



Indira Gandhi National Open University
School of Inter-disciplinary and
Trans-disciplinary Studies

BPYC-103

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY: CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY



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CONTEMPORARY**



**SCHOOL OF INTER-DISCIPLINARY AND TRANS-DISCIPLINARY STUDIES
(SOITS)**

**INDIRA GANDHI NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI**

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A diacritical mark is a symbol that tells us how to pronounce a word. Generally whenever we write a word from a language in roman script we use diacritical marks to convey the exact pronunciation. In line with this academic practice this study material also makes use of diacritical marks wherever words from Sanskrit language are mentioned.

Vowels

Devanāgarī	Transcription		Category
अ	A	A	monophthongs and syllabic liquids
आ	ā/â	Ā/Â	
इ	I	I	
ई	ī/î	Ī/Î	
उ	U	U	
ऊ	ū/û	Ū/Û	
ऋ	r̄	R̄	
ॠ	r̄̄	R̄̄	
ऌ	l̄	L̄	
ॡ	l̄̄	L̄̄	

ए	E	E	diphthongs
ऐ	Ai	Ai	
ओ	O	O	
औ	Au	Au	
ं	m/n	Ṁ/Ṇ	anusvara
ः	ḥ	Ḥ	visarga
ँ	~		chandrabindu
ऽ	'		avagraha

Consonants

velars	palatals	retroflexes	dentals	labials	Category
क k K	च c C	ट ṭ Ṭ	त t T	प p P	tenuis stops
ख kh Kh	छ ch Ch	ठ ṭh Ṭh	थ th Th	फ ph Ph	aspirated stops
ग g G	ज j J	ड ḍ Ḍ	द d D	ब b B	voiced stops

घ gh Gh	झ jh Jh	ढ ḍh Ḍh	ध dh Dh	भ bh Bh	breathy-voiced stops
ङ ṅ Ṇ	ञ ña Ñ	ण ṇ Ṇ	न n N	म m M	nasal stops
ह h H	य y Y	र r R	ल l L	व v V	approximants
	श ś Ś	ष ṣ Ṣ	स s S		sibilants
	क्ष Kṣ	त्र Tr	ज्ञ Jñ		

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COURSE INTRODUCTION

The Indian Philosophy is expressed through a rich variety of thoughts and practices that have developed over more than three thousand years. There is no single Indian Philosophy, but rather a plurality of ways of understanding and relating to Reality from a stock of widely held ideas reflected in the Vedas and the Upanishads, and particularly in the classical systems of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism, Philosophy becomes thematic at various levels and in different contexts, in debates concerning the status of certain concepts as the soul, God, substances, universals, time, change, permanence/impermanence, one and many, etc. This Course helps a student to understand the different aspects and systems of Indian Philosophy in its long formation. This course also includes some contemporary Indian Thinkers/Philosophers with specific emphasis on the philosophical underpinnings of the Bhakti, Sufi, and Reform, with the aim of presenting these movements as a link between ancient and contemporary Indian philosophical thought.

This course is **BPYC-103 Indian Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary**. It is a 6 credit (Major) course for the BAFPY students.

This course consists of 6 blocks and 20 units. This course emphasizes on the *nastika* and *astika* traditions of Indian philosophy then presents a detailed analysis of philosophical movements in India. Last two blocks of this course present the central ideas of significant contemporary Indian thinkers in detail.

First block is **Nāstika Darśanas**. This block differentiates between the *Nāstika* and *āstika* traditions of Indian philosophy then analyses main *nāstika* traditions such as, *Cārvāka*, Jainism and various schools of Buddhism.

Block II is **Āstika Darśana-I**. This block presents in details the views of Nyaya, Vaisesika, Samkhya and Yoga school on soul, god, and liberation among other ideas.

Third block is **Āstika Darśana-II**. Here the learners will study the Indian philosophical schools of Mimāṃsā, Śaivism, Vaiṣṇavism, and Vedānta. It explores the views of these darśanas on important philosophical enquiries such as, epistemology, metaphysics and question of God and liberation.

Āstika Darśana-III is the fourth block. It studies the philosophies of Vedantin Philosophers; Śamkara, Mādhava and Rāmānuja. This block is further divided into 3 units. These units analyses and examines the *advaita*, *dvaita*, and *visistadvaita* schools of vedantin tradition.

Block V deals with **Contemporary Indian Philosophy-I**, wherein we study different philosophical movements including Bhakti movement, Sufism and reform movement and their impacts on the

development of philosophy in India. To acquaint the learners with contemporary thoughts of Indian philosophy it also studies the philosophical views of thinkers like, Swami Vivekanand, Aurobindo, Gandhi, and Tagore.

Last block of this course is **Contemporary Indian Philosophy-II**. This block further provides the learners with the philosophies of other significant contemporary thinkers such as; Jawaharlal Nehru, B.R. Ambedkar, S.Radhakrishnan, Amartya Sen, Pandit Deen Dayal Upadhyay and M.N. Roy.



BLOCK I
NĀSTIKA DARŚANAS

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INDIAN PHILOSOPHY: CLASSICAL
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Block I

Nāstika Darśanas

Unit 1

Nāstika and Āstika Darśana

Unit 2

Cārvāka

Unit 3

Jainism

Unit 4

Schools of Buddhism

BLOCK INTRODUCTION

This block is titled **Nāstika Darśanas**. As the title signifies this block deals with the Nāstika traditions of the Indian Philosophy. It discusses the major heterodox schools- Cārvāka, Jainism and different schools of Buddhism. These schools rejected the authority of the Vedas. Before discussing these schools it distinguishes between the nāstika and āstika schools to provide the learners with clarity about these. There are 4 units in this block.

Unit 1 is Nāstika and Āstika Darśana. This unit provides the learners with the meaning of the terms āstika and nāstika in Indian Philosophy. It examines the basis of the division of the Indian Philosophical Schools. In doing so it present an overview of both the orthodox (āstika) and heterodox (nāstika) schools.

Unit 2 is on Cārvāka Philosophy. It is one of the important counter-movements in India that challenged the authority of Vedas and questioned its teachings. The aim of this unit is to introduce the students to the teachings, philosophy and arguments of this school which were diametrically opposed to those of orthodox schools of philosophy in India.

Unit 3 highlights the philosophical thesis of Jainism, which is a very old heterodox system that repudiates the teachings of the *Vedas*. The word “Jainism” is derived from ‘jina’ which means conqueror, i.e. one who has conquered one’s passions and desires. Jainism arose in the later Vedic period, and it was revived by Vardhamāna, also called Mahāvīra or the great spiritual hero in the 6th century B.C.

Unit 4 explores various **Schools of Buddhism**. In this unit learners will study the *Vaibhāṣika*, *Sautrāntika*, *Yogācāra*, and *Mādhyamika* schools of Buddhism. These schools came into existence after the death of the Buddha. He left many things unsaid which lead to the vagueness leading to multiple interpretations on his teachings. This unit studies the metaphysical views and practical teachings of the schools of Buddhism.

UNIT 1 NĀSTIKA AND ĀSTIKA DARŚANA¹

Structure

1.0 Objective

1.1 Introduction

1.2 An Overview

1.3 Reflection on the Core Issues/Concepts

1.4 Philosophical Response

1.5 Let Us Sum Up

1.6 Key Words

1.7 Further Readings and References

1.8 Answers to Check Your Progress

1.0 OBJECTIVES

In this Unit, you are expected to know the following:

- The meaning of Darśana
- The meaning of the term āstika and nāstika in Indian Philosophy
- The basis of the division of the Indian Philosophical Schools.
- The notion of Puruṣārtha
- The styles of Indian philosophical literature
- An overview of āstika darśanas
- An overview of nāstika darśanas

1.1 INTRODUCTION

In the Indian philosophical tradition, no philosopher or philosophical system comes in isolation

¹ Dr. Ajay Jaiswal, Assistant Professor, Hindu College, University of Delhi. This Unit is taken from BPYC-131 (Block-1, Unit-4).

for they have to adhere to some of the schools of Indian philosophy. Such allegiance is based on the proclivity of the thinker to a particular frame of mind and understanding, known as *darsānas*. It is derived from the Sanskrit root *drik*, i.e., to perceive or to have a vision and it represents a synoptic understanding of the world and human beings. This ancient notion of *Darsāna* as a world-view also corresponds to the Greek and German notions of *kosmotheoriā* and *weltanschauung* respectively. Accordingly, Indian philosophical wisdom consists of two parallel streams, known as *āstika* and *nāstika* *Darsāna* based on Vedic and non-Vedic texts respectively. The *āstika* tradition consists of further six *darsānas* (thought-system), viz., *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika*, *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga*, *Mīmāṃsā*, and *Vedānta*.

The *nāstika* tradition consists of further three sub- schools, viz., Buddhism, Jainism, and *Cārvāka*. In this Unit, we shall try to understand the meaning and basis of such division of Indian philosophy; and also the key themes and concepts of all the prominent *darsānas* of these two traditions.

1.2 AN OVERVIEW

In common parlance, *āstika* and *nāstika* would denote a theist and an atheist respectively. However, contrary to this, the terms *āstika* and *nāstika* have an entirely different connotation in Indian philosophical context. Etymologically, it either denotes existence (*asti*) or non-existence (*na-asti*) of something. Here, the subject of the existence (the predicate) is the sanctity of the *Vedas* or Vedic knowledge. Hence, *āstika* means accepting the authority of *Vedas* while *nāstika* means denying or neutralizing the allegiance to *Vedas*.

Now, to understand the basis of such division we need to go back to very roots or basic assumptions and approach of Indian thought. One overriding principle of the entire Indian thought is that it is human-centric. It seeks to alleviate the suffering of human beings and maximize the pleasure or happiness of in its highest possible form. In this sense, Indian philosophy may be deciphered as essentially hedonistic/ beatific and teleological. It is merely the source of inspiration and the way they approach that goal on which they differ.

Vedas, from the Sanskrit root *vid*, means to know the light of wisdom. They are the ancient most texts of Indian philosophy and of utmost sanctity as they are revealed by *Īśvara* to the Indian seer known as *Ṛṣi*s. However, some schools also consider *Vedas* to be *apaurusēya*, i.e., non- personal yet the text of purest knowledge and the highest veneration. In any case, those who believe that *Vedas* consist of the Ultimate Truth and is thus capable of dispensing human beings from suffering forever are known as the followers of *āstika* *Darsāna*. Traditionally, there are six systems of *āstika* *darsānas*, viz, *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika*, *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga*, *Mīmāṃsā*, and *Vedānta*. Though they have dissenting views and approaches yet all of them, unanimously accept the authority of the *Vedas*.

On the other hand, those who drift away from the Vedic system of knowledge are known as the followers of *nāstika* *Darsāna*. Within them also there is a subtle but important division. One group consists of Jainism and Buddhism. They also contend that the Ultimate Truth or Enlightenment can be attained, but there is no necessary condition of following the *Vedas*. Liberation from suffering is possible even without *Vedas*. The possible reason could have been either the dysfunctional and corrupted status of *Vedas* or the zeal of a fresh start of philosophizing and solving

the human problem without adhering to *Vedas*. Hence, we find that initially Jainism and Buddhism were more or less neutral about *Vedas* and restricting their concerns purely to the pursuit of Truth and happiness. Accordingly, the Buddhist and Jainist ideals culminated in Nirvāṇa and Kaivalya respectively.

The other group of nāstika Darsāna consists of the exceptional case of Cārvāka. They vehemently reject the authority of Vedas. They are also critical of Jainism and Buddhism. Cārvākas have no leaning towards any metaphysical speculation. For them, there is no Mokṣa or liberation. Notwithstanding the impossibility of rebirth and the law of Karma, the sole aim of life is to maximize human pleasures. For them, kāma (pleasure) is the parama Puruṣ ārtha (the highest attainment). Ontologically, Cārvāka is a materialist philosophy denying the existence of God, soul, heavenly places, rituals, etc. Thus, we can see how the overriding principle in all the darsānas is the same, i.e., the alleviation of human suffering or positively the attainment of supreme happiness. Yet, they differ in respect of the allegiance to certain texts and in the outcomes of their pursuit of truth and happiness. This point is further explained in the next section along with a brief explanation of the core concepts of all the major darsānas.

Check Your Progress I

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answer with those provided at the end of the unit.

1. What is the meaning of āstika and nāstika Darsāna?

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.....
.....
.....

2. How within the nāstika tradition, Cārvāka is different from Jainism and Buddhism?

.....
.....
.....
.....

1.3 REFLECTION ON THE CORE ISSUES/ CONCEPTS

We have seen how no philosopher in India comes in isolation. He/she has some predilections towards certain set of philosophical attitude known as darsānas. Āstika and nāstika are the two traditional divisions of Indian darsānas. We have also reflected on the basis of such division being the authority of Vedas. Still, a more in-depth look on the genus (sameness) and differentia

(differences) of such division is required which is as follows:

A. The Notion of Puruṣārtha-

To understanding the āstika and nāstika division more profoundly, we need to understand the ancient philosophical notion of Puruṣārtha. Puruṣārtha, from the Sanskrit root Puruṣa (human/soul) and artha (function), means the purpose of human beings. It is the teleological explanation of being human. Traditionally, as per Vedic philosophy, there are four Puruṣārthas, viz, dharma, artha, kāma, and mokṣa meaning righteousness, wealth, sensuous satisfaction, and the supreme liberation respectively. The nāstika darsānas have dissenting attitude and views on the notion of puruṣārtha which become the basis of their division.

B. Genus and Differentia of Āstika Darsānas-

All the six darsānas have the genus or sameness of accepting the authority of Vedas. Further, all of them accept all the four Puruṣārthas and highest being Mokṣa. However, they have different terms for Mokṣa such as apvarga, niḥśreyasa, Samādhi, turīyavasthā, etc.

All the āstika darsānas have differentia in many aspects. As noted above, they give their own theory of the Parama Puruṣārtha with different nomenclature. Metaphysically, epistemologically, and axiologically also they have slight variations in their philosophies for they have different interpretations of Vedas. Last, these darsānas also differ in their specializations. For instance, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā have their specializations in cosmology/ evolution, psychology, reasoning, physics, and Vedic rituals respectively.

C. Genus and Differentia of Nāstika Darsānas-

All the nāstika darsānas are similar in the sense that they do not have any allegiance towards Vedas. However, they differ regarding the degree of condemnation of Vedas. Jainism and Buddhism, on the one hand, partially reject Vedas, thus having a constructive or a soft criticism of Vedas. Cārvāka, on the other hand, vehemently rejects the authority and the entire outlook of Vedas. They only accept the first two Puruṣārthas, viz., artha and kāma, and the latter being the Supreme end of human existence. Jainism and Buddhism, on the other hand, have a transcendental foundation. Contrary to the hedonistic attitude towards life, they have the elements of asceticism. Accordingly, we can say that for Jainism and Buddhism the Parama Puruṣārtha would be dharma and mokṣa only.

