7.1 Introduction

Without exaggeration, one may say that in the history of social anthropology and sociology, no theory has generated so much of interest, enthusiasm, and response as did functionalism. Known by different names (such as ‘functional approach’, ‘structural-functional approach’, ‘structural-functionalism’, ‘Functional School’, etc.), functionalism emerged as some kind of a unified methodology and theory in the 1930s. Earlier, right from the beginning of the nineteenth century, it was a body of scattered ideas and propositions. Until the 1960s, its reputation was unassailable, as its adherents were scholars of outstanding merit, who were known (and are still known) for various other contributions besides developing it both in terms of theory and method. For example, the famous American functionalist, Talcott Parsons, is well known for his contribution to family sociology, the school as a social system, role analysis in medical institutions, professions and problems of the blacks, evolutionism, etc. Similarly, Robert Merton's contribution to social structure and anomie, deviance and conformity, dysfunctions of bureaucracy, sociology of science, survey methods, role-set, etc., will always be referred.

During this period from the 1930s to the 1960s, when functional approach was virtually unchallenged in the United States of America and the other parts of the world, some of its criticisms were undoubtedly surfacing. For instance, the British social anthropologist, Sir E.E. Evans-Pritchard, rejected the idea of social anthropology as a science (held by the protagonist of the structural-functional approach, A.R. Radcliffe-Brown) and viewed it rather as a ‘comparative history’. Although Evans-Pritchard began as a functionalist, he transformed into a humanist. Sir Edmund R. Leach also started his career in social anthropology as a functionalist, he then moved to the ‘processual analysis’, i.e., looking at society as a ‘process in time’, as it is evident from his 1954 book on political systems. Later, under the influence of Claude Lévi-Strauss, he became a structuralist, and came to be known as a neostructuralist (Kuper 1973). His 1961 publication of *Rethinking Anthropology* offered a challenge to structural-functionalism. In spite of these criticisms, functionalism continued to survive with glory.
But by the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the criticisms of the functional theory increased manifold. Parsons’s attempts to merge theories based on action with those based on structures were unconvincing to many critics. The rehabilitation of Marxian approach in sociology and the successful emergence of the conflict theory was a big blow to functionalism. Several new theories and approaches, each trying to bring in the aspects that functionalism had ignored, became the focal points. It seemed clear to many critics that sociology had entered a post-functional, a post-Parsonian phase in its development.

Gradually, after a brief hiatus, during the 1980s, there was a revival of interest in Parsons’s work - some call it a phase of a ‘rediscovery’ of Parsons. Initially, it had little to do with structural-functionalism, but with Parsons’s ability to synthesize the works of the classical thinkers (such as Émile Durkheim, Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto) to explore a theory of social action in his The Structure of Social Action (1937), which he ably used to advance fields like economy and society, family and industrialisation, etc. Following this was a resurgence of interest in Parsons’s functionalism, first in Germany and then, America. In 1985, Jeffrey C. Alexander introduced the term ‘neofunctionalism’ with an aim to reconsider and revise Parsons’s theory. Neo-functionalism offered a critique of the fundamental propositions of the original theory of functionalism. It examined the aspects of several other theories - some of which had conflicting relations with functionalism, for example, Marxism - in order to integrate them with neofunctionalism. Because of this, neofunctionalism does not manifest itself in one single theory, rather as several variants put together under the same rubric. Against this background, Alexander (1985) emphasizes that neofunctionalism should be considered to a lesser extent as a theory and more as a ‘wide-ranging intellectual tendency or movement’.

This unit centers around the critical evolution of functionalism and the emergence of neo-functionalism. We will explore the concept of neo-functionalism in sociological writings and examine its merits and limitation.

7.2 Criticisms of Functionalism

One of the main criticisms of functionalism is that it does not adequately deal with history. In other words, it is inherently ahistorical (but not anti-historical). It does not deal with the questions of past and history, although the advocates of functionalism have considered evolution and diffusion as important processes of change. Functionalism in social anthropology in the 1930s emerged as a reaction to the nineteenth century ‘pseudo-historical’ and ‘speculative’ evolutionism and diffusionism. It also tried to overcome the ethnocentric biases of the earlier approaches, which regarded the contemporary pre-literate societies, popularly known as ‘primitive societies’, and certain customs and practices found among them as remnants of past. Edward Tylor unhesitatingly regarded the ‘contemporary primitives’ as ‘social fossils’ and ‘survivals’ of the past, assuming that their study would guide us to an understanding of the cultural traits of the societies of prehistoric times (Harris 1968: 164-5). This would help us in reconstructing the history of humankind.

