cultural object which was originated by American Indians. The latter have a fixed way of consumption such that can be termed as their 'native'way of consumption. Traditional tobacco preparations and use varies across tribes and regions. These variances are due to the many different oral histories among Tribes of North America. In some of these cultures, the roles of growing, harvesting, and preparing traditional tobacco are held by specific groups of people who use traditional ways to prepare tobacco for a specific use. Often such tobaccos have medicinal, spiritual and communal uses embodied in them that have ingrained properties of inter-subjectivities and for which the usage differs from one community to other.

3.2.3 Jean-Paul Sartre's Body, Intercorporeity and Inter-subjectivity

Following the foot-steps of Marleau-Ponty, another French philosopher of the twentieth century, Jean Paul Sartre, introduces his idea of "flesh" *(la chair)*. For Sartre, flesh is the central point of contingency andintercorporeity. Inter-corporeity is an approach in social cognition which tries focusing on the relation between one's own body and that of the other. Through this reciprocity between bodies, we directly try grasping the intention of another's action. For the self, to cognize another's action, it potentially takes up the same action. For instance, yawning, as it is said, is contagious. When you see others yawning, you also feel like yawning. It is through our motor capacity that we understand the meanings of the other's action. Similarly, flesh is "the pure contingency of presence".More importantly; my flesh constitutes the other's flesh, especially in the acts of touching and caressing: The caress and the pat reveal the other's flesh as flesh to myself and to the other. Sartre believed that it is my body as flesh which causes the other's flesh to be born. I have one kind of knowledge of the body within my experience and another experience of the body given from the perspective of the other. Therefore,the body as it is "for me" and the body as it is "for others" or "for the other" is different.

See students, Sartre talks of the two dimensions which according to him are "incommunicable" and thus "irreconcilable". Either it is a thing among other things, or else it is that by which things are revealed to me. But it can never be

both at the same time. In the first place, Sartre puts it, "I exist my body" *(J'existemon corps)*. Here the body is taken as non-thing, as a medium for my experience of this world. This is *le corps-existé*, which means, the body as lived, as opposed to *le corps-vu*, the body as seen from the perspective of the other. The second dimension is the manner in which my body is experienced and indeed utilized by the other (and utilized equally by myself occupying the role of third-person observer of my body). (The third dimension is far more complicated: it is the manner in which "I exist for myself as a body known by the other"), what Martin C. Dillon has characterized as "the body-for-itself-for-others."

This captures theinter-subjective dimension, which is the core area of embodiment. It talks of the manner in which I experience my body as experienced by others, an area on which Sartre has more edge than any other phenomenologist with a marked exception of Levinas. Students, do you understand this? This is the body as I experience it under the gaze or glare of the other, as in the case of shame, punishment or embarrassment. I experience how the other sees me, even in the solitude, in the glaring physical absence of the other. I am, Sartre says, "imprisoned in an absence". Thus it is the embodiment of the feelings in a state of ridicule or despair. Try to imagine how you feel when you are bullied, punished or heckled? You try experiencing your body as others look at you while you are being pinned down. While I am under the scanner I believe people experience me in a different way, of which I am both aware and inquisitive. This is lived experience about my body which I myself experience and try to experience how others judge my body. But students remember it is only after Simone De Beauvoir's publication of *The Second Sex*, that the entanglements between the body, self and the gender begun. Let us move into the next section.

Check Your Progress 1

1) What is embodiment?

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2) Discuss briefly Husserl's idea of Body and Embodiment.

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3.3 INITIATING A DISCUSSION ON BODY, SELF AND GENDER IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR'S SECOND SEX

With the publication of The Second Sex by Simone De Beauvoir, feminist inter-relation between the body and the self, assumed a significant position. Along with other phenomenologists whom we spoke about, particularly Merleau-Ponty, and, of course Sartre, Beauvoir presumed that "to be present in the world implies strictly that there exists a body which is at once a material thing in the world and a point of view towards the world" *(Beauvoir,* 1953). She primarily inferred that bodily existence and the perspectives were shared and lived differently for men and women. She sees less of biological facts and more of 'rehearsed' facts which are not that 'natural'. She gives an account which can well become the core of the relation between bodies and selves. See students, she will remain important for us for not only detailing to us on the inter-relationship between gender and body but rather for her pioneering work of lived experience, who spoke not of body as an abstract but rather as a situated being, afar from biology. Contemporary theory and researches on embodiments of gender reflect Beauvoir's (1961) classic notion that the body is an experience in a given situation. Beauvoir's prime position is that bodies are subjects with underlying feelings and motivations which make them an agent in itself. So subjectivity is always embodied, and therefore the body does not exist in vacuum. It must always be a part of one's living and lived experiences. Such experiences are moulded not only by biographical, political, historical, cultural, and interactional contexts but also by one's will and fancy. Even before one can speak of the sex/gender distinction we must learn to talk of subjectivity of the body, which is the power of the body to act on its own. Empowering the body to speak on its own has been a central development of this century. Let us move next into the subsequent developments.

