
UNIT 3 PEACE AND PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY

Structure

3.1 Introduction

Aims and Objectives

3.2 Relation between Peace and Democracy

3.3 Man as *Homo Politicus*

3.4 Rift in the flute

3.5 Mending the Rift: Participatory Democracy and Peace

3.6 Summary

3.7 Terminal Questions

Suggested Readings

3.1 INTRODUCTION

I am convinced that for practical as well as moral reasons, non-violence offers the only road to freedom for my people.

Martin Luther King Jr.

Peace and Participatory democracy: two ideals that mankind swears by, hopes to achieve and seldom realises. Peace has, although the history of mankind, been coveted as an ideal and has been frequently broken either by internal turmoil or external wars. Similarly, participatory democracy was once an actualised dream, especially in Athens, but was disrupted either by internal conflicts or by the rise of monarchies and autocracies. Democracy as we know it today, arose only three centuries ago. Today the idea of democracy is universally popular. “Most regimes, Dahl notes, stake out some sort of claim to the title of ‘democracy’ and those who do not, often insist that their particular instance of non-democratic rule is a necessary stage along the road to ultimate “democracy”. He further observes that “in our own times, even dictators appear to believe that an indispensable ingredients for their legitimacy is a dash or two of the language of democracy”.²

As Federico Mayor, the former Director-General of UNESCO, puts it: “For the world over, it is increasingly the focus of (the people’s) hopes for a brighter future and aspirations for a life of freedom and dignity.”³ Democracy represents a universal and irresistible force, which has overthrown the feudal system and vanquished mighty kings. In its onward march since its inception in its modern embodiment, the democratic idea has been universally and irresistibility victorious. But can we say the same about peace and non-violence? However, the joint occurrence of peace and participatory democracy, especially when we do not restrict the meaning of ‘participatory’ to the act of voting in elections, has yet to become a reality. They remain simply ideals to be realised. As Gleditsch observes, “Most countries, even many that are not themselves highly democratic or very peaceful, pay lip service to these ideals, as do the United Nations and other international organizations”.⁴

In view of the fact that the ideals of the joint occurrence of the ideals of peace and participatory

democracy, it can be asked: Is the joint occurrence of these two ideals simply a utopian dream? Or, if it is felt necessary that, for the good of the mankind, the realisation of these ideals together is essential, under what conditions can it become possible? Moreover, it must also be asked whether these two goals are compatible with each other or even whether they mutually support each other? Given the concerns articulated above, three interrelated facets of the questions raised above need to be examined. The first concerns the identification of the substantive referents of the terms “peace” and “participatory democracy,” if we do not take the act of voting in elections alone as the distinctive characteristic of participatory democracy. This is necessary in order to avoid the confusion that is likely to arise when democracy as we know it that is formal, representative democracy, is interchangeably used with participatory democracy. And, lastly, it is necessary to identify the conditions under which the joint occurrence of peace and participatory democracy becomes a reality. Reference here is to certain socio-political conditions, which are essential for making the realisation of the two ideals, i.e. peace and participatory democracy possible. These conditions are associated with the kind of world of pragmatic affairs that is thought to be absolutely necessary for human well-being. The management of pragmatic affairs may be inspired by competition or collaboration. Both of these modes of management of pragmatic affairs of man have differential impact on both peace and participatory democracy.

Aims and Objectives

This Unit would enable you to understand:

- The substantive referents of participatory democracy.
- Development, social order and peaceful democratic existence.
- Critical examination of developmental models.
- Differential impact of development models on peace and participatory democracy.

3.2 RELATION BETWEEN PEACE AND DEMOCRACY

Gleditsch explores the relationship between peace and democracy at four different levels: dyadic, that is, between two democratically organised political systems at national level, system level and intrastate level. For his analysis, he has relied upon statistical data involving interstate relations, used in co-relational analysis by, for example, S.A. Bremer⁵ E.N. Muller⁶. J.D. Singer, and M. Small⁷ and others. Construction of indexes of peace and war and their co-relation are relied upon to yield reliable conclusions about the relationship between peace and democracy. If organised military action with annual battle deaths exceeding 1000 has been declared as war, countries enjoying universal suffrage, full freedom of speech, etc. are treated as democratic. The results obtained from this analysis only present a mixed picture. At the dyadic level, however, the conclusion that democracies rarely fight one another seems to be quite impressive.