Closely related with this is another criticism of functionalism: it does not effectively deal with the contemporary processes of social change. Thus, in essence, because it is neither able to study the pasts of societies nor the
contemporary change process, it is more suited to the study of ‘contemporary static structures’, if there are any. Or, perhaps, it portrays the societies it studies as if they are static, which, in reality, may not be so. The picture of a society that functionalists present is like the picture of a ‘frozen river’ that tells nothing about its ebb and flow. By analogy, functionalists ‘freeze society’ in the same manner as a still camera ‘freezes’ people and locations in its frame.

There are two views on this issue. First, the problem is believed to lie with the theory of functionalism, because when the parts of a society are seen as reinforcing one another as well as the system, when each part fits well with the other parts, then it is difficult to explain how these parts can contribute to change (Cohen 1968). Or, why should the parts change or contribute to change when they are all in a state of harmony? The second opinion is that there is nothing in functionalism which prevents it from dealing with the issues of history and change. For instance, Parsons’s 1966 book titled Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives reflects the ability of structural-functionalism to handle the dimensions of change. So does Smelser’s work of 1959 on industrial revolution. The problem lies, according to some, not with the theory of functionalism, but its practitioners, who rarely address the issues of change and even when they do, it is in developmental and adaptive terms than in revolutionary (Turner and Maryanski 1979). Whether the problem of functionalism has to do with the theory or its practitioners, ‘the fact remains that the main contributions of structural functionalists lie with the study of static, not changing, social structures’ (Ritzer 2000: 115).

Another criticism of functionalism is that it is unable to deal effectively with conflict. Functionalists have overemphasized harmonious relationships. They tend to exaggerate consensus, stability, equilibrium, and integration, disregarding the forces of conflict and disorder, and changes emerging from them. For them, conflict is necessarily destructive and occurs outside the framework of society. One may remember here Durkheim who regarded ‘anomie’ (the state of normlessness) as a ‘social sickness’. Both Comte and later, Durkheim were staunchly critical of the Marxist and socialist thoughts, for they believed that the need of that time (when they were writing) was social reconstruction and order. Society had already become quite disintegrated, Comte said, because of the French Revolution and any support rendered to the idea of revolution would further accentuate disorder. Thus Comte’s positivism and Durkheim’s ‘functional explanations’ paid scant attention to the issues of conflict.

**Box 7.1: Early Twentieth Century Functionalism**

The early twentieth-century anthropological functionalism certainly inherited the legacy of the past, the theory of social order, but there was another reason why it consistently ignored the aspects of conflict and change. It received its empirical substantiation not from philosophical premises (as it did in case of Comte) or from secondary data (as was the case with Durkheim), but from first-hand, observation-based studies of simple societies, like that of Andamanese or Trobriand Islanders. The societies the anthropologists studied were largely cut off from the outside world. By comparison to other societies of the world, a higher degree of normative consensus prevailed among them because they were largely homogeneous. They had by and large one culture. Social sanctions were undisputable among them, contra-normative
actions were negligible, conformity to rules and tradition was higher and valued, and relatively speaking, the extent and magnitude of change was definitely less. It however did not mean that they were ‘changeless’, but they were changing slowly, at a snail’s speed.

In the words of Robert Redfield (1955), these societies were ‘past-oriented’ in comparison to modern societies which were ‘future-oriented’. The ‘past-oriented’ societies were proud of their tradition, which for them was sacrosanct; they wanted to keep it intact and therefore, any attempt to assail it was strongly dealt with. The ‘future-oriented’ societies were not satisfied with their lot; they looked forward to changing their lifestyles, technology, and norms and values. Since the substantiation of anthropological functionalism came from the empirical study of ‘past-oriented’, technologically simpler, pre-literate, and non-civilized societies, it was obvious that the characteristics of these societies would find their conspicuous presence in the theory.

