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## UNIT 2 UNDERSTANDING PEACE, WELL-BEING AND JUSTICE

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### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

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No civilized society can thrive upon victims whose humanity has been permanently mutilated.... Those we keep down inevitably drag us down ... we insult our own humanity by insulting man when he is helpless and where he is not of our kin.

Rabindranath Tagore

One of the components of the UNESCO's Culture of Peace Programme stipulates the ending of the exploitation that has characterised the culture of violence and war (slavery, colonisation and economic exploitation). It further stipulates to replace culture of violence by cooperation and sustainable development for all. This component distinguishes the culture of peace from static conceptions of peace which perpetuate the violence of the status quo and links it intrinsically with social justice and the changes necessary to attain and to preserve it.<sup>1</sup> This component of the UNESCO's Culture of Peace Programme draws our attention to three important factors. First, the conception of peace the programme projects is not merely the absence of violence. Eschewing the idea of negative peace, that is, the absence of violence, it posits a dynamic conception of peace. This conception posits the idea that a society must have the capacity to solve problems without resort to violence. Second, for the creation and preservation of positive peace requires equitable, if not equal, distribution of economic resources so that material needs of every person is assured. And, lastly, if these two conditions prevail in society, social justice will also be assured.

The UNESCO views definite linkages between peace, well-being and justice. Peace is necessary for human flourishing. Without peace, life becomes a constant struggle, struggle in the interior of man, and struggle with neither external forces, which the individual cannot see nor control. Whatever the cause that disturbs peace, the resultant state of affairs is unsettling and threatening

to human composure. The reason for this lies in the fact that when peace is disturbed, predictability is lost. Once the normal tenor of life is breached, psychological stress combines with material difficulties to incapacitate the individual in meeting the challenges of life.

It is also clear from the UNESCO's Culture of Peace Programme that for the preservation of peace equitable distribution of economic resources is a necessary condition. But can it be said that the prevalence of peace, even positive peace, is necessary for human well-being and justice? Two questions can be raised in this connection. First, what is meant by sustainable development? In general, it refers to a kind of development that does not allow destruction of natural resources; it must stop at a point where the danger of ecological degeneration arises. This further means that the fulfillment of needs must stop at a level where transformation/manipulation of nature does not harm nature. If this is true, then, where does that level lie? Also, if an eco-friendly attitude is required to fix that level, how is that attitude acquired?

Secondly, in relation to the necessity of positive peace for ensuring human well-being and justice, how is the capacity to find solution to an emergent problem with the possibility of violence, earned? In this context, we have to be clear about the substantive meanings of such terms as "peace", "well being", and "justice". It means that one can put any content in these terms depending upon ideological inclination individual predilection and zeitgeist. Hence the necessity to understand them.

### **Aims and Objectives**

This Unit will enable you to understand

- World views, beliefs systems underlying conditions salubrious to peace, well being and justice;
- Alternative ways of viewing man and his world;
- A critical appraisal of worldviews and belief systems;
- Relationship between peace, well-being and justice.

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## **2.2 MEANING OF THE TERMS**

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In view of the questions raised above, it is necessary, first, to clarify the substantive referents of the terms that constitute the title of this lesson. Whatever meaning we attribute to these terms, they have a definite connection with worldviews and belief systems. In addition, there is also the question of the conditions that must prevail in society to allow a beneficial relationship to obtain between the real situations these terms denote. It is necessary to explore the following:

The three terms- peace, well-being and justice that constitute the title of this unit are not very easy to define. These terms can take on any meaning depending on the circumstances and personal preference of the person who uses these terms. Thus, these terms have no fixed, unalterable meanings. Their meaning changes from one person to another depending on the prevailing fashion of opinion, and ideological commitments. It therefore makes it necessary for us to give exact signification to these terms before we can talk sensibly about their interrelationship. In addition, we should also define exactly the way they are related to each other. For example, can it be said that in all circumstances when peace prevails, human well-being and justice will be assured? If not, what kind of relationship obtains between them? Moreover, can it be taken for granted that peace is an autonomous phenomenon and does not need nourishment from such sources as say worldview and belief system?