3.4 GENDER AND EMBODIMENT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Away from the classical thoughts, let us move into the recent junctures to see how the classical concepts have been played upon by the contemporary sociologists to penetrate deeper into body and further into the crevices of gender and embodiment. Feminism has been pivotal in forcing social sciences to engage with the body not only as a social and cultural reality. Starting from late 1980s, the most prominent voices in the feminist theorisation of the body have been post-structuralist. Such theoriststry exploring gender as a loop thus understanding its discursive and resilient form. It eventually colour the actual political and social-cultural implications and undercurrents of being gendered. Theorists of embodiment' such as Franz Fanon, Elizabeth Grosz, Judith Butler, Sara Ahmed, Margrit Shildrick, RaiaProkhovnik, Moira Gatens and Rosi Braidottideploy various theoretical approaches at their end. They claim that bodies cannot be casually taken as granted but they have extra meanings. Instead of being mere biological beings, there are much more to it. They are culturally and socially produced and reproduced through complex ideological, historical, social, cultural and political games of power. Not just questioning the sex/gender differentiation,

these theorists also question many other pejorative binaries like mind/body,nature/ culture, male/female and heterosexual/homosexual.

See students we being obsessed with making the distinctions between sex and gender, forget that such distinctions are clouded with more rigorous blankets of patriarchal and hetero-normative system order. Bodies are not naturally existent but they are made to be existent, as they are made to be'sexed' and/or 'gendered' through powerful mazes of intelligibility *(Prokhovnik,* 2002; *Gatens,* 1996; *Butler,* 1999/1990). Phookan asserts that these scholars have rejected the ongoing myth that a pre-given body is biologically or naturally 'sexed' from before. We actually embody our bodies and make it 'sexed' or 'gendered' *Moira Gatens* (1996) therefore askes 'how does culture construct thebody so that it is understood as a biological given?'

3.4.1 Embodying the Feelings of Shame, Stigma and Exclusion: Dan Zahavi

According to Dan Zahavi, a *Danish* philosopher and Professor of Philosophy at the *University of Oxford,* shame is a form of intentional consciousness. I am ashamed of being what I am, and in that order shame also exemplifies a self-relation. Shame is, as Sartre puts it, 'an immediate shudder which runs through me from head to foot without any discursive preparation' *(Sartre,* 2003:246). It presupposes the mediation of the other, not merely because the other is the one in front of whom I feel ashamed, but notably because the 'other'is the one that constitutes the agent of myself being shameless. This is the self of which I am not confident about and therefore ashamed of. My public persona when brought into a close encounter engenders my feelings of agony and eventually 'stigma' arises. I am scared of the 'other' as I believe I do not match up to his standards and therefore the seeds of shame or stigma get reaped. It is brought about by this encounter. To feel shame is— if ever so fleetingly— to accept the other's evaluation.

In being ashamed I accept and acknowledge the judgement of the other. I am the way the other sees me, and I am nothing but that *(Sartre,* 1957: 246, 287). The other's gaze confers a sudden truth upon me that is beyond my control such that I become powerless. I give primacy to the roles that others play. To claim that shame only occurs in situations where a discrediting fact about oneself is exposed to others is not convincing. One can certainly feel ashamed when alone— that is, shame does not require an actual observer or audience. One may also feel ashamed of something even if one can be certain that it will forever remain secret. One might face this feeling of sham without anyone present before you. For example, you have a congenital facial disfigurement, and you feel shame when you see yourself in the mirror. Again, You have made a firm decision not to touch alcohol again; but in a moment of weakness you start drinking again. However, the very next moment you feel ashamed of your lack of self-control and repent. Still there are other types of shame arising out of more social scenarios. It is the gaze of the other which disrupts my control over the situation.

Rather than simply existing and being projected bodily, I become suddenly aware of my body's factual presence and being-there. I become aware that my body is something on which others' points of view are hooked upon.