Because functionalism does not deal with the issues of conflict, disorder, and change, many critics note that it has a conservative bias. In his critical assessment of functionalism, Gouldner (1970) says that for Parsons, one of the leading functionalists, a ‘partly filled glass’ is ‘half full’ rather than ‘half empty’. The point here is that for those the ‘glass is half full’ are emphasising the positive aspects of a situation in comparison to those who lay emphasis on the negative side, seeing the ‘glass as half empty’. The conservative bias in functionalism is not only because of what it ignores (history, change, conflict, disorder) but also what it emphasises (society ‘here and now’, norms and values, consensus, order). Functionalists are overwhelmingly preoccupied with the normative order of society.

The individual in functionalism is devoid of dynamism and creativity. He is simply a product of society and its forces constrain him at every juncture. The opposite view is that it is the individual who in fact initiates change in society. Individuals as much use the system as the system uses them. Those who subscribe to the interactional approach argue that functionalism has failed to conceptualise adequately the complex nature of actors and the process of interaction. One of the reasons of why functionalism ignored the role of the individual in society was that it was solely interested in explaining the survival of society. It was interested in the ‘collectivity’ and not the ‘individual’, and even when it was interested in the individual, as was the case with Malinowski, it was only till the point of the satisfaction of its biological needs. It was not to look at and analyze the attitudes and sentiments of the individual, and the role these psychic dimensions play in initiating social changes.

The functionalists’s search for order led them to lend justification to the existing norms and values, ideological and hierarchical structures, institutions, and rules of power distribution prevalent in a society. They did not realize, as Marxists had done, that the normative system in a society was a creation of the ruling elite, and there may be several opposing forces to it. By looking for order, they in fact were justifying the system, the established order, and thus were helping in the maintenance of the status quo. Functionalism was charged for supporting the dominant elite and the system as it was.
In addition to these, there were some important methodological and logical criticisms of functionalism. The belief of functionalism that there is a ‘single theory’ that could be used in all situations was an illusion. Many scholars found that it was difficult to apply functionalism to complex societies, which were not only fast changing but were also conflict-ridden. The ideas of relativism - i.e., things are meaningful in their respective cultural contexts — to which functionalists gave support, made a comparative analysis difficult. If ‘things’ can only be understood in the context of the social system of which they are a part, then how can we compare it with similar ‘things’ in other systems? If polyandry, for example, makes sense in the context of the community of the Todas, how can we compare it to polyandry in Jaunsar-Bawar? Some scholars have tried to deal with this matter of the lack of comparability in functionalism. Walter Goldschmidt (1966) has argued in favour of an approach he has called ‘comparative functionalism’. According to this approach, there is a universality of functions to which institutions are a response. All cultures require the same functions; however the institutions that fulfill these functions vary from one society to another.

One of the important criticisms of functionalism is that it is inherently teleological, i.e., explanations are given in terms of ‘purposes’ or ‘goals’. With respect to this, Turner and Maryanski (1979) submit that teleology per se is not a problem. As a matter of fact, social theory should take into account the ‘teleological relationship between society and its component parts’ (Ritzer 2000). The problem comes when teleology is stretched to unacceptable limits, when it is believed that only the given and specific part of society can fulfill the needs. Teleology becomes illegitimate when it fails to take into consideration the idea that a variety of alternative structures can fulfill the same needs. Why certain structures come up and why certain structures become irreplaceable needs to be explained. The later functionalists – such as Parsons and Merton – were aware of this problem and in their own ways tried to overcome it. Merton, for example, proposed the concept of functional alternatives. In his analysis of the family system, Parsons was able to show that in the contemporary industrial society, nuclear family performed the functions of primary socialisation and the stabilization of adult personality and no other institution could carry them out. These functions were non-transferable to any other institutions.

