
UNIT 7 IDEA OF DUTY

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7.1 INTRODUCTION

Rights discourse has been one of the most prominent features of contemporary political philosophy and political agendas. It argues that persons, mainly as individuals, are the bearers of a body of claims, liberties and powers which the rest of the society has to acknowledge and public life should be based on such acknowledgement and support. Such an exaltation of rights has led to a deep unease regarding duties and obligations that are called for the maintenance and reproduction of a just and sane social order or for fostering and promoting an ideal society. The criticisms regarding privileging of rights in the constitution of a good society has brought to the fore the role of duties, denoting a shift in perspective, which, while seeing duties as complementary to rights, also construes duties as marking a space of their own. Such an endeavour has led to spelling out the role of duties much more clearly in recent literature.

7.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF DUTY

It has been argued by several scholars that the rights discourse focuses much more and often exclusively, on individuals without drawing attention to cultures and communities which enable people to be claimants and bearers of such rights. This stream of thought stresses on duties and obligations to sustain culture and communities without which it would be impossible for people to make claims on and sustain a regime of rights.

Sometimes, denial of certain rights may make people rise in revolt against a system which is by and large fair. Discourse on duty has drawn attention to the need to preserve a system which is overall fair and one cannot rebel against such an order.

While rights discourse has seen itself as universally holding good, there have been currents of thought upholding the significance of reasonable, yet diverse, ways of life and ideals which qualify such a universal claim to different degrees. They have sought from their followers commitment and duties to uphold ways of life and ideals distinctive to themselves. Given the deep pluralism in which societies are being caught today, we cannot ignore such duty based evocations present in our public life.

Thinkers, like Mahatma Gandhi, have felt that the rights discourse has been fed into the service of an unending chain of satisfactions and gratifications and this discourse has not been sensitive to authentically human pursuits, i.e., pursuits characteristic of human beings qua human. It has led to wanton exploitation of earth's resources, breeding conflicts and violence closely bound up with such an endeavour. They have drawn attention to the need to foreground a conception of the human person and moral duties if we have to sustain civilised ways of life.

At the same time, we cannot ignore that fascist and authoritarian orders have stressed on the duty to contend against liberal stress on rights and the Marxist pursuit of a non-exploitative and just social order. By stressing on duty they have attempted to instal their interpretation on several cherished values and strivings, such as self-respect and culture.

Given such a deployment of the understanding of duty, it necessarily makes this idea a deeply contested one susceptible to different pulls and pressures. It is also deeply caught in the contexts of analysis and frameworks and deployed to subserve different ends and purposes. It is, therefore, important to understand concepts and values that foreground duty. The concept of duty has to be understood in relation to other values and strivings. This is particularly important for us in India as duty is often associated with *dharma* and the latter is related to duties associated with *varna* and caste orders. Foregrounding duty without being sensitive to its associations may lead us to endorse uncritically social grading and ranking and the deep inequalities and subordination they endorse.

7.3 MEANING

A duty generally prescribes what we ought to do and what we ought not do. It is a reason for action. Duty specifies the terms that are binding on individuals and groups in their social practices. It has been suggested that our conscious practices can be seen as motivated by right-based, duty-based or goal-based perspectives (Dworkin, 1978 and Weldron, 1984). While our practices might be governed by all these perspectives, one of them might be fundamental. A duty-based perspective appeals to duty and the reasons embedded therein to uphold and justify our practices. Duty-based propositions need not deny rights or satisfactions that the other two perspectives suggest, but they necessarily assert the priority of the former over the latter as in an argument of the kind below: "A citizen should vote and participate in shaping and forming public life. His civic and political rights must depend upon the extent to which he participates in public life. He cannot demand rewards and benefits from public life unless he has extended such support and participation".

7.4 DUTIES AND RIGHTS

Duties are closely associated with rights in liberal thought. The nature and degree of this association, however, has greatly differed. In pre-liberal societies where persons were caught in social roles, and people were not free to pursue their choices, duties ordered their lives.

Liberal transportation led to stress on rights and duties were seen as correlated to rights. If a person possessed rights, then others – be it individuals, groups or the state as the case may be, were invested with a determinate set of duties to protect and promote those rights. If I have a right to physical security, others have a duty not to violate or assault such security and if it was violated or assaulted, the state is duty bound to come to my protection. This correspondence between rights and duties which led to the effective collapsing of duties within rights has been challenged from within liberal thought as well as from outside its framework.

