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# UNIT 16 RESOURCE ANALYSES AND MOBILISATION

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## 16.0 LEARNING OUTCOME

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After going through this Unit, you should be able to:

- Understand Center -State relations regarding disaster management financing;
- Grasp modalities for resource transfer as suggested by Finance Commissions; and
- Critically examine relief provisions.

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## 16.1 INTRODUCTION

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Considering the series of disasters our country has faced in the last few decades, the Finance Commissions have been active in making allocations for financing disaster of late preparedness and response. Disaster management has seen a shift of emphasis on preparedness and mitigation from the earlier focus on disaster response. Fund provision accordingly needs to provide for long-term mitigation instead of short-term response efforts. However governments are hard pressed to even provide for disaster response. Hence a discussion on resource provision for disaster response, preparedness and long-term mitigation has been deemed important.

### Existing Arrangement

Disaster Management is primarily the responsibility of the States. Funds are available to states from the Calamity Relief Fund (CRF) and the National Calamity Contingency Fund (NCCF). The Calamity Relief Fund was set up on the recommendations of the Ninth Finance Commission though subsequent commissions have determined the funding pattern that establishes the relative share of the Center and the State towards calamity relief. The break up presently is 75:25 between Center and States, respectively. The Eleventh

Finance Commission recommended setting up the National Calamity Contingency Fund (NCCF) replacing the National Fund for Calamity Relief (NFCR), which existed for five years from 1995-96 till 1999-2000 as per the recommendation of the Second Finance Commission. The NCCF is a Central government fund, which supplements the CRF in case of excess requirements. Before the CRF, the scheme of Margin Money was in operation. Whereby the Centre allocated funds to states, which were required to, kept as separate funds by states.

### Developments so Far

The states received fewer amounts as against their requirements under the Margin Money Scheme. The Eighth Finance Commission continued this arrangement but recommended changes in respect of the quantum of margin money and the manner of its funding. The margin money for all the states was increased from rupees (Rs) 110.55 crores to Rs. 240.75 crores. Half the margin money was taken into account in the forecasts of State budgets as determined by the Finance Commissions and the remaining half was to be provided by the Centre after the States exhausted the available funds. Additional Central assistance beyond this margin money could be provided where the calamity was of a rare severity after the visit of the central team and consideration of its report.

The Ninth Finance Commission, while making its final recommendations, took the following other factors into account; *first*, the existing system of assessing the damage and the mechanism of Central assistance led to delays whereas speedy response should be a basic feature of the scheme; *second*, the catalogue of demand presented by the states are inflated because of the assumption that these would in any ways be curtailed by the Centre and also following to assign public opinion in the state; *third* the need that, the scheme should be so designed as to ensure against profligacy and wastefulness. The big increase in expenditure in the recent past could not be explained purely in terms of the growing severity of the natural calamities and *fourth*, the money already provided in advance should be more or less sufficient for the purpose of relief expenditure, except where there is a calamity of a rare nature.

Some of the other important recommendations of the Ninth Finance Commission included:

- Creation of a separate relief fund (quite apart from the Public Account of the State) for each state;
- Formation of a State level Committee under the State Chief Secretary to operate this fund;
- Co-ordination and monitoring by the Union Ministry of Agriculture (department of agriculture and cooperation); and,
- Handling of calamities of rare severity by the Centre involving additional Central assistance over and above the Calamity Relief Fund (CRF).

Further, recommendations of the Tenth Finance Commission, were:

- While a separate fund should be created, there should also be flexibility of choice with regard to the avenues of investment, subject to ensuring security and liquidity; the question of holding the fund entirely in a nationalised bank should also be considered while issuing the necessary instruction by the Finance Ministry;

- The Agriculture Ministry was required to issue guidelines for the State level committees in respect of all matters connected with the financing of relief expenditures;
- The norms of expenditure under each head for the different items of work were to be laid down by the Agriculture Ministry after due consultation;
- The State Accountant Generals were then to be instructed to see that only expenditure on the items approved by the Agriculture Ministry is booked under the head *Natural Calamities*; and
- The Ministry of Agriculture was also required to monitor whether the states were adhering to the norms prescribed.