A secular tendency towards statistical regularity confirming a positive relationship between democratic countries and rarity of war between them seems to obtain. However, explanation for this relationship is not very convincing.⁸ It is this regularity that prompts Rudolph Rummel to pronounce that democracy is a general method of non-violence. However, when we come down to national level, the picture changes radically. The persistence of the empirical finding that democracies do not fight wars against each other is matched by the lack of relationship between the political system and war at the national level. Most studies reveal that democracies participate as much in war as do non-democracies, at least since after the Napoleonic wars.

One possible explanation for this might lie in the fact that democracies have to fight when attacked by non-democracies. However, instances of democracies declaring war against non-democracies are not lacking.

Coming to the national system level, what needs to be noted first is that since the last 150 years, there has been a process of increasing democratisation. The process has not, however, been monotonic; rather, there have been waves of democratisation, in Samuel Huntington's apt phrase. If the statistical finding that democracies do not fight unless a war is imposed upon them is true, an intriguing question can then be posed: Will war be abolished if all the countries in the world turn democratic? We return to this question later. However, on the basis of the evidence available, there seems to be a paradoxical relationship insofar as most studies come to the conclusion that democracies participate in war just as much as countries with other political systems. The reason for this perhaps lies in the fact that the initial process of democratisation is likely to be accompanied by an increasing frequency of war in the system as a whole. Only when a certain threshold is crossed further, democratisation is likely to lead to decreasing frequency of war in the system.

Insofar as the intra state level is concerned, most of the wars since World War II have been civil wars. During the period from 1989 until 1996, Peter Wallerstein and his colleagues at Uppsala University have identified a total of 101 armed conflicts occurring in 68 different locations, most of them in the Third World and all but a handful of them domestic. If the idea of democracy is the "method of non-violence," it would seem that democracies, whether old or new, should be able to resolve their differences non-violently, thus eliminating the probability of violence, organised or not. However, this does not seem to happen. One of the hypotheses advanced to explain this phenomenon concerns the theory of resource mobilisation. It is argued that the openness that democratic system allows encourages political activities of all kinds including those of the claims for entitlements. This requires even more resource mobilisation for satisfying demands processed in the political system. Failing in this, conflict and violence are likely to erupt.

It is not necessary that all such demands be expressed through political institutions. As such, a certain degree of conflict may be the price that democracies would have to pay for individual freedom that they permit. Thus, it is argued that the more democratic a state, the more likely it is that socio-political interests express political protest, non-violently as well as violently. It is precisely because of this that the democratic wave⁹ after the end of the Cold War has resulted in some new conflicts, because liberalism has permitted the open expression of old hostilities, which were previously repressed by autocratic forces. It is against this background that Edward Muller and Erich Weede conclude that domestic violence is likely to be low not only under very strict authoritarian rule, but also in highly democratic countries. In the former there is no opportunity to form an opposition, and any rebellion is nipped in the bud before it develops into an organised force. In democracies there is no motive for rebellion, because conflicts are handled in non-violent ways.

Muller and Weede argue further that in the in-between societies, the semi-democracies in particular, of its demands and the political bargaining—the opposition is able to organise. But it is unable to get full recognition for the legitimacy of its demands. Also, the bargaining process is skewed in favour of the executive authority. In this in-between area, the armed rebellion may seem justified and may offer greater promise of change than to wait for the rulers to change their ways peacefully. This conclusion is supported by empirical studies since civil wars and acts of terrorism have not infrequently taken place in some democracies. Some instances of terrorism have been supported politically and financially from non-democratic neighbouring

states. However, Jan Oscar Eugene links the occurrence of terrorism to flaws in the practice of democracy and a relatively recent legacy of authoritarian rule. He thus concludes that stable, well established and “inclusive” democracies are generally free of significant political terrorism.