This is why Sartre speaks of my body as something that escapes me on all sides and as a perpetual 'outside' of my most intimate 'inside' *(Sartre,* 2003:375). Thus types of shame provide vivid examples of other mediated forms of self-experience and their bodily implications. You will better understand the conceptualization of shame and how it qualifies as a self's lived experience if you go through its forms and its relations with the self and others. This is how one embodies the socially constructed values of approval and disapproval and generates the sense of inclusion and exclusion.

3.4.2 Body, Space, Strange Encounter and Embodiment: Sara Ahmed

Sara Ahmed is a British-Australian scholar who has been researching exclusively on the intersection of feminist theory, lesbian feminism, queer theory, critical race theory and post-colonialism. She has worked intensely on gender and forms of embodiment. She believed that many of our early experiences of feeling troubled, as a girl, rose from unwanted male attention. Ahmed pondered what actually is feminism? What is it that brings people together on this platform? She believed what bring us all together to feminism are the histories of uncanny and sad happenings that leave us fragile. She is optimistic that Feminism might help us save from the grim experiences that leave us vulnerable and exposed *(Ahmed*, 2017 :33). She takes feminism as the craft of survival against all odds.

Watch students! Any untoward incident which happens in our life course makes us hesitant and reluctant. For instance, you went on the streets and raced in the morning. In the course of your morning work, you were touched inappropriately by a man. What do you do? Our body repels and it bears the brunt of the trauma. Our body starts reacting differently and we bear the repercussion of it over a prolonged span. Our body may spring back into action but the tremor remains, it does not ebb out. It remains dormant within and sometimes without. My body is like a hard memory. When we think of sharing a memory, we put the body into words. What do we do when these kinds of things happen? Who do we become? I kept on going *(ibid*: 2017:34). I began running again, but it is different now: I have a changed body which reacts in an awkward manner now. I am much more nervous. Any one knocks me from behind and I shudder. My body is no longer that jubilant as it was then. It has drooped down and stooped low. Ahmed says, experiences like these seem to pile up over time such that our body is a bag and everything gets struggled inside the bag, which is far heavier than it was.

The violence inflicted upon you changes you and the social embodiments. You learn to treat and inhabit your body differently through social expectations that teach you to what to expect and what not. When you sense the world out there as a danger, it is your relation to your own body that changes *(Ahmed,* 2017:35). Some encounters, you experience to be unhealthy and unpleasant. Such encounters get tinged with hate. We sense that something is not right, and this is communicated not through words or sound but by 'touch'. How do we express such feelings? How does someone else read our body? It is our non-verbal expressions, gestures and bodily responses that render our discomfort, agony, disgust or trauma. Ahmed said, " The strange encounter is played on the body, and is played out with the emotions" such bodily interactions or encounters that generate fear or disgust, also re-formulate the bodily spaces. The bodies which were brought together forcefully, immediately jump back away from one another

to find peace and solace. The question that Ahmed asks is? What then is the body? She is happy to take bodies as nothing in particular. There are no bodies as such but they are something that materialize in a complex set of temporal and spatial relations to other bodies, that may be taken as recognized and therefore familiar and friendly, as against those considered as strange.

For Ahmed, growing up to be a girl is how you negotiate the thin grounds between gender and space. Students imagine your everyday experiences of travelling in local transport and you will have a fair idea of the inter-connections between gender and space. Men often occupy wider spaces in public transport or while standing, relaxing or chatting at the alleys. They stand or sit with their legs far apart, something which is an absolute 'no' for girls. Girls from the beginning are taught to sit tight with their legs glued to one another. Tiny girls are asked to sit cross-legged lest they become unruly and demand for larger spaces. While men sitting with legs thrown wide a far is no folly. Women are taught to be less space consuming so that they can be accommodative and space spacing. The more accommodating we are the less space we have to take up. Gender is like a loop where when world needs to shrink women can accordingly made to shrink. We are the conservers and not the men. *Judith Butler* (1993) taught us to think of "girling" as a social mechanism.

