
UNIT 20 MĪMĀMSĀ*

Structure

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20.0 OBJECTIVES

After having studied and worked through the unit, you should be able to:

- illustrate the validity of knowledge;
- discuss *arthāpatti* (postulation) as a source of valid knowledge;
- analyze *khyātivāda* (theory of error);
- explain the nature of self; and
- discuss Mīmāṃsaka's concept of liberation.

20.1 INTRODUCTION

In this unit, you will find the complete discussion on the Mīmāṃsā philosophy, their views on epistemology and the metaphysics. Theory of error and theory of causation are also discussed with reference to their view. Further, their arguments on the sources of valid knowledge (*pramāṇas*) are elucidated in an elaborate manner.

The Mīmāṃsā philosophy is one among the other schools of Indian philosophy. The Mīmāṃsā School was founded by Jaimini in 400 B.C. He was the author of '*Mīmāṃsā sūtra*'. The commentator works on *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* are primarily of Kumārlia Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara Miśra. Like Nayaya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Mīmāṃsā-Vedānta is considered as an allied system of Indian school of thought. The word 'Mīmāṃsā' means 'revered thought' or 'enquiry' which is to be applied originally in the interpretation of the vedic rituals. To interpret

Vedic Sentences, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa develops the theory of Abhihitānvayavāda, which means the words have their own independent meanings and sentence-meaning (vākyārtha) is the sum total of word-meanings. Prabhākar develops anvitābhidhānavāda. According to this, words have no independent meanings. Words express meaning in a sentence (with relation a verb; for example, Pot has a meaning in relation to verb ‘bring’). Mīmāṃsā deals with the initial part of the Veda and is therefore called as Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. The initial part of the Veda concerns human action, their rituals and the sacrifices. It is thus known as *karmakaṇḍa*.

Two scholars namely Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākar Miśra wrote treatises on the Mīmāṃsā philosophy. They aimed at giving a theistic learning to the Mīmāṃsā philosophy.

20.2 EPISTEMOLOGY

The term epistemology deals with knowledge of an object. When we cognize an object we possess knowledge of that object. To verify whether our knowledge of that object is correct or not, we have to consider the below four conditions. These are;

- i) It must not arise from defective causes.
- ii) It must be free from contradiction. This implies it must be self-consistent and should not be contradicted by subsequent knowledge.
- iii) It provides the experience of an object which has not been experienced earlier. In short, it provides experience of an unknown object.
- iv) It must represent the object.

Once these conditions are satisfied, our cognition of an object will be treated as valid. While considering these conditions, it is mentioned that memory can't be regarded as valid knowledge because it arises from the impression of a prior cognition which contradicts the third condition/ criterion of valid knowledge.

Validity of knowledge

Kumārila regards cognition as a means of valid knowledge because of its apprehension (*anubhūti*), and he regards cognizedness produced by a cognitive act as its result. Prabhākara, on the other hand, vividly expresses that we cognize an object by means of valid knowledge as it is an apprehension, but it is not to the means of ‘recollection’ as it is found in case of memory. He identifies *pramāṇa* with *prama* or valid knowledge and regards cognition as manifesting itself but not inferable from cognizedness of its object. Thus for him, *pramāṇa* is the same as *pramā*. In his views, all cognitions are valid and their invalidity is due to the disagreement with the real nature of objects. So wrongness does not belong to the cognition but to the object cognized.

With these analyses, the Mīmāṃsā philosophy discusses two theories; *Svataḥ* *pramāṇyavāda*, and *Parataḥ* *pramāṇyavāda*. The former is translated as intrinsic validity and the latter is translated as extrinsic validity of knowledge. To explain *Svataḥ* *pramāṇyavāda*, knowledge of an object is valid by itself. Validity of

Orthodox Systems

knowledge arises from the essential nature of the causes of knowledge and it is not due to any extraneous conditions. To elucidate Parataḥ pramāṇyavāda, knowledge is not self-evident but it is validated by extraneous conditions.