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## 2.3 MEANING OF PEACE

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To begin with, let us begin with the term “peace”. Peace was taken earlier to mean the absence of organised violence. This prevented scholars from looking at peace as something broader than the cessation of hostilities between two or more nation states. As a result, peace tended to be defined negatively as the absence of war. The fact is that the term “peace” can also refer to individuals, groups and societies. Two other factors need to be mentioned here. In the first place, peace can also be characterised as static or dynamic. By static peace is meant a social situation in which nothing changes and no violence is taken recourse to for settling differences whenever they arise. In contradistinction to this, dynamic peace refers to a situation where differences and disputes do occur, but they are settled non-violently.

In the second place, the fact that disputes do occur, but they are settled non-violently suggests that there can be no eternal peace. But we can very well visualise that there exist peaceful societies which are characterised by two distinct attributes: one, disposition to eschew violence for settling disputes and two, certain institutional mechanisms geared to settling disputes non-violently. Thus disputes do occur not only because of conflicting claims of entitlements but also because of the feeling that some aspects of the social order are unjust or inappropriate or downright useless. This calls for change and change is always upsetting. Resistance to change may invite violence and the possibility of the upsetting of equilibrium. However, the two distinctive attributes mentioned above come into play in peaceful societies, contentious issues are satisfactorily resolved, and a new equilibrium is established. This is what is meant by dynamic peace; it signifies balance in movement. It is this meaning of peace that is important for our purposes.

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## 2.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF WELL-BEING

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The term “well-being” too is subject to different interpretations. Broadly speaking, these two are completely divergent perspectives, one emphasizing the achievement of felicity through the ceaseless satisfaction of ever proliferating material needs.<sup>2</sup> These material needs are involved with the process of production and reproduction. The acquisition of wealth, power and prestige are now counted as the most important factors that everyone should seek to realise. It is on this basis alone that man can, it is claimed, ever hope to become happy, if not contented. Contentment is something that must not be allowed to deflect man from the pursuit of happiness through the satisfaction of material needs. It is also presumed that it is only through the satisfaction of material needs that the way to cultivating morality, if not sociality, opens up.

To satisfy his material needs, man has to interact with nature with the help of technology; interaction with nature gives birth to a system of production that grows hungry for natural resources as it grows and expands. As economy grows, man’s needs proliferate; this gives further fillip to economic growth. It is in the process of this dynamic interaction between needs, technological advancement, and nature that man realises his hidden potentialities, and becomes moral; that is he develops the capacity of deciding what is worth doing, and what is not. This perspective creates the notion of order and the idea of what happiness and, therefore, well being, consists in. Order, on this view, is grounded not in any a priori principle for frictionless coordination of diverse and usually incompatible interests. It consists in a set of interlocking elements whose relations can be explained in terms of efficient causation....The order...in things...(consists) in their meshing without conflict and distortion. Applied to human realm, this means that man comes to realize natural order when the company of subjects comes to achieve full satisfaction (happiness), each compatible with others.<sup>3</sup>

In contradistinction to the view of man as merely a body- mind complex, there exists another view, which treats man as a member of the cosmos. The term “cosmos” signifies a world, which is not only fully ordered but also happens to be the source wherefrom man derives his sense of truth, meaning and value. The real purport of cosmos is not only that it is an exemplar of order, it is, at the same time, also the source and cause of order in particular beings that constitute it. It is true that the source of order in the universe is always referred to as beyond the comprehension of the senses; it is supposed to be something that cannot be known by man’s ordinary sensory faculties; it can only be experienced. The creator of the cosmos is considered to be the unseen, the divine being. Its experience is ineffable. It is this ineffable experience that becomes the source of installing order in man’s interior.