D. Corpus of Indian Philosophical Literature-

All the schools of āstika and nāstika darsānas (except Cārvāka) have developed a huge corpus of philosophical literature which can be divided into two major groups or approaches, viz., Sūtra and Vyākhyā. Sūtra śāilī (Sūtra Style) is the way of aphorism whereas aphorisms are short, condensed, and cryptic statements of Truth. All the darsānas have one or few Sūtra style text/s propounded by their respective founders. Being cryptic in nature, they are open to diverse interpretations. Hence,

the second style of literature is called vyākhyā sāilī, i.e., the way of exegesis, which are explanatory commentaries on the Sūtra literature. Technically these commentaries are called bhāṣya, tīka, tātparya tīka, etc. Together, they all constitute a vast corpus of Indian philosophical literature.

E. The Need of Ṣ aḍ Darsānas-

Ṣ aḍ Darsānas are the six systems of āstika darsān based on Vedic Tradition. Here, it is pertinent to understand how they originate with Vedic foundation and in what conditions. Vedas, as stated earlier, exhibit the supreme embodiment of Knowledge. Vedas come in four parts- mantras, brāhmaṇ a, āraṇyaka, and Upaniṣads meaning hymns, injunctions, forest wisdom, and philosophical wisdom respectively. Their language (old esoteric Sanskrit) is uniquely accessible to the men of highest spiritual and moral caliber. There are six Vedanga (auxiliary disciplines) which one needs to master before he/she can venture into the subtleties of Vedas. These six Vedāṅgas (six limbs) are sīkṣā, vyākaraṇa, chanda, nirukta, jyotiṣa, and kalpa meaning phonetics, grammar, the science of meters, etymological science, astrology, and religious injunctions respectively. This complex structure of Vedic pre-requirements made Vedas inaccessible to a layman. Therefore, from time to time at different places of the Indian subcontinent, many realized souls encapsulated the entire Vedic wisdom in a particular set of philosophy, called darsānas such as Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Vedānta, etc. Thus, different ṣ aḍ darsānas also known as Upāṅga (the six sub-limbs) of Vedas, came into existence.

F. The Six Āstika Darshanas

Following is an overview of the core philosophical concepts of the six āstika darsānas, their founders, and the key texts:

1. Sāṅkhya-

Sāṅkhya is possibly the oldest of all the āstika darsānas; founded by Sage Kapila before 500 BC. Sāṅkhya Sūtra is the foundational aphoristic text of Sāṅkhya Darsāna. Sāṅkhya aims to alleviate human suffering by the knowledge of two ultimate principles, viz., Prakṛ ti and Puruṣ a denoting unconscious and conscious elements respectively. Sāṅkhya is dualist and follows the doctrine of realism or real causation in the form of Satkāryavāda. It says that the effect preexists in the cause. Hence, entire evolution ensues from Prakṛti (having sattva, rajas, and tamas) and Puruṣ a while their dissolution and unique transcendental realization is Mokṣa.

2. Yoga-

It is the practical aspect of Sāṅkhya with a specialization of the philosophy of mind and higher states of the human psyche. Yoga Darsāna was founded by sage Patañjali in his great compilation known as Yoga Sūtra. It aims to control and pacify several modifications of the human psyche. In this pursuit, it develops an eight fold path (aṣṭāṅga yoga) beginning with moral constraints (yama and niyama) and ending with trance states of Samadhi.

3. Nyāya-

Nyāya was founded by sage Gotama in his text- Nyāya Sūtra. It specializes in the science of reasoning. However, the grand claim of Nyāya is to provide the supreme happiness (apavarga) by understanding the sixteen philosophical concepts such as knowledge, god, soul, pain, doubt, etc. Throughout centuries, the Nyāya system has meticulously developed the science of reasoning or logical thinking.

4. Vaiśeṣika –

Vaiśeṣika Darsāna was founded by the sage Kaṇāda. Its authoritative text is Vaiśeṣika Sūtra. Again, akin to Nyāya, its aim is apavarga. However, it specializes in sciences of physics or substance and predicates. It adds seven more substances/ concepts to the sixteen concepts floated by Nyāya. Vaiśeṣika adheres to the philosophy of atomism and pluralistic realism.

5. Mīmāṃsā-

It was founded by sage Jaimini in his masterpiece- Jaimini Sūtra. Mīmāṃsā is hermeneutical in the sense that it prescribes the rules of interpretation of Vedic statements and injunctions. Its chief focus is to follow Vedic rituals at various stages of human life. It concerns itself to the mantra and brahmana portion of Vedas which consists of hymns and ritualistic injunctions respectively. Therefore, this Darsāna is also called Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. Two other great proponents of Mīmāṃsā were Kumārila and Prabhākara.

6. Vedānta-

Vedānta represents the final teachings based on Upaniṣads which were the crux of contemplation of Rishis dwelling in forests. The other two great sources of Vedānta are Bhagavad Gīta and Brahmasutra. The latter was authored by sage Badarayana Vyasa. Together these three texts are called Prasthāna Trayī. Vedānta teaches the realization of divinity of Atman and Brahman, with the help of certain doctrines, for instance, the doctrine of three states of Consciousness, the doctrine of three bodies, the doctrine of five sheaths, etc. On Prasthānatrayī arose many commentaries giving rise to various schools of Vedānta such as Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita, Dvaitādvaita,

etc. A summative account of these sub-schools of Vedānta is given at the end.

G- The Three Nāstika Darsāna-

1. Jainism –

It was founded by enlightened sages known as Tīrthaṅkaras. Vardhamān Mahāvīra (5th BCE) was the 24th and the last Tīrthaṅkara of Jainism and Ṛ ṣ abhadeva being the first. Āgama Suttas are the oldest texts of Jainism. The chief doctrines of Jainism are anekantavada (the theory of relative viewpoints), saptabhaṅgīnaya (theory of seven judgments) bondage through pudagalas (materialistic) and karmas. Through strict penance, Jainism proposes the path of liberation of soul through samyaka - jñāna, caritra, and Darsāna meaning right knowledge, right conduct, and right vision respectively.

2. Buddhism -

It was founded by Gautama, the Buddha in 5th BCE. Tripiṭaka and Dhammapada are some of the ancient texts of Buddhism. Buddhism was utterly pragmatic and human centric contrary to the prevailing tendencies of metaphysical abstractions. Buddhism can be encapsulated in its doctrine of the Four Noble Truths-

1. There exists suffering; 2. there is a cause of suffering; 3. If the cause is removed, the effect will also be removed and hence there is the state of Nirvāṇa; 4. there is a path to Nirvāṇa. The Buddhist path consists of moral asceticism and renunciation of all kinds of desires and cravings. Other pillars of Buddhism are the practice of non- violence, compassion, and celibacy. There are three main schools of Buddhism- the realist school of Sarvāstivāda and Vaibhāṣika; the absolutist school of Mādhyamika; the idealist school of Vijñānavāda.

3. Cārvāka

Cārvāka represents the common sense philosophy of egoistic hedonism. It is materialist also in nature. Its founder was Bṛhaspati or Cārvāka. The ancient most texts are Bṛhaspati Sūtra and Tattvoppalavasimha. However, since this is the least popular Darsāna and hence it developed in small proportions and without any authoritative texts. Nevertheless, its chief doctrines are of materialism, no heaven/hell, hedonism, perception being the only valid source of knowledge, skepticism, etc. Cārvāka despises the concept of Mokṣa and hence radically drifts away from the Vedic āstika and the other two nāstika darsānas.

1.4 PHILOSOPHICAL RESPONSE

There is no certainty regarding the origin and span of these schools. However, it is believed that any philosopher or philosophical system that arose in India adhered to either of these darsanas. For instance, Vivekananda and Aurobindo Ghosh belonged to the Vedānta tradition of āstika darshans. Modern- day ISCKON is an offshoot achintya bhedābheda school of Vedānta. It is a popular view that hardly any philosopher in Indian came in isolation owing to the diversity of āstika and nāstika darsanas.

If this division is real, then we should understand the advantages and disadvantages of this division. There are certain advantages and disadvantages of such a division of Indian philosophy. The advantages accrue in the form of diversity, a plethora of interpretation, multiple ways of attainment, flexibility, different specializations, readymade assimilation of a lifestyle, etc. Disadvantages come in the form of bitterness and antagonism ensuing from the conflicting and contradictory views, authoritativeness, lack of novelty, rigidity, etc. Despite such hurdles, Indian philosophy as a whole has been influential in all walks of intellectual spheres. Owing to such division, a passionate scholar finds it easy to comprehend Indian aspects such as of cosmology, psychology, logical framework, rules of interpretation, and ātma vidyā in Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta respectively. Jainism and Buddhism also offer a comprehensive and synoptic worldview.

Some people are of the opinion that this division is influenced or started from the word “Nāstiko Vedanindakaḥ” of Manusmṛiti. However presently we are not concerned with the historical facts and interpretations, but its philosophical interpretations. This division of āstika and nāstika tradition appeared in the Sarvadarsanasāgraha of Mādhvācārya of the 12th century. Many modern scholars have pointed out some degree of arbitrariness in his division. Many have also challenged the viability and all-inclusiveness of such division.

The distinction of Āstika and Nāstika is not acceptable to all. Some scholars believe that this division is a result of writings on the history of Indian philosophy and these writings did not do a deep survey to establish this division. Their claim is superficial. We find opinions against this distinction not only in writings of modern philosophers like Daya Krishna but in tradition as well. For example, Sāṅkhya philosophy is called non-vedic philosophy, while the division considers it in Vedic tradition. One of the reasons why Sāṅkhya is called non-vedic is that it has formed reasoning its basis. Sāṅkhya maintains that puruṣ as are many in number, now for its accomplishment, Sāṅkhya provides the reasoning that one birth does not lead to the birth of all,

and death of any one person does not result in death of all, etc. It shows that puruṣ as are many not one. Similarly we can consider another example of Buddhist, which is called an atheist school, Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti says that we (Buddhists) should not be considered atheists because we believe in the other world (parlok; Swargādi). It can be considered from this that the word atheist has not been related to Vedas in the philosophical tradition. Other meanings of this have also been there like belief-disbelief in the heaven (parlok), belief-disbelief in the being of God, belief-disbelief in the existence of the soul.

Philosopher Daya Krishna, while considering this, finds that the theist philosophies also have different views regarding the authority and validity of the Vedas. As the Nyāya philosophy never quotes the Veda-vākya as evidence for its philosophical grounds. Vaiśeṣika philosophy does not regard śabda as a means of knowledge. The Mīmāṃsā philosophy considers the injunction (vidhi) prohibition (niṣedha) in the Vedas and establishes the rules of interpretation sutras in order for how to perform a yajña; in the absence of one thing, which other thing will be in accordance with the Vedas, etc. and also establishes authorlessness/impersonal (apauruṣeytā) of the Vedas. On the other hand, Vedānta (specifically Sāṃkaravedānta) accepts only the last part of the Vedas as means in his philosophy and presents the statements of Upaniṣads to prove his philosophical beliefs. Apart from these, there are no differences in the interpretation of the Vedas in the orthodox Schools; in fact most of them have not even made any attempt to explain the Veda. We find that there is hardly any philosophical system other than the Vedānta School which grounds its theory on the interpretation of the Vedas.

In this way, while accepting the usefulness of this division, we will also keep in mind the problems or objections related to this division.

Check Your Progress II

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answer with those provided at the end of the unit.

1) Comment on the two styles of the Indian philosophical texts.

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2) Describe briefly Upaniṣads as the source of Vedānta.

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1.5 LET US SUM UP

We have seen how Indian philosophy has been pragmatic and anthropocentric. It is based on the teleological explanation of the human beings where there is a cessation of suffering and the attainment of happiness. Cārvāka adheres to purely hedonistic basis of an ethical life while all other darsānas transcend the gross materialism and guarantee spiritual solace. In this pursuit, āstika darsānas followed the legacy of Vedas while Buddhism and Jainism grew independently. The following tables present a summative account of various darsānas, the key texts, and the key schools.

Bhāratīya Darsāna

Āstika Darsānas	Nāstika Darsānas
Sāṅkhya	Cārvāka
Yoga	Jainism
Nyāya	Buddhism
Vaiśeṣika	
Mīmāṃsā	
Vedānta	

Table 1. Āstika and Nāstika Darsānas

Āstika Darsānas

Darsānas	Founder/Propounder	Key Text/s
Sāṅkhya	Kapila	Sāṅkhya Sūtra
Nyāya	Gotama	Nyāya Sūtra
Vaiśeṣika	Kaṇ āda	Vaiśeṣika Sūtra
Yoga	Patañjali	Yoga Sūtra
Mīmāṃsā	Jaimini	Jaimini Sūtra
Vedānta/Uttar Mīmāṃsā	Upāniṣadic Ṛṣis and Bādrāyaṇa	<i>Upaniṣads, Bhagavad Gīta, and Brahmasūtra</i>

Table 2. Āstika Darsānas

Schools of Vedānta

Schools	Founder	Texts
Advaita	Sāṅkara	Sāṅkara Bhāṣya
Viśiṣṭādvaita	Rāmānuja	Śrī Bhāṣya
Dvaita	Madhava	Purṇa Prajña Bhāṣya
Dvaitādvaita	Nimbārka	Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabh
Sūdhādvaita	Vallabha	Aṅu Bhāṣya
Achintya Bhedābheda	Chaitanya Mahaprabhu	Govinda Bhāṣya

Table 3. Schools of Vedānta

Schools of Buddhism

Sarvāstivāda/ Vaibhāṣika	Realism/ Quasi Realism (The means to know external world is perception; Bāhya pratyakṣavāda)	Abhidamma Kośa
Sautāntrika/ Sūtravādin	Realism (External world can be known through Inference; Bāhya- anumeyavāda)	Kalpanāmaṇḍiṭṭika, Abhidharmakośakārikā
Mādhyamika	Absolutism/ Nihilism	Mūla Mādhyamika Kārikā, Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, Hṛdaya Sūtra, etc.
Yogācāra Vijñānavāda	Yogic Discipline/ Idealism	Yogācārabhūmisāstra, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, etc.

Table 4. Schools of Buddhism

1.6 KEY WORDS

Absolutism : The belief in an all-inclusive Ultimate authority, for instance Brahman, Sūnya, Śiva, etc.

Āstika : Literally denoting the non-existence of something. In the present context, it is the denial of the authority of *Vedas*.

Ātman : The immanent and transcendental state of Consciousness. It is at par with the Lord or Nirguna Brahman. It is represented by the amatra (silence) at the end of

Hedonism : The view that maximizing pleasure/happiness is the supreme goal of life.

Idealism: Ontological reduction of entire world into some form of Consciousness or Idea/Mind.

Mokṣa: The Ultimate end/liberation of human beings.

Nāstika : Literally denoting the non-existence of something. In the present context, it is the denial of the authority of *Vedas*.

Nihilism : Denial of all though categories/ linguistic concepts.

Pañca Kośa : The five sheaths of human personality, as explained in Taittirīya and other *Upaniṣads*. They are, namely, annamaya, p r ā ṇ amaya, manomaya, vijñānamaya, and ānandamaya kośa.