Functionalism has also been criticised for making explicit what is implicit in the premise; the technical term used for this kind of reasoning is ‘tautology’. For example, if religion exists, it must be functional, otherwise, it will cease to exist, and its function must be to contribute to social solidarity, because without it, society will not be able to survive. Many critics have pointed out that functionalism suffers from ‘globular or circular reasoning’. Needs are postulated on the basis of the existing institutions, that are, in turn, used to explain their existence. For instance, society as a ‘social fact’ explains the division of labour, and in turn, division of labour contributes to the maintenance of solidarity in society. What is happening here is that the whole is being defined in terms of its parts and then, parts are being defined in terms of the whole. Because one is being defined in terms of the other, in fact, none of them - neither the whole nor its parts - is actually being defined. As we noted earlier, here also there is a debate whether tautology is inherent in the theory or has come into existence because of the deeds of its practitioners.
7.3 The Thesis of Neo-functionalism

A revival of interest in Parsons’s work, first in Germany and then, the United States of America, led to the emergence of neo-functionalism. The basic aim has been to merge certain aspects of functionalism, those which have withstood the test of time, with other paradigms that have better developed critical perspectives. The aim has been to build a ‘hybrid’ that combines the strong points of the other perspectives so that one can deal with the so-called opposite issues (such as, consensus and conflict, equilibrium and change, collectivity and individual) in a balanced manner.

a) Revival in Germany

Those associated with neo-functionalism in Germany are Niklas Luhmann and Jürgen Habermas, who initially collaborated on a theory of social engineering in modern society, but later worked separately. Although formally trained in law, Luhmann has been a student of sociology and in 1960, spent a year at Harvard where he had a chance to be in contact with Parsons. He developed a sociological approach that combined certain aspects from Parsons’ structural functionalism with general systems theory. He also introduced in it concepts from cognitive biology and cybernetics (Ritzer 2000: 185). However, he disagreed with Parsons about the options available to individuals as concrete human beings. Parsons placed emphasis on value consensus, also believing that because the social system penetrates the personality system, the options available to the individual for social relationships and behaviour are limited. But that is, Luhmann thinks, not simply correct. He moves the individual out of the social system into the ‘society’ — what may be termed the ‘societal environment’ — which is far more complex and less restrictive. It accords people more freedom, especially freedom for carrying out ‘irrational and immoral behaviour’ (Abrahamson 2001: 148).

Abrahamson (2001: 148) says that if Luhmann moved from Parsons, and then discovered the problems with the concept of value consensus, Habermas moved toward Parsons. Habermas’s early writings were strongly critical of Parsons, but later, he accorded a place to cultural, social, and personality systems in his theory. His conceptualisation of the relationship between these systems was quite consistent with Parsons’s views. He also gave place to Parsons’s concept of ‘self-regulating system’, which comes into existence when societies become complex as a consequence of which structural systems are separated from ‘lifeworld’, i.e., the inter-subjective realm for experiencing and communicating about culture, society, and personality.

b) Revival in the United States of America

The main spokespersons of neofunctionalism in America are Jeffrey Alexander and Paul Colomy. In one of their joint publications of 1985, they define neofunctionalism as ‘a self-critical strand of functional theory that seeks to broaden functionalism’s intellectual scope while retaining its theoretical core’ (p. 118). Under the rubric of ‘neo-functionalism’, they have made an effort to extend structural functionalism by overcoming its difficulties. Structural functionalism envisions a single, all embracing conceptual scheme that is
supposed to be applicable for all societies at all points of time. By comparison, neofunctionalism is a ‘loosely organised package’ built around a general logic. It possesses a number of autonomous ‘proliferations’ and ‘variations’, which work at different levels and in different empirical contexts (Alexander and Colomy, eds., 1990).

The goal of neo-functionalists is to create a more synthetic theory. There is no doubt that Parsons was an unparalleled synthesizer of grand theory and structural functionalism has a strong synthetic core from the beginning. In his variety of structural functionalism, Parsons tried to integrate a wide range of theoretical inputs. He was also interested in drawing an interrelationship between different systems that constitute the social world — such as, cultural, social, and personality systems. So, Alexander and Colomy say, the beginning of structural functionalism was quite promising, but gradually, Parsons’s approach became overly narrow and deterministic. He started viewing the cultural system as determining the other systems. Also, his overwhelming preoccupation with the ‘problem of order’ led to insufficient attention being paid to conflict and strain.

Alexander and Colomy think that the deficiencies of structural functionalism are not irreversible. Its synthetic orientation can be recaptured. The concepts of conflict and subjective meaning can be introduced. One can regard the integration of the system and the interpenetration of its various subsystems as a ‘tendency’, to be investigated rather than as a ‘given’ or ‘assumed’ fact.