3.5 GENDER AND EMBODIMENT: THE WORLDWIDE PRACTICES

Thus we find the body has always been an important component of our discussions and readily it went on to be tagged with gender to make it more magnified. Body must be clothed and amplified with various dimensions and ramifications to make it more pronounced and socially significant. Thus it must be decked up by the society in different ways across gender to make it loud and apparent. Bodies must be gendered and embodied so that expressions may be varied and in stark contrast to one another. Embodiment is therefore the lived experiences of women as their bodies get embodied and they are made to pass through various experiences and emotional roller-coaster. Conboy, Medina, Stanbury, (1997) studied the tug-off-war between women's symbolical representation and her lived bodily experiences which included topics that raged across rape, genital mutilation, pornography, eroticism, fasting, anorexia, body building, menstruation, masturbation and maternity, mutilation and so on. Female genital mutilation is yet another practise of embodiment practised across cultures. It is taken as a part of 'body art' or as a means to increase or decrease sexual pleasure. Eve Ensler, writer of the *Vagina Monologues*, an episodic play that explores various components of gendered embodiment like consensual and non-consensual sexual experiences, body image, genital mutilation, direct and indirect encounters with reproduction, vaginal care, menstrual periods, and several other encounters through the eyes of women with various ages, races, sexualities, and other differences, speaks at large on this area. Her newest play, *The Good Body*, observes that `everything women do is about being good'. In every culture, she believes, this imperative or compulsion to be 'good' is linked with particular ways of wielding control over women through `mutilating, hiding, fixing, reducing, shrinking' female bodies. Strategies for embodiment are many such that they differ across cultures such as there is skin lightening in some countries, female genital mutilation in another, fattening a bride in another, and dieting and making

her suffer from anorexia in another'. Practices of embodiment are not only diverse but also complex ranging from cosmetic surgery procedures which include breast augmentation, labiaplasty, and liposuction to 'body art' practices such as piercing, tattooing and cutting. Embodiment practices have spread with age starting from the nineteenth century circumcision operations that performed on women in the United States and Britain to stop masturbation, nymphomania and hysteria to more contemporary reproductive procedures such as caesarean sections, episiotomies, tubal ligations, hysterectomies and radical mastectomies; and more recently, operations to `correct' ambiguous genitalia in intersex babies.

Practises of embodiment also pose an objection to the cultural essentialism and racism involved in mainstream, as well as in feminist representations of such embodied cultural practices which are fundamentally different. We may also cite the national laws and international directives designed to regulate such female genital mutilation processes and yet not other body altering practices which may involve similar health hazards. Waririmu Ngaruiya Njambi (2004), for instance, posed a critique against the American Medical Association and the World Health Organization for issuing directives which describe such acts as 'medically unnecessary' and requiring 'eradication', while failing to deliberate on 'culturally acceptable' practices such as male circumcision and cosmetic surgery. Thus we see through these practices of embodiment we can smell an air of differentiation which creates culturally essentialist binaries to construct non-Western cultures as patriarchal and oppressed and Western cultures as liberated and empowered.

3.6 GENDER AND EMBODY: THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE

In India bodies experience gender construction, where girls are religiously taught to learn gender roles and qualities that are entirely feminine. Such roles are expected to compliment men's superior macho traits. Women from middle and upper castes and classes remain caged in these feminine bodies and learn to perform according to the strictures. Besides, the gendered bodies of lower castes and classes get bogged down by poverty, malnutrition, heavy burden of work, gender discrimination, and so on. They become such embodiments so as to personify shame, pollution, dirt and impurity. They become lost survivors. Their embodiments get more pronounced by ideologies of motherhood, son preference, notions of purity and pollution that keep women captive. We need to recognize the fact that the category "woman" too is not stable or monolithic identity. In a country like India where the binary oppositions of sex/gender are strongly imposed, the conditions of the third gender is beyond imagination. Their embodiments remain out of the bounds of sane discussions and analysis that we actually need to encourage to build up a society with equity and empathy.

Check Your Progress 2

1) What do you mean by 'lived experience'?

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2) How do you define 'Shame'?

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3.7 LET US SUM UP

Thus we saw how the inter-twining between gender and body unfolded. The classical history with its rich set of philosophers like Husserl, Marleau-Ponty, Sartreetc though spoke a lot on body per se they never much detailed on gender and gendering attributes. Though they spoke of inter-subjectivity, it was especially articulated in the works of Simon de Bevouire who spoke of the agency and lived experiences of the body without which they are incomplete. Next we come to the contemporary theorists who look at the various dimensions of the gender embodiment correlation. We came back from theoretical plans to empirical cultural experiences to understand the nature and form that such practices held throughout the world.

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3.9 KEYWORDS

Cartesian dualism : It the idea is that the immaterial mind and the material body, while being onto logically distinct substances, causally interact.

Perspectivism : It is the view that perception, experience, and reason change according to the viewer's relative perspective and interpretation.

Intersubjectivity : It is an idea used in philosophy, psychology, sociology, and anthropology, is the psychological relation between people. It is usually used in contrast to sole individual experience and emphasizes our inherently social being.

Intercorporeity : Intercorporeality is a notion proposed by Merleau-Ponty that enables us to illuminate social cognition in an alternative way, by focusing on the relation between one's own body and that of the other.

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