The present scheme of financing relief expenditure is based on the recommendations of the Eleventh Finance Commission. The CRF has been set up in each state to provide funds in case of floods, droughts, cyclones, hailstorms, earthquakes and fires. The total size of the CRF for the five year period is 11,007.59 crores. The Center will contribute 75% of the amount while the state's share would be 25%. In case of severe calamity, the National Calamity Contingency Fund (NCCF) would supplement the CRF. The NCCF was created with an initial corpus of 500 crores, financed from budgetary sources. The Corpus is to be replenished through a surcharge on certain central taxes. A high level Committee consisting of the Home Minister, Finance Minister, Agriculture Minister and Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, sanctions funds from the NCCF. Total CRF disbursement from the CRF for the year 2004-05 amounted to 1748.66 crore from the NCCF, to 1623.66 crore. Certain modifications have been made in the norms and items for approval from the CRF and the NCCF based on the recommendations of the Central teams constituted for the purpose with representatives of the States. Priority would now be accorded to the special requirements of the vulnerable sections of society. Focus would be on making available funds for immediate restoration of livelihood assets like cattle care requirements etc and public utility infrastructure in the aftermath of a disaster. States can now spend 10% of funds allotted from CRF on securing needed equipment for disaster response involving activities related to search, rescue evacuation and communication activities etc. Funds would be made available for training of police and paramilitary forces in disaster response and providing them necessary facilities and equipment for carrying out their functions. Transparency would also be a requirement in disbursement of relief funds. This would involve preparing a list of beneficiaries along with quantity and quality of relief disbursement with names of beneficiaries and displaying them at public places (*Annual Report, 2004-05, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India*). The share of the Government of India towards the Calamity Relief Fund is released in four equal installments at the beginning of each quarter. During the period of Ninth Finance Commission's recommendations, there was no separate earmarked corpus available with the Government of India for dealing with calamities of rare severity. By and large, no additional central assistance such was given to the states, though in addition to advance share of CRF, the expenditure of certain adjustments and enhancements under various schemes such as JRY, etc. was resorted to.

In comparison with the earlier existing Margin Money Scheme, the States now get a higher assistance from the Central Government for relief expenditure and the response of the State governments to natural calamities can potentially be quicker than before. The CRF scheme gives more autonomy, more responsibility and also assigns greater accountability for disaster response activities.

The Twelfth Finance Commission has recommended continuing the scheme of Calamity Relief Fund (CRF) in its present form with contributions from the Centre and States in the ratio of 75:25. The size of the fund worked out at Rs21, 333 crore for the period 2005-10. The outgo from the fund is to be replenished by way of collection of National Calamity Contingent Duty and levy of surcharges. The definition of natural calamity is to include landslides, avalanches, cloud burst and pest attacks. Provision of disaster preparedness and mitigation is to be classified plan expenditure and not calamity relief.

### **Plan Funds**

As referred in the previous Unit, Plan funds are also utilised by way of centrally sponsored schemes, such as drinking water, employment generation, inputs for agriculture and flood control measures etc. There are also so facilities for using loans for short-term purposes upon certification by the District/State administration. Besides, International aid agencies give funds for assistance to disaster-affected countries. According to the instructions contained in the Ministry of Home Affairs circulars, official publication, (*A Status Report, issued from the Natural Disaster Management Division*), states need to make better use of existing plan schemes, and possibly reallocate funds from other schemes to disaster management schemes for prevention and mitigation of disasters. The mechanism for making it possible is currently being evolved in consultation with the Planning Commission. Special emphasis is being given to the need for efficient communication process in every state as the same is crucial for mobilisation of effort at the State, District and Local levels, for disaster response particularly emergency communications, and the chief factor in coordination between Central and State agencies involved in the process. In cases of projects proposed in hazard prone areas, components providing for disaster mitigation will be given priority clearance, to avoid cost accumulation in reconstruction and rehabilitation activities at later stages. Disaster insurance would be encouraged, to enforce mitigation measures in infrastructure development in public and private sectors.

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## **16.2 ISSUES IN DISASTER RELIEF**

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With reference to the Gujarat drought and the Orissa super cyclone, shortcomings detected in relief provision and implementation are as follows:

- After the state governments officially declare a drought in their state, distribution of relief effort is allegedly done on political considerations. Such extraneous considerations reportedly determined drought relief to Andhra Pradesh following 2001-02 droughts, of 148 crores, when deficient rainfall was measured at only 6%. On the other hand, Rajasthan did not get anything despite facing its third successive drought.
- Response initiatives of the Central Government were often not implemented on the ground. There have been reports of gross irregularities and inadequacies in relief distribution.
- Poverty reduction programmes as per socialist planned economic development had ameliorated the poverty situation somewhat in drought-affected states, which had increased the resilience of people. Following liberalisation and the New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1991, the Government has chosen to neglect the social sector by and large. Resource allocation for rural development and poverty reduction programmes has been brought down. The Government, for relief in drought-affected states has not used even excess grain stocks. This has worsened the prevailing adversity due to droughts. Large parts with non- irrigated agricultural land have been particularly hit,

as fuel driven tube wells are an expensive proposition for already impoverished farmers. Public investment consequently, has fallen in agriculture, drastically over the past years.