Once man’s interior is ordered, he acquires the capacity of freeing himself from the slavery of many masters, that is, his appetites and passions. When man’s soul is attuned to the divine ground of reality, he develops what Plato calls “synoptic vision”, that is, a capacity to establish a principled relationship among various goods as well as among various components of the external world. Without it, man’s soul loses its discriminating, regulatory and disciplining power; appetites and desires fill the gap vacated by the withdrawal or suppression of the ordering element. Integration of different capacities of the individual as well as with the cosmos is disrupted; the consequent disorder of the soul leads to what Plato calls *polypragmosyne*, the readiness to engage in multifarious activities, which are not one’s proper business and *allotriopragmosyne* (meddlesomeness, officious interference.).

The attunement of the soul to the divine ground of reality acts as a transformative influence. It initiates the process of self-development leading to the ultimate aim in life, that is, self-knowledge. This brings about a radical transformation in man’s outlook towards his own self, towards others and towards the external world. The process of self-development is also instrumental in excavating the soul from its entombment in the passions of the body. It brings home the necessity of what Plato calls *sophrosyne*, that is a capacity by which men learn to know and remember the limits of human power and ambition.<sup>4</sup> The realization of *sophrosyne* checks the tendency towards *pleonexia*, that is self aggrandizement. This further means the termination of rebellion against God and the death of *hybris* (the feeling of omnipotence).

Once man is rid of his *hybris*, he becomes aware of several things. First, he becomes aware of the fact that he must put his interior in order by curbing the waywardness of Id and put his passions under strong leash. The capability to put one’s passions under leash is symptomatic of the man’s capacity to discriminate between what is proper to do and what he must not do. Second, the capacity to discriminate has two important referents. One of these referents has to do with the health of his own self in terms of limiting his wants by curbing his passions. The other referent is his fellow beings whose interests must not be harmed by his actions. In other words, he must have the intuitive knowledge of what he must do in order to bring about and maintain compatibility between the good of one individual and the good of all individuals. And, lastly, he becomes capable of eschewing instrumental attitude towards nature and consciously seeks to promote a nurturant view by refraining from despoiling and exploiting nature.

It is, then, obvious that the substantive meaning of well-being is radically different from that projected by the view of man as merely a body-mind complex. Well-being, in this perspective, means the establishment of a salubrious balance between man, society and nature. This means curtailing those wants whose satisfaction signifies voluptuousness, on one hand, and the treatment of society and nature as potential means for the realisation of one’s purposes, on the other. To lead such a life is to become *swastha* in the Vedic sense of the term; that is a person remains healthy by anchoring his self that is touched by the flash of eternity. It is a *swastha* person who is capable of securing his own well-being and that of society and nature.

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## 2.5 JUSTICE AND ITS MEANINGS

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Multiple significations are also true of the term “Justice”. To begin with, earlier the term “justice” was used as equivalent to righteousness in general. It comprised the whole virtue and signified complete conformity with the approved pattern of moral conduct. Plato saw justice, for example, in his *Republic*, as the key virtue that regulates and equilibrates other virtues. Its functions were envisioned by Plato to achieve harmony and to maintain equilibrium. To do these things, reason (*sophia*) must rule within the psyche and reason’s embodiment (the elite guardians) must rule within the state. Justice results from each element in society doing the appropriate task, doing it well, and doing it only. When we come to Aristotle, we find him restricting the term’s reference to a particular virtue, distinguishing, for example, between justice and equity or between justice and charity.

Later, Plato’s influence can be seen in philosophical writings, which concentrated on the tension between (a) justice as an impartial application of established substantive rules and (b) Justice as an ideal criterion for judging and evaluating such rules. In whatever sense we choose, both of them involve what we know as substantive justice. However, there is yet another extremely important logic in which the term “justice” is latterly used. According to common experience, in every species of economic and social activity, the problem of justice is at least as likely to arise out of, say, being condemned without a hearing as out of being condemned under an unfair substantive law. In short, it lacks a procedural aspect; in the absence of correct procedure, any concept of justice may readily become a mockery.