By doing integration (reshuffling) of these two theories, we are resulted in four theories. These are;

- i) *Svataḥ pramāṇyavāda* (intrinsic validity)
- ii) *Svataḥ apramāṇyavāda* (intrinsic invalidity)
- iii) *Parataḥ pramāṇyavāda* (extrinsic validity)
- iv) *Parataḥ apramāṇyavāda* (extrinsic invalidity)

The Mīmāṃsā (Kumārila) upholds Svataḥ pramāṇyavāda and Parataḥ apramāṇyavāda. For him, the validity of knowledge arises from the essential nature of its causes untainted by defects, and is known by the knowledge itself. Intrinsic validity of knowledge consists in its being generated by the complement of causal conditions of the knowledge itself, and not by extraneous conditions besides them. The knowledge of validity is also generated by the aggregation of causal conditions, which make the knowledge known. But the invalidity of knowledge arises from defects in the causal conditions of the knowledge. It is known from the knowledge of the object itself.

Analyzing the four theories, the Sāṅkhya philosophy upholds Svataḥ pramāṇyavāda and Svataḥ apramāṇyavāda. In their view, both valid and invalid knowledge are intrinsic whereas Buddhists argue in favour of Svataḥ apramāṇyavāda and Parataḥ pramāṇyavāda. They regard that validity of knowledge is extrinsic and invalidity of knowledge is intrinsic. For them knowledge is invalid in itself but it is validated by extraneous conditions. As soon as knowledge of an object is generated, it can't apprehend the real nature of the object. It is uncertain at the time and liable to contradiction, and so should be regarded as invalid. Its validity is subsequently known by the knowledge of the excellence of its causes; or the knowledge of its harmony with the real nature of its object, or the knowledge of a fruitful action and sets aside its intrinsic invalidity.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards the validity of knowledge as due to the excellence (gunna) of its causes. These schools regard both validity and invalidity of knowledge as extrinsic.

Check Your Progress 1

Notes: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. Explain Svataḥ pramāṇyavāda.

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20.3 SOURCES OF VALID KNOWLEDGE (PRAMĀNAS)

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa recognizes six pramāṇas. These are;

- i) Perception
- ii) Inference
- iii) Comparison
- iv) Verbal testimony
- v) Postulation (*Arthāpatti*)
- vi) Non- apprehension (*Anupalabdhi*)

Prabhākara rejects non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) as a source of valid knowledge. He states that negation can't be an independent *pramāṇa*. The reason he gives, it is a disagreement with positive facts or phenomena which are found in other pramāṇas. Thus, he accepts five pramāṇas. Let us illustrate all the above pramāṇas in a sequential manner.

Perception

Perception is a form of knowledge which results from the contact between the object and the sense-organs. Generally, we believe whatever is perceived by our senses must be true because in perception, the objects are directly known through our sense-organs. Thus perception is an immediate knowledge. Example; by seeing and touching a table one can acquire the knowledge of that table. Perceptual knowledge is valid only when an object is perceived as it is.

Like Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṃsā School has classified perception in various kinds from different perspectives. Firstly, perception is classified in two types; ordinary (*laukika*) and extraordinary (*alaukika*). When sense organs come into the contact with the object in the usual way we have ordinary perception. *savikalpaka* (determinate) and *nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate) are two forms of ordinary perception. The detail analysis of these two perceptions are found in the first unit of this block. In the case of extraordinary perception, the objects are not presented to the senses in the usual way but they are conveyed to the sense through unusual medium. On perception, the basic difference between the *Nyāya* and the Mīmāṃsā philosophy is, the Naiyayikas regard the auditory organ as proceeding from ether (*ākāśa*) while the Mimamsikas regard it is proceeding from space (*dik*).

Inference (Anumāna)

The second kind of *pramāṇa* is called *anumāna*. Inference is a kind of knowledge, which is based on previous cognition. In perception we have direct knowledge of an object because there is a direct presentation of an object before our sense organs. Therefore, perceptual knowledge is immediate.

In *anumāna*, there is no such direct presentation of the object and therefore it is called *parokṣa jñāna* or mediate knowledge. In *anumāna*, an object is inferred to be present in a particular case because it has been invariably perceived to be

present in all such similar cases. Thus in anumāna, the cognition of an object is based on our prior knowledge of it. For example, we see smoke in a distant hill. From the presence of smoke, we at-once infer that there must be fire in the distant hill.