Principal Upaniṣads : these are also called mukhya *Upaniṣads*, widely studied in Vedānta philosophy. Shankaracharya wrote commentaries on them. Generally, they are ten in numbers, namely- Īśā (IsUp), Yajurveda, Kena (KeUp), Sāmaveda, Kaṭha (KaUp), Yajurveda, Praśna (PrUp), Atharvaveda, Muṇḍaka (MuUp), Atharvaveda, Māṇḍūkya (MaUp), Atharvaveda, Taittirīya (TaiUp), Yajurveda, Aitareya, (AiUp), Ṛ gveda, Chāndogya (ChhUp), Sāmaveda, and Bṛhadāraṇyaka (BṛUp), Yajurveda.

Puruṣārtha : It means the virtues or duties of human beings. They are four- dharma (duty), artha (wealth), kāma (pleasures), and Mokṣa (liberation).

Realism: The belief in a real external world existing independent of human mind.

Śarīra Traya : The three bodies of human beings explained in *Upaniṣads*, namely, sthūla, sukṣma, and k ā r a ṇ a śarīra representing gross, subtle, and causal levels respectively.

Teleology : Explanation of a thing based on telos, i.e., purpose or end.

Transcendentalism : Belief in the existence and possibility of the experience of metaphysical realms.

Vedānta: It represents the teaching based on prasthāntṛaya, the three great sources (texts), namely, *Upaniṣads*, *Bhagavad Gīta*, and *Brahmasūtra*.

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1.8 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress I

1. In common parlance, āstika and nāstika would denote a theist and an atheist respectively. However, contrary to this, the terms āstika and nāstika have entirely different connotation in Indian philosophical context. Etymologically, it either denotes existence (asti) or non-existence (na-asti) of something. Here, the subject of the existence (the predicate) is the sanctity of the *Vedas* or Vedic knowledge. Hence, āstika means accepting the authority of *Vedas* while nāstika means denying or neutralizing the allegiance to *Vedas*. Furthermore, this division is based on a teleological explanation of human beings. Traditionally, there are six systems of āstika darsānas, viz., Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta; and three systems of nāstika Darsāna, viz., Jainism, Buddhism, and Cārvāka.

2. Those who drift away from the Vedic system of knowledge are known as the followers of nāstika Darsāna. Within the nāstika tradition, there is a subtle but important division. One group consists of Jainism and Buddhism who contend that the Enlightenment can be attained but there is no necessary condition of following the *Vedas*. Liberation from suffering is possible even without *Vedas*. They partially rejected *Vedas* and began a fresh start restricting their concerns purely to the pursuit of Truth and happiness. Accordingly, the Buddhist and Jainist ideals culminated in Nirvāṇa and Kaivalya respectively.

The other group of nāstika Darsāna consists of the exceptional case of Cārvāka. They vehemently reject the authority of *Vedas*. They are also critical of Jainism and Buddhism. Cārvākas have no leaning towards any metaphysical speculation. For them, there is no Mokṣa, Nirvāṇa, or Kaivalya. Notwithstanding the impossibility of rebirth and the law of Karma, the sole aim of life is to maximize the human pleasures. For them, kāma (pleasure) is the Parama Puruṣārtha (the highest

attainment). Ontologically Cārvāka is a materialist philosophy denying the existence of God, soul, heavenly places, rituals, etc. Thus, we can see how despite coming from the same tradition of nāstika Darsāna, Cārvāka is strikingly different from Jainism and Buddhism.

Check Your Progress II

1. All the schools of āstika and nāstika darsānas (except Cārvāka) have developed a huge corpus of philosophical literature which can be divided into two major groups or approaches- Sūtra and Vyākhyā. Sūtra shailee is the way of aphorisms. Sutras are short, condensed, and cryptic statements of Truth. All the darsānas have one or few Sūtra style text/s propounded or compiled by their respective founders. Being cryptic in nature they are open to diverse interpretation and explanation. The second style of literature is called vyākhyā sālī, i.e., the way of exegesis. It consists of the explanatory commentaries on the Sūtra literature. Technically these commentaries are called bhāṣ ya, tīka, tātparya tīka, etc. Together, they all constitute a huge corpus of Indian philosophical literature. They all exhibit the diversity, profundity, and subtle analysis of philosophical concepts of all the Indian intellectual spheres.

2. The term Upaniṣ ad is derived from the three Sanskrit root words- ‘upa’, ‘ni’, and ‘ṣ ad’, which literally means ‘to sit near’. In an Upanishadic setting, a disciple (śiṣ ya) sits near his master (guru). This symbolizes respect for the teacher. Through this setting the darkness of ignorance is dispelled away just by the light of Knowledge of the great statements about Ātman and Brahman. Īsāvāsya Upaniṣ ad also serves the same purpose. The teachings based on Upaniṣ ads (also along with Bhagavad Gīta and Brahmasūtra) is also called Vedānta. It is best encapsulated in Mahāvākyas which denote the oneness of the Self, the world, and the Lord.

UNIT 2 CĀRVĀKA²

Structure

- 2.0 Objectives
- 2.1 Introduction
- 2.2 Origin of the School
- 2.3 The literary sources of Cārvākas/Lokayatas
- 2.4 Epistemology
- 2.5 Metaphysics of Cārvākas
- 2.6 Cārvāka views on God and Religion
- 2.7 Ethics of Cārvākas
- 2.8 Let us Sum up
- 2.9 Keywords
- 2.10 Further Readings and References
- 2.11 Answers to Check Your Progress

2.0 OBJECTIVES

One of the important counter-movements in India that challenged the authority of Vedas and questioned its teachings is Cārvāka philosophy. It sought to unsettle most of the traditionally held views and beliefs such the existence of God, soul and life after death. That is why it was called heterodox school of philosophy. The aim of this unit is to introduce the students to the teachings, philosophy and arguments of this school which were diametrically opposed to those of orthodox schools of philosophy in India.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Cārvāka is a non-vedic Indian materialistic school of philosophy named after a sage called Cārvāka, the founder of this system, according to a popular view. But some think that Cārvāka was a prominent disciple of Brhaspati, the actual founder of the school. Cārvāka etymologically means ‘sweet-tongued’ (*caru+vak*). Cārvāka have sweet words. They are votaries of pleasing ideas if only you choose to follow their ways. Some hold that ‘Cārvāka’

² Prof. Sudha Gopinath, Koramangala, Bangluru. This Unit is taken from BPYC-131 (Block-4, Unit-14).

has its etymology in 'carva' which means to chew or eat. It is an allusion to their doctrine of 'eat, drink and make merry.' According to Gunaratana of eight century C.E., 'carva' stands for chewing, grinding with the teeth, eating and swallowing virtues and vices. Cārvāka are those who take no notice of virtues and vices. Cārvāka was also called 'Lokayatya' which is the combination of the two words 'loka' (The world) and 'ayata' (basis). It accepts only the reality of the material world. In other words, Cārvāka are the people who care only about the earth and not about the heaven.

2.2 ORIGIN OF THE SCHOOL

According to the scholars, the origin of the school can be traced back to post-*upanishadic* period. The school would have been born between 600-400 B.C.E. The Buddhist texts of this period mentions several heterodox teachers such as Sanjaya, the skeptic, Ajita, the materialist, Purana Kasyapa the indifferentist and Kosala, the fatalist and Katyayana whose ideas in some way or the other come closer to the views of Cārvāka. It is probably in this ambience of skepticism, materialism and nihilism that Cārvāka philosophy would have originated. It must be noted that it is around the same time that the Atomists and the Sophists became popular in Greece. Though it is a remote possibility that the Atomists, the Sophists and the Cārvāka would have influenced one another, it is evident that all these shared certain common views.

But Chattopadhyaya who has written extensively on Lokayata and Cārvāka schools holds that already in pre-Buddhist text of Chandogya Upanishad (vii 7-9) of seventh century BCE there is a reference to a view identifying body with the self, the philosophical position of Lokayata/Cārvāka. But it must be noted that the text does not mention the word 'Lokayatas' or 'Cārvāka' and attributes the view to the Asuras. According to T.M.P. Mahadevan, even in the earliest text of Rg-veda, there are references to heretics, non-conformists, skeptics, agnostics and critics of Vedas.

But Kautilya in the fourth century B.C. speaks of the Lokayatas though only once, but in the context in which he speaks of them seems to indicate that they had an established system already that time like that of the Samkhya and Yoga. In the second century B.C. Patanjali speaks of the Lokayatas and of the Bhaguri as their supporter. The texts of second century C.E., namely, the *Kamasutra* of Vatsayana and the *Nyayasutra* of Gautama—one of earliest texts of Nyaya system contain the views of Lokayata Sutras and have an extensive discussion mainly on two topics, very commonly attributed to Lokayatas/'Cārvāka': i) the denial of inference as a source of knowledge and ii) the denial of self distinct from the body. Besides this, the Buddhist sources such as *Payasi Suttanta* and *Samanna-Phala-Sutta* written around 4th-5th Cent CE speak about the views of materialism and the later text speaks of 'heretics' of Buddha's time including Ajita Kesakambali who is a representative of extreme materialism and regarded as a follower of Cārvāka school. Hiriyanna considers Cārvāka philosophy as a form of accidentalism namely *yadracca-vada* or *animitta-vada* because, for all of them, world is basically a chaos and whatever order is seen in this world is the outcome of mere

chance.

2.3 THE LITERARY SOURCES OF CĀRVĀKAS/LOKAYATAS

The original writings of Cārvāka, if any, are no longer extant. Most of what we know about Cārvāka and their philosophy is through the Purvapaksha (refutations) as provided by the opponents. The chief among them are Madvacharya's Sarva-darsana-samgraha, Samkara's Sarva Siddanta-samgraha and Krishn Misra's Prabodha-chandrodaya (an eleventh century C.E. allegorical drama intended to popularize the Advaita view by ridiculing specifically the Cārvāka view), Only exception to this is Jayasiri Bhatta's Tattvo-paplava-simgha, (which literally means 'the lion that throws overboard all categories), a treatise in defense of Cārvāka philosophy. The work edited by Sanghvi and Parikh claim that the actual text of the only original work of Cārvāka roughly belong to the eight century CE. Since the text holds that no pramana whatsoever is possible, many scholars think that it represents extreme skepticism, and it defends neither materialism nor perception as the only source of valid knowledge.

Apart from these, one more text needs to be mentioned in connection with Cārvāka and it is called Lokayata-sutra or Cārvāka-sutra which was only referred to by many writers but never available as a text. It is generally attributed to Brihaspati, who is traditionally regarded as the founder of this school. Yet the existence of another work known as Brhaspati-sutra (a work on political economy) attributed to the same author brings in more ambiguity. But Misra's Prabodha-chandrodaya says that the Lokayata Sutras were initially formulated by BrihasPati and later handed over to Cārvāka who popularised them through his pupils.

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answer.

1. What is the meaning of the term 'Cārvāka'? What is the other name for this school?

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2. Who is believed to be the founder of the school? What is his major work (attributed to him) that forms of the basis of Cārvāka philosophy?

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3. What are some of the non-Cārvāka literary sources that speak about the philosophy of Cārvāka?

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2.4 EPISTEMOLOGY

According to Cārvākas, perception (Pratyaksa) is the only source of valid knowledge and they hold that nothing exists except what is perceived by five senses. Accordingly, they refuted inference (anumana) and testimony (sabdha), which are accepted by almost all other schools of Indian philosophy as valid and reliable. For them, perception is of two kinds, namely, external and internal, the former kind involving the operation of the five senses while the latter involves the operation of the mind. Knowledge is the outcome of contact between an external object and one of the five senses, although further knowledge may be acquired through the process of the mind operating with the sense knowledge. Ultimately, then, all knowledge is derived from the senses.

For them inference is not a valid means of knowledge because universal relation which should serve as its ground is impossible. For instance let us take the following example:

“whatever has smoke has fire

The hill has smoke

therefore the hill has fire.”

Here a universal and necessary relation is assumed between the smoke and the fire. Cārvāka questions this. They would ask 'How did you get this knowledge? From the kitchen where you have seen fire and smoke? But it cannot give you necessary relation between fire and smoke? Have you observed all kitchens to affirm their (smoke and fire) co-presence. What about the past and the future instances. So no one can be certain about any relation. In inference we proceed from the known to the unknown and there is no certainty in this, though some inferences may turn out to be accidentally true.” Just because certain things are sometimes true in some instances, they need not be true at all times in all instances. Consider a causal relation between A and B in which A causes B. What you observe is A is followed by B. This induces a belief in you that this will be the case in the future too. Therefore causation is a belief, nothing more. From the observed case, we cannot infer anything about the observed. Inference is impossible and it is utmost “a merer leap into the dark.” Thus inference is not a valid means of knowledge.

Cārvāka brought several other objections against the possibility of a valid inference. They are 1. Impressions created by inferential knowledge are not as vivid (aspastavat) as those made by perception. 2. Inference always depends on other things for the determination of its objects. 3. Inference has to depend on perceptual statements. 4. Inferential knowledge is not directly produced by the objects. 5. Inference is not concrete (avastu-vishayatvat) 6. Inference is often contradicted

(badhyamanatvat) and 7. There is no proof which may establish that every case of the presence of the reason (hetu) should also be a case of the presence of probandum (sadhya) i.e. there is no proof establishing the invariable and unconditional concomitance between the middle and the major terms.

Cārvāka's views on inference has been criticised by many thinkers and philosophical schools. According to them, first of all, inference is inescapable for Cārvāka himself. To refuse the validity of inference is to refuse to think and discuss. All thoughts, all discussions, all doctrines, all affirmations and denials, all proofs and disproofs are made possible by inference. It is through inference, not through sense-perception that the Cārvāka knows what the other doctrines are, and it is through inference that the Cārvāka hopes to convince others of the soundness of his argument. Secondly, the rejection of inference itself is self-contradictory. That all inferences are invalid is itself an inference, which the Cārvāka must admit. Some historians of philosophy think that Cārvāka did not reject inference altogether. They did not favour the use of inference only for metaphysical categories, i.e as regards things that have never been perceived.

They also do not accept testimony (sabda). Madvacharya in his Sarva-darsana-samgraha quotes their position as follows: “Nor can testimony be the means thereof, since we may either allege in reply that this is included in the topic of inference; or else we may hold that this fresh proof of testimony is unable to leap over the old barrier that stopped the progress of inference, since it depends itself on the recognition of a sign in the form of the language used in the child's presence by the old man; and, moreover, there is no more reason for our believing another's word that smoke and fire are invariably connected than for our receiving the ipse dixit of Manu (which, of course, we Cārvāka reject).”

Thus it is clear that testimony does not have any value for the Cārvāka and accordingly Vedas are not authoritative and they are meaningless and misleading. Those who composed them aimed to confound and confuse the common people in order to achieve their own selfish purpose.

2.5 METAPHYSICS OF CĀRVĀKA

Cārvāka Metaphysics, which is directly and logically derived from their epistemology, is “an unqualified materialistic monism.” They hold a philosophy of the matter which means 'Matter is all.' Since perception is the only reliable source of knowledge, whatever is known through it alone is real and matter becomes the only reality. Sense-perception does not reveal any metaphysical entity. What it can perceive is only matter in its fourfold form; earth, water, fire and air. Cārvāka do not accept ether (akash), because it is not an object of perception. The four elements are real not as subtle forms but in their gross particle forms. There is no reality other than these four elements and their combinations.