It is clear from the analysis presented by Gleditsch that no firm conclusion about a positive relationship between peace and democracy can be arrived at. Insofar as the conclusion that democracies do not fight each other is concerned, it cannot be relied upon to predict and profess that if every country adopts democratic institutions, war and violence will cease. As Gleditsch observes:

The major means of promoting the expansion of democracy will remain economic and political rather than military. These means of influence are slower and less dramatic, but they may also have a lower probability of back firing. At the end of the day, democratization is probably mostly a matter of internal forces, and the outside world may have limited influence over this process. Only, then, can a world wide democratic peace may be built on a solid foundation.¹⁰

The hope, that a peaceful world after the world will emerge has been democratised is based on shifting sand. Three important reasons can be advanced for this conclusion. First, this hope is the artifact of statistical manipulation insofar as indicator of democracy covers only the shadow of real democracy; change the components of the indicator and we will have a different result. Also, as the analysis above shows, newer democracies have not been free of violence. Failing to find a satisfactory result, the hypothesis of mature and not so mature democracy has been introduced to explain anomalies. Last of all formal, representative democracy has been confused with participatory or substantive democracy.

3.3 MAN AS *HOMO POLITICUS*

With the emergence of the state, a fissure appeared between the private and the public aspects of the individual’s existence. As long as highly centralised, large states did not see the light of the day, individuals in smaller communities combined the roles both of a private person and a responsible citizen. But when the state appeared, these two aspects of the individuals were split asunder. With the rule of one (that is, monarchy) or a few (that is, aristocracy), the individual looked after his own pragmatic affairs without bothering about public affairs unless it concerned his immediate environment. However, arbitrary rule and heavy taxation provoked the people to regain political sovereignty lost to the king or the aristocracy. A long struggle ensued carried on first by the politically alert and knowledgeable gentry and later by the people themselves. People did win the right to rule and democracy reappeared on the world scene. However, the victory of democracy meant the surrender of political power of the people to a chosen few. This is what Peter T. Manicas calls the victory of “democratic ideology against democracy”.¹¹

The victory of democratic ideology was contrived by James Madison and celebrated by political pundits. What this victory substantively meant was to divest the people, the *demos*, of their sovereignty and locate it in a few persons who are claimed to represent the people. But this divestment was, as experience shows, done on false pretext. For James Madison, factionalism seemed to be the greatest stumbling block insofar as the rule by a faction and that also by a permanent factional majority was sure to impose its own perspective on the people. Madison termed this to be a rule in which the passions of one faction triumphed over the passions of other factions. Madison’s solution to this problem was to prevent the formation of a permanent majority by a resort to two institutional devices.

Madison treats factions as a source of distortion in the political system. When a faction becomes a durable majority, “the form of popular government enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens”.¹² Two measures—delegation of authority and extension of territory—would, in Madison’s view, control the ill effects of factional competition. The first was to replace direct democracy by representative democracy and the second was the extension of territory by carving out constituencies from where representatives could be elected. The delegation of authority through representative and extended territory for mobilising support would, it is claimed, protect the rationality of politico-administrative decision-making by separating it from the process of legitimising political will formation. This means restricting the role of the citizen to the selection of rulers through election. It would, it is claimed, ensure the election of those “whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of the country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations”.¹³ The expansion of territory “would prevent the formation of permanent majority and therefore render factional combinations less to be dreaded.....”¹⁴.