Comparison (*Upamāna*)

Upamāna is a *pramāṇa* recognized by the Mimamsikas as similar to Naiyāyikas' views. In *upamāna*, knowledge of an object is determined by comparing it with other similar kinds of objects. Thus roughly it is treated as analogy. For example, assume a situation where a man has not seen a *gavaya* or a wild cow and doesn't know what it is. A forester told him that a wild cow is an animal like a country cow but she is more furious and has big horns on her forehead. In a later period he comes across a wild cow in a forest and recognizes it as the wild cow by comparing the descriptions made by the forester. This knowledge is possible due to the *upamāna* or comparison. Thus, *upamāna* is the knowledge of the relation between a name and the object it denotes by that name.

Verbal Testimony (*śabda*)

According to the Mīmāṃsā philosophy, testimony is a reliable statement uttered by a trustworthy person similar to Nyāya Philosophy. It is stated that a sentence consists of a group of words, and a word is considered as an entity which has the power to express some meaning. Testimony is a valid knowledge, which is derived from word or sentence. But all words or sentences can't be treated as testimony because all verbal expressions are not necessarily regarded as valid knowledge. So, on the account of Mīmāṃsakas, *śabda* must be based on the verbal assertion of a trustworthy person who knows the truth and desires to speak the truth for the guidance of others.

Verbal testimony is used as meaningful words or sentences. The mere combination of letters or the words don't provide a valid knowledge. Therefore, words and sentences must be used in a specific sense whose meaning will be clear, as a result, it would be treated as a valid *pramāṇa*.

Postulation (*Arthāpatti*)

This is a unique source of valid knowledge upheld by the Mimamsikas. In other words, the Mimamsikas expressed *arthāpatti* as a valid method of cognition. The expression "arthāpatti" is a combination of two words namely 'artha' and 'āpatti'. The term artha means fact and āpatti means 'kalpanā' which is understood as 'supposition' in English. Thus, etymologically speaking, *arthāpatti* is that knowledge which resolves the conflict between two facts. It entails a presupposition which solves the problem that occurred between two facts.

Arthāpatti is the assumption of an unperceived fact in order to reconcile two apparently inconsistent perceived facts. When a known fact can't be accounted without another fact, we have to postulate the existence of a third fact. The valid and justified knowledge of the third fact is known as *arthāpatti*.

For example, Devadatta is a fat man by fasting in the day. In this proposition we find two facts. One, Devadatta is a human being alive and he is fat. Second, he is not eating in day time. In order to resolve this conflict, i.e. how a person will

be fat and not eating anything in day time, we postulate the existence of third fact, i.e. he must be eating in the night. Another example, “John is living and who is not at home”. The problem observed here is how John is alive and is not found in his home. To resolve this conflict, we postulate the fact, i.e. he may be staying in a rented house outside his home. Thus, postulation or presumption is a valid source of knowledge.

Check Your Progress II

Notes: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1. Discuss ‘arthāpatti’ as a valid pramāṇa.

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Non-Apprehension (*Anupalabdhi*)

This is an independent source of valid knowledge subscribed by the Mīmāṃsā Philosophy. Non-apprehension is the immediate knowledge of the non-existence of an object. An object doesn’t exist in a particular place and a particular time. But it exists elsewhere. To perceive the non-existent of that particular object in a given situation/place is known as *anupalabdhi*.

For example, ‘there is no book on the table’. Here, an individual does not perceive the book directly through his/her sense organs. But the knowledge of the absence or non existence of the book on the table arises because of the non-perception of the perceivable object. The absence of an object from the situation in which it should be available is said to be its non-existence. And, to possess the knowledge of non existence of objects in an existence form is called *anupalabdhi*.

20.4 THEORIES OF ERROR (*Khyātivāda*)

The theory of error is called ‘*khyātivāda*’. It is opposed to the theory ‘*pramāṇyavāda*’ (validity of knowledge). The term ‘*khyātivāda*’ is associated with invalid or erroneous knowledge. Generally *Khyāti* means knowledge or cognition. Before, entering into the discussion of theories of error which is expressed differently by different schools you should know ‘what is error?’