It is, therefore, necessary to consider justice to be residing also in the correctness of procedure for judging any issue. Procedural justice consists in employing correct methods to develop rules of conduct to ascertain the facts of a particular case, or to devise a total appreciation, absorbing rules and facts into a final dispositive judgment.<sup>5</sup> It is true that errors in interpreting laws and facts abounded earlier. However, since the eighteenth century, judicial processes have undergone noteworthy reforms and advances. The procedural criteria compendiously known as “due process of law” have improved sufficiently in most countries, especially in mature democracies. What the due process of laws signifies is that no one must be accused of violating a rule of behaviour unless he could have ascertained the existence and meaning of that rule before he committed the challenged act. When accused, a person must be told the ground on which he is accused. The accused is entitled to have a fair opportunity to collect and present his own evidence, of course, with the help of a counsel. He is also entitled to a fair and free trial. Moreover, even if a person has been found guilty, he must be given the opportunity to go to higher courts for reconsidering the case and correcting any serious error that comes to light.

Given these different connotations of the term “justice”, our task here is to determine which one meaning should we opt that suits most in the modern age with its emphasis on freedom and equality. Procedural justice comes into effect only after laws relating to proper conduct have been passed by the legislature of a country. The basis of procedural justice is to fit a particular law to certain facts for arriving at a particular decision. Procedural justice is concerned only with applying a particular law to a particular set of facts under dispute; it does not concern itself with the question whether a particular law is proper or not. The question of the validity of a particular law is beyond the understanding of procedural justice. Given this, it is quite conceivable that an impartial administration of justice can comport with an oppressive system of substantive law. It is true that the application of procedural justice highlights certain deficiencies in substantive law. As a result, substantive laws can be examined, reframed and

improved upon. However, the fact should not be ignored that a particular law, at any moment, signifies a balance between contending socio-economic and ideological forces. Most often it symbolises the victory of a particular preference over any other preferences and of one power configuration over other power configurations. It is, therefore, necessary to go beyond the mere procedural justice.

It is apt to recognise Aristotle's distinction between distributive justice and commutative or corrective justice. The former applies to the allotment of honour, wealth and other social goods and should be proportionate to civic merit. Commutative justice concerns remedial measures when two contending parties engage into a dispute over the merit of voluntary exchanges outside the law courts. Distributive justice is concerned with meritorious achievements of persons distinguished by some excellence. It is basically concerned with honouring meritorious persons who are distinguished and distinct from common men. Similarly, Aristotle's commutative justice refers only to certain feuds between persons about entitlement and the court when it is approached for decision, rules not according to any moral norms, but according to the law of the country. Aristotle treated justice as immanent in positive law and gave it a markedly more effective function. However, we should note two difficulties here. First, as has been already pointed out, the administration of law may go along with a very oppressive legal system. Second, none of the senses of justice in the Aristotelian framework deals with the pattern of distribution of social goods that is seen to be just because it takes into account needs and merits of the members of a particular society.

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## **2.6 WORLDVIEWS ON PEACE, WELL-BEING AND JUSTICE**

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What is it that determines whether a particular pattern of distribution of social goods, according to needs and merits, is just? The trouble here is that while merit can be determined objectively, needs cannot be so determined. Needs are subjective and there are no objective methods to ascertain them and measure them. Any so-called objective method will prove awfully inadequate because the standard of measurement will miss variations in needs articulation and needs fulfillment. Do we then say that it is a problem that cannot be resolved and must be so? We should seek to resolve this question by linking the question of the relationship between needs and justice with worldview.

In order to see the connection between worldview and societies, we have to view it as a deeply embedded soul of all individual members (as reflected in the substratum of their life activities). It is because of this that society is capable of making and sustaining the awareness of its members of their identity, ideals, rights and duties. It is also because of this that it is capable of providing them with the opportunity (and the means) of living their lives and engaging in action in ways sanctioned by it. In the words of Pandey:

Every individual finds himself related with a tradition of knowledge and understandings as well as a network of relationships that are larger than their finite existence. If this tradition of knowledge and understanding can be characterized as culture, then, the network of relationships can be called society. Man as a being, who is endowed with consciousness, is in this sense, a resident of a socio-cultural cosmos that has an external form and internal consciousness.<sup>6</sup>