The victory of democratic ideology against democracy reflects at once a bias in favour of the elite and a suspicion about the common man’s capability to make wise decisions. This suspicion involves two grounds. One, it is argued that industrial civilisation has pervaded most aspects of the people’s life. This has signified the extension of what Max Weber calls rationalisation, that is, joining means to ends for better result. As a result, the way has been paved for conjoining the spread of capitalism with the advance of bureaucracy. This has made the increased role of expertise, science and technology indispensable in modern life. As Anthony Giddens notes:

The further expansion of capitalism thus completes the disillusionment of the world (through a commitment to scientific ‘progress’), transmutes most forms of social relationship into conduct that approximates to *zweickrational* (through the rational construction of tasks in bureaucratic organizations) and advances the spread of norms of an abstract legal type which, principally as embodied in the state, constitute the main form of modern ‘legitimate order’.¹⁵

The hint is very clear. The complexity involved with the management of industrial society is such that it debars the common man, who has no knowledge of science and technology or business management, from participation in making public choices. Folk wisdom or the common man’s judgment is no more an apt instrument of the determination of public policy. Direct democracy is, therefore, out of the question. Universal participation installs the rule of fashion, of fleeting opinions and of powerful interests, as such, in the seething, surging and highly volatile sea of changing and shifting opinions, where the ship of the state will always be buffeted. And lack of consensus will afford it no resting place. If Giddens is influenced by the complexity of the industrial society for reducing the sovereign people to the modest role of periodically uttering “ya” or “nay”, Joseph A. Schumpeter brands the citizen, the *demos*, as rank illiterate in politics.

Schumpeter’s justification for limiting the role of the people to accepting or rejecting the men, who are to rule them, is based on his perception that politics is business. In addition, he also is convinced that citizens qua political man are incompetent and become primitive when they enter the political field.¹⁶ His castigation of the voter as a political illiterate emanates precisely from his judgment that politics is business; this, in effect, reduces the role of the citizen to that of acclaiming the selection of “ruler managers” in the open market of electoral politics. Democracy, for Schumpeter, signifies only an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle

for the people's vote.¹⁷ Essence of democracy lies not in the ability of citizens to rule but in their ability to replace one government by another in order to prevent the formation of a permanent majority and thus, able to check the threat of tyranny.

In essence then a system, which was meant to be ruled "by the people, of the people, and for the people" has been reduced to market mode democracy. It is, as Fred Hirsch remarks:

Essentially a choice exercised periodically by the mass of the people among alternative and open ruling elites, who, in turn, are induced by the force of competition (from rival elites) to offer policies tailored to attract electoral support. The political arena in this approach is akin to the market mode for the fulfillment of personal wants. It is an extension of the departmental store – and the problem is to find managers who can undersell the rest of the street.¹⁸

The arguments that have been advanced to degrade direct democracy into formal, representative democracy, as noted earlier, are, to say the least, frivolous. As experience has shown, neither citizens are politically illiterate nor are rulers always politically sagacious or above their narrow self-interest through which public choices are made. It is therefore strange to argue that participation of citizens must be limited. Similarly, to argue that full participation by citizens in political processes must be limited to their periodical acclamation of the rulers is to make citizens passive. As such participation that is considered to be instrumental in the development and maturation of *zoon politicon* (political man) has come to be treated as a disturbing factor, a factor that is supposed to let passions encroach upon a field that must be nurtured and nourished by rationality. It should also be pointed out that when man, supposed to be all powerful, has been reduced to the size of a pigmy unable to stave off the encroachments on his autonomy by the state, which has acquired more and more power in recent times, it is intriguing to find that a political system, which promises to make everybody, a ruler ends up by locating power and authority in only a few hands.

3.4 RIFT IN THE FLUTE

Restriction of participation is justified in the name of the stability and the ability to govern democratic political order. The impetus for this derives from the insistence that economic development is the foundation on which developments in other areas rests; economic development is also claimed to be instrumental in the realisation of man's hidden potentialities. This possibility turns into actuality when individuals engage into self-regarding actions, that is, their main concern for acting is to safeguard and promote their own interests irrespective of the consequences their actions may have for the well-being of others. All self-regarding actions are grounded in calculative reasoning since the main concern is to weigh benefits against costs. Thus the end result that self-regarding action is supposed to yield is two fold: happiness and actualisation of potentialities.