Error (*viparyaya*)

Error or *bhrama* is the reverse of valid knowledge (*pramā*). In the case of valid knowledge the presentation of an object is found what it really is, but in case of error, it is found in inverse mode. In case of error, we cognize what it is not. In error, an object is cognized as having certain characteristics that really fall outside of its being. Thus, it is a wrong apprehension in which the object is taken for what it is not. All errors are subjective in their nature. For example; we

cognize a snake instead of a rope. This happens because the characteristics of a snake are found in the rope. In the similar way we cognize shell erroneously as silver.

Check Your Progress III

Notes: a) Space is given below for your answers.

b) Compare your answer with the one given at the end of this unit

1. What is error?

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Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedantins propounded ‘*akhyātivāda*’ and ‘*anirvacanīya khyātivāda*’ respectively. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa advocates the theory of error known as ‘*viparīta khyātivāda*’. Nyāya accepts ‘*anyathākhyātivāda*’, Earlier Sāṅkya and Rāmānuja advocates ‘*Satkhyātivāda*’, Later Sāṅkya and Jainism advocate ‘*sadasatkhyātivāda*’, Śūnyavāda accepts ‘*asatkhyātivāda*’ and Vijñānavāda advocates ‘*ātmakhyātivāda*’. Let us discuss how they establish their theory in their own ways.

Akhyātivāda

This theory of error is advocated by Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā. It is also known as ‘*viveka khyāti*’. According to Prabhākara School of Mīmāṃsā, there is no invalid cognition. A particular cognition may be less true but it can never be untrue. They recognize two fold classification of cognition. These are;

- i) Valid cognition
- ii) Memory

But they did not acknowledge delusive cognition as a third class. This is because delusive cognition generates out of above two cognitions.

For example, ‘This is silver’. The ‘this’ is perceptually cognized and the ‘silver’ is remembered. The cognition of the ‘this’ is perceptual because there is sense contact with what is present before us, i.e. shell. However, the cognition of silver is a memory being generated by our sense-impression. In this case, the cognizer fails to demarcate percept from *smṛti*. As a result, our knowledge of the object is treated as erroneous. Hence we cognize shell as silver.

Anirvacanīya Khyātivāda

This theory of error is proposed by Advaita Vedantins. It states that something is presented to our senses because of *avidyā* or ignorance. Due to *avidyā* the cognizer cognizes an object something different from what it is.

For example, we cognize shell as silver. In this case our knowledge of silver is imposed on the object 'shell'. So it is erroneous. Further, they said that nothing is found real in this world because knowledge of an object is altered in the next moment. Due to 'I-ness', we cognize objects in the world. But the fact is that there is only one reality that is eternal and unchanging which is known as Brahman. Hence, whatever we cognize is not real.

Therefore, the nature of creation is indescribable. This implies that cognition of shell as well as silver is not real. Hence, the theory of error is indescribable.

Viparīta Khyātivāda

In regard to the theory of error, Bhaṭṭa School of Mīmāṃsā proposed a new theory known as '*viparīta khyātivāda*'. In their view, error lies because of the wrong relation between the object and sense organs, but it is not due to the objects which are real. For example, people belong to different parts of the world see one and the same moon but wrongly claim that they see different moons. This theory of error is reversal of right behaviour towards an object. For him error is miss-apprehension.

Anyathākhyātivāda

Nyāya Philosophy believes that error is miss-apprehension. It is like Kumarila's Viprītakhyāti. Naiyāyikas say that the presented object is perceived elsewhere (anyathā) and represented object is perceived elsewhere. For Example when someone mistakenly perceive silver in place of shell, then s(he) perceived (presented) shell as (represented) silver (elsewhere) and perceive silver in the other place (elsewhere). The perception of silver is revival in the memory due to jñānalakṣaṇapratyakṣa. Kumārila does not accept such kind of pratyakṣa.

Satkhyātivāda

Ramanuja accepts that error is non-apprehension. Similar to Prabhākar, he believes that error is imperfect and not ignorance. It is partial truth. For him every object has the qualities of others, that is why error occurs. For this he accepts triplication (trivṛt karaṇa) or quintuplication (pañcī karaṇa). The shell appears as silver, because some particles of silver exist in the shell. That is why this theory is also called Yathārthakhyāti or akhyāti-saṁvalitasatkhyāti (non-apprehension-cum-apprehension of reality).