- Sociological dynamics are also at work in determining disaster relief and influencing/affecting rehabilitation decisions. Access to resources is unfortunately determined by caste and class considerations rather than humanitarian, which puts a question mark on ethics involved in the process. Decline of agriculture leads to decline in employment opportunities for poor tribal communities like the *Sahariyas* in Rajasthan and other marginalised communities who till lands belonging to rich farmers. Many deaths had reportedly been caused due to hunger or consumption of poisonous *Sama* seeds in the absence of any grain, during the 2001-02 droughts, though the government insisted they were caused due to illness. Relief works were found to be almost non-existent, particularly public health infrastructure to protect from diseases. No gratuitous relief and no public works programmes were evident in the Baran district of Rajasthan, quite contrary to government claims and where pursued, were wholly inadequate. There are also reports of discrimination against backward communities in employment opportunities in government relief works.
- Relief works, where undertaken, were of poor quality, and hence, unviable such as *Kachcha* roads, wells which would not last a season. Important requirements such as primary health care centers (PHCs), veterinary hospitals and schools were largely ignored. Animal shelters were ill kept and fodder depots failed because of excess losses against gains. Heavy advance payments had to be paid and transportation costs added considerably to overall costs.
- After the Orissa Super Cyclone, the Government announced a compensation of Rs. 3,500 for every house swept away, Rs. 2000 for every house fully collapsed, and Rs. 1000 for every house partially collapsed. There was alleged underestimation of property and loss of lives by the state administration (Das and Jha, 2004).

### 16.2.1 Assessment of Audit Reports

The C &AG of India had audited the expenditure incurred by the State governments from the CRF and the National Fund for Calamity Relief (NFCR) during the period 1992-98 and presented the audit results in its Union Government (civil) Performance Appraisal Report Number 3, of 1999.

- The C &AG had noted improprieties related to misuse and diversion of Rs. 670 crores on items not connected with calamity relief, like payment of salaries, wages, office furniture, transport, maintenance, renovation of assets not related to relief were noticed in the sample check. Out of Rs. 670 crores mentioned above, Rs. 133 crore was spent by the states in areas where no calamity had occurred.
- The C&AG had also noticed large number of cases of misappropriation of funds and fraudulent transactions out of CRF.
- The inherent defect in design for release of funds from the NFCR in case of calamities of rare severity led to delays in release of funds, in some cases up to eighty months after the onslaught of the calamity.

On the basis of all its findings, the C & AG was of the opinion that the Calamity Relief Fund (CRF) and the National Fund for Calamity Relief (NFCR) had not met the intended

objectives satisfactorily, which was primarily due to the tendency of states to exhaust the allocations under the CRF in an indiscriminate manner. (*ibid*)

### 16.2.2 Drawbacks in the CRF Structure

Subrato Das and Nandan Kumar Jha (2004) list the following drawbacks of the CRF scheme:

- One of the major drawbacks of the CRF scheme is the skewed method of determination of CRF's size for different states. The Eleventh Finance Commission (EFC) did recognise factors such as states' proneness to natural calamities and repeat occurrence of natural calamities etc., but did not incorporate these as factors in the determination of the quantum of CRF for a state. Thus allocations to CRFs of economically advanced states, like Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Punjab were higher than backward states like Orissa, Bihar Assam, Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal.
- The 75-25% sharing of responsibility is reportedly unfair on poorer states. Thus, despite total increase in allocation, it continues to be less in real terms.
- Calamity relief is limited to drought cyclone, flood earthquake, fire and hailstorm. Losses occurring due to heat wave, cold wave, landslides, heavy rains, avalanches, and pest attacks are not considered.
- There have been reports of delays in release of financial assistance to states from the NCCF on account of submissions from states, assessments of submissions, from inter ministerial group, etc. States on their part have been guilty of irresponsible behavior, such as not crediting CRF and NCCF funds into their CRF account, resulting in delayed release of the central share of CRF.
- Funds for long-term disaster mitigation have not been considered. With the paradigm shift in disaster management from response to long-term mitigation, substantial expenditure on capital works would need to be undertaken. Provision for the same has to be built into relief fund provisioning.
- Besides, financial provision for relief and implementation of programmes for relief and preparedness need to be decentralised and planning made more objective and fact based accurate assessments of data regarding assessment of financial requirements and monitoring of expenditure. While the funds allocated are inadequate and the process of establishing of separate National, State and District level funds for disaster management is yet to take place, one of the most difficult problems in disaster management is achievement of optimum utilisation of available resources.