7.4.1 Distinct Spaces of Duties and Rights within Liberal Thought

Within the liberal tradition, broadly defined as invoking centrality of rights, we can identify five distinct positions with respect to the relation of duties and rights.

i) Interest Theory

This theory was initially stated by Jeremy Bentham who saw rights not as natural or moral, but as products of law. He argued that the law by creating duties stipulates rights. He said, “It makes me liable to punishment in case of my doing any of those acts which would have the effects of disturbing you in the exercise of that right (Hart, 1978).” There is no right if there is no corresponding duty sanctioned by law. This understanding of the relation is sometimes called as ‘sanction theory’. It makes possession of a right as another’s legal duty and it becomes a legal duty only if it is liable for punishment. This way of constructing duties need not preclude social sanctions of a kind. Individuals as members of non-state organisations may be subject to rules and to the imposition of sanctions, if they break those rules. Being subject to sanctions means having duties and those who benefit from those duties can be said to have rights.

However, legal provisions on one hand and social disapproval on the other, may beget an impasse in the framework of interest theory unless there is a natural or moral grounding to this relation. But interest theory does not subscribe to the priority rights as natural or moral principles. A case in point is when the law states that its citizens have the right to preach and practice its religious beliefs and whenever it does so, it is restrained by threats and actual use of force by a well organised gang and society does not establish conditions where such practices are met with approval. In such a case we can scarcely say that the minority has a legal right to practice its religion. A duty which has to be constantly shored up by force and coercion has little reason in built into it why an action ought to be performed or to be avoided. Therefore, J.S. Mill was to say, “To have a right is to have something which society ought to defend one in the possession of. (Mill, 1910)” Even if we conceive duty as corresponding to rights, it cannot be borne on the back of force and sanctions.

ii) Choice Theory

The choice or will theory counter poses itself against the interest theory stipulating the relation between rights and duties. One of the important proponents of this theory is H.L.A. Hart. He suggested that a right is a form of choice. The essential feature of a right is that the person to whom the duty is owed is able to control the performance of that duty. The duty-right relation is a chain which binds one individual, the bearer of the duty, and whose other end is in the hands of another individual, the bearer of the right to use it according to his will. It could beget the following relations:

- (a) The right holder may waive or extinguish the duty or leave it in existence.

- (b) After a breach or threatened breach of a duty, the right holder may leave the duty unforced or may reinforce it by suing for compensation.
- (c) The right holder may waive or extinguish the obligation to pay compensation resulting from the breach of duty.

The choice theory invokes duties primarily with reference to rights. But the space of duty need not be marked by reference to rights only. Duty-acts need not always correlate to right-acts. Further several rights may not have corresponding duties.

iii) **Autonomy**

Autonomy is the capacity for reflection and to formulate and revise our preferences, desires, values and ideas. The philosopher Immanuel Kant advanced a theoretical formulation of this notion and put forward a specific conception of duty in relation to this capacity. He suggested that the behaviour of the non-human world is governed by nature. Non-human beings did not will to act, but acted subject to natural forces and instinct. To the extent human beings acted on the basis of their appetites and emotions, they too acted heteronomously, i.e. according to laws and dictates given externally and not by themselves. The characteristic mark of human beings is their reason, which enabled them to deliberate the way they should act and will to act accordingly. In following this reason, they acted autonomously; they acted in accordance with their duty. The morality prescribed by reason was a matter of 'practical necessity'. Moral agents understood this necessity and acted accordingly. Through his capacity for autonomy, an individual acted according to a law that he had prescribed for himself rather than on external dictates.

For Kant, human beings have a duty to cultivate this autonomy and to act towards others as beings possessing this capacity. The rights that people possess are expressions of this autonomy as well as means to nourish the same. Persons possess intrinsic value and should not be used as the instruments of others' purposes. He defends right on the grounds of duty which comes not from nature, but "is apriori, regardless of all empirical ends."

His famous formulation in this regard was "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end."

The Kantian notion of autonomy can be seen as cherishing a valued end and constructing a preference scheme of values based on it for duties to be pursued. Mainstream contemporary liberalism, however, does not propose any such valued ends and purposes and remains neutral to them. The ends and purposes are the products of choices rather than given. It is stated in a principle, interestingly, drawn from Kant himself: Right is before Good.