At the level of the political system, it means the maintenance of productive forces for turning out more and more goods and services. This is necessary to cope with the rising expectations and, consequently, the demands for material benefits. Dynamic interaction between these two factors sets the context for the functioning of democratic political system, in general, and for popular participation in governmental process, in particular. Given the liberal perspective on democracy and industrialisation, it is both natural and rational for individuals to compete among themselves for privileged access to scarce material resources for ensuring their own felicity. In this competition the individual fails to confront in his own actions:

The distinction between what is available as a result of getting ahead of others and what is available from the general advance shared by all. The individual who wants to see better has

to stand on tiptoe. In the game of beg your neighbour, that is what each individual must try to do, even not all can.¹⁹

This introduces a mismatch between the good of one individual and the good of all individuals. This mismatch is symptomatic of erosion of morality with the consequence that the fabric of social cooperation becomes fragile and finally gets shattered. The pursuit of private and essentially individualistic goals must be girded at key points by a strict social morality which the system erodes rather than sustains. Such a situation engenders contradictory pressures on democratic political system. Freedom of choice cannot be excessively curbed or altogether suppressed. However, the exercise of freedom by isolated individuals, in a situation where the connection between individual and aggregate advance has broken down, breeds social conflict. This conflict turns not infrequently into violence. This involves increase in the capacity of the system to perform well not only on the economic front but also on the political front for material benefits and political participation.

This, however, becomes difficult for various reasons. First, there are definite limits, both physical and social, to economic growth. Even if these limits are somehow surmounted, rising affluence itself will stimulate the demand for those goods and services which cannot be easily satisfied, or can be satisfied only for a few. This will intensify competition in a system of imposed hierarchy (of wealth, power and prestige) that confines socially scarce goods to those on the higher rungs of distributional ladder, disappointing the expectations of those whose position can be raised only through a lift in the ladder as a whole. Thus prosperity for all remains a chimera and acts as a snare. Democratic politics based on economic liberalism is, in this sense, a victim of its own propaganda: it evokes demands and pressures that cannot be contained.

We should also note that philosophy of economic growth in form or other has always been central to political democracy. The relative quietude in democratic politics is purchased in considerable measure through a growing economy. But two factors have increasingly shattered the quietude. First, growth always includes decline and instability, which translates into human dislocations and suffering. The difficulty is that governments have neither mastered the self-discipline nor risen to the challenge of educating their citizens concerning the principles of action required to confront economic uncertainty. Two things have aggravated the difficulty further. One, liberal democratic order takes cognizance of inequality of possession, but hopes to get over it with the help of equality of opportunity. However, the initial inequality puts paid to the hope of reducing, if not wiping out in equality. As a matter of fact, the gap between the rich and poor widens in the course of economic growth. This produces deleterious consequences for the peaceful conduct of democratic politics. As Robert A. Dahl notes, it produces "inequalities in social and economic resources so great as to bring about severe violations of political equality and hence of democratic process".²⁰ Two, economic difficulties are further aggravated, on the one hand, by ups and downs in global economy and on the other hand, by global economic interdependence, which makes evidence the limits of states and their governments.

The combinations of factors elaborated above create social maelstrom; however, the ministrations of political figures appear ineffectual. Moreover, the need to acquire political power forces the leader to adopt appeasement strategies that promises of ever more benefits. However, they create a spiral of ever greater promises and steeper expectations. As a result, disjunction between individual preferences and collective goals occurs. This makes it difficult to find a way to order goals either rationally or democratically. At best the leaders can help at the margins by enforcing the law and targeting programmes of assistance for those who can be helped;

they can neither compel nor transform the majority whose creature they ultimately remain. At worst, they accelerate the process of disintegration through the recurrently competition for votes that can only be obtained by over-promising than what can be achieved.

