
UNIT 13 INTER AND INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS

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13.1 INTRODUCTION

There is no denying the fact that theories simplify reality and they have been true to their times. Realism, for instance, was the dominant theory throughout the Cold War because it “provided simple but powerful explanations for war, alliances, imperialism, obstacles to cooperation and other international phenomena, consistent with the central features of the American-Soviet rivalry.” Classical realists like Morgenthau and Niebuhr believed that states, like human beings, had an innate desire to dominate others, which led them to fight wars. Morgenthau stressed the virtues of classical, multipolar, balance-of-power system and saw the bipolar rivalry between US and the Soviet Union as especially dangerous.

By contrast, the “neorealist” theory advanced by Kenneth Waltz ignored human nature and focused on the effects of international system. For Waltz, in an anarchical set-up, states (mostly great powers) had to survive on its own. This condition would lead weaker states to balance against, rather than bandwagon with more powerful rivals. And contrary to Morgenthau, he claimed that bipolarity was more stable than multipolarity. Waltz was in favour of defensive realism, which was challenged by Stephen Van Ever, Robert Jervis, who argued in favour of ‘offensive realism,’ where wars were more likely when states could conquer each other easily.

The principal challenge to realism came from the school of liberal theorists who argued that economic interdependence, Weapons of Mass Destruction, had reduced realism to an ‘academic scrapheap,’ as states refrained from using force against each other. And warfare threatened mutual prosperity and survival. A second strand, often associated with President Woodrow Wilson, saw the spread of democracy as the key to world peace, based on the premise that ‘democracies do not fight each other.’ A third theory argued that ‘regimes/institutions’ could help overcome selfish state behaviour, by encouraging them

to forego immediate gains for the greater benefit of enduring cooperation. While classical liberal theories, saw states as the central players in international affairs, more modern liberals flirted with the idea that transnational actors (multinational corporations) were gradually replacing states as potential actors on the world stage.

Other radical approaches to mainstream realist and liberal traditions came from Marxism, as orthodox Marxist theorists saw capitalism as the central cause of international conflict. And Neo-Marxist “dependency” theorists argued that advanced capitalist powers along with the ruling classes of the developing world had grown rich by exploiting the poor/proletariats of the less developed states. The solution lied in overthrowing these ‘pseudo elite’ and installing a revolutionary government committed to autonomous development.

Whatever the theories may be, the fact remains that there always has been a conflict between states and within states. Since the end of World War II and more so after the end of Cold War there have been changes in the type and nature of conflicts and causes for those. There also has been a shift from concerns for national pride towards development and human security.

Although, how states prepare to improve themselves for the change are country-specific, they ought to take the challenges of preparing itself for the 21st century for three reasons: One, to avert economic backwardness; two, to respond to demographic and environmental challenges through appropriate use of ‘technology’; and three, to reduce chances of political instability and threats of violence and war by anticipating and preparing for it beforehand. Book VII of Kautilya’s *Arthashastra* says: When the advantages derivable from peace and war are of equal character, one should prefer peace; for disadvantages, such as the loss of power and wealth, sojourning and sin are ever attending upon war. There is need to understand the phenomena of wars and conflict. In this unit we will discuss that.

Aims and Objectives

After reading this unit, you would be able to understand:

- the incidence of inter/intra-state conflicts in Asia;
- meaning of Inter-State and intra State Conflicts;
- whether Asia is more ‘warlike’ as societies here are more poverty-stricken and technology has failed to meet the demands of its growing population;
- whether seeds of intra-state conflicts are hidden in the ‘weak status’; and
- whether inter/intra state conflicts in India have similar cause’s via-a-via perceived variable encompassing South Asian conflicts.

13.2 DEFINITION OF INTER/INTRA –STATE CONFLICTS

On Google search one finds interstate violence being defined as a conflict between two or more states that use their respective armies/national forces in the conflict. On the contrary, intrastate conflicts are defined as sustained political violence that takes place between armed groups within the state and one or more non-state groups. Violence of

this sort is usually confined within the borders of a single state, but usually have international dimension and holds the risks of spilling over into bordering countries.