If so, what is consciousness? How do you account for it? How do you explain the capacity of human beings for reasoning, reflecting and imagining? Cārvāka do not deny consciousness but deny only that it can be independent of the body. They regard consciousness as a mere product of matter. It does not 'inhere in particles of matter' but when the latter come to be organized in a specific form, they are found to show signs of life. It is always found associated with the body and

is destroyed with the body's disintegration. When the four elements of matter come together in a particular mode to form the living organisms, the animal and human consciousness appear in it. It is the result of an “emergent and dialectical evolution, an epiphenomenon, a by-product of matter.” Consciousness is an after-glow of matter. They would say “Matter secretes mind as liver secretes bile”. If none of the elements of physical body possesses consciousness, is it not that consciousness is independent of physical body? Their answer would be no. When physical elements come together to form an organic pattern, consciousness emerges. It does not inhere in any particular part of the body. It is just like certain tastes and intoxicating qualities are got out of certain combinations of ingredients, though none, taken separately, possesses it. Red is got out the betel leaf and lime, but none of it apparently seems to possess red.

The soul therefore is nothing other than the conscious living body. They say that there is no soul or no consciousness apart from body which is evidenced by the fact that consciousness perishes with the body. Therefore body is the self and the body is the product of material elements. Sankara in his Sarva Siddhanta-samgraha describes their understanding of the soul as follows:

“The soul is but the body characterized by the attributes signified in the expressions, “I am stout,” “I am youthful,” “I am grown up,” “I am old” etc. It is not something other than that body. The consciousness that is found in the modifications of non-intelligent elements (i.e. in organisms formed out of matter) is produced in the manner of the red colour out of the combination of betel, areca-nut and lime. There is no world other than this; there is no heaven and no hell; the realm of Siva and like regions are invented by stupid imposters of other schools of thought.”

The Cārvāka thus denies soul or Atman as a surviving or transmitting entity, but it does not mean, according to Hiriyanna, that the Cārvāka denies a conscious or spiritual principle but refuses to regard it as ultimate and independent.

Check Your Progress II

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Compare your answers with ones provided at the end of the unit.

1. What are the means of knowledge that Cārvākas accept? What do they reject explicitly?

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2. Do Cārvākas believe in the five elements of the material world? What do they deny? Why?

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3. Do Cārvākas accept consciousness? How do they understand it?

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2.6 CĀRVĀKA VIEWS ON GOD AND RELIGION

Since Cārvāka do not believe in any metaphysical reality beyond matter, it logically follows that they out rightly consider that traditional concepts of God, religion and life-after death are “pure fictions, sheer imaginations of fevered brains”. There is nothing existent beyond this material world. Hence there is no survival of anything, no other world, and no God as unmoved mover, the first cause and the creator of the universe. Since all that exists is only matter, God who is supposed to be a supernatural and transcendental being does not exist as it cannot be the object of perception, the only valid means of knowledge. Thus Cārvāka summarily deny the existence of God and dethrone God who is supposed to indwell in the human beings as *antaryamin*. They also de-recognise conscience, the voice of God, which guides man. Subsequently, they rule out the possibility of religion as the realm of faith and belief systems that assume human beings' innate thirst for spirituality and structure their consciousness towards a destiny beyond this world has no basis in the true nature of reality (i.e. materialistic) according to their scheme of things.

2.7 ETHICS OF CĀRVĀKAS

The Cārvāka ethics is based on the assumption that the human beings get annihilated at the point of death. She or he begins life with birth and ends it with death. Cārvākas do not believe in the theory of karma and accordingly they reject the notion of re-birth after death. Since this is the only life for the individual, their exhortation is: “make the best use of it.” To get the best out of this only life, one has to enjoy this life and to seek the utmost pleasure. The basic desire of every being/creature is to gain pleasure and avoid pain. Pleasure in this life is the sole end of man. Pleasure goes with pain. But on account of this, you should not run away from pleasure. The fact that there is pain in life should not deter the human beings from pursuing pleasure. Some of the sayings of Cārvākas encourage us not to be bogged down by the presence of pain in the process of seeking pleasure: “The wise man does not reject the kernel because of the husk;” “None gives up eating fish because there are bones and scales;” “Roses are not discarded because they have thorns;” “we do not cease to grow crops because the animals destroy them; we do not stop cooking our food, because beggars ask for it;” In all of these sayings the Cārvākas call upon the people to enjoy pleasure at all times. Thus pleasure is the natural ethical principle. One should take efforts

to minimize pain and maximize pleasure. Whatever action minimizes pain and maximizes pleasure is a good action.” A Carvaka lives in the moment for the moment. They exhort the human beings not to ignore a present pleasure in the hope of gaining some greater pleasure later. They invoke the following proverbs in support of their position: “Make hay while the sun shines;” “A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush;” “A pigeon today is worth more than a peacock of tomorrow.” They debunk all religious practices and rituals. One of the reasons for their rejection is that they falsely promise people a good future life but in reality the religious rituals are mechanisms of priests to exploit others and make a living out of it. Vatsayana in his kamasutra quotes some of the Lokyata Sutras. In this connection let us see one of their aphorisms:

1. Religious rites should not be practiced,
2. Because their fruition depends upon the future,
3. And is doubtful.
4. Who, unless he is a fool, gives away to others what belongs to him?
5. A pigeon to-day is better than a peacock tomorrow.
6. A sure kaudi is better than a doubtful gold coin.

These Lokyata Sutras thus appeal to people not to ignore the present at the cost of the future. In a spirit of cynicism, one Carvaka asks a priest why he sacrifices a poor animal. The priest replies that the animal sacrificed goes direct to heaven. Then the Carvaka tells the priest “If so, you can jolly well put yourself in that inevitable position.”

The Cārvākas do not believe in heaven or hell and for them paradise could only be on this earth. Sankara's Sarva-siddhanta-samgraha speaks of what has been repeatedly called the Carvaka philosophy of hedonism:

The enjoyment of heaven lies in eating delicious food, keeping company of young women, using fine clothes, perfumes, garlands, sandal paste, etc.

The pain of hell lies in the troubles that arise from enemies, weapons, diseases; while liberation (moksha) is death which is the cessation of life-breath.

The wise therefore ought not to take pains on account of that (liberation); it is only the fool who wears himself out by penances, fasts, etc.

Chastity and other such ordinances are laid down by clever weaklings. Gifts of gold and land, the pleasure of invitations to dinner are devised by indigent people with stomachs lean with hunger.

The construction of temples, houses for water-supply, tanks, wells, resting places, and the like, is praised only by travelers, not by others.

The Agnihotra ritual, the three Vedas, the triple staff carried by the priests, the ash-smearing, are the ways of gaining a livelihood for those who are lacking in intellect and energy

The wise should enjoy the pleasures of this world through the proper visible means of agriculture, keeping cattle, trade, political administration, etc.

From the above passage it is clear that the Carvaka's emphasis is on the individual, rather than any collective, good; accordingly, the Cārvākas accept only two of the four purusarthas or traditional human values, namely, attainment of worldly pleasure (kama) and the means of securing it (artha = wealth), thus rejecting religious merit (dharma) and liberation (moksha). The Cārvākas do not make any qualitative distinction among pleasures, nor do they try to distinguish the pleasures of the body from the pleasures of the mind. Except in the case of activities like trade and agriculture they accept immediately available pleasures rather than any promised ones of the future as they would say "A pigeon today is better than a peacock tomorrow," and "a certain copper is better than a doubtful gold."

Check Your Progress III

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Compare your answers with ones provided at the end of the unit.

1. Why do you think that Cārvākas do not accept God? Give reasons.

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2. Why should I 'make the best use of life' according to Cārvākas? How?

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3. Why do Cārvākas reject religious rituals?

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2.8 LET US SUM UP

Carvaka philosophy or Indian materialism, one of the oldest doctrines in India already quite noted in the earliest text of Rig Veda, an anti-hegemonic counter-movement, has continued to influence Indian academia even into our modern times as we see in the philosophy of modern and contemporary Indian thinkers like Devatman and M.N. Roy. Some view Carvaka philosophy less as a constructive philosophy than as a reaction to the excess of ritualism, spiritualism, world-negating idealism, oppressive clericalism and inhuman casteism. However this is not to state that the Carvaka system is philosophically insignificant and unsound as Dale Riepe observes that Carvaka's epistemological outlook is empirical, their metaphysics materialistic and ethics hedonistic.

Carvaka etymologically means 'sweet-tongued' (caru+vak). Carvaka was also called 'Lokayatya' which accepts only the material world as real. Brhaspati is the founder of the school. Some of the texts that refer to the philosophy of Cārvākas are Madvacharya's Sarva-darsana-samgraha, Sankara's Sarva Siddanta-samgraha, Krishn Misra's Prabodha-chandrodaya, the Kamasutra of Vatsayana, the Nyayasutra of Gautama—one of the earliest texts of Nyaya system and the Buddhist sources such as Payasi Suttanta and Samanna-Phala-Sutta.

The only means of knowledge the Carvakas accept is perception. And they openly question and deny the validity of means of knowledge such as inference and testimony. Cārvākas do not believe in all the five elements of the material world. They deny the existence of Ether because it cannot be perceived. Cārvākas do not deny consciousness but only its existence independent of the body. It is always found associated with the body and is destroyed with the body's disintegration. For them, consciousness is as a mere product of matter arising out of the combination of the four elements of matter under certain favourable conditions. Cārvākas do not believe in God because they deny the existence of anything which is not material. Hence God who is supposed to be a supernatural and transcendental being is not a reality as God cannot be the object of perception, the only valid means of knowledge. Since this is the only life for me, I must make the best use of it. To get the best out of this only life, I have to enjoy this life and to seek the utmost pleasure. Cārvākas reject religious rituals because they falsely promise people a good future life but in reality they are mechanisms of priests to exploit others and make a living out of it.

2.9 KEY WORDS

Cārvāka: etymologically it means 'sweet-tongued' (caru+vak). Some hold that 'Cārvāka' has its etymology in 'carva' which means to chew or eat. 'carva' allegorically stands for chewing, grinding with the teeth, eating and swallowing virtues and vices.

Lokayatya: It is the combination of the two words 'loka' (The world) and 'ayata' (basis). This

word expressed the belief of the 'Cārvākas that accepts only the reality of the material world.

BrihasPati: He is traditionally regarded as the founder of Cārvāka school. Lokayata-sutra or Cārvāka-sutra which was only referred to by many writers but never available as a text is generally attributed to him.

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2.11 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress I

1. Cārvāka etymologically means 'sweet-tongued' (*caru+vak*). Cārvāka have sweet words. They are votaries of pleasing ideas if only you choose to follow their ways. Some hold that 'Cārvāka' has its etymology in '*carva*' which means to chew or eat. It is an allusion to their doctrine of 'eat, drink and make merry.' According to Gunaratana of eight century C.E., '*carva*' stands for chewing, grinding with the teeth, eating and swallowing virtues and vices. Cārvāka are those who take no notice of virtues and vices. Cārvāka was also called 'Lokayatya' which is the combination of the two words '*loka*' (The world) and '*ayata*' (basis). It accepts only the reality of the material world. In other words, Cārvāka are the people who care only about the earth and not about the heaven.

2. Brihaspati is traditionally regarded as the founder of this school. Lokayata-sutra or Cārvāka-sutra which was only referred to by many writers but never available as a text, is generally

attributed to Brihaspati. Yet the existence of another work known as Brhaspati-sutra (a work on political economy) attributed to the same author brings in ambiguity. But Misra's Prabodha-chandrodaya says that the Lokayata Sutras were initially formulated by Brihaspati and later handed over to Cārvāka who popularised them through his pupils.

3. The original writings of Cārvāka, if any, are no longer extant. Most of what we know about Cārvāka and their philosophy is through the Purvapaksha (refutations) as provided by the opponents. The chief among them are Madvacharya's Sarva-darsana-samgraha, Samkara's Sarva Siddanta-samgraha and Krishn Misra's Prabodha-chandrodaya (an eleventh century C.E. allegorical drama intended to popularize the Advaita view by ridiculing specifically the Cārvāka view), Only exception to this is Jayasiri Bhatta's Tattvo-paplava-simgha, (which literally means 'the lion that throws overboard all categories), a treatise in defense of Cārvāka philosophy. The work edited by Sanghvi and Parikh claim that the actual text of the only original work of Cārvāka roughly belong to the eight century CE. Since the text holds that no pramana whatsoever is possible, many scholars think that it represents extreme skepticism, and it defends neither materialism nor perception as the only source of valid knowledge.

Check Your Progress II

1. According to Cārvākas, perception (Pratyaksa) is the only source of valid knowledge and they hold that nothing exists except what is perceived by five senses. Accordingly, they refuted inference (anumana) and testimony (sabdhha), which are accepted by almost all other schools of Indian philosophy as valid and reliable. For them, perception is of two kinds, namely, external and internal, the former kind involving the operation of the five senses while the latter involves the operation of the mind. Knowledge is the outcome of contact between an external object and one of the five senses, although further knowledge may be acquired through the process of the mind operating with the sense knowledge. Ultimately, then, all knowledge is derived from the senses. For them inference is not a valid means of knowledge because universal relation which should serve as its ground is impossible.

2. They hold a philosophy of the matter which means 'Matter is all.' Since perception is the only reliable source of knowledge, whatever is known through it alone is real and matter becomes the only reality. Sense-perception does not reveal any metaphysical entity. What it can perceive is only matter in its fourfold form; earth, water, fire and air. Cārvāka do not accept ether (akash), because it is not an object of perception. The four elements are real not as subtle forms but in their gross particle forms. There is no reality other than these four elements and their combinations.

3. Cārvāka do not deny consciousness but deny only that it can be independent of the body. They regard consciousness as a mere product of matter. It does not 'inhere in particles of matter' but when the latter come to be organized in a specific form, they are found to show signs of life. It is always found associated with the body and is destroyed with the body's disintegration. When the

four elements of matter come together in a particular mode to form the living organisms, the animal and human consciousness appear in it. It is the result of an “emergent and dialectical evolution, an epiphenomenon, a by-product of matter.” Consciousness is an after-glow of matter. They would say “Matter secretes mind as liver secretes bile”. If none of the elements of physical body possesses consciousness, is it not that consciousness is independent of physical body? Their answer would be no. When physical elements come together to form an organic pattern, consciousness emerges. It does not inhere in any particular part of the body. It is just like certain tastes and intoxicating qualities are got out of certain combinations of ingredients, though none, taken separately, possesses it. Red is got out the betel leaf and lime, but none of it apparently seems to possess red.

Check Your Progress III

1. Cārvāka do not believe in any metaphysical reality beyond matter, it logically follows that they out rightly consider that traditional concepts of God, religion and life-after death are “pure fictions, sheer imaginations of fevered brains”. There is nothing existent beyond this material world. Hence there is no survival of anything, no other world, and no God as unmoved mover, the first cause and the creator of the universe. Since all that exists is only matter, God who is supposed to be a supernatural and transcendental being does not exist as it cannot be the object of perception, the only valid means of knowledge. Thus Cārvāka summarily deny the existence of God and dethrone God who is supposed to indwell in the human beings as *antaryamin*. They also de-recognise conscience, the voice of God, which guides man.