One of the recent scholars who upholds the valued end of autonomy on liberal grounds is Joseph Raz. According to him, not merely the abilities of autonomous conduct needs be considered, but also the desirability of the autonomous life they beget. Personal autonomy consists in appropriate mental abilities, availability of adequate range of options to choose from and freedom from coercion and manipulation. Personal autonomy makes people to control, to some degree, their own destiny expressed through successive decisions throughout their lives. But the good of autonomy lies not in these abilities and conditions as such, but in the autonomous life they promote. It does not lie merely in the act of choosing. Autonomy is valuable only if exercised in the pursuit of good. He thinks that there are multiplicity of good forms of life and it is choice

among those many good forms that makes autonomy both meaningful and valuable. Freedom understood both as the absence of coercion and manipulation and as the presence of worthwhile options has value because it promotes autonomous lives. Rights to freedom are justified to the extent they contribute to such an ideal.

Raz sketches the following relation between rights and duties:

- (i) An individual X has a right if and only if X can have rights and other things being equal, an aspect of X's well-being is a sufficient reason for holding some other person to be under a duty.
- (ii) Rights do not entail duties which merely correlate with or correspond to those rights. Rights are grounds of duties. Rights are the reasons for the duties to which they give rise. This does not mean that only rights give rise to duties. Duties might be invoked by other considerations as well.
- (iii) One has a right not merely if one is an intended beneficiary, but only if one's interest is a sufficient reason for holding another to be under a duty.

In this consideration, the value of autonomy is qualified by rights and rights invoke a specific set of duties although there are types of duties other than invoked in terms of rights.

Raz insists upon the importance of the general structure and culture of a society for the possibility and viability of personal autonomy. According to him, an autonomous life can be lived only in the context of shared institutions, values and opportunities.

It requires such things as a culture of tolerance and a range of career options. He insists upon duties to cherish such a cultural ambience. Raz also argues that the state should be committed to promote the good of autonomous life and its constitution and laws and policies should seek to promote that good. In promoting such a good, the state may avow many individual rights, although many of the goods that the state promotes may be collective goods bound up with the performance of specific duties.

iv) **Justice**

John Rawls proposes a set of principles to inform a just society which, he argues, all reasonable people will concur. These principles establish a fair and equal basis for collective life expressed in terms of rights. These principles of justice lead to two sorts of principles: Principles for institutions which apply to the basic structure of society, and principles for individuals which set the duties and obligations of persons with respect to institutions and one another. Citizens are duty-bound to support just institutions as they themselves concur to them.

For Rawls, persons are bound to abide by social practices upholding a just society on the basis of natural duty or obligation. He, therefore, makes the distinction between duty and obligations. Persons may be bound by natural duty or obligation. Natural duties are those moral claims that apply to persons irrespective of their consent such as to help others in distress, not to be cruel etc. Such duties are not tied to particular institutions or social arrangements, but are owed to persons as persons. They are prior to social agreement or choice. Obligations, unlike duties, describe those moral ties we voluntarily incur whether by contract, promise or other expressions of consent. The latter by themselves are not enough to create obligations. They should be just too.

The liberal tradition on the relation between rights and duties remains profoundly complex. A great part of this complexity has to do with the kind of values prioritised under different tradition of liberalism. Those perspectives which give priority to rights tend to make duties supportive to rights. Those traditions which insist on certain perfectionist values that a society should promote tend to be more emphatic on duties.

This emphasis on duties becomes significant when we move out of liberal tradition and begin to focus on other traditions of thought. Three of them will be considered here on account of their emphasis on duty.

7.4.2 Duties and Rights in the Conservative Perspective

Conservatives stress on duties and the grounds they adduce for the same vary markedly. Their mainstream arguments, however, are clear. Social institutions and mores are formed through the efforts of several preceding generations. The thoughts and efforts of generations have gone into the making of these institutions and mores. Such endeavours have often resulted in separating the chaff from the grain retaining only those elements which can be retained. Weight of generations lie behind efforts which have furthered certain institutions and led to the decay of others.