Since the end of the Second World War, classical or inter-state wars between countries accounted for less than 25 per cent of the 196 wars between 1945 and 2001. The former colonial powers, Great Britain and France, the US and the former USSR took part in these wars since 1945. In most cases, they engaged in ongoing wars on behalf of one party or as members of UN missions rather than starting wars. These interventions occurred to back a certain regime in power or as an upshot of Cold War rivalry between the two superpowers. And most of these wars after 1945 took place in the Third World — West Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast Asia being the most war-torn regions. In South Asia, for instance, conflicts, according to SD Muni can be broadly put into 4 categories: i) those imposed and escalated by global, political, strategic and developmental dynamics, including the role of great powers; ii) those inherited and strategically induced in inter-state engagement; iii) those precipitated and nurtured by internal political turbulence, socio-cultural fault-lines and developmental distortions; iv) those that are caused and covered by non-state actors. The United States post 9/11 intervention in Afghanistan to wage a “global war on terrorism”, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979-80 and the US-led resistance to this intervention during 1980-89, will come under the first category. The Chinese war on India in 1962 was also a war inflicted on a South Asian country from outside the region. In the second category, India-Pakistan conflicts would assume an important place. In the third category would fall all the insurgencies and ethnic/sectarian conflicts in South Asia and the fourth category would cover activities of the terrorist groups, like the one on Mumbai in 2008, or the operations of insurgent and criminal groups across the borders in South Asia.

While most scholars see colonial legacies of unresolved borders, turbulent and unfinished processes of state and nation-building as conventional reasons of inter-state war in the region, the “war on global terrorism” and globalisation are also seen as giving rise to conflictual situation in the 21st century. “Globalisation,” according to SD Muni, “which has otherwise stirred up global developmental processes and opened up several opportunities for the countries of South Asia, have induced distortions by widening inequalities, creating and sustaining poverty, enhancing consumerism, encouraging crony capitalism and intensifying cultural alienation.” Moreover unnatural and open borders along with its contiguous ethnic and social spread have easily allowed one country’s internal conflicts to spill-over into the other, leading to bilateral conflicts. India’s involvement in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict and the emergence of Bangladesh, Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism against India and Afghanistan, Nepal’s resentment over the flow of Nepali refugees from Bhutan are examples of internal conflicts turning into bilateral and regional conflicts in South Asia.

Traditional and Expanded Typology of War

Traditional Typology	Expanded Typology
International Wars A. Inter-State wars B. Extra-systemic wars C. Imperial D. Colonial II. Civil Wars	Inter-State Wars
	II. Extra-State Wars A. State vs. independent non-state actor B. State vs. dependent non-state actor III. Intra-State Wars A. Civil Wars B. For central control C. For local issues D. Inter-Communal wars

13.2.1 Country Case Study

We can understand the emerging nature of inter-state conflicts by looking into the specific case of the bilateral dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands known as Diaoyutai to the Chinese, with support from global power from outside. The following sections look into this dispute with an analysis of regional efforts at averting such a calamity.

Inter-State Conflict: The East China Sea Problem in Perspective

The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands consisting of five uninhabited islets and three barren rocks are located approximately 120 nautical miles southwest of Okinawa. The Islands which were occupied by the United States after World War II, were returned to Japan in 1972 with administrative rights over the Senkaku Islands granted to Tokyo, a move that was jointly criticized by China and Taiwan, as Beijing stated that “the United States and Japan conducted ‘backroom deals’ concerning the power of administration over Diaoyu Dao.” Since then the dispute has escalated, as the Japanese administration purchased privately-held leases to three of the five islands in 2012; and ever since the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) survey of the East China and Yellow Sea suggested that a vast deposit of hydrocarbon resources were to be found on or near the continental shelf shared by China, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan.

Chinese maritime and air intrusions have occurred daily into the maritime and territorial waters of this region, with Beijing encouraging fishing, drilling activities, including dispatching civilian marine surveillance and law enforcement vessels to exercise nominal administrative control. The newly elected governments in China and Japan—the one led by Shinzo Abe and the other headed by Xi Jinping, have, both, reiterated their intentions to strongly guard their “indisputable sovereignty” over these islands and their surrounding waters. Under such circumstances, most maritime scholars have voiced their fear that the situation

in the East China Sea is more dangerous than the South China Sea problem as there have been no noticeable dialogue between the two countries. While China and Japan have preferred to keep its territorial dispute within its bilateral channel of negotiation (the 2008 agreement on a joint development zone and gas project), the Asia-Pacific countries have agreed on a common set of norms for maritime security that will be acceptable to disputant parties.