Asatkhyātivāda

For Śūnyavādin reality is void. Void means no independent origination. So for them error means that the object of cognition is unreal (asat), because reality is void.

Ātmakhyātivāda

According to Vijñānavādin error is the superimposition of the vijñāna (form of cognition) on the so-called external object. In reality external object is unreal.

Sadasatkhyātivāda

Later Sāṅkhya (*Sāṅkhya Sūtra*) and Jainism believe that in erroneous perception the cognition of the object is real but the synthesis of the cognition is unreal.

Abhinavanyathākhyātivāda

Madhva theory of error is known as Abhinava anyathā khyāti. The past experience of real silver that has created an impression in the mind is triggered on seeing a shell due to certain defects. The 'silver' seen on shell is non-existent. Due to the confusion between the mental impressions of silver with the shell it gives rise to the illusion of silver.

20.5 METAPHYSICS

The Mīmāṃsā Philosophy believes in the existence of an eternal world and the innumerable individual souls within it. They also admit the existence (presence) of other eternal and infinite substances in the earth. They viewed that the world is constituted of three types of elements. These are; body, sense organs and eternal things. The self in the body enjoys the fruit of its actions. Sense organs used as the means to experience pleasure and pain. External things are meant for enjoyment. Apart from all these realities they also believe in many other realities like, the existence of heaven, hell, etc. although these are not perceivable. Thus, Mīmāṃsakas are treated as pluralistic realists.

The Mīmāṃsakas agreed upon the view that the creation and destruction of the world is based on our karmas. Hence, they ruled out the existence of God behind the creation of the world. For them, God is an unseen power who guides/instructs us to do certain karmas in a certain time/period.

Regarding categories, Prabhākara School of Mīmāṃsā recognizes eight categories. These are; substance (*Dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), generality (*sāmānya*), inherence (*samvāya*), force (*śakti*), number (*saṃkhyā*) and similarity (*sadrshya*). Differing from Prabhākara, Kumārila admits only four positive categories out of eight. These are; substance, quality, generality and action. Further, Kumārila adds one more in his list-abhāva.

Theory of Causation

According to the Mīmāṃsā philosophy, theory of causation is explained through 'theory of energy'. They explained that there are potent energies found in the cause. As a result, a particular cause produces a particular effect and that has been observed or known by us (human beings). Thus each phenomenon can be explained only by the theory of potent energy in the cause. If the potent energy is absent, no effect would be observed. An example can clarify this notion. If we fry a seed and sown in the soil, it won't sprout out. The reason is the potent energy of the seed is consumed in the process of burning it.

20.6 NATURE OF SELF

About the self, Mīmāṃsakas admit that there are innumerable selves exist in the world. For them, souls are of two sorts. One is liberated soul and other is living soul (individuals of the earth). This implies every living being possesses a distinct self or soul. For Mīmāṃsakas, the self is eternal and imperishable substance. When a living animal dies, it won't die with it. It continues to live to reap the fruits of its deeds. According to Mīmāṃsakas, 'consciousness' is not the essential attribute of the self. Rather, it is considered as an adventitious quality that emerges in particular situations. For example, while in deep sleep

consciousness is not found in the self. This is so because in this stage there will be no contact between sense organs with objects.

Kumārila says that there is no knowledge of self as we have the knowledge of external objects like, tree, grass, bird, etc. Thus, for him, self is the object of self consciousness. Further, he states that when we concentrate on self we realize 'I exist'. Refuting this view Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā expresses that the self can't be the subject and object of the same knowledge. This is so because one thing can't be both the 'doer' and the 'deed' at the same time, and in addition to that the function of the doer and the deed are opposite/contrast to each other. Thus, on the account of Prabhākara, an objective knowledge consists of three constituents; the knower, the known, and the knowledge. All these three constituents are known simultaneously for acquiring the knowledge of an object. For example, "I know this table". Here, the knower is "I", the known is 'table' and the knowledge that acquires is about the object 'table'.