2. Cārvākas do not believe in the theory of karma and accordingly they reject the notion of re-birth after death. Since this is the only life for the individual, their exhortation is: “make the best use of it.” To get the best out of this only life, one has to enjoy this life and to seek the utmost pleasure. The basic desire of every being/creature is to gain pleasure and avoid pain. Pleasure in this life is the sole end of man. Pleasure goes with pain. But on account of this, you should not run away from pleasure. The fact that there is pain in life should not deter the human beings from pursuing pleasure. Some of the sayings of Cārvākas encourage us not to be bogged down by the presence of pain in the process of seeking pleasure: “The wise man does not reject the kernel because of the husk;” “None gives up eating fish because there are bones and scales;” “Roses are not discarded because they have thorns;” “we do not cease to grow crops because the animals destroy them; we do not stop cooking our food, because beggars ask for it;” In all of these sayings the Cārvākas call upon the people to enjoy pleasure at all times. Thus pleasure is the natural ethical principle.

3. They debunk all religious practices and rituals. One of the reasons for their rejection is that they falsely promise people a good future life but in reality the religious rituals are mechanisms of priests to exploit others and make a living out of it. Vatsayana in his kamasutra quotes some of the Lokyata Sutras.

UNIT 3 JAINISM³

Structure

- 3.0 Objectives
- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 Metaphysics
- 3.3 Jaina Epistemology
- 3.4 Pramāṇas
- 3.5 Empirical Perception
- 3.6 Syllogistic Inference
- 3.7 Authority
- 3.8 Practical Teachings of Jainism
- 3.9 Let Us Sum Up
- 3.10 Key Words
- 3.11 Further Readings and References
- 3.12 Answers to Check Your Progress

3.0 OBJECTIVES

Jainism is a way old form of heterodox system and was founded by Vardhamāna. This system speaks about independent existence and its position is unique. It teaches to us a new way of life and the ways and methods to conquer life

At the end of this unit you should be able to:

- Distinguish the system on its metaphysical and epistemological positions.
- The different sources of knowledge.
- Speak about Syllogistic Inference and Authority
- And mainly its practical teaching

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Jainism is a way old form of heterodox system which repudiates the teachings of the *Vedas*. The word 'Jainism' is derived from 'jina' which means conqueror, i.e., one who has conquered his

³ Prof. Sudha Gopinath, Koramangala, Bangalore. This unit is taken from BPYC-131 (Unit-15, Block-4).

passions and desires. In all probability Jainism arose in the later Vedic period, and it was revived by Vardhamāna, also called Mahāvīra or the great Spiritual hero, in the 6th century B.C. Vardhamāna was the last in a series of prophets. According to tradition, twenty three prophets preceded him. Vardhamāna was the twenty-fourth prophet or Tirthāṅkara. Jaina tradition ascribes the origin of the system to Ṛṣabha.

Vardhamāna was born in a princely family in north Bihar about 540 B.C. On attaining his 30th year, he renounced all empirical comforts and led a life of severe abstinence and meditation. After thirteen years of such penance he attained illumination securing freedom from all ills. He then became a 'jina' or a spiritual leader, a word from which the term 'Jainism' is derived.

Jainism, like Buddhism and Cārvāka, does not believe in the authority of the *Vedas*. All these three heterodox systems also are alike in so far as they do not believe in a supreme God. But unlike Cārvāka and Buddhism, Jainism believes in permanent entities like the self and matter, because of which Jainism is described as a theological meaning between Brāhminism and Buddhism.

3.2 METAPHYSICS

The distinguishing feature of Jainism is its belief in the eternal and independent existence of spirit and matter or in the animate and inanimate respectively called Jīva and ajīva. But by spirit we have to understand only the individual self and not the supreme soul as in the *Upaniṣads*. According to Jainism, the jīvas are many in number and even material entities possess a soul. One of the curious features of Jainism is the belief in the variable size of the Jīva in its empirical condition. It is capable of expansion and contraction according to the dimension of the physical body with being. In Their Empirical form they are classified as having one sense, two senses and so forth. Jains believe that the Jīva is both an experiencer (bhoktā) and an agent (kartā). The intrinsic nature of the Jīva is perfection and is characterized by infinite intelligence, infinite peace, infinite nature of the Jīva is obscured though not destroyed. Again, the difference in bound Jīvan is due to the degrees of their connection with matter. Karma is conceived as subtle particles of matter, and the presence of karmic matter in the soul is the cause of the soul's bondage.

Consciousness, according to Jainism, is the very essence of Jīva. They say that in an inorganic body, the soul's consciousness is dormant while it is active in the organic body. Knowledge is a quality of the soul and a conscious self-experiences perception, intention, etc. Jains prove the existence of the soul by pointing out that the soul is directly experienced owing to the 'I – consciousness' (aham pratyaaya) in "I did, I do, and I shall do". Jains point out that doubt

presupposes a doubter as its ground. That ground is a soul or conscious self. Further, jains point out that consciousness cannot be the quality of a material body because the body has form and knowledge, feeling, etc. Again, the material body cannot be the substratum of consciousness because perception, memory, etc are absent in deep sleep or death even though the body is present. Jīva's relation to matter explains the Jaina view of knowledge. Knowledge is not something that characterizes the Jīva but it constitutes Jīva's very essence. The Jīva therefore can know everything unaided directly and exactly as it is if there is no impediment in its way. In other words, all knowledge is in the soul though it manifests itself only when the impending media are removed. The knowledge which a Jīva has is fragmentary because of the obstruction caused by karma which interferes with its power of perception. The impediments are passions and emotions. The Jaina, therefore, recognizes differences in the extent of enlightenment that a self may possess depending upon the extent to which obstacles (karma) have been removed. But there can be no self without knowledge or knowledge without a self. The culmination of enlightenment is reached when the obstacles are completely broken down. This is kevala jñāna when one becomes omniscient. This knowledge is pure because it is immediate and is obtained without any aid like sense, mind, etc. Thus, from the Jaina point of view, senses and mind are aids to knowledge only from the empirical point of view. They are also impediments being part of matter.

Jaina epistemology points out that the process of knowledge does not modify the object of knowledge. The consciousness of the Jīva is ever active and this activity reveals its own nature as well as that of the object. As light reveals itself and other objects, so also knowledge reveals itself and other objects. Again In knowing anything, the self knows itself simultaneously. If it did not know itself, nothing else could impart this knowledge to it.

Consciousness which is the essence of jīva has two manifestations – (i) darśana or intuition (ii) jñāna or knowledge. In the case of intuition, the details are not perceived while in knowledge the details are also known. Darśana is simple apprehension while jñāna is conceptual knowledge. In its perfect condition referred to as Kevala Jñāna, darśana and jñāna are together. Such knowledge is perfect, free from any doubt or uncertainty.

Apart from jīva, the other everlasting category of the universe is ajīva. According to Jainism, the whole universe can be brought under one or other of the two everlasting, uncreated, co-existing but independent categories described as jīva and ajīva. That which has consciousness is jīva and that which has no consciousness but can be touched, tasted, seen and smelt is ajīva. Jīva and ajīva

do not correspond to 'I' and 'not I', but it is an objective classification of things in the universe. This Classification clearly shows the realistic and relative stand point of Jainism. The ajīva is the object and Jainism says that as sweaty as there is a subject that knows so sweaty there is an object that is known.

The term 'ajīva' is used to denote the five categories of pudgala (matter), kāla (time), dharma (motion), adharma (rest) and ākāśa (space). Of these, dharma, adharma, ākāśa and kāla are without form (arūpa) and matter is with form (rūpa). Their essential distinction from the jīva is that they as such lack life and consciousness.

Pudgala denotes matter or material object in general. Matter possesses colour, flavour, odour and touch. Sound is considered not as a quality but as a mode of it. Matter is not created but indistinguishable and real. It is real and independent of the perceiving mind. The basic definition of pudgala, which stands for matter in Jainism, is "that which can be experienced by the five sense organs." The second definition is derived from the etymology of the compound word 'pudgala'. The term 'pud' refers to the process of combination and 'gala' stand for disassociation. The significance of the definition lies in the atomic theory of the Jains. The term 'anu' which means atom is found in the *Upaniṣads* but there is no systematic atomic theory in the *Upaniṣads*. We can say that the Jaina atomic theory is the earliest. The ultimate constituent of matter is aṇu or paramāṇu (atom). The atoms are all of the same kind, yet they can give rise to an infinite variety of things. Even the elements of earth, water, fire and air are divisible and have a structure. By developing the respective characteristics of odour, flavour, etc. the atoms become differentiated and thus the material world is divided though the atoms are not different from one another qualitatively. Therefore matter has two forms, one atomic or simple and the other compound called skandha. The process of combination of atoms gives rise to the molecules or skandha. All perceivable objects are skandhas. It is the combination of molecules that is responsible for the different types of objects with varying qualities. Six forms of skandha are recognized

Bhadra (Gross) – Bhadra: This type of skandha when split cannot regain the original undivided form. For example, solids.

Bhadra: When split, this type of skandha has the capacity to join together, for example, liquids.

Bhadra – Sukṣma (finer): This type of skandha appears gross but is really subtle. It can neither be split, nor pierced through or taken up in hand, for example, Sun, heat, shadow, light, etc. Minute particles of these are evident to senses.

Sukṣma – Bhadra: This type of skandha appears subtle but is really gross, for example, sensation of touch, colour and sound.

Sukṣma: Skandhas of this type are extremely subtle and they are beyond sense perception. It is matter in this subtle form that constitutes karma, which by its influx into the jīva brings on saṃsāra or bondage.

Sukṣma - Sukṣma: They are finer than Sukṣma Skandhas.

From the atomic theory, it is clear that the Jain view of reality is identity and change. The Jain view states that to suffer change and yet endure is the privilege of existence. The change or modes are known as paryāyas, which come into being, persist for at least for one instant and then disappear. The change is due to the different modes of combination of atoms. Underlying all the changing modes is the fact there is the identity of the ultimate constituents, the atoms. Thus in the atoms, we find the identity element, in their combining to form molecules and in the division of and addition of atoms, we find the element of change. According to Jainism, the nature of reality is such that there is a constant factor while there is change, which is also real. Thus Jainism defines reality as one-in-many.

A thing seems to assume various shapes and to undergo diverse changes. For example, clay can assume various shapes and can undergo diverse changes. *Upaniṣads* held that since in all changes the clay matter remained permanent, that alone was true where as the change of form and state were but appearances, the nature of which cannot be rationally explained. According to *Upaniṣads*, the unchanging substance alone is true and the changing forms are mere illusions of the senses. On the other hand, according to Buddhism, the changing qualities alone can be perceived and that there is no unchanging substance behind them. What we perceive as clay, says the Buddhist, is some specific quality and what we perceive as jug is also some quality. For the Buddhist qualities do not imply that there are substances to which they adhere. We can neither perceive nor infer such pure substances. As against these two views of the *Upaniṣads* and Buddhism, Jainism holds that the nature of reality is both permanent and changing. Jainism claims that they are able to speak of two contradictory characteristics in the same reality because experience warrants it. Thus, they say that, both *Upaniṣads* and Buddhism contain only an element of truth but not the whole truth as given in experience. Jains point out that in all experience, there are three elements: - (i). Some qualities appear to remain unchanged. (ii). Some new qualities are generated. (iii). Some old qualities are destroyed. It is true that qualities of things are changing but all qualities are not

changing. Thus, when a jug is made, it means that clay lump is destroyed and a jug is generated and the clay itself is permanent. Thus clay has become lost in some form, has generated itself in another and remained permanent in another form. It is by virtue of three unchanged qualities that a thing is said to be permanent though undergoing change, which we call the substance. Hence the nature of being (sat) is neither absolutely unchangeable nor the momentary changing qualities of existence, but reality is that which involves a permanent unit. While every moment it loses some qualities and gains some.

After taking a view of the nature of Pudgala, it is necessary to understand the nature of the other categories of ajīva like, kāla (time), ākāśa (space), dharma and adharma. Of these times or kāla is infinite but it has cycles in it, each cycle having two eras of equal duration described as ‘Avasarpini’ and ‘Utsarpini’. Avasarpini is the descending era in which virtue gradually decreases. Utsarpini is the ascending era where virtue gradually increases. According to Jainism, the present era is the descending era, where virtue is gradually decreasing. Ākāśa or space is also infinite and is conceived as being of two parts, namely, Lokākāśa and Alokākāśa. In Lokākāśa movement is possible and in Alokākāśa movement is not possible. Whatever exists exists only in Lokākāśa (like matter). This universe is cosmos, not a chaos which means that there must be certain laws of motion and rest. Dharma is the principle of motion and adharma the principle of rest. The two principles are non-active, non-physical, non-atomic and non-discrete in structure. Dharma and adharma are neutral conditions of movement and rest. They are the forces that cause movement and rest. Space gives room to subsist; dharma makes it possible for things to move and be moved and adharma to rest. Dharma as a principle of motion does not create motion but only helps those things, which have the capacity to move. Similarly, adharma does not interfere with moving objects but like the earth it is the condition of rest for objects on it. Both dharma and adharma do not have the same qualities. Empirically They Were considered to possess a number of space-points (pradeśas) but transcendently they are considered as each possessing one pradeśa only. They are considered to be responsible for the systematic character of the universe.

3.3 JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY

According to Jainism, knowledge is of two forms – Pramāṇa or knowledge of a thing as it is in itself and naya or knowledge of a thing in its relation. The doctrine of nayas or standpoints is a peculiar feature of Jaina logic. Anaya is a standpoint from which we make a statement about a thing. What is true from one standpoint may not be true from another. This is a reference to the

relativity of knowledge. The particle views are due to the purposes that we pursue. But to profess one particular standpoint is not to deny the others. The general character of reality is given in general practical views. There are several ways in which nayas are divided. There are artha (meaning) nayas where in the division is based on whether the emphasis is on the particulars or on the general views. So also there are dravyārtika nayas based on the point of view of substance, and paryāyārtika nayas based on the point of view of modification or condition.