It is important that every generation be inserted into the culture, mores and institutions of society rather than every individual think that he has the right to choose culture, mores and institutions of his choice. Traditions and legacies assign to people definite tasks and responsibilities to be fulfilled. By performing such tasks and responsibilities, one furthers the purposes of institutions enabling new generations to be inserted into the collective life of societies. It is by performing such duties that everyone comes to fulfil himself or herself. Such a fulfilment contributes to further the purposes of society and reinforce its mores and institutions. On the other hand, insistence on rights undermines age-old and cherished institutions and hallowed ways of life. It breeds deep insecurity and uncertainty in life prompting and promoting widespread dissatisfactions.

Conservatives argue that the arrogance of the rights-bearing individual suggests that he has access to all the knowledge that has gone into the making of social life and that he has access to absolutely certain knowledge to change and transform such social life. They believe that both these claims are unfounded and hold the prospects of a far worse kind of life than the one embodied in the ways of life they strove to alter.

Conservative perspectives often urge members of society to look at its institutions and ways of life with awe and respect rather than through critical scrutiny. The performance of one's duty acquires greater purposefulness and satisfaction, if such a perspective is internalised by the concerned social agent.

Conservatives link duty with a set of values such as trust, loyalty, dedication, cooperation, obedience and satisfaction with one's station in life. They stress the limitedness of human understanding and the reach of human reason and scrutiny. Maintenance of the existing social order and its preservation often remains their battle cry. They may not be against certain reforms, but such reforms need to be firmly based upon existing order and its continuation.

Conservatives, by focussing on centrality of duty, have decried the stress on rights in liberal and radical thought-currents.

7.4.3 Duties and Rights in the Communitarian Perspective

While the idea of autonomy is deeply influenced by Kant, communitarians are influenced by certain ideas underscored by Aristotle and Hegel. Communitarians argue that right-based theories ignored the fact that our capacity to conceive and exercise rights and pursue autonomy can only develop in society, in and through relations and interactions with others. They argue that prioritisation of rights neglects the social conditions that enable us to exercise choices. They accuse those who accord priority to rights as subscribing to atomism, wherein individuals are seen as self-sufficient agents outside the society.

The communitarians, therefore, reject the notion of primacy of rights, i.e., the moral stand that individual rights have primacy over duties, virtue or collective good. They stress on duties and duty to sustain institutions which can promote virtue and collective good.

Communitarians reject the notion of neutral political concern, central to right-based perspectives wherein the state remains neutral to different conceptions of good life that may prevail in a society whether such conceptions are held by the majority or by a minority. Communitarians feel that neutral political concern vetoes collective pursuit of aims shared by the majority. They argue that the promotion of a society sharing common values must be prior to the rights of individuals within that society. Promotion of culture and shared values necessarily insists upon duties to be performed rather than rights to be enjoyed. Scholars like Charles Taylor have argued that given our dependence on the culture of freedom for our individual liberty, we must have 'not only negative duties of non-interference', but also 'positive duties to sustain such a culture'.

Such a culture of freedom requires public support which can come forth only from public institutions, which are stable and effective. This requires that such institutions enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. Such legitimacy can come forth only if society is organised around shared concerns.

Communitarians argue that even if rights are upheld, they will not enjoy respect if people are not bound together by shared conceptions and ways of life sustained by duty. It is through duties that we not merely reach out to others, but also sustain an appropriate milieu for the exercise of rights.

There are different types of communitarians. All of them do not necessarily reject the significance of rights. However, they all argue that duties are significant not merely in relation to rights, but in protecting and promoting common good.

7.4.4 Duties and Rights in the Gandian Perspective

M.K. Gandhi is well known for his stress on duties and his identification of dharma as the path of duty. He also upheld the values of 'swaraj', i.e. self-rule. Such a fusion of dharma and swaraj, or duty and freedom, is a characteristic mark of Gandhian thought.

Gandhi argues that all men and women are equal. The doctrine of *advaita* upholds it. "If I am That and besides That there is none else", being characteristic of *advaita*, every being has to be regarded as supreme. The same principle dwells in each and every one of us. By realising this principle in us, we will be able to wholly determine our lives. This belief in equality, he says has led him to fight "against the Brahmins themselves whenever they have claimed any superiority to themselves either by reason of birth or by reason of their subsequently acquired knowledge." (Iyer, 1979)

Swaraj for Gandhi is a pursuit within the reach of everyone. It involves the duty of self-discipline and a transformation on that basis. It is the rule of the mind over passions. Self-rule enables one to pursue *Artha* and *Kama* within the bounds of *dharma*.