Difficulties tend to arise for some or all of the following reasons:

- In case the counter-disaster planning is inadequate;
- In case all potential resources have not been identified during the planning process;
- In case resource organisations have not been accurately assessed in terms of their capability, availability and durability;
- In case the allocation of tasks to resource organisations has not been accurate or appropriate;
- In case the resource organisations are not sufficiently skilled in carrying out allotted tasks;

- In case some resources may be destroyed or put out of action by disaster impact;
- In case of any delay that may occur in the availability and application of resources, also due to disaster impact;
- In case the resource organisations have had insufficient practice in their disaster roles, especially in coordinating their activities with those of other resource organisations;
- In case the system for directing the use of resource organisations, and especially for coordinating their activities, is inadequate; and
- In case of poor direction of resources that may result in duplication of gaps in disaster response activities.

Available resources are often not enough to cope with all requirements. Requirements are different for different organisations. For instance, response to an earthquake situation requires:

- Heavy earth-moving equipment;
- Search and rescue; and
- Special medical skills.

Besides, preparedness in terms of resources might be lop sided in the sense that funds might be available for one requirement, and not for some other essential and related requirement. For example, relief supplies might be adequate but disbursement capacity/mechanism might be inadequate. Shortfalls in planning may also affect response in that resources for some urgent requirement may not be immediately secured.

Disaster management cannot be completely planned for in advance. The scope of disaster management differs as per the requirements of the situation. Resources of the state, whether in developed or poor Third World countries, are stretched in disaster response. Disaster Mitigation is hard to provide for and also not completely feasible/practicable as disasters are an uncertain phenomenon. Therefore instead of newer provisions there needs to be emphasis on utilising existing disaster related resources to the full. With burgeoning fiscal deficit, excess expenditure on relief, rehabilitation and public works put additional burden on state resources. Hence practicality and necessity of any scheme has to be considered in the context.

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### **16.3 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF RESOURCE ORGANISATIONS**

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Some organisations are closely oriented towards disaster tasks. For example, the Public Works Department has the equipment for day-to-day experience in clearing debris and cutting access roads, which is primarily a disaster management task. Similarly, much of a telecommunications agency's daily task is concerned with maintenance of communication systems. In times of disaster that task may increase considerably but its nature does not change. There is little need for extra disaster related provisioning. Other organisations however may have to make significant adjustments when *extending* into their disaster role. Some resource organisations may have difficulty in converting to a disaster service mode, since it mandates special requirements in terms of staff and training needs, asset requirements or administrative modifications such as decentralising, setting up field

headquarters etc. With non-governmental organisations, the assumption of disaster roles is easier since most NGOs are normally concerned with various aspects of community care and assistance and are therefore, oriented towards disaster related roles and, indeed, in most cases would expect to do so. What comes out of the discussion is that such complications need to be understood in planning for disaster response and gearing up individual organisations for the same. Flexible methods need to be devised since 'conversion' requirement for each organisation would differ.

Some other key factors, which affect the functions of resource organisations, are as follows:

- *Clear Understanding of Disaster Role:* It is necessary that organisations have an absolutely clear understanding of the disaster role(s), which they are required to perform, especially the additional financial commitments which would be involved during and after disasters.
- *Organisational Scope and Limitations:* The scope and limitation of organisations in relation to their disaster tasks also need to be examined, involving available resources in terms of manpower, training and development needs, additional or excess capacity which can be used as a reserve, for example, staff, which can be used in different activities as per suitability. The capability of organisations to fulfill their disaster roles must also be examined and updated.
- *Suspension of Normal Role Elements:* If some elements of some organisational roles can be temporarily suspended or left in abeyance, these should be identified as clearly as possible, thus releasing the relevant resources for disaster - response purposes.
- *Effect of Disaster Commitments on Own Resources:* In view of above requirements, assumption of disaster response related role might disturb the organisation's financial management/commitments for the year. Post disaster recovery may be a protracted and costly process. In conditions of post-disaster stringency, the losses may take a significant time to recover. This point needs to be resolved at the planning stage itself, to avoid complications later.
- *Exposure of Risk:* Sometimes disaster operations may expose the personnel and inventory to the risk of loss. This may not be acceptable to resource organisations, resulting in reluctance to carry out certain tasks. This point, if it is likely to be relevant, needs to be satisfactorily settled during the planning process.
- *Legal Implications:* As with exposure to risk, disaster operations may sometimes involve disaster workers and/or organisations in legal implications. For instance, damage may be caused to private property during these operations. Resource organisations need to be assured that they are safeguarded against any such eventuality. Disaster legislation can be suitably framed to cover this kind of possibility.
- *Management of Resources for Optimum Effectiveness:* Probably the biggest problem concerning key requirements is that they are identified and articulated specifically and accepted by both the resource organisation and disaster management authorities. Once the requirements are clarified there is no reason why they cannot be resolved by good disaster management processes.
- *Rationalisation of Roles:* The overall management requirement is obviously to achieve the best possible rationalisation between differing objectives, which affect