The East Asian Summit, held in November 2011 offered a venue for discussion of maritime security in the Asia-Pacific. The US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev joined the meeting as observers, and while territorial disputes were not on the agenda, the rights to transit through the complex array of waters off continental Asia were discussed. The statement issued by the 18 countries represented in the EAS Recognised the importance of the international law of the sea that contains crucial norms towards the realisation of peace and stability in the region. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China, have reached consensus on a 'dual track approach' committing to discuss disputes bilaterally without hampering the centrality of ASEAN. Indonesia as a de facto leader of ASEAN has been pushing for a unified approach to the dispute among the members. According to Amitav Acharya, Asian security institution have done well in the spread of cooperative security (like the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation), engagement of former adversaries (ASEAN and Vietnam, China and former USSR, India and Pakistan), the involvement of all major powers of the world and the simultaneous engagement of US and China, although, one should not be too enamoured by the pace and progress of regional structures as response has been slower than that from countries outside the region.

In overall terms, Chinese posture in the East Asian waters presents the classic case of a rising sea power challenging an established one in this zone. According to maritime scholars, such rivalry can either lead to confrontation, crisis or war. Based on Alfred Mahan's theory, sea power is key to world power, as witnessed all through the 19th and 20th centuries in the phenomenal rise of Great Britain in the 19th century which was later replaced by the United States: in the imperial rise of Japan in the 1920s which relentlessly sought to expand and modernize its navy to which United States responded by deploying its fleets in the Pacific in the 1930s: the Chinese naval strategy of the 21st century, are primarily aimed at accelerating off-shore operations, while developing blue-water capabilities of conducting mobile operations, carrying out international cooperation and countering non-traditional security threats (the PLA Navy organised seven batches of blue-water training in 2012 and another two batches in the first half of 2013. From April to September 2012, the training vessel 'Zhenghe' completed a global voyage training exercise).

According to C. Raja Mohan, apart from traditional assumptions that Chinese naval modernization is aimed at the unification of Taiwan, there are a range of other ambitions beginning to define the process. These ambitions, include securing China's many disputed maritime territorial claims all along its eastern seaboard, legitimizing its interpretation of International Law on freedom of navigation, protecting China's Sea lanes of communication to the Indian Ocean on which the nation's economy depends, underwriting China's emerging role as a great power and promoting Beijing's influence in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

The Chinese Navy has, in fact, emerged as the fastest growing force in the Chinese military as by 2020 PLAN is expected to have 73 principal combatants; 78 submarines,

including 12 nuclear; 80 medium and heavily amphibious lift ships; and 94 guided missile boats; Chinese analysts see the period up to 2020 as one of transition to a blue-water force. Besides the Taiwan contingencies, Beijing is emphasizing the creation of capabilities for sustainable blue-water operations beyond its first island chain. China's maritime geography being defined in terms of island chains running parallel to its coastline—the first chain running along the Kuril Islands, Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia. The second island chain runs from a north-south line from the Kuril through Japan, the Bonins, the Marianas, the Carolines and Indonesia. Together, they encompass maritime areas of nearly 1,800 nautical miles from China's coast, including most of the East China Sea and East Asian sea lines of communication.

The US Navy that dominated the two island chains since World War II, find itself threatened along with other middle powers of the region. While most observers seeking solution to these problems mention the need for increased 'regionalism', 'cooperation' through multilateral forums like ASEAN, the ARF and other sub-regional groupings, there is no denying the fact that behind any collective security agendas, the general security environment in this region is tilted more towards competition than cooperation.

Alarmed at China's assertive posture in the maritime domain, Tokyo views the South and East China Sea issues as inextricably interlinked. While Japan is not a claimant in the South China Sea, it has two major concerns regarding the dispute: one, that instability in this area has the potential to disrupt the free flow of maritime trade on which the country's economic prosperity depends; second, if China is able to persuade other Asian nations into accepting its claimed "historic rights" in the South China Sea, it might do the same in turning East China Sea into a "Lake Beijing."