The notion of self-rule for Gandhi implied the voluntary internalisation of our obligation to others which will be obstructed by our placing ourselves at the mercy of our selfish desires. Our civil duties flow from such self-cultivation. For Gandhi, real rights were the results of the performance of duty.

At the same time, Gandhi opposed domination. He held that freedom is necessary for moral growth. He said, “no society can possibly be built on the denial of individual freedom; it is contrary to the very nature of men.”

For Gandhi, equality is one of the greatest good to be cherished. Other goods like dignity and integrity were closely interwoven with it. Gandhi rejected considerations such as gender, birth, class, caste, education and nationality as justifying unequal treatment.

At the same time, Gandhi upheld the path of *dharma* and he considered the *Varnashrama* dharma as the appropriate path of duty. But unlike the prevailing belief, he argued that the *varna* system upholds, “absolute equality; although the way it is presently expressed it is a monstrous parody of the original.” For him *varna* is not the ranking of status based on inherited division of labour, nor is it the division of labour in accordance with innate abilities. For him, “*Varna* is nothing more than an indication of a duty that has been handed down to each one of us by our forefathers.” He argued that the law of *varna* meant that everyone followed as a matter of *dharma*, duty, the hereditary callings of his forefathers in so far as it was not inconsistent with fundamental ethics. The authentic culture for man was to free himself to spiritual pursuits. *Varna* helped one to conserve one’s energy by making him expand little in the cultivation and pursuit of his occupation of his livelihood as it is passed on from generation to generation, thereby freeing men for higher pursuits.

He argued that *varna* set human-beings free for extending the field of spiritual research and spiritual evolution. It also curbed material ambitions.

Gandhi argued that *varna* is binding as far as the mode of acquiring one’s livelihood is concerned. It does not prevent any one from acquiring knowledge and skills one might wish to pursue. Therefore, he said, “A *Sudhra* has as much right to knowledge as a Brahman, but he falls from his estate if he tries to earn his livelihood through teaching.”

Gandhi related the concept of *Swaraj* and *dharma* to his other concepts such as non-attachment and non-violence. One sets oneself free towards self-realisation and self-rule through non-attachment to material possessions and belongings and by being free from the entanglements of desires and passions. Non-violence rests upon extending the principle of respect and equality towards others. The autonomy that Gandhi envisaged was not on the basis of the availability of abundant material resources, but on the basis of conscious control, regulation and denial of such resources. The latter set people free to make truly authentic choices while entanglement in material possessions vitiates such choices.

7.5 TYPES OF DUTIES

Often a distinction is made between negative duties and positive duties. While the former requires other people to merely refrain from acting in certain ways, to do nothing that violates

the related rights, the second requires that people act positively to do something. The first calls for refraining from action or non-interference, while the latter calls for action or intervention. However, such a distinction is far too naïve. Often the so-called negative duties call for extensive positive action. For instance the right to security does not merely call for abstinence from injury or assault, but involves contributions in terms of taxes and public supports to maintain an extensive system of public security. Sometimes, the so-called positive duties might be embroiled in a complex set of abstentions and interventions. Subsistence rights, for instance, involve the duty to support the deprived as well as extending the enabling support to the deprived to be self-supporting on the basis of their own work. The latter may call forth a series of interventions and non-interventions.

We have to distinguish between the duty not to violate a right and the duty to prevent violation of rights. For instance, duty not to assault others is not the same as the duty to prevent a third person from assaulting someone when one could protect the victim from such an attack. The first is of greater import than the second.

There is no one to one pairing between kinds of duties and kinds of rights. The fulfilment of rights may call for multiple kinds of duties. For every basic right, three types of duties are suggested:

- i) Duties to avoid depriving
- ii) Duties to protect from deprivation
- iii) Duties to aid the deprived.

For example, with regard to personal security everyone has the duty:

- i) Not to endanger a person's security
- ii) To protect people against deprivation of their security by other people
- iii) To provide for the security of those unable to provide for their own.