The social maelstrom, however, continues and deepens conflict surface; peace is disturbed and democratic politics gets distorted. The lack of participatory democratic process exposes the system to threats of turmoil, or even jeopardy. Without political participation, insufficient support will be forthcoming to sustain the democratic method from a variety of potential threats. These threats range from jeopardy of procedural safeguards by governing elite seeking to perpetuate their power to the pressing of political demands that exceed what the system can provide. Thus people want peace and well-being but the formal democracy grants them only uncertainty and conflict.

3.5 MENDING THE RIFT: PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND PEACE

The preceding analysis makes it evident that democracy neither ensures peace nor does it avert threats to its own continuance. The principal reason is the divestment of the people of their sovereignty and restricting their participation to simple acclamation of the selection of rulers through periodical elections. Does this, then, mean that if full participation of the people in the making of collective decisions is allowed, peace- eternal peace- will reign? In order to find a satisfactory answer to this question, two further questions need to be answered. One, if participatory democracy is an indispensable condition for the vigour of democratic life and relations and for ensuring peace, does not the Panchayati Raj system currently operative in India provide an adequate institutional format to ensure peace? If not, what, then, is necessary to promote participatory democracy?

To facilitate participatory democracy is to carry out decentralisation of the polity. Decentralisation, in turn, is to restore to the people their sovereignty usurped by the state. Broadly speaking, two different perspectives on decentralization are of interest here. The first perspective underlines the need of the people sharing in the responsibilities of public life. When they participate and act in public life, they stand outside their own narrow self-interest and speak on behalf of the common interest. "In and through political life men's true individuality can be cultivated within an ensemble of responsibilities sharing in tasks of deliberation and executing public decisions, and so on that encourage them to see what is good for themselves and desirable for others in general."²¹ In this perspective, full participation in public life is a necessary condition for man to become truly human. Such participation can be ensured only in a small, intimate community.

The vicissitudes of history have, however, put paid to small communities. Political communities have become so large that direct participation by the people in making public choices has become impossible. It is in this context that the second alternative comes into operation. It is argued that in this situation only politico-administrative decentralisation is possible. Constitutional Amendments 73 and 74 guarantee only this. What they do is a set of three things. First, panchayati raj has been made a permanent institution with a fixed tenure and regular reconstitution through elections. Second, they have ensured representation of the scheduled castes and tribes by reserving certain proportion of seats on panchayati raj bodies. And, lastly, the representation of women has also been guaranteed by allowing them a particular proportion of seats on panchayati raj bodies.

However, the Panchayati Raj system suffers from certain limitations. First, it has been authorised to raise taxes for undertaking some public works; however, it becomes politically difficult to

do so. Second, no panchayat has its own resources; the resources it can have are funneled to them by state and central governments for completing certain projects sanctioned by these governments for which the panchayats are allocated certain financial resources. These resources cannot be used for purposes other than they are meant for. The greatest limitation panchayat bodies suffer from is their inability to plan something entirely different from or opposed to the planned development strategy carved out by the central government. In essence, then, they signify nothing more than politico-administrative decentralisation of certain functions.

The greatest hindrance to complete decentralisation is posed by the belief that the size of the polity makes it difficult for installing participatory democracy. It is true that participation is felt to be necessary for invigorating democratic politics. For example, scholars like C.B. Macpherson and Norberto Bobbio recognise that participation of the people in making collective choices is necessary. However, for them, the crux of the problem is the size of the polity that prevents face-to-face communication from becoming a reality.²² As such, representative democracy, especially at the national level, becomes necessary. What this point of view ignores is the necessity of complete decentralisation, not of politico-administrative variety alone, but of economic power, allowing local communities to manage their own affairs cooperatively and harmoniously. M.K. Gandhi has already offered a model of this kind of decentralised polity. At the heart of such a polity is the development in the people the capacity to resist tyranny and fight arbitrariness.²³ This capacity can develop only when the individual exercises self-rule (i.e self-control). Unless humans are essentially self-governing beings, there can be no case for self-governing societies. Self-rule, then, lays the foundation for political self-rule.