both normal roles, and disaster roles. It is suggested that this is, to a large extent, an ongoing management task. It may involve substantial monitoring, especially if variations and changes are likely to occur in either normal roles or disaster related roles. If standard operating procedures are maintained, required monitoring and checking are facilitated. Moreover, if such standard operating procedures are officially authorised in disaster legislation and / or counter-disaster plans, they provide a means of formal backing for the disaster management authority, and indeed, for resource organisation also.

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## **16.4 SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS**

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Though NGOs have proven their worth as support organisations, some governments are diffident in their approach towards NGOs. Also, NGOs themselves are often skeptical of the government.

The important thing is optimum effectiveness of disaster response through mobilisation of sufficient resources. There is often excess provision of relief by way of international aid, which requires proper management on the part of both the government and non-government organisations. This is a possible area of cooperation between government and non-government agencies. Thus, whatever system is in place for NGO participation, there still needs to be a workable arrangement between the disaster management authorities and NGOs for synergy in resource management. It is also important that arrangements for NGO participation be sustained in normal times as well, to maintain continuity of such synergy/cooperation required. Proper accountability and audit arrangements might need to be put in place.

### **Training**

This also involves associating with NGOs in a reciprocal learning relationship/ interface, involving exchange of training and technical know how. Since NGOs are networked internationally, they possess significant knowledge resource, which needs to be introduced in governmental functioning. All forms of training, which are related to the functions of resource organisations under relevant disaster plans, should involve relevant government and non-government organisations in closer cooperation than has been evident up till now. Resources for the same may have to be ensured on a sustained basis in government programmes.

### **Resource Use**

One area concerning the utilisation of resources, which may not always receive adequate attention in counter-disaster planning, organisation and training, is activation/readiness of organisations. The activities concerned are primarily related to 'response', generically, though they could apply to certain aspects of preparedness, of which mobilising of resources is a key ingredient. The objective is to build emergency lead reserves of resources, in advance of a possibly developing disaster situation. There are a number of factors, which may affect the way in which such 'activation' is achieved. These factors are best considered against what might be called a 'best-case' situation. Best-case situation involves anticipation of a disaster scenario and assessing the resource capability of the organisation as per identified requirement and exploring the possibility of maximum or best possible resource use in accordance with such requirements. In best-case situation, following conditions would generally apply:

- Advance planning with proper lead time
- Establishment of and compliance with standard operating procedures
- Training of personnel in standard operating procedures
- Effective warning and communication system

A step-by-step implementation system involving succession of steps as:

### 1) **Readiness or Alert**

This stage comes into effect when some form of information is received which indicates that the provisions of the counter-disaster plan may have to be evoked. The National Disaster Regulating Authority declares that the stage is in force and if deemed necessary, authorises a public broadcast to this effect. The authority consults as per requirements, with other concerned committees and decides what action is to be taken at this stage. The authority then initiates such measures under the plan as are considered necessary. In some circumstances, when there is no warning, this stage does not apply. Resources need to be budgeted as per need. Forethought and fore planning may be involved in such an exercise. Equipment provision, training and conversion of technical information in user-friendly mode format are the essential organisational requirements involved.

### 2) **Stand-by**

This stage comes into effect when it is established that a threat exists to all or part of the country. It requires that all relevant organisations and personnel be placed on stand-by, so that they are ready to begin operations/ actions under the plan immediately, when called upon to do so. The central authority, in consultation with other committees decides when this stage gets operative and announces it accordingly. As with Stage 1, this may become applicable in no-warning situations.