If the external aspect of society is concerned with the organisation of work and play, the internal aspect, that is, the world of culture denotes principles and processes that give the world of work and play a definite shape. The internal aspect also controls relationships that develop among the members of the society. There is yet a third aspect that animates most

societies. This is the aspect of society that symbolises its connection with a transcendental entity by virtue of which a society claims to be the representative of truth. As Voegelin notes:

Human Society is not merely a fact or an event, in the external world to be studied by an observer like a natural phenomenon. Though it has externality as one of its important components, it is as a whole a little world, a cosmion, illuminated with meaning from within by the human beings who continuously create and bear it as the mode and condition of their self-realization. It is illumined through an elaborate symbolism, in various degrees of compactness and differentiation- from rite through myth, to theory and this symbolism illuminates it with meaning insofar as the symbols make the internal structure of such a cosmion, the relations between its members and groups of members, as well as its existence as a whole, transparent for the mystery of human existence.<sup>7</sup>

Thus every society has a symbolic aspect. The self-illumination of society through symbols is an integral part of social reality, and one may even say its essential part, for through such symbolisation the members of society experience it as more than an accident or a convenience, they experience it as of their human essence. And, inversely, the symbols express the experience that man is fully man by virtue of his participation in a whole which transcends his particular existence, by virtue of his participation in the *Xynon* the shareable commonality, as Heraclitus called it. The whole in which man participates is, of course, the cosmos as the projection of the transcendent entity itself. The term “cosmos” conveys three fundamental ideas. In the first place, it denotes that there are several worlds beyond the phenomenal world, the world of here and now, all of them linked in an organic relationship with each other. In the second place, the term “cosmos” signifies that it is...” the perfect example of order, and, at the same time, the cause of all order in particular, which only in degrees can approximate the whole.”<sup>8</sup> In the last place, man is just one instance of particulars that compose the whole. As a part of the whole that is larger than the totality of the perceptible phenomenal world, man is not self-complete and, therefore, not perfect. He becomes complete and perfect when, as Cicero observes, he “contemplates and imitates it,”<sup>9</sup> particularly the source of order inherent in it.

It is this contemplation and imitation of order inherent in the cosmos that constitutes the mainspring of the internal, or, rather, the cultural aspect of any society. As every society usually but not necessarily can be viewed as composed of three layers. These three layers can, for the sake of convenience, be identified as (a) world-view engendering a belief system, (b) an interior world manifesting a cultural pattern that determines and regulates the world of work and play; and (c) the exterior aspect constituted by the structure and processes of work and play.

### **2.6.1 Modern Worldview of Peace, Well-being and Justice**

Almost all traditional societies displayed all these three layers, which refer to different aspects of social organisation. However, in recent times, beginning from seventeenth century, many societies turned their back upon their connection with the cosmos. As a result, man emerged as a secular being, who depended on his own capability and power to refashion himself and his world in accordance with his own preferences. However, in the process, the idea of common humanity tends to be destroyed. With it man also loses his wholeness. A fragmentary idea, such as, a European, a labourer, or belonging to a particular race etc, replaces the universal idea of man. And the fragmented idea of man is attributed with universality and wholeness. What should also be noted in this connection is that when man is de-linked with divinity, he claims to become God-like and arrogates to himself the responsibility of re-ordering the world so that it becomes useful to him. This is clearly reflected in the fact that God becomes the function of man.

In the nineteenth century, Feuerbach's "psychology of projection" sharply pointed to this. All religious ideas, especially the idea of God, were conceived by Feuerbach as a projection of contents of the human mind into the beyond. But when we come to Marx, we find man himself being declared as the surrogate of divinity. Marx pulled the psychological projections into man and man himself as God. As God, he claims absolute freedom, but he is, at the same time, hedged in by freedom enjoyed by others; he seeks to shape and refashion the conditions of his own existence, but he is externalised in the process of interacting with the external world and emerges as a function of the world; he claims to secure happiness by amassing wealth, but he is reduced to the status of what Iris Murdoch calls "broken totality" and becomes the prisoner of his own avarice and suffers if he encounters setbacks.