To mitigate its concern, Tokyo is found pursuing a number of strategies: it has raised the problem at regional security forums; it tries to encourage ASEAN unity on issues of maritime security; it discusses the problem bilaterally with Southeast Asian countries, provides capacity building support to selected claimants; and it seeks closer ties with other external stakeholders in the region. At the ARF meeting in Hanoi in July 2010, Japan was one of 12 countries that expressed concern at developments in the South China Sea, a move it repeated in 2011 and 2012. At the 2012 ARF, Japan described the South China Sea dispute as "directly related to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region," and called on all parties to clarify their claims in accordance with UNCLOS and expressed serious concern over the Sino-Philippine Scarborough Shoal Incident in May-June, 2012. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda reiterated these concerns at the EAS in November 2012. Japan has welcomed America's "pivot" or rebalancing of military forces towards Asia. In December 2012, Shinzo Abe's government proposed a "Democratic Security Diamond" comprising Japan, America, India and Australia in which these four countries would work together to "safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the Western Pacific."

As far as America is concerned, Washington, so far, has maintained an ambiguous posture towards territorial sovereignty issues because it does not want to be involved in regional disputes, a consistent US policy. Whilst American fundamental tenets on disputes are clear- that nations should resolve their *disputes* without coercion, intimidation or the use of force—the US unified maritime strategy, presented in 2007, clearly explains the defence of the freedom of navigation and commerce as a 'core capability' of US naval forces, committed towards 'imposing local sea control wherever necessary, ideally with our friends and allies, but by ourselves if we must.' Although US has little interest in

provocation, but it has been seeking a more direct, deployed presence, as its 'pivot' is aimed at much a rebalance within the region as a 'rebalance' towards the region. These include new deployments to Singapore and Australia; an increased rotation of forces through the Philippines, as well as a revised agreement to relocate 9,000 marines from Okinawa in Japan to Guam, Hawaii and Australia. According to Sarah Raine and Christian Le Miere, the US aims to benefit from the dispersal of its forces through East Asia in terms of its relation with China as well as with the broader region. The pragmatic removal of its troops out of the range of Chinese missiles signals a defensive stance, while the broader distribution of troops across the region allows for stronger relationship to be built with a wider number of allies, vis-a-vis creating a robust defensive posture to counter China's asymmetric capabilities.

13.3 INTER-STATE CONFLICTS

The preponderance of balance of power situation, rule of law, democracy, economic interdependence among 'rational' nations, role of regional/supra-national organisations have averted outright outbreak of conflicts between developing societies. Although the world has not seen a purely conventional war, more than 30 countries – including Colombia, Iraq, Israel, Mexico, Pakistan, Somalia and Ukraine – now find themselves fighting foes that rely on guerrilla or terrorist tactics. Here protracted (intra-state) conflicts linked with 'Great Transformation' superimposed by capitalist modernity have become common phenomena in these societies. According to Dietrich Jung and Klas Schlichte, institutions of modern state in these countries are usually incapable of mediating the social conflicts resulting from society's transformation to capitalism. The state is not the crystallization point of collective identity, but only a formal framework acquired during the colonial past and guaranteed by world order and international law. The state exists in many Third World countries as a mere territorial and legal cover, as an imposed form whose social content has yet to consolidate itself. In this consolidation form, violence is a rational option for self-enrichment or for gaining political power.

13.3.1 The Weak States

K.J. Holsti argues that 'regimes populated by strong states, defined in terms of legitimacy are arenas of peace. And regions of weak and failed states are prime location of war. Weak states being defined by the following characteristics:

- a) The ends or purposes of governance are contested in such states;
- b) There are two or more "differentially treated communal groups" within the state;
- c) The government apparatus is 'captured' or held by one group, which systematically excludes others. Its strategies for dealing with 'minorities' range from expulsion (Uganda, Myanmar), forced integration (Sudan) to various forms of systemic exclusion (Myanmar, Iraq, Sri Lanka) and ethnocide (Rwanda);
- d) The government is 'captured' by a family or clan for the primary purpose of personal enrichment;
- e) Major communal or ideological groups or nations identify with or are loyal to external states/societies;
- f) The state is incapable of delivering basic services or providing security and order for the population (India, Lebanon, Somalia and Afghanistan today);

- g) The government relies primarily on violence, coercion and intimidation to maintain itself in power, often targeting nations/minorities or ideological groups (Myanmar under military regime for 50 years) to gain support from other groups;
- h) The state lacks legitimacy as inhabitants do not regard their rulers as providing a legitimate authority.