Check Your Progress IV

Notes: a) Space is given below for your answers.

b) Compare your answer with the one given at the end of this unit

1. Explain the Mīmāṃsaka's views on 'self'.

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20.7 GOD AND LIBERATION

The Mīmāṃsā Philosophy has given much importance to the Veda than the God. The Vedas prescribe eternal principles to do one's own duties and possess a good and healthy life in the cosmic world. God becomes only the name to offer flowers while performing the rituals. They consider 'yajña' is the highest sacrifice to achieve summum bonum in one's life. Yajña is not for the worship to Gods or propitiation of Gods but purification of one's own soul.

There are two sorts of actions performed by living soul in this earth. One; actions are performed to achieve certain worldly pleasures. Second; actions are to be performed because the *Gīta* prescribes it. In short, the former action is known as duty for duty sake and later is known as duty for deity. Since, there are actions, there are attachment with worldly objects, hence arouses sufferings and pains. To detract from (get rid of) all sorts of sufferings, one needs to get liberation. In this regard, Mīmāṃsakas state that the self moves in the cycle of birth and death because of its action and attachment towards worldly pleasures. The state of liberation can be attained only when the self gets emancipation from the bondages of mind, body, sense organs and objects of the world. This helps the self to remain free from the cycle of birth and death. In the state of liberation, the self cannot enjoy the experience of pleasure and pain because it is devoid of consciousness.

Thus, for Mīmāṃsakas, liberation is not a state of bliss. It is a state where the self achieves its real nature and dissociated from worldly pleasure and pain.

20.8 LET US SUM UP

The founder of the Mīmāṃsā School is Jaimini. He is the author of Mīmāṃsā Sūtra followed by two chief commentators, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara Mishra out of many.

Epistemology (*Jñānamīmāṃsā*)

A valid knowledge is one, that doesn't arise from defective causes, it is devoid of contradictions and dealt with object. The Mīmāṃsā philosophy states about Svataḥ pramāṇyavāda (intrinsic validity) and Parataḥ pramāṇyavāda (extrinsic validity).

Metaphysics (*Tattvamīmāṃsā*)

The Mīmāṃsā philosophy is pluralistic realism because they suggest there are innumerable objects existing in the world. There are infinite and eternal souls also exist in the world. Souls are of two sorts. One is a liberated soul and another is, a living soul. This implies as many bodies as there are many souls. Further, they said that non-perceivable entities exist in the world, like, hell, heaven, etc.

20.9 KEY WORDS

Sūtra	: Sūtra (Sanskrit) literally means a thread or line that holds things together, and more metaphorically refers to an aphorism, or a collection of such aphorisms.
Karmakāṇḍa	: <i>Karmakāṇḍa</i> refers to portions of the <i>Samhitās</i> and <i>Brāhmaṇas</i> with ceremonial rituals used in a system of worship to establish communication with gods.

20.10 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

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20.11 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Answers to Check Your Progress I

1. Svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda means intrinsic validity of knowledge. In this case, knowledge arises from the essential nature of its causes untainted by defects, and is known by the knowledge itself. Intrinsic validity of knowledge consists in its being generated by the complement of causal conditions of the knowledge itself, and not by extraneous conditions besides them.

Answers to Check Your Progress II

1. *Arthāpatti* or postulation is the assumption of an unperceived fact in order to reconcile two apparently inconsistent perceived facts. When a known fact can't be accounted without another fact, we have to postulate the existence of third fact. The valid and justified knowledge of the third fact is known as *arthāpatti*.

Answers to Check Your Progress III

1. All error is subjective. In case of error, we cognize an object what is not present. An object is cognized as having certain characteristics that falls outside of its being. Thus, it is a wrong apprehension or non-apprehension in which the object is taken for what it is not. For example, cognizing a shell as silver.

Answers to Check Your Progress IV

1. According to Mīmāṃsakas, there are innumerable selves existing in the world. Self or soul are of two types. One is liberated soul and another is living soul (individuals of the earth). This implies every living being possesses a distinct self. For them, a self is eternal and imperishable. When a living animal dies, it won't die with it. It continues to live to reap the fruits of its deeds.