The regnant worldview is claimed to open up the highway for all to enjoy heaven on this earth, a heaven forged of worldly pleasures. However, the highway is unending and the heaven tends to slip out of reach when it seems very close. Thus the conception of well-being that is dependent on the extent to which a person is able to satisfy his ordinary life needs proves to be a chimera. Moreover, this worldview grants freedom to everybody; however, not everybody is equipped with the same merit and capacity. As a result, there exists wide gap between the efficacy and effectiveness of one person and that of others. This differential endowment of efficiency leads to a situation where acute inequality in the distribution of social goods reigns. As a consequence, inequality of possession in a situation where equality of possession is deemed to be an ideal that must under-gird the social order means perpetuation of injustice. And when justice is denied, conflicts become endemic and pervasive. And when peace is disturbed well-being and justice too become scarce.

When everybody is driven by the energy of his desires to seek what he wishes to have, it is claimed that personal as well as collective good will be adequately served. On this view, the one dynamic element in society is the self-defining subject, who as the centre of energy, enterprise, and creativity, serves to promote collective good by promoting and realising his own self-defined purposes. Collective good is nothing other than the sum-total of individual goods. In this perspective, individual actions are the expression of will caused by desire; according to this, the chain of parochial reasoning always terminates in some "I want" or "it pleases me."<sup>10</sup> Decisions made by individuals must not be influenced by any source external to him. However, actions that please individuals need not satisfy the condition that they prove compatible with actions that other persons may decide to take. To the extent that this happens, that is, if actions of different individuals do not prove compatible, social concord is likely to be disturbed. It is all the more likely in view of the central importance of satisfying desires for securing felicity, the only consideration of the individual is to see that his desires are fulfilled. This exclusive concern with satisfying one's own desires does not induce the individual to take into account whether whatever he wishes to do is harmful to others or not. In such a situation, auto-control is sure to erode leading again to the possibility of the disruption of social concord. In addition to the disruption of social concord, there is also the possibility of justice being tampered with. Given the centrality of the possession of earthly goods, everybody must claim to have a certain share in collective resources whether a person deserves it or not. This is what in the social science literature has been described as claims of entitlement. These claims are justified on several grounds. However, Aristotle termed it *pleonexia* (self-aggrandisement) signifying a claim for certain goods even when a person's merit did not justify it. This is surely to create a big gap between merit and reward making distributive justice a mockery. As a consequence, it is likely to breed dissatisfaction, disquiet and dissension.



## 2.6.2 Traditional Worldview of Peace, Well-Being and Justice

It is quite clear, then, that a worldview that pins its hope for securing peace and assuring well-being and justice by promoting and safeguarding individual interest, only frustrates this hope. The principal reason for this, as Immanuel Kant realised long ago, is that it makes discord integral to human existence. It is for this reason that we must take a look at traditional worldviews in order to examine whether they are at all helpful for establishing peace, promoting well-being and securing justice. It was indicated earlier that most traditional worldviews are characterised, in contrast with the modern worldview, by three layers of attributes. By dint of this characteristic, society comes to be viewed as a cosmion. The most distinctive feature of a cosmion is its rootedness in the divine ground of reality. By virtue of this, it offers to its members the opportunity to attain his/her higher nature by disciplining and controlling its base nature. If this opportunity is properly exploited, man can attain internal harmony, which then becomes the basis of harmony without, that is, between man and society and man and nature. Internal harmony is the only basis on which integration of man with the larger order becomes possible.

To be integrated with the larger order is to sustain a social order as a cosmion. Such a society underlines the fact that society is a civilisational unit that constitutes an arena where human consciousness, intentions and purposes receive definite shapes and direction. The shaping of human consciousness, intentions and purposes is not haphazard or ad hoc; instead it is inspired and informed by the vision of the cosmic order. As a replica of the cosmos, the social order is not only based on the principles that are seen to underlie the cosmos, the meaning man derives from these principles for informing and regulating his life and social relations but also aims at celebrating these principles and values, preserving them in institutional arrangements and social practices. In such a society a person does not live life; he becomes able to lead life towards attaining a higher purpose.