The characteristic of 'failed' states being ones with:

- a) One or more armed sovereigns exists within the state;
- b) An external power wields effective authority or influence within the territory of the state and has the coercive capacity to resist pressures from legal authorities;
- c) Communities fight each other and the central authorities lack the capacity to end them. (Rwanda in 1994);
- d) The state is incapable of providing minimal security for ordinary tasks of life—commerce, transportation, agriculture and communication—to proceed. These tasks have to be performed by outsiders, as has been done by the United Nations in Somalia.

13.4 INTER STATE CONFLICTS IN ASIA

Europe since the 1990s was 'primed for peace' because of the waning of factors like offense dominance, militarism and hyper-nationalism in their foreign policy planning and implementation. And democratization, less stratification of societies on social and economic grounds and absent 'warlike' aggressive revolutionary states at their internal 'systemic' level. In contrast, Asia, since the 1990s saw the preponderance of weak/failed (largely a Western {American} invent) states owing to prolonged internal civil wars, political instability, lack of civil society, ethnic, racial aberrations posing daunting challenges to the statecraft and governance. In South Asia, for instance, India and Pakistan have been instances of weak states. Pakistan, since its inception, had to undertake many challenges like forming the government, enactment of Constitution, frequent and continued military dictatorship, sectarian violence, economic turmoil, corruption, activities of militants and many undemocratic practices. The very Islamic identity which was once the keystone of the foundation of the state has been used to breed, nurture and pamper radicals. With the result that US President Barak Obama once tagged Pakistan as the 'ladle of terrorism'. Any scholar would have doubted the very existence of the state as it is.

India as a nation-state has been viewed both as a strong and a weak state by its critics and admirers. While one saw the state as an 'oppressive monopolist of power', others believed that it lacked the will and the strength to stand up to the West or put its own minorities in their place. One seemed to welcome the possible disintegration of the country; others were 'terrified of the break-up of India,' thinking that 'India has still not recovered from partition and any further secessions would lead to 'Balkanization' of the country. Jawaharlal Nehru once pointed out that India was home to all that is truly disgusting as well as truly noble in the human condition. Contemporary India, says Ramchandra Guha, like yesteryears, is home to pluralists and democrats as well as to fanatics and sectarians; to selfless social workers as well as to greedy politicians; to honest and upright officials as well as to officials who are time-servers; to capitalists who distribute their wealth quietly and widely as well as to those who seek only to publicly and provocatively display it. "We are in some ways where Europe wants to be, but we

have a tremendous job of reform, of repairing our damaged institutions, and of inventing new ones.”

In other states of Asia, like Iraq and Afghanistan, dictatorship, regimes of torture, mass murder and sectarian violence within the countries, threatened to rip it apart and gave militancy – the kinds of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, ISIS an operating base under its roof. In Southeast Asia, sectarian violence against Rohingya Muslims of Myanmar have rendered them ‘stateless’ as Myanmar’s Buddhist populace regard Rohingyas as “illegal” migrants from Bangladesh with no rightful claim to stay in the Rakhine state. In 1982, Burma passed a citizenship law Recognising eight races and 130 minority groups—but omitted the nation’s 80,000 Rohingya’s among Burma’s 60 million people. Members of Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslim minority have been victims of attacks and widespread abuse from time immemorial; they have been barred from citizenship, work, and travel, restrictive laws pertaining to marriage and having children, religious practice and even proper burial of their dead. Even the first census of the country in over 30 years denied self-identification to the Rohingyas. The census requires the Rohingya’s to self-identify as “other/Bengali” under a column designated for “foreigners.” Although the political reforms of President Thein Sein have earned him praises from all circles, most have criticized the negative repercussions of a ‘failed state’ for “permanent segregation of its ethnic communities.” “You have a Muslim minority in [Myanmar],” said US President Barack Obama “that the broader population has historically looked down upon and whose rights are not being fully protected.” “Myanmar won’t succeed if the Muslim population is oppressed,” said Obama while addressing a town hall of young leaders from across South East Asia.