### 3) **Action**

This stage comes into effect when it appears certain that a disaster is imminent or when such an event has already occurred. The central authority, in consultation with other committees, as found appropriate, will decide when this stage is to be implemented and announces it accordingly. If circumstances so demand, provincial or other committees may make their own decisions regarding implementing this stage. Proper compatibility / tuning between centralised and decentralised operations would be crucial here. All relevant organisations and personnel are then to take action as required by the plan, under the direction of the central authority.

Within standard operating procedures there would be a communication procedure to inform individual members of resource organisations that they are required for duty in their disaster roles. The transmission or receipt system required to implement this procedure needs to be foolproof and the means employed depend on local circumstances and capability (e.g. some organisations might have mobile radios; others might have to rely on a siren system; others might be dependent on the telephone; and others again, might have to rely on word-of-mouth). Equipment and vehicles should be readily available for manning deployment and utilisation. Flexibility in resource utilisation is important in disaster management activities since contingent needs might arise, which need to be provided for immediately. Such requirements are unplanned and unbudgeted. Hence concerned administrative authorities need to have the authority to take quick on-the-spot decisions

regarding resource availability. Bottlenecks in the absence of the same would well nigh jeopardise the response effort.

There would be enough warning time to enable resource organisations to comply with counter disaster plans in terms of precautionary measures and standard operating procedures and be operationally ready in time to meet the threat.

Obviously, with certain resource organisations and/or in specific disaster circumstances, additional factors might apply such as securing international networking for communication and search and rescue equipment, or trained manpower. International assistance might comprise a major aspect of commodity management, involving reception, off-loading, cataloguing, storage, security and distribution. Disaster management authorities would have always to be well advised to try to assess, as accurately as possible the requirements involved. However, those stated above are likely to be the most general ones. In such specific cases, commodity management comes forth as an important aspect of disaster response. An important part of resource management is concerned with commodities, such as fuel, food, emergency materials and so on. Four major considerations in this regard are:

*Planned management of government stock:* Stockpiles of medical supplies, reserves of building materials held for government purposes etc. need to be reviewed for their suitability and emergency availability, and arrangements made for their possible utilisation under disaster circumstances.

*Supplies relevant to resource organisations:* The private corporate sector needs to be involved in resource provision for disaster response. Account needs to be maintained of parallel resources within the private sector. These parallel resources usually tend to consist of items such as vehicles and equipment but the inclusion of appropriate stores is worth considering. This action should not, however, duplicate action taken under the foregoing category.

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## 16.5 CONCLUSION

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Risk Management is a mainline management function in private organisations today. However the same needs to be incorporated functionally as well as in a cultural sense in public organisations which may not be credited with effective resource or capacity utilisation through efficient logistics management, marketing and human resource management. The growing synergy between the government corporate sector and the non- government sectors should be further promoted and capitalised upon to ensure better disaster preparedness through relevant and meaningful policy formulation and more effective horizontal collaboration between organisations/departments involved in disaster policy formulation and implementation.

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## 16.6 KEY CONCEPTS

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**Counter Disaster Planning** : Counter Disaster Planning refers to preparedness in ‘normal’ times to build disaster for the period when it strikes. Counter disaster planning involves government agencies as well as community preparedness to reduce the loss of lives and property in the event of a disaster. Counter disaster plans are prepared for

individual organisations as an essential management requirement.

### **Budgeting for Risks**

- : Risk management requires separate resource allocation for risk mitigation activities under relevant cost centers in budgets under plan and non-plan, revenue and capital heads. Emphasis in disaster management is currently on mainstreaming risk management measures in regular decision making or policy planning process instead of disaster response which had been the orientation up till now. Hence risk management is a not a separate but integral aspect of management, particularly, disaster management.

### **Non-Government Organisations**

: These organisations are wholly or partly controlled by the government or independently owned/ controlled. Some organisations are internationally networked in that they are financed and managed by international associations. These organisations function in the social sphere and are mostly in the nature of social action groups. They are engaged in 'needs articulation' with respect to disadvantaged special groups and some like the OXFAM are engaged in financing rural regeneration/development activities. These organisations typify civil society, which is partaking in governance actively in a synergistic partnership with the government, in accordance with the new public management approach to governance (involvement of civil society in service delivery, end and client orientation to governance).

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## **16.7 REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING**

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## **16.8 ACTIVITIES**

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- 1) Discuss Center -State relations regarding disaster management financing.
- 2) Write a note on the functional requirements of resource organisations.