Box 7.2: Neo-Functionalism: Problems that need to be Surmounted

In neo-functionalism, the problems that need to be surmounted are:

1) Anti-individualism — the individual in structural functionalism is passive and lacks creativity, and is simply a product of the social forces, which he neither checks nor controls;
2) Antagonism to change — structural functionalism is a theory of social order rather than of change;
3) Conservatism — structural functionalism has worked toward offering a justification of the system and its practices, often justifying inequality, exploitation, and oppression.
4) Idealism — structural functionalism speaks in terms of an ideal society, where everything is in order and stability.
5) Anti-empiricist bias — structural functionalism is more concerned with abstract social systems instead of real societies.

Neo-functionalism can be seen as an ‘effort’ or ‘tendency’ to overcome these problems. Alexander was skeptical of calling this a developed theory and more an orientation sensitive to the criticisms of structural functionalism.

The basic orientations of neofunctionalism may be outlined. Neofunctionalism operates with a descriptive model of society. For it, society comprises elements that are constantly in interaction with other elements, and together they form a pattern. Because of this pattern, society is differentiated from its environment, with which it has its ceaseless interaction. Parts of a system are symbiotically connected - one contributing to the other. However, there is no overarching force that determines their interaction. Neofunctionalism rejects any monocausal determinism; it is open-ended and pluralistic.
Neo-functionalism allocates equal attention to action and order. According to Alexander (1982: 65), these concepts constitute the ‘true presuppositions of sociological debate.’ Structural functionalism has a tendency to focus almost exclusively on the macro-level sources of order in social structures and culture. It gives little attention to micro-level actions — actions that take place at the local level. In its analysis, neo-functionalism includes rational as well as expressive actions. It is far from viewing that human actions are only rational, gain-multiplying, profit-oriented, and ‘scientific’. One of the main functions of culture is that it allows people to express themselves, sometimes aesthetically.

Like structural functionalism, neo-functionalism retains interest in integration, but it is not an accomplished fact. Rather, it is a social possibility. It recognises that deviance is a ubiquitous social reality, and to check it, each system must have the instruments of social control, forcing the deviants to subscribe to rules lest punishments to their actions become cumulatively stringent. Social control tries to restore some sort of stability in the system. Neo-functionalism is concerned with equilibrium, but it is broader than the concern of structural functionalism. Neo-functionalism does not believe that any system can ever be in a state of ‘static equilibrium’; it is always moving and partial. Moreover, the concept of equilibrium is to be regarded as a reference point for functional analysis. It does not describe the lives of individuals in actual social systems, which is perennially in action. It brings us once again to the point about neofunctionalism mentioned earlier - it is concerned equally with order and action.

Of all the functionalists, it was Parsons’s structural functionalism that exercised the maximum impact on later scholars, some of whom later became famous as neo-functionalists. The latter accept the traditional Parsonian emphasis on culture, social, and personality systems, which are vital to any society. These systems interpenetrate one another, because of which they produce tension, which is one of the important sources of change and control. Further, change occurs when cultural, social, and personality systems are differentiated over time. This change does not occur because of conformity and harmony, but because of the rise of individualism and institutional strains.

### Reflection and Action 7.2

What are the major similarities and differences between structural functionalism and neo-functionalism?

Neo-functionalism submits that in order to enrich our understanding of the processes of order and action in society, we should think of borrowing from other theories and perspectives in sociology and other social sciences. Alexander and Colomy have tried synthesizing structural functionalism with other theoretical traditions. To overcome the idealist bias in structural functionalism, neo-functionalism encourages materialist approaches. To counter the structural functional tendency to emphasize order has led neo-functionalists to explore the theories of culture. Insights from approaches such as exchange theory, symbolic interactionism, pragmatism, and phenomenology are being drawn to compensate for macro-level biases of the traditional functional approach.