The most important use of these standpoints is of course the Syād-Vāda or the saptabhaṅgi. It is the conception of reality extremely indeterminate in its nature. It signifies that the universe may be looked at from many points of view and each point of view yields a different conclusion (anekānta). The nature of reality is not expressed by any of them. In its concrete richness, reality admits all predicates. Therefore, strictly speaking, every proposition is only conditional. Absolute Affirmation and Absolute negation are both erroneous. The Jains illustrate this point by narrating the story of six blind men examining an elephant and arriving at different conclusions regarding its form. While, in fact each observer has only a part of the truth. The seven steps of syādvāda are:

May be, is (syāt asti) May be, is not (syāt nāsti)

May be, is and is not (syāt astu bāsti) Maybe, is inexpressible (syāt avaktavyah)

May be, is and is inexpressible (syāt asti ca avaktavyah)

May be, is not and is inexpressible (syāt nāsti ca avaktavyah)

May be, is, is not and is inexpressible (syāt asti ca nāsti ca avaktavyah)

Each naya or point of view represents one of the many ways in which a thing can be looked at. When anyone's point of view is mistaken for the whole, we have a nayābhāsa or a fallacy. As pointed out earlier, Jains believe that both the Upanishadic thinkers who believe in permanence and the Buddhist thinkers who believe in change are one-sided, and that both are against experience. Since the Jains believe in both permanence and change, they have difficulty in expressing the nature of reality in one step. But we have to mention here that the Jaina Criticism against the Upanishadic view is Not Warranted because the Jaina is only speaking of the empirical reality while the Upanisads are speaking of the transcendent. But the Jains while rightly drawing our attention to the relativity of all judgments and knowledge fail to understand that all talk of relativity makes sense only in the light of some absolute. But Jainism never leaves the plane of the relative. Further, the seven-fold scheme is only a mechanical assemblage of the various possible judgments but not a synthesis of them. Jains forget that the conjunction of several partial truths is

not equivalent to the whole truth. It is a theory of identity and difference but not identity in difference. If the Jaina logic is built on the law of contradiction, then they forget that the law of contradiction is only the negative aspect of the law of identity. But the Jains believe in kevala jñāna, which is the right intuitive experience. It is perfect knowledge, which is in fact a case of absolute-izing the relativity of knowledge. If, in this experience, there is the unity of the subject, object and knowledge, then their claim to relativistic pluralism breaks down.

The Jains admit of five kinds of knowledge – mati, śruta, avadhi, manaḥ-paryāya and kevala.

Mati jñāna: is the knowledge by means of senses or indriyas and mind. Mind is called anīndriya. This is knowledge by acquaintance.

Śruta jñāna: refers to testimony. It is knowledge derived from signs, symbols or words. This is knowledge by description.

Avadhi: is clairvoyance or it is knowledge of things even when it is at a distance in space and time. However, since it is not beyond the spatio-temporal existence it is limited.

manaḥ-paryāya: is telepathy. It is the direct knowledge of the thoughts of others. It is knowing other minds.

Kevala: is perfect knowledge, which comprehends all substances and their modifications. It is omniscience, and is unlimited by space, time or objects. This is independent knowledge not dependent on the senses and can only be felt but not described. This is the knowledge that is acquired by the liberated souls.

These five types of knowledge are brought under two broad divisions – pratyakṣa (immediate) and parokṣa (mediate). The Details of this classification shall be discussed in the next section under the heading Pramāṇas.

Of the five kinds of knowledge mentioned above, the first three kinds of knowledge, namely, mati, śruta and avadhi are liable to error but manaḥ-paryāya and kevala cannot be ever wrong. Validity of knowledge consists in its practical efficiency enabling us to get what is good and avoid what is evil. Valid knowledge is a faithful representation of objects and therefore practically useful. It is said, "... the validity is either determined intrinsically or extrinsically." (*Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā* 1-1-8, Hemachandra). Jains believe in both intrinsic and extrinsic validity. The determination of validity in some cases is achieved by a cognition by itself. Under this we can cite the example of all those cognitions, which are habitual. Like we know water quenches thirst and we do not require another confirmatory cognition to establish the validity of this proposition. On some occasions the

experience of validity is secured by means of an external datum. Its validity is determined by (i) a consequent confirmatory cognition of the same object.

(ii) a recognition of its pragmatic consequences (iii) the cognition of an object invariably or universally concomitant with it. This is extrinsic validity because here the validity is determined by other means.

According to Jains, wrong knowledge means disharmony with the real nature of the object. Invalid knowledge represents things in relation in which they do not exist. When we mistake a rope for a snake, our error consists in seeing a snake where it is not. Erroneous knowledge is of three kinds. They are, (i) Samsāya or doubt (ii) Viparyaya or mistake (iii) Anadhyavasāya or wrong knowledge, which is caused by carelessness or indifference. According to Jains, invalid knowledge leads to contradiction.

Check Your Progress I

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answer with those provided at the end of the unit.

1. What is consciousness, according to Jain Philosophy?

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2. Write a short note on the Jain's theory of erroneous knowledge.

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3.4 PRAMĀÑAS

The Jains believe in three sources of valid knowledge, viz., perception, inference and testimony. These sources of knowledge are discussed under two broad divisions, direct and indirect – pratyakṣa and parokṣa.

Jaina thinkers divide perceptual knowledge into categories. The first division is that where perceptual cognition is directly related to the soul. This perception is called direct perception,

immediate perception, transcendental perception, extra-sensory perception or real perception. Direct perception is defined as follows: “The perfect manifestation of the innate nature of a soul emerging on a total annihilation of all obstructive veils is called direct perception.” (*Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā* of Hemachandra I, 1.15). Consciousness is the very essence of the self and the self is self-luminous. So this form of perception is where self is manifested as it is. It is pāramārthika pratyakṣa. It is pure, perfect and is independent of the senses and the mind. This occurs when all the obscuring veils on the self disappear or when karma is totally annihilated. Then, the soul manifests itself in a pure form and perceives the whole of reality in a direct and immediate manner. Hence it is called kevala jñāna or omniscience. The other forms of transcendental knowledge accepted by Jains are, clairvoyance and telepathy. Clairvoyance is confined to the objects having form. Only Those Things having shape, colour, etc. can be perceived through this faculty. Thus Avadhi or clairvoyance is ‘limited so far as it is limited by space and time. Telepathy or manaḥ-paryāya is the direct apprehension of the modes of minds. This is confined to the abode of human beings. A Person possessing the faculty of telepathy can directly recognize the thought of people. This is possessed by an ascetic with strict mental and physical discipline. This is higher, purer and more lucid than clairvoyance. As pointed out earlier, the culmination of knowledge is kevala jñāna.

3.5 EMPIRICAL PERCEPTION

This form of perception is conditioned by the senses and the mind and it is limited. It is samvyāvahārika pratyakṣa. The senses are five in number that of touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing and each have a specific capacity to know. Each of these is of two kinds, physical and psychical. Mind is the organ of apprehension of all the senses. It is designated as anindriya (not a sense-organ), sukṣma-indriya or inner self (antaḥkaraṇa). Mind is also of two kinds, physical and psychical. The physical refers to the material entity and psychical to the conscious activity. Empirical perception is of four kinds, viz., Sensation (avagraha), Speculation (tīhā), Determinate perception (avaya), Retention (dhāraṇa).

Sensation is the indeterminate awareness of an object when the senses come in contact with the object. Speculation is to speculate and understand the specific details of what is sensed. Determinate perception is the determination of specific characteristics of the objects of speculation and it is here that one makes a definite proposition about what has been sensed. Finally, retention is the condition of memory, enabling recollection of a past event. It is the latest mental trace left over by the previous experience.

The other sources of knowledge are discussed under non-perceptual cognition, or parokṣa. The most important sources of this kind of knowledge are inference and testimony. The Jains add that recollection; recognition and induction are also parokṣa jñāna. This form of knowledge is less vivid than pratyakṣa.

Inference is the knowledge of the probandum (sādhya) on the strength of the probans (sādhana). The knowledge of the probandum, which is of the nature of a real fact and which arises from a probation either observed or expressly stated, is called inference or anumāna. Probandum stands for the object of inference. It is that which is not perceived but needs to be inferred and this is indicated by a sign or probans. In an example like, “The hill is on fire because there is smoke”, the probans, i.e., smoke is what we perceive. From This Sign (smoke), we infer the unperceived fire or we get the knowledge of fire on the hill. This is possible because there is an invariable relation or concomitance between the probes and the probandum. Going back to our example, the inference of fire from the perception of smoke is possible because there is an invariable concomitance or relation between smoke and fire. Inference can be of two types, one is to get rid of doubts in one’s own mind, which is called svārthānumāna and the other is to provide knowledge for others which is known as parārthānamāna or syllogistic inference. The invariable relation is called vyāpti. Which are of different kinds, like essential identity, cause and effect or co-inherent in the same substratum. These relationships can be illustrated by examples. When a word is heard, the meaning of the word is inferred because there is a relation of identity between the word and what it stands for. Cause and effect relation can be illustrated by examples like, from dark clouds we can infer that there will be rain or from smoke we can infer that there must be fire. The Illustration of the co-inherent in the same substratum is the taste and colour belonging to one and the same fruit.

3.6 SYLLOGISTIC INFERENCE

(*Pramāṇa Mīmāṃsā* II 1.1.) Syllogistic inference is definite cognition resulting from a statement of a probans having the characteristic of necessary concomitance with the probandum. In Other words, the minimum condition for any inference is some kind of vyāpti between the middle and the major terms. The probans is the sign or middle term which is perceived (smoke) and the probandum is the major term (fire) or what is inferred though it is not perceived because there is such an invariable relation between the two (i.e., smoke and fire). Therefore by perceiving ‘smoke on the hill’ we can conclude that the ‘hill has got fire.’

3.7 AUTHORITY

The knowledge acquired by the words of reliable persons is called 'authority.' it is also known as 'verbal testimony'. He who possesses right knowledge and then makes the right judgment is said to be reliable or *āpta*. The words of a reliable person are always true. The authority is of two kinds: ordinary or *laukika* and extra-ordinary or *alaukika*. *Laukika śabda* is from one who is reliable while *alaukika śabda* is from one who is omniscient.

3.8 PRACTICAL TEACHINGS OF JAINISM

Practical teachings are the special feature of Jainism. As the word 'jina' suggests, the aim of Jaina Philosophy is to enable man to conquer his passions and desires. The chief feature of the discipline that is prescribed is to extreme severity. It prescribes a rigorous discipline both for the ascetic and the householder. Jainism, like so many other doctrines, insists on both enlightenment and conduct. Morality is essential to reform man and to prevent the formation of new karma. The path is through the three jewels or *triratna* or the three precious principles of life. They are:

Right faith (*samyagdarśana*)

Right knowledge (*samyagjñāna*)

Right conduct (*samyak cāritra*)

Of these three, the first place is given to the right faith. They say that even right activity accompanied by false convictions loses much of its value. Right faith is the unshaken belief in Jaina scriptures and the teachings intended to dispel skepticism or doubt, which comes in the way of spiritual growth. Right knowledge is the knowledge of Jaina religion and Philosophy. Right conduct is translating into action what has been learnt and believed to be true. It is a very important part of the discipline for it is through right action one can get rid of karma and reach the goal of life. To get rid of karma, Jains prescribe five ethical vows. These are to be followed rigidly by the Jain ascetics and they are slightly modified for the lay disciples. The five great vows of Jainism for the monks are called 'Mahāvratas' and those to be followed by the laymen are called 'aṇuvratas'. The five vows are:

Ahimsā – The Principle of *ahimsā* or non-injury is the most significant of the five vows. It refers to the positive virtue of not harming any living being. One should practice the vow of non-violence in thought, word and deed. It is not simply avoiding giving pain to others; it is also helping the suffering, which is of at most importance. It is only by overcoming passions like pride, prejudice,

attachment and hatred that one can successfully tread the path of ahimsa.

Satya – The second vow is that of truthfulness. Adherence to truth in all circumstances is the satya mahāvratā. Speech without deliberation, speech in anger, and speech motivated by avarice or by fear is to be shunned.

Asteya – The principle of asteya is the vow of non-stealing. Stealing is unlawful possession of the belongings of others and should be abhorred. Accepting bribes, smuggling, black marketing and the like are all instances of the principle of asteya.

Brahma-carya – This vow refers to the principle of celibacy. The ascetics must practice the vow of chastity in thought, word and deed and not violate the virtue of continence. Such a code of conduct leads to self-control over the senses and the attainment of perfect self-discipline.

Aparigraha – This vow emphasizes the spirit of renunciation. The ascetic should not desire material things. An attitude of complete detachment is advised.

In the case of a layman, he is asked to follow the aṇu-vratas, in which the last two are replaced by chastity and contentment, or strict limitation of one's wants.

The aim of life is to get oneself disentangled from karma. In most systems of Indian philosophy, karma stands for action but in Jainism, karma is conceived as subtle particles of matter and the cause of soul's bondage is the presence of karmic matter in it. Again, the difference in jīvas is due to degrees of their connections with matter. According to Jainism, karma being material permeates the jīva through and through weighing it down to the mundane level. It is said that karma unites with the soul like heat unites with iron and water with milk and the soul so united with karma is the soul in bondage. Karma particles bind men for varying lengths of time depending on the intensity of passions and actions. Jainism also makes it clear that karma can be completely broken down by self-discipline. While giving details of the course of practical discipline, Jaina Explains the scheme of nava-tattva, or nine categories. These categories are jīva, ajīva, punya, papa, āśrava, bandha, saṁvara, nirjarā and mokṣa.

Jīva and ajīva stand for the conscious principle and matter respectively. Puṇya and pāpa stands for the virtuous deeds and the vicious deeds respectively. Āśrava and bandha are the categories through which the jīva gets bound. Certain psychical conditions like ignorance of the ultimate truth and passion lead to the movement of karmic particles towards the soul. That is āśarva. Then, there is the actual influx of karma and that is bandha. The falling away of karma is also through two stages. First through right knowledge and self restraint the influx of fresh karma is stopped and

enlightened beings having attained kevala jñāna or omniscience. Some arhantas/arihantas are said to be *tīrthānkara* types. The *tīrthānkara* type of arihant is the one who is engaged in preaching and propagating Jainism.

3.10 KEY WORDS

Epistemological Realism : Epistemological realism is a philosophical position, a subcategory of objectivism, holding that what you know about an object exists independently of your mind. It opposes epistemological idealism.

Relativism : Relativism is the idea that some elements or aspects of experience or culture are relative to, i.e., dependent on other elements or aspect

3.11 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

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3.12 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Answers to Check Your Progress I

1) Consciousness is the very essence of Jīva.

Consciousness which is the essence of jīva has two manifestations –

(i) darśana or intuition (ii) jñāna or know

(i) Darśana is simple apprehension while (ii) jñāna is conceptual knowledge.

2) For Jains, wrong knowledge means disharmony with the real nature of the object. Invalid knowledge represents things in relation in which they don't exist. When we mistake a rope for a snake, our error consists in seeing a snake where it is not. Erroneous knowledge is of three kinds. They are, (i). Samśaya or doubt (ii). Viparyaya or mistake (iii). Anadhyavasāya or wrong knowledge, which is caused by carelessness or indifference. According to Jains, invalid knowledge leads to contradiction.

Answers to Check Your Progress II

1) Empirical perception is of four kinds, viz,

- i) Sensation (avagraha),
- ii) Speculation (īhā),
- iii) Determinate perception (avaya)
- iv) Retention (dhāraṇa).

i) Sensation is the indeterminate awareness of an object when the senses come in contact with the object.

ii) Speculation is to speculate and understand the specific details of what is sensed.

iii) Determinate perception is the determination of specific characteristics of the objects of speculation and it is here that one makes a definite proposition about what has been sensed. And,

iv) Retention is the condition of memory, enabling recollection of a past event. It is the latest mental trace left over by the previous experience.

2) The main aim of Jaina Philosophy is to enable man to conquer his passions and desires.