This requires an alternative political arrangement in keeping with the true democratic ideal; that is, a radically decentralised and layered arrangement of building blocks, in which constituent units yield increasingly specific powers as territory and scope, is enlarged. Pursuing a simple life, self-reliant and self-governing local communities are to constitute the base of national political life. It is at this level that full participation of the people in making collective choices is institutionalised. It is this participation that enables people not only to rule and be ruled, but also to work jointly, cooperatively and peacefully to solve their problems and give effect to their hopes and aspirations as collective endeavour.

3.6 SUMMARY

The preceding discussion has broadly surveyed some empirical findings related to the relationship between peace and democracy. The conclusion that was arrived at was not conclusive. Moreover, it was suggested that the variety of democracy that was juxtaposed against peace happened to be formal, representative democracy, which does not allow full participation to the people in making decisions that deeply affect their lives. After exploring the reasons, it can be concluded that for participatory democracy, complete decentralisation is indispensable. Only then there could be a positive relationship between participatory democracy and peace.

3.7 TERMINAL QUESTIONS

1. What conclusion do some of empirical studies about the relationship between peace and democracy arrive at?
2. Discuss the characteristics of formal, representative democracy.
3. What prevents formal, representative democracy from ensuring peace and harmony?
4. What kind of institutional arrangement does participatory democracy require and why?

End Notes

1. Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics*,: Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1991, p.2.
2. Ibid.,
3. *Democracy in a World of Tension—A Symposium*. Ed. Richard MacKean. Quoted in G. Sartory, *Democratic Theory* Oxford and IBH Publishing Co., Calcutta, 1965, pp.8-9.
4. Niels Petter Gleditsch, “Peace and Democracy,” in *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict*,: Academic Press, San Diego, 2001, p.643.
5. “Dangerous Dyads, Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War 1861-1965.” In *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 36, 1992, pp. 309-41.
6. “Cross-national Variation in Political Violence, A Rational Action Approach,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 34, 1990, pp.624-651.
7. Correlates of war project. International and Civil War Data: 1816-1992. Ann Arbor: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1994.
8. Gleditsch, op. cit, p. 645.
9. The waves of democracy, especially after the Second World War, involved the countries that were colonized by European powers. These powers arbitrarily drew boundary lines, created colonies with mixed populations, etc. After independence, most of the newly independent countries fought with each other for reclaiming their territories.
10. Gleditsch, op. cit, p.651.
11. Peter T. Manicas, “The Foreclosure of Democracy in America, “ *History of Political Thought*, IX, 1(Spring 1988), p. 187.
12. *The Federalist Papers*, No. 10.
13. *Ibid*, No. 59.
14. *ibid*, paper No. 60.
15. Anthony Giddens, *Politics and Sociology in the Thought of Max Weber*, Macmillan, London, 1979, p.45.
16. Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, Harper, New York, 1950, p.262.
17. *Ibid*, p. 269.
18. Fred Hirsch, *Social Limits to Growth*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1977, pp.93-94.
19. *Ibid*, p. 10.
20. Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Political Democracy*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985, p.6.
21. John Keane, *Public Life and Late Capitalism: Towards a Socialist Theory of Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984, p.116.
22. C. B. Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, p.94.
23. See *Young India*, 26 January, 1925.

SUGGESTED READINGS

Gleditsch, N.P, and H. Hegre., “Peace and Democracy: Three levels of Analysis,” in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41, 1997, pp.283-310.

Gleditsch, N.P., "Democracy and Peace", in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 29, 1992, pp.369-376.

Gleditsch, N.P., "Peace and Democracy", in *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict*, Academic Press, San Diego, 2001, pp.643-652.

Keane, John., *Public Life and Late Capitalism: Towards a Socialist Theory of Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984.

Muller, E.N, and E. Weede., "Cross National Variation in Political Violence: A Rational Action Approach", " *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 34, 1990, pp.624- 631.

Ray, Ramashray., "Parameters of Democracy, and Decentralization: Some Unanswered Questions" *Both in Captive Vision, Ideas as Weapons*, Ajanta, Delhi, 1993.