The future of neo-functionalism has been cast into doubt by the fact that Alexander in his book *Neofunctionalism and After* (1998) has stated that he
has outgrown a neo-functionalist orientation in his career. He says that one of his important goals was to show the importance of Parsons’ theory. Parsons had built a theoretical scheme that was potentially capable of overcoming the contradictions inherent in classical sociology, but neither he nor any of his collaborators and students was able to take full advantage of the theory. Alexander saw his aim as that of developing the theoretical strands that lay incipient in Parsons’s work. Since he thinks that he has succeeded in this venture, his project of neo-functionalism is over. It will however, Alexander says, keep on influencing his later thoughts, and his present work on civil societies.

7.4 Merits and Demerits of Neo-functionalism: Conclusion

Although some of the traits of what has come to be called ‘neo-functionalism’ are found in the German interest in Parsons’s works, this theoretical ‘tendency’ is principally associated with an American sociologist, Jeffrey C. Alexander, and later, his younger collaborator, Paul Colomy. A restricted use of the term ‘neo-functionalism’ is also found in ecological studies where it basically means assigning primary importance to techno-environmental forces in an analysis of the processes of cultural adaptation (Bettinger 1996).

Alexander does not seem to be happy with the use of the term ‘neo-functionalism’. He also thinks that ‘functionalism’ was not really an appropriate term to describe Parsons’s approach. Parsons himself tried to discard the term ‘structural functionalism’ for his approach, but he knew that it would continue to be used for his sociology. Some of his associates preferred to call his theory ‘action theory’. Alexander (1985) also thinks that notwithstanding the inappropriateness of the term ‘functionalism’, Parsons’s sociology will be known in future by this name. Thus, not much will be gained by discarding the term; rather one should cling to it, and redefine it. Instead of being a unified theory, neofunctionalism is a ‘tendency’, characterised by the following propositions (Alexander 1985: 10):

1) An open and pluralistic description of society as a whole.
2) An even-handed apportionment when it comes to action vs. structure (or action vs. order).
3) Integration is viewed as a possibility; deviance and social control are considered realities.
4) Discernment between personality, culture, and society.
5) Differentiation is viewed as the central driving force producing social change.
6) The development of concepts and theory is considered to be independent of all the levels involved in sociologic analysis.

There have been marked variations in the responses to the efforts of Alexander and others to revive functionalism. Some have found Alexander’s account of the functional tradition as extremely vague. They also question the purported continuity between functionalism and neo-functionalism, because ‘neo-functionalism seems to include everything functionalism has been criticized as lacking’ (Fauske 2000:245). There are limits to the length to which any theoretical perspective can go in accommodating incompatible notions and yet retain its name and lineage. For some critics, the changes introduced in structural functionalism are more cosmetic than real. Neo-functionalism is
still imbued with the features that distinguish functionalism. For instance, the view that societies can be studied objectively continues to predominate. Individuals are still regarded as ‘reactors to the system’ rather than ‘dynamic and creative actors’. Conflict is recognised but remains at a secondary place in the theory (Abrahamson 2001). And, revolution is certainly not considered. So, isn’t neofunctionalism old wine in new bottles?

Alexander suggests that sociology should be based on a post-positivistic understanding of science, which means that we can understand the world around us as much through theoretical explanations as through empirical enquiry. This view opposes positivism because it reduces theory to empirical data; in other words, for it, there cannot be a theory divorced from empirical facts. Positivism makes a sharp distinction between empirical observations and non-empirical propositions. The latter constitute the realm of philosophy and metaphysics, thus deserving no place in empirical science.

Post-positivism submits that a theory can be discussed, examined, verified, and elaborated with reference to other theories rather than empirical research. In other words, the referent for a theory might be another theory rather than an ensemble of facts. Theories are viewed as if they represent the ‘empirical observations’. Alexander is critical of empirically-based inferences in social sciences. One of the fundamental differences between social sciences and natural sciences is that theoretical perspectives always permeate every work that social scientists do. Sociological theory, therefore, can be scientifically significant irrespective of its ability and capacity to explain empirical observations.

In future, Alexander thinks, there will be a ‘grand theory’, built on the premises of post-positivism. This theory will be multidimensional with respect to various polarities in classical sociological theory, such as micro-macro, order-conflict, equilibrium-stability, structure-agency, etc. But even after its ‘hybridization’, drawing upon different theoretical perspectives, neofunctionalism will not be a ‘distinct paradigm’, much less a grand theory. In other words, skepticism prevails about the future of neofunctionalism.

7.5 Further Reading


References