The three precious principles of life are:

- i) Right faith (samyagdarśana)
- ii) Right knowledge (samyajjñāna)
- iii) Right conduct (samyak cāritra)

Of these three, the first place is given to the right faith. They Say that even right activity accompanied by false convictions loses much of its value. Right faith is the unshaken belief in Jaina scriptures and the teaching is intended to dispel skepticism or doubt, which comes in the way of spiritual growth. Right knowledge is the knowledge of Jaina religion and Philosophy. Right conduct is translating into action what has been learnt and believed to be true. It is a very important part of the discipline for it is through right action one can get rid of karma and reach the goal of life.

UNIT 4 SCHOOLS OF BUDDHISM⁴

Structure

- 4.0 Objectives
- 4.1. Introduction
- 4.2. Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika Schools
- 4.3 Yogācāra School of Buddhism
- 4.4 Mādhyamik School
- 4.5 Metaphysical Views of the Schools of Buddhism
- 4.6 Sūnyavāda of the Mādhyamikas
- 4.7 Let Us Sum Up
- 4.8 Key Words
- 4.9 Further Readings and References
- 4.10 Answers to Check Your Progress

4.0 OBJECTIVES

Buddhism as propounded by Gautama Buddha is pragmatic and practical. The chief aim of Buddha's philosophy was to find a way out of suffering. Hence he did not indulge in abstract, metaphysical arguments. However, he left many things unsaid which led to some vagueness leading to many interpretations on the teachings of the Buddha. This resulted in the birth of many schools of Buddhism. Scholars point out that there were as many as eighteen in India itself. But for convenience the schools have been broadly classified under two heads – Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. In this unit you are expected to study:

- Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika Schools
- Yogācāra School of Buddhism
- Mādhyamika School
- Metaphysical views of the Schools of Buddhism
- Practical teachings of the Schools of Buddhism

⁴ Prof. Sudha Gopinath, Koramangala, Bangluru. This unit is taken from BPYC-131 (Unit-17, Block-4).

4.1 INTRODUCTION

After the enlightenment, the Buddha gave his first sermon to his five friends, which is termed as “Dharma Chakra Pravartana” or “Setting in motion the wheel of the Law”. Gradually, the number of disciples increased and they became the missionaries to spread the new Dharma. Buddha’s teachings spread widely in course of time and eventually grew into a world religion. When Buddha visited his father’s court, even his family members became his disciples. Having given his councils and directions to Ānanda, his favorite disciple, the Buddha died at the age of eighty.

Quite early in the history of Buddhism, sectarian differences appeared. The tradition tells us that two great councils of the Buddhist order took place. The first one was soon after the death of the Buddha and the second a hundred years later. At the Second council, a Schism occurred and the sect of Mahāyāna broke away on account of differences on point of monastic order and also on certain doctrinal differences. At this point, the main body claimed that they were faithful to the teachings of the Buddha and called themselves ‘Theravāda’ or ‘the teaching of the elders’.

Mahāyāna literally means the ‘great vessel’ and Hīnayāna means the ‘small vessel’. Obviously, the name Hīnayāna must have been devised by the Mahāyāna thinkers because Hīnayāna means ‘low’ and they called the other sect of Buddhism as being lower than their own.

The fundamental truths on which Buddhism is founded are not metaphysical or theological, but rather psychological. However, after Buddha’s death his followers got more interested in subtle metaphysical arguments. The Enlightenment of The Buddha was the knowledge of ‘Dependent Origination’ or Praṭītya Samutpāda’, on which was built the Four Noble Truths. The Theravāda or the Hīnayāna Buddhists claimed that they were the true followers of the Buddha and it is only their doctrines which represented Buddhism faithfully. But the Mahāyāna thinkers pointed out that their doctrines alone could unravel the truths latent in Buddha’s teachings. The exponents of Mahāyāna further claimed that the variations in Hīnayāna was due to either the Master saying those things for some of the followers who were less qualified or because some of these men were not capable of grasping the real significance of Buddhism. Whatever the truth maybe, both forms of Buddhism exhibit several important changes from early Buddhism. Undoubtedly, early Buddhism contained germs capable of development along different lines, and the advocates of these schools took different abstract positions. According to scholars, there are four chief schools, of which two

belong to the Hīnayāna and two to the Mahāyāna. The Hīnayāna schools are Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas and the Mahāyāna schools are the Yogācāras and the Mādhyamikas. Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas are realists or Sarvāstivādins. They believe in a self-existent universe actually in space and time while the Yogācāras are idealists and the Mādhyamikas believe in Sūnyavāda.

The literature concerning these later schools of Buddhism appeared as early as the first or second century A.D. But some of the Sanskrit works are lost. The chief exponents of the Vaibhāṣikas views were Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti. Diñnāga the scholars believe belonged to 500 A.D. Dharmakīrti is often referred to as the chief interpreter of Diñnāga. The Important Work of Diñnāga is *Pramāṇa-Samuccaya*, and Dharmakīrti's important work is *Nyāya – Bindu*. Kumārabhaṅga is considered to be the founder of the Sautrantika School. The chief teachers of the Yogācāra school are Asanga and Vasubandhu. They were brothers and probably they belonged to the third century A.D. It is believed that Vasubandhu started as a realist, a Sautrāntika and later become an idealist under the influence of his brother. Vasubandhu's *Abhidharma Kośa* is a very authoritative work on this school of thought. He has also written a commentary on it. It covers the whole field of ontology, psychology, cosmology, the doctrine of salvation and the discipline for the saints and the vast proportion of its matter is common to all Buddhistic belief. The other important work on Yogācāra is *Lankāvatāra*. The significance of the name Lankavatara is the belief that it represents the teaching of Buddha as given to Rāvana, the king of Lanka. The chief exponent of the Mādhyamika school is Nāgārjuna. He was a renowned scholar. Some scholars believe that he was the pupil of Aśvaghosa (A.D. 100). Aśvaghosa was renowned Buddhist philosopher, poet and dramatist. His chief works are *Buddhacarita* and *Saudarānanda* and the drama *Sāriputraprakarana* -all on the life and teachings of the Buddha. Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyama-Kārika* is a very valuable work. The commentary on this work is written by Candrakīrti. The *Sata-Śāstra* or *Catuh-Sataka* of Aryadeva is another important work belonging to the Mādhyamika School. Aryadeva was the pupil of Nāgārjuna.

Check Your Progress I

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answer with those provided at the end of the unit.

1. Write a note on the silence of Buddha.

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The Vaibhāṣikas who hold that objects are known directly are able to dismiss the intervening psychic medium. In fact, the Vaibhāṣika criticizes the Sautrāntika view saying that it goes against experience and also that perception itself cannot be made a matter of inference. Since without perception there cannot be inference. However, the criticism is not correct because according to the Sautrāntikas the existence of the object is not a matter of inference but only implies that the object is known indirectly. They're only giving an explanation on the process of knowing. Though there is this little difference between Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas with regard to the nature of knowing, both these schools believe that the particular or Svalakṣaṇa alone is real but not the general or the sāmānyalakṣaṇa. In other words, so far as the nature of universal is concerned, the Sarvāstivādins are nominalists. They deny any ontological status to the universals. The status of perception in Buddhism will be discussed further under the heading 'Pramāṇas'.

4.3 YOGĀCĀRA SCHOOL OF BUDDHISM

The other name for this school of Buddhism is *Vijñāna Vāda*, as this name suggests, this is a school of subjective idealism. We can say that Vijñāna Vāda is a direct outcome of the representative theory advocated by the Sautrāntikas. Of the triple factors of experience, viz., knower, known and knowledge, for the Vijñāna Vādin, knowledge alone is real. There is neither subject nor object but only a succession of ideas. The specific form which cognition at any particular instance assumes is determined on this view not by an object presented to it but by past experience. That is, the stimulus always comes from within, never from outside. No object can be experienced apart from consciousness, therefore, according to Vijñāna Vāda, consciousness and its object are one and the same. The Yogācāra points out that objects are not substances but duration less point-instants on the basis of the theory of momentariness. The object as a point- instant cannot be causally efficacious. Therefore, it is not possible, says the Vijñāna Vādin, to accept an external object. Thus for these thinkers, the external world is not only epistemologically but also ontologically dependent upon the perceiving mind or consciousness. The argument from dream is considered by Yogācāra to prove their view. They point out in dream, experience arises even though no object is perceived. Secondly, cognition becomes aware of itself. In self-cognizing cognition what is known is identical with what knows. Also, they say that the so-called objects seem to impress different people in different ways, and sometimes the same person differently at different times. The Yogācāra argues that this is so because really there is no object out there. The above arguments do

not assume the dimension of a proof for subjective idealism because these thinkers forget that the contact apprehended may have a subjective side and may at the same time, point to a real object outside.

The view of Vijñāna Vāda can be summarized as follows:

What appears in knowledge has no counterpart outside and what is supposedly outside does not appear in knowledge.

There are difficulties in accounting for cognition on a dualistic basis viz., knowledge here and object there with a similarity or sārūpya between them. The inconceivability of an unknown object throws doubt on the realistic hypothesis.

The occurrence of illusion, dream objects, mirage, reflection, etc., proves that Vijñāna can have content without there being a corresponding object outside.

We can explain all facts of experience on the view that Vijñāna manifests the object content from time to time owing to its own internal modification, which are the results of its latest forces or Vāsanās i.e., karmic impressions from the past, latent in the stream of consciousness. Just as out of the countless things in our memory, we only recall certain things at certain times, of the myriads of impressions that lie deep in our consciousness, only some rise to the surface at some time and under certain circumstances and appear as objects both internal and external.

It is from this point of view that Yogācāra calls consciousness (*Ālaya Vijñāna*, the repository or storehouse of all past consciousness). In conclusion, we have to emphasize that for Yogācāra consciousness is not an unchanging substance but an unbroken stream of states and impressions. As long as one is in bondage ignorance, impressions, thoughts, ideas and desires arise in accordance with the law of karma. One who overcomes attachment and illusion realizes the sole reality of consciousness.

4.4 MĀDHYAMIKA SCHOOL

The Mādhyamika is the most important outcome of Buddha's teaching. The literal meaning of the term Mādhyamika is 'the farer of the middle way'. Mādhyamika avoids all extremes such as eternalism and annihilation of spirit and body, unity and plurality and treads the middle path. This standpoint of the Mādhyamika with regard to knowledge is altogether novel. The other schools of Buddhism held at least the subject series as real but Mādhyamika is quite revolutionary and questions the validity of knowledge as a whole. They hold that if criticism of knowledge is

necessary, it should be for all knowledge without presuming that some part of it is self-evident. We commonly believe that we get in touch with reality through knowledge. However, when we inquire into the nature of this so-called reality, we discover that our enquiry is full of discrepancies. Man in his thirst for knowledge, thinks of the world as the other. But all knowledge is a matter of relation. Knowledge, in so far as it can express anything at all, is prepositional. Propositions are made up of percepts and concepts, which are called *nāma rūpa* (name and form) in Mādhyamika language. Accordingly, the reality created by philosophers in their knowledge is nothing but names and forms. This is ignorance leading to suffering. Nāgārjuna tries to free men by calling attention to the relativity of all thought constructions thereby eliminating the very basis for clinging.

Vijñāna Vāda does not believe in the duality of subject and object and it is a form of *nis-svabhāva vāda*, so also Mādhyamika is a form of *nis-svabhāva vāda* for it believes in only mutual dependence and the subject and the object are nothing in themselves. The Difference between the two is that the Mādhyamika considers the logical constitution of a thing and finds it lacking in essence. The Vijñāna Vāda views it psychologically and says that the object cannot stand by itself. It is nothing without the consciousness on which it is superimposed (*parikalpita*), it is Vijñāna that can undergo modification and it can purify itself by getting rid of the superimposed duality. Mādhyamikas point out that neither the external objects nor Vijñāna has any self-essence. It is *sūnya*. Thus they conclude that though knowledge serves the purposes of empirical life, and may be valid or not as the case may be, it is impossible to attach any metaphysical significance to it. This view accounts for the Buddhist criterion of truth viz., that knowledge is true which confirms the expectation it raises. Truth consists in its fitness to secure for us the object in question. Right cognition is successful cognition. Cognition, which leads us astray or which deceives us is wrong cognition or error. Thus, there is a connection between the logic of our knowledge and its practical efficiency. Right knowledge is efficacious knowledge. The other characteristic of right knowledge is the cognition of the object not yet cognized. It is the first moment of cognition, enduring cognition is recognition Diñnāga says that only the first flash of awareness can be a source of knowledge. According to the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas, *Sva-lakṣana* is given but knowledge only directs us to the series of which *Sva-lakṣana* cognized was a member. Knowledge merely lights up the path of action and so long as it successfully does so, it is regarded as true. So also in inference, inference is based on invariable concomitance, invariable concomitance is a relation and according to Buddhism all relations are by hypothesis unreal. Yet, when it leads to the requirements of

practical life it is valid. Since there can be errors in both perception and inference, knowledge can be accepted only after verification. However, it is necessary to distinguish between the content of error and ideal constructions or kalpanā. Kalpanā is false but yet it is necessary for all perceptions. They are the forms of the mind. As against this, errors are occasional and they affect only individual recipients.

All schools of Buddhism accept that knowledge serves the purpose of empirical life and hence it is necessary to discuss the meaning and significance of the word 'pramāṇā' and the source of empirical knowledge. The Buddhist philosophers differ among themselves with regard to the meaning of the word 'pramāṇa'. For the realists among Buddhists, viz., the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas, the formal similarity obtained between cognition and its object is to be regarded as pramāṇa. According to Vijñāna Vādins, self-cognition and the capacity to acquire such cognition is pramāṇa. Nāgārjuna, the propounder of Mādhyamika School of Buddhism does not attach any special significance to the meaning of pramāṇa. For the Buddhists conceptual knowledge of language and all nameable things and of all names is dialectical.

The Buddhist epistemology divides knowledge into direct and indirect. The direct source of knowledge is sensibility and the indirect one is intellect or understanding. Diñnāga calls these sources of knowledge conventionally as perception and inference respectively. These are the only two sources of knowledge accepted by the Buddhists. The Buddhists do not give verbal testimony the status of pramāṇa.

Diñnāga says that perception is a source of knowledge which is non-constructive which means that it is direct. According to the view, pratyakṣa or perception is different from imagination and has no connection with names, genus, etc. This definition, we can notice, makes no mention of sense-object contact. So it signifies that as direct cognition, pratyakṣa includes mental cognition, self-consciousness and mystic cognition. This definition also makes no mention of pratyakṣa being non-illusionary. As against this Dharmakīrti defines perception as a presentation which is generated by the objects alone, unassociated by names and relations (kalpanā) and which is not erroneous. Perception thus means the correct presentation of an object through the senses in its own uniqueness as containing only those features which are its own or Svalakṣaṇa. What is presented is only the bare particular or Svalakṣaṇa and all the general qualities or sāmānya lakṣaṇas, like the name, genus, etc. are constructed by the mind. These are the imaginative constructs or Kalpanās. These are five:

- a) Jāti Kalpanā, having universal as its content
- b) Guna Kalpanā, having an attribute as its content.
- c) Nāma Kalpanā, having a name as its content
- d) Karma Kalpanā, having an action as its content.
- e) Dravya Kalpanā, having a substance as its content.