When a person is conscious about his linkage with the divine ground of being, he treats every life activity as the vehicle of refreshing and renewing his attunement to the divine ground of reality. The worldview that gets its inspiration from its groundedness in the transcendental entity forges a society that treats cooperative, interdependent and harmonious relationship among its different constitutive components as necessary. It is such a social order that Coomaraswamy calls a sacramental order in which there is need and place for “all man’s work; and there is no more significant consequence of the principle, work is sacrifice, than the fact that under these conditions...every function from that of the priest and the king down to that of the potter and scavenger, is literally a priesthood and every operation is a rite”.<sup>11</sup>

The social order, is thus, conceived to be a system of interdependent, cooperative and harmonious relations. The individual person is not a competitor for access to and control over scarce material resources, but co-partners in managing the resources in such a way that the minimum needs of everyone are fulfilled. Another distinctive mark of such a society is that, while immersion in materiality is considered to be inimical to the pursuit of higher life purposes, the fulfillment of ordinary life needs is not considered undesirable. As a matter of fact, the fulfillment of these needs is supposed to be infra-structural for the pursuit of a higher life purpose. Further the fulfillment of these needs is subordinated to the pursuit of higher life purposes. The subjugation of the conduct of pragmatic affairs of life to morality is what proves to be the constitutive principle of social life and relations.

Well-being in such a society does not lie in the ceaseless process of satisfying one desire after another. What happens in such a society is that the worldview that underlies it and the belief

system that it engenders puts a break on desires and allows cooperation and harmony to prevail and flourish. Thus, when competition is replaced by cooperation, the fear that a person may be left far behind in the race of life is overcome; contentment then constitutes a principal attribute of human existence. And as far as well-being is considered, it lies in the extent to which a person succeeds in blending the pursuit of a higher life purpose with the management of the pragmatic affairs of life. Moreover, when society happens to be a system of cooperation and harmony, justice lies in everyone performing his assigned tasks well. What makes justice possible is the attitude of refraining from encroaching upon the area of other's responsibility.

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## 2.7 SUMMARY

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When well-being and justice are served, peace too, becomes enduring. Thus, it is not necessary that the prevalence of peace will automatically guarantee human well-being and social justice. What is certain is that when well-being and justice prevail, peace is sure to prevail. These three can take on any meaning depending on the circumstances and personal preference of the person who uses these terms. Thus, these terms have no fixed, unalterable meanings. Their meaning changes from one person to another depending on the prevailing fashion of opinion, zeitgeist, and ideological commitments. It therefore makes it necessary for us to give exact signification to these terms before we can talk sensibly about their interrelationship. In addition, we should also define exactly the way they are related to each other.

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## 2.8 TERMINAL QUESTIONS

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1. "Peace is necessary for well being and justice." Give your reasons justifying this statement.
2. Discuss the meanings of justice at length.
3. What does the term "society" mean and what are its attributes?
4. In what social situation can peace, well being and justice be assured and why?

### End-Notes

1. For details of the UNESCO's of Peace Programme, see Elsie Boulding, "Peace Culture" in *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict* (San Diego: Academic Press, 1999), p.654
2. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*
3. Charles Taylor, *Hegel and Modern Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) p.75
4. Warner Jaeger, *Paideia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 44-45 5 "Justice" in *International Encyclopedia of social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1968), vol. 8, p. 343.
5. Gobind Chander Pande, *Bharatiya Samaj: Tattwik aur Aitiasik Vivechana* (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1994), p.37.
6. Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics: An Introduction* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p.27
7. Hans Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion: The Message of the Alien God and the Beginning of Christianity* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), p.242.
8. *De Natura Deorum*, II.II.II Quoted in Jonas, *ibid* p. 245.
9. Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? What Rationality* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd, 1988), p.21
10. Anand K. Coomaraswamy, *Hinduism and Buddhism* (Delhi: Munshiram Manohar Lal Publishers, 1975), p.27

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## SUGGESTED READINGS

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