It is impossible for any right to be fully guaranteed unless all three types of duties are fulfilled, although different types of duties have differential binding force. Duties to avoid depriving demand that one refrains from making an unnecessary gain for oneself by means detrimental to the claims of others. Such duties bind us not to undertake a course of action that deprives others of a means which, without such action, would have provided a satisfaction. Further, such an action was not called for to meet one's basic rights as the only realistic option in the context.

The duty to protect arises when the duty to avoid is not fulfilled. It is a secondary duty enforcing the primary duty of avoiding deprivation to others. It calls upon, sometimes individuals and at other times groups or institutions, to enforce this duty. In many societies, the governments acting on behalf of common interest enforce such duty.

There are three sub-categories of duties to aid which beget transfer of resources to those who cannot provide for their own survival:

- i) There are duties to aid attached to certain roles or relationships. Such duties are the concern of only those who are in a particular relationship and are directed towards specific persons.

Duties of parents towards their young children and duties of grown up children towards their aged parents come under this category.

- ii) Suppose some people have acted in such a way as to eliminate the last available means of subsistence and the responsible government has failed to protect the victims, the duty to aid the latter falls on those responsible for the deprivation. In such cases, there is failure to perform duties and the victims were harmed by both actions and omission of actions by other people.
- iii) A third kind of deprivation is not on account of failure in duty but is, in a sense, natural such as in situations of hurricane or earthquake. The victims in this instance are helpless in the face of truly great obstacles to their existence. They are, however, able to maintain themselves if they are provided with protection and if they are left alone, they will die due to lack of the means of subsistence.

One of the major expressions of duty to aid is the duty to design social institutions that do not exceed the capacity of individuals and groups. If duties to avoid and to protect are fulfilled, duties to assist may not be urgently called for, but in the event of failure to avoid deprivation and to extend protection, duty to aid could assume a great deal of importance.

The above explanation goes to suggest that the scope of duty is significantly different from that of right, although one cannot speak of duties without eventually relating them to rights.

As the scope of duty gets markedly varied as we move beyond their immediate correspondence to rights, there are rights which are not immediately tied up with duties:

There are four kinds of rights that are generally spoken of:

- I. **Claim Rights:** They are the demands that one party has upon another. In such instances, while 'A' has a right, 'B' has a reciprocal duty. Those who argue for the mutualities of rights and duties often restrict rights to claim rights. For example, workers have claim rights on their wages; their employers have a duty to pay them wages mutually agreed upon.
- II. **Liberty Rights:** Often they are simply called as liberties. They do not immediately suggest duties, for e.g., my right to wear a dress does not invoke a corresponding duty from others in an immediate sense.
- III. **Powers:** Laws and customs invest certain distinct capacities on people which might be possessed by all, such as the right to vote, or confined to a select few, such as the power to adjudicate invested in the judges. Such powers do not necessarily have corresponding duties.
- IV. **Immunities:** Immunities are counter-posed to powers and, therefore, are protections against the reach of powers. For instance, the power of conscription may be vested in some authorities in a state, but immunity provides safety valves against such powers. Again, they are not correlated with a set of duties.

Liberties, powers and immunities do not have correlated duties marking an enlarged space for rights.

7.6 SUMMARY

Although rights and duties are often correlated, different theories and perspectives may apportion

different weights to rights and duties. Duties are prioritised in perspectives which valorise substantive conception of what is good and what is bad. Within liberal tradition itself, there might be distinct perspectives on rights and duties. While dictatorships, authoritarian regimes and fascist leaders have underscored duties and decried rights, there are other perspectives which have argued that rights can be honoured only if an ambience for the same is sustained through duties. Mahatma Gandhi prioritised duties and argued that only those have claims on rights who have performed their duties. Even if there is a correlation between duties and rights, they cannot be paired with each other one to one. Although rights and duties often invoke each other, their ambits markedly vary. There are rights which have no immediate correlated duties. There are duties which, as they distance themselves from their immediate correlation with rights, lead to sustenance of common good.

7.7 EXERCISES

1. Highlight the reasons for the growth in concerns associated with duty.
2. Formulate an argument or present a narrative that reflects a duty based perspective.
3. Distinguish between understanding of duty in interest and choice theory.
4. Give two reasons why Conservatives stress on duties over rights.
5. Relate the notion of Swaraj to the notion of Dharma.
6. Outline different types of duties and suggest their implications.