Pratyakṣa is knowledge free from constructions when it is not affected by illusion caused by colorblindness, rapid motion, travelling on board a ship, sickness and other causes. One factor that is significant from the Buddhist view of perception is that a real sense of cognition or perception exists through the senses only the first moment of perception. The first instant can be called sensation when only the bare unrelated particular is given. This stage is generally described as indeterminate or nirvikalpaka. Here the mind is passive but in the next stage of determinate perception or savikalpaka the mind becomes active giving it a subjective elaboration because of which the reality becomes greatly transformed. However, a conceptual judgment is not the same as an erroneous judgment, erroneous perceptions are of different kinds.

An illusion proper is when intellect mistakes a ray of light for water in the desert. Here the intellect mistakes what is imagined for what is presented. This illusion disappears as soon as a man realizes that it is a mirage and not water. But if a man sees a double moon due to some defect in the eye, their image persists even when he is aware that actually there is only one moon. Apart from these illusions, hallucinations and dreams are also illusory. As Against These Illusions, the empirically true judgments are efficacious or they have the quality of *arthakriyākaritva*.

Inference

The cognition of a non perceived object through a perceived object is called inference. It is an indirect cognition, cognition of an object through its “mark”. The inferential judgment is possible only because the ‘mark’ that you see is related to the object yonder by a necessary relation or vyāpti. According to the Buddhists only two types of vyāpti are legitimate. They Are:

Sphere of causation – we can infer fire from smoke because smoke is caused by fire. To doubt the law of causation is to take away the meaning from life’s activities.

Sphere of identity – when we know that a certain thing is Śimśupa, we know that it is a tree. This relation between genus and species can be the basis of a valid inference, so long as what is inferred is not narrower than from which it is inferred. For example, we can say that all Śimśupa are trees but all trees are not Śimśupa.

Every inference has three terms, the logical subject, the logical predicate and the mark which unites them. Inferential reasoning that is used for the knowledge of others, is called a syllogism (parārthānumāna) when it is for oneself, it is called svarthānumāna (Inference for oneself), which can be worded as ‘there is a fire on the hill because there is smoke just as in the kitchen. The syllogism reads as:

*wherever there is smoke, there must be fire as in the kitchen. There is such a smoke on the hill.
Therefore there must be fire on the hill.*

Dinnāga says that these three propositions are enough in a syllogism and he criticizes Nyāya for their five membered syllogism.

Dinnāga gives three rules that should be followed. The presence of the reason in the subject
Its presence is necessarily in all similar instances. It’s necessary absence in all dissimilar instances
A fallacy will occur when anyone of these rules are violated.

4.5 METAPHYSICAL VIEWS OF THE SCHOOLS OF BUDDHISM

The important features of early Buddhism are emphasized to a great extent by all the schools of Buddhism. The view that everything is flux and everything is an aggregate or saṅghāta are two important theories which have influenced the views of the schools of Buddhism. Undoubtedly, the doctrine of dependent origination or pratityasamutpāda is the very foundation of Buddhism and therefore it continues to be very important for the development of the schools of Buddhism as well. According to Buddhism, when there is a change, the change is total and there is nothing that remains, which endures the change. For example, according to common sense, when XA changes, it becomes XB; such that X endures and it is the characteristic. A, which becomes B. Buddhism does not accept this view. For them change is total. It is a revolution not an evolution. Going back to our example, XA will become YB, because reality is becoming, change is not only total but perpetual. This follows from their conception of reality according to which, that which is capable of causal efficiency. For example; when a seed becomes a shoot it becomes wholly different without anything called seed surviving-niranvayanasa. This causal efficiency is described in Sanskrit as artha-Kriyā Kāritva. To go back to the example taken, causal efficiency means that when a seed gives rise to shoot the seed series will give rise to the shoot series and the activity is continuous. Also, no extraneous causes are required for the destruction of the thing. Non existence

cannot be brought about. If anything does not annihilate itself, nothing can do it. Also, if the thing does not lend itself in the instant following its appearance, there is no reason why it should disappear at all. Hence if things are not momentary, they have to be eternal which is not acceptable. This conception of reality is criticized by the other systems of Indian philosophy. The critic says that if everything is a flux, how is it that there is recognition? The Buddhist answers this criticism by saying that everything is continuously changing but we mistake similarity for identity. Recognition is a compound of memory and perception. What we perceive and what we remember are two members of the same series and hence they are similar and we mistake the similarity for identity. The example of a flame is taken to prove this point. When a flame is burning it is not the same flame in any two instants and that is clear from the consumption of oil. Similarly All things are changing from moment to moment.

The next criticism is regarding the causal efficiency as being the criterion of the real. According to Buddhism, a series never ends but maybe transformed into another like the seed series making way for the shoot series. But when they speak of the ego series, it is said that it ends when an arhat attains nirvāṇa. If so, the final member of the ego series has no causal efficiency and so is it real? If so, then the whole ego series must be unreal or they have to give up the ideal of nirvāṇa. However, the Buddhist claims that Nirvāṇa or freedom from samsāra is the truth because there is scope for any one to get to that state of experience.

Of The Four Schools of Buddhism, the Vaibhāṣika may be described as pluralistic realism. They believe only in the bare particular or the Svalakṣaṇa as what is independent of the perceiver. Time and space are also mental devises and no Svalakṣaṇa by itself has either duration or extension. But these Svalakṣaṇa are not ultimate. They are secondary. The ultimate elements of reality are the atoms. The critics of Vaibhāṣika point out that the Svalakṣaṇa is not able to explain the world view and it can as well be dispensed with. Since it is always accompanied by the subjective categories or sāmānyalakṣanas, the critics say that it is not much of a realism. However the Hīnayānists were not idealists and in attempting to be most loyal to Buddha's teachings, they committed some subtle errors and the dimensionless Svalakṣaṇa is a weakness. To improve on this, the Sautrāntikas advocated the representative theory of perception.

Vijñāna Vāda represents the idealist view-point. They are called Yogācāra because they believe that Buddhahood is attainable through the practice of yoga. In this school, all reality is reduced to thought-relations. The truth is one homogenous Vijñāna which is not an abstract but concrete

reality. The whole system of facts is placed within the individual consciousness. It is Ālaya Vijñāna. The Ālaya with its internal duality of subject and object becomes itself a small world. It is confined to its own circle of modifications. The Ālaya which is a continually changing stream of consciousness is contrasted with the Ātman which is immutable. Every individual has in him this vast whole of consciousness, the great tank, and we are not aware of the entire contents. Our personal consciousness knows but a small fraction of the sum total of our conscious states, the Ālaya Vijñāna. Particular phenomena are manifestations of the Ālaya according to the number and nature of the conditions. Ālaya Vijñāna is the absolute totality, originality and creativity, unconditioned space and time. Space and time are the modes of existence of the concrete and empirical individuality. Ālaya Vijñāna is the whole containing within itself the knower and the known.

Śaṅkara criticizes this theory on several grounds. Śaṅkara says that Yogācāra fails to account for perception satisfactorily. He says, because things and ideas are presented together it does not mean that they are the same. Inseparable connection is different from identity.

Śaṅkara says that Vijñāna Vāda is wrong in so far as it compares waking experience with dream experience. What is true of dream experience cannot be taken as an example to explain the nature of waking experience. Dream experience is subjective and private and lasts so long as the dream lasts, while waking experience endures. Śaṅkara further says that waking experience can be said to be false only if we have access to some experience to contradict it. The dream experience is contradicted by waking experience because of which we say that the dream experience is false. Similarly, waking experience can be falsified only when there is another higher experience.

Check Your Progress II

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answer with those provided at the end of the unit.

1. What arguments Vijñanavadin give to refute the existence of the external world?

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2. Write a note on the divisions of knowledge in Buddhist philosophy.

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4.6 SŪNYAVĀDA OF THE MĀDHYAMIKAS

The term Mādhyamika refers to the middle path of the Buddha. It is said to be the middle path between Being and Non-Being, attribute and Substance, cause and effect. Thus the Mādhyamika philosophy tries to adopt the mean between extreme affirmation and extreme negation.

The phenomenal nature of the world follows from the doctrine of pratityasamutpada or dependent origination. Nothing is by itself. Everything depends on something else. The Mādhyamika do not dismiss all dharmas as well as their collections as unreal, though they look upon them as phenomenal and momentary (the word 'dharma' here in Buddhism stands for the causal elements).

According to the Mādhyamikas, if incapacity to explain is sufficient reason to deny the reality of a thing, then, neither external objects nor inner souls are real. The Yogācāra argues that external objects are unreal since we cannot say whether they arise from existence or not, from atoms or complex bodies. Nāgārjuna goes one step further and says even consciousness or Vijñāna is unreal, because we cannot say anything consistent about it. Mādhyamika calls the objective world sūnya.

Empirical reality is designated as sūnyayata, it is the non- existence of individuality or *pudgala sūnyata* or *dharma sūnyata*. This word sūnya had been used in early Buddhism but not in the Mādhyamika sense. When this word was used by Hīnayānists, it was used as the fourth term, along with the usual three terms, namely, dukha, anitya, anātma. So for the Hīnayānists, sūnya was used as anatama, and sūnya connoted no other sense. For the Mādhyamikas sūnyata is the middle way, it is the logical consequence of pratityasamutpada. The sūnya vādain is neither a thoroughgoing skeptic nor a cheap nihilist, who doubts and denies the existence of everything for its own sake, or who relishes in shouting that he does not exist. His object is only to show that world-objects when taken to be ultimately real, will be found self-contradictory and relative and hence mere

appearances. However, Nāgārjuna maintains the empirical reality of all phenomena. Mādhyamika is aware that absolute negation is impossible because it necessarily presupposes affirmation. Nāgārjuna denies the ultimate reality of both affirmations and negation. Sūnya is understood as what is indescribable. It is beyond the four categories of understanding. It is neither affirmation nor negation, nor both affirmation and negation and neither affirmation nor negation. Empirically sūnya is relativity and transcendently it is indescribable. Therefore everything is sūnya. Appearances are *svabhava sūnya*, that is devoid of ultimate reality.

Reality is *prapañca sūnya* or devoid of plurality. Dialectic is the soul of Mādhyamika philosophy. The primary alternatives are the affirmative (sat –is) and the negative (asat –is not). These are conjunctively affirmed and denied, yielding two derivative alternatives of the form both ‘is’ and ‘is not’ (sadāsat) and neither ‘is’ nor ‘is not’ (na sat naiv asat). This is the celebrated ‘*catus-koṭi*’ of the Mādhyamika. According to sūnya vādins he who knows that all empirical dharmas are sūnya or devoid of self reality, knows the supreme wisdom of the Buddha. He who knows that all worldly objects are like illusion, dream, echoes of reality reaches blissful Nirvāṇa.

4.7 LET US SUM UP

The practical teachings of the Buddha (early Buddhism) were carried forward almost faithfully by all the followers of Buddhism. That all is suffering and pleasure itself is ‘attenuated suffering’ continues to characterize later doctrines as also that knowledge is the means to overcome it. The course of discipline laid down for Nirvāṇa is also the same as before, partly moral and partly intellectual. But the divergence of Mahāyāna from Hīnayāna is in their conception of the ideal of life. Both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna do believe in aspiring for one’s own salvation, but in Mahāyāna the salvation is not recommended for its own sake but it is regarded as a qualification to strive for the salvation of others. This is the ideal of Bodhisattva as distinguished from that of the Arhat of the Hīnayāna schools. The bodhisattva, having perfected himself, renounces his own salvation work for the good of others. It is even believed that the Bodhisattva can even transfer his good deeds to others thereby helping them in their struggle for freedom from suffering. This new feature has a special appeal to the lay aspirant and that is shown by the large following that is therefore Mahāyāna Buddhism. The other significant change that one notices in the Mahāyāna faith is the deification of Buddha. Buddha is revered as a God. The iconic worship of Buddha became popular by 1st century A.D. the formula of the “Three Jewels”... “I take refuge in the

Buddha, I take refuge in the doctrine, I take refuge in the order”... became the Buddhist profession of faith and is used by monk and layman alike.

“Buddham sharanam gaccāmi; Dhammam sharanamgaccāmi; Sangam sharanam gaccāmi.”

4.8 KEY WORDS

Monastery : Monastery, a term derived from the Greek word monasterio (from monazein, “to live alone”) denotes the building, or complex of buildings, that houses a room reserved for prayer as well as the domestic quarters and workplace(s) of monastics, whether monks or nuns, and whether living in community or alone (hermits).

Stimulus: In physiology, a stimulus (plural stimuli) is a detectable change in the internal or external environment. The ability of Organism or organ to respond to external stimuli is called sensitivity. When a sensory nerve and a motor nerve communicate with each other, it is called a nerve stimulus.

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4.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress I

1) Buddhism as propounded by Gautama Buddha is pragmatic and practical. The chief aim of Buddha's philosophy was to find a way out of suffering. Hence he did not indulge in abstract, metaphysical arguments. A story in one of the Suttas makes this point very clear. Sitting under the Śimśupa tree, the Buddha gathered some leaves and asked his disciples if these were the only leaves on the tree. The disciples said that surely there were many more. Then, the Buddha said, similarly, he knew much more than what he had told the disciples and it was not necessary to say everything, since it has no practical utility.

2) According to scholars, there are four chief schools, of which two belong to the Hīnayāna and two to the Mahāyāna. The Hīnayāna schools are Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas and the Mahāyāna schools are the Yogācāras and the Mādhyamikas. Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas are realists or Sarvāstivādins. They believe in a self-existent universe actually in space and time while the Yogācāras are idealists and the Mādhyamikas believe in Sūnyavāda.

Check Your Progress II

1) Of the triple factors of experience, viz., knower, known and knowledge, for the Vijñāna Vādin, knowledge alone is real. There is neither subject nor object but only a succession of ideas. The specific form which cognition at any particular instance assumes is determined on this view not by an object presented to it but by past experience. That is, the stimulus always comes from within, never from outside. No object can be experienced apart from consciousness, therefore, according to Vijñāna Vāda, consciousness and its object are one and the same. The Yogācāra points out that objects are not substances but duration less point- instants on the basis of the theory of Momentariness. The object as a point- instant cannot be causally efficacious. Therefore, it is not possible, says the Vijñāna Vādin, to accept an external object. Thus for these thinkers, the external world is not only epistemologically but also ontologically dependent upon the perceiving mind or consciousness. The argument from dream is considered by Yogācāra to prove their view. They point out that dream experience arises even though no object is perceived. Secondly, cognition becomes aware of itself. In self-cognizing cognition what is known is identical with what knows. Also, they say that the so-called objects seem to impress different people in different ways, and sometimes the same person differently at different times. The Yogācāra argues that this is so

because really there is no object out there. The above arguments do not assume the dimension of a proof of subjective idealism because these thinkers forget that the contact apprehended may have a subjective side and may at the same time, point to a real object outside.

2) The Buddhist epistemology divides knowledge into direct and indirect. The direct source of knowledge is sensibility and the indirect one is intellect or understanding. Dinnāga calls these sources of knowledge conventionally as perception and inference respectively. These are the only two sources of knowledge accepted by the Buddhists. The Buddhists do not give verbal testimony the status of *pramāṇa*.



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