Table 13.1: War Onsets per Decade

Decade	Inter-State Wars	Extra-State Wars	Subtotal for International Wars	Civil Wars
19 th century	30	73	103	71
1900-1909	6	4	10	7
1910-1919	8	6	14	11
1920-1929	2	6	8	12
1930-39	9	2	11	8
1940-1949	3	5	8	9
1950-1959	3	6	9	11
1960-69	6	3	9	16
1970-1979	7	3	10	26
1980-89	4	0	4	19
1990-97	1	0	1	24
20 th century	49	35	84	135

Source: Taken from Meredith Reid Sarkees Et Al, *Inter-State, Intra-State and Extra-State Wars 1989-2007: Inter-State Conflicts (9); Intra-State Conflicts (54)*

13.5 INTER/INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS IN INDIA

India, the largest country of South Asia, is plagued by three major conflicts-separatism and terrorism in Kashmir, insurgency in North-east and Naxalite violence in Central and East India – each of these conflicts having regional network and interstate dimensions. While violence in Kashmir is largely supported and promoted by neighbouring country, the North-Eastern insurgents have had safe sanctuaries Myanmar and Bangladesh and the Naxals / Maoists.

Though none of these conflicts have the potential to challenge the survival of India as a state, they have impeded India's speedy growth and greater role in global affairs. Then there are inter-state disputed between Assam and Nagaland over vast tracts of land which Assam claim to have encroached by Nagaland; disputes between Gujarat and Rajasthan over Mangadh Hills; that between Assam and Arunachal Pradesh over alleged Assamese encroachment and the separations of Telangana from Andhra Pradesh over issues of resources distribution.

According to South Asian experts, the fundamental issues underlying the veritable mass of complex conflicts in this region are shaped by four sets of variables.

One real or perceived marginalisation of certain groups that has played a crucial role in the origin of the conflict: two, perceiving marginalisation in terms of a given identity, which maybe ethnic, religious, castes or linguistic based. In case of South Asia, the intensity of such identities and their cross – border spread are crucial factors in shaping the nature of conflicts three, the response of state of conflicts, which may be military, political or economic without a holistic analysis of the root of the problem; and four, external linkages which maybe regional or extra-regional. Majority of the conflicts in South Asia have inter-state linkages due to cross national nature or identities and historical experience of the region.

13.6 SUMMARY

In this unit, you have read the meaning of inter and inter-state conflicts, their causes, nature and type. In the post-Second World War and more particularly after the end of Cold War trend is more towards intra-state conflicts. These are more so in inter-states Asia also is a major arena of inter- state conflicts. In India these conflicts are primarily in three regions, Kashmir, North East and Maoist Violence in East and Central India in the interest of citizens welfare and development, it is necessary that such conflicts are managed.

Gautam Buddha had once said: “All fear death, none are unafraid of sticks and knives, seeing yourself in others, don't kill don't harm”. Mahatma Gandhi said: “An eye for an eye goes to make the whole world blind.” At times when human beings have turned suicide-bombers, they use fellow beings as ‘shields,’ and killing innocent lives with more sophisticated weapons have become a “style,” it is hard to suggest peace and non-violence as the only recourse to wane social injustice, poverty, abuse and conflicts. Everyone seems to ask for more speedy/counter “operations” to get rid of such crimes.

It is only up to human race to choose a ‘middle path’ between gory bloodshed and peaceful coexistence of the entire universe. Buddha once said: “If one seeks retribution of vengeance through vengeance, the chain can never be broken.”

13.7 TERMINAL QUESTIONS

- 1) Define inter and intra-state conflicts.
 - 2) Analyse Asia's tryst with inter/inter-state conflicts. Suggest measures that can save the regions.
 - 3) Can Non-violence and 'middle-path' provide viable solutions to conventional and asymmetric security threats across the globe?
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