UNIT 1                  HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY

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1.0 OBJECTIVES

The main objective of this Unit, in which Early Continental Philosophy is introduced, is to present the phenomenological method rather elaborately. It is done on purpose, since most of the continental philosophers of contemporary period basically follow Husserl’s phenomenological method, although most of them have deviated considerably from him. Phenomenology is not confined to Husserl’s philosophy, nor is it right to say that all of Husserl’s philosophy is phenomenology. All the same, the central figure of and the initiator to this movement is none other than Husserl. Hence knowledge of Husserlian thought will give a solid foundation to the contemporary Western philosophy. It will enable the students to understand the other thinkers of contemporary period. We shall begin by introducing his career and thought, followed by some of the basic conceptions that motivated Husserl to initiate such a philosophy. As his phenomenology passes through three stages, we will be paying attention to all of them. But greater emphasis will be placed on the ‘phenomenological period’ during which the method got developed.

1.1 INTRODUCING HUSSERL’S CAREER AND THOUGHT
Edmund Husserl was born in Moravia (then in Austria, now part of Czechoslovakia) on 8th April 1859, of Jewish parents. After finishing his basic schooling, he joined the university of Leipzig and then university of Berlin, where he was trained under the leading mathematicians of the time in rigorous and disciplined way of thinking. His interest was gradually turned to philosophy. In Vienna he did his doctorate on: “Contributions to the theory of Calculus of Variations.” It is in Vienna that he met and attended the lectures of Franz Brentano, who impressed him by the way in which philosophy and science were linked. Husserl taught in three universities. At the university of Halle (1887-1901) he was Assistant to Prof. Stumpf. Here he published his *Philosophy of Arithmetic* and the first part of *Logical Investigations*. This period corresponds to his pre-phenomenological phase. From 1901-16 he was at Götingen as extraordinary professor. Here he wrote *Lectures on Phenomenology*, *Idea of Phenomenology* and *Ideas-I*. This period corresponds to the phenomenological phase. In 1916 he was called to Freiburg as a full-fledged professor. Here he completed *Ideas-II*, *First Philosophy*, *Phenomenological Psychology* and *Cartesian Meditations etc*. This period corresponds to that of pure phenomenology. He died in 1938; Herman Van Breda went to Freiburg to do his doctorate in 1938 on phenomenology. On learning that the Nazis were intending to destroy Husserl’s manuscripts, he managed to get them shifted to Louvain, and established the *Husserl-Archives* there. Now his manuscripts are being edited and published under the general title *Husserliana*.

Before we launch ourselves into Husserlian phenomenology, it is good to have a pre-view of phenomenological method. The term ‘phenomenology’ reminds us of Kant’s distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. Husserl was opposed to the dualism of Kant. He agrees that only phenomenon is given, but in it is given the very essence of that which is. When one has described the phenomena, one has described all that can be described. But what is this phenomenon, something purely objective, or purely subjective? It is neither of them, but Husserl locates it in the reconciling of reality and thought. The history of philosophy is a series of attempts at reconciliation. The difference in reconciling occurs due to the more or less emphasis on the subjective or the objective. Husserlian phenomenology is an attempt at reconciling them; but he too experienced in himself this difference of emphasis in his reconciling consciousness and reality. Phenomenology is a return to the things themselves, as opposed to mental constructions, illusions etc. The ‘thing’ is the direct object of consciousness in its purified form;
hence it is never arbitrary, being conditioned subjectively. The phenomenologist is convinced that an analysis of the things themselves can be made by a return to the pure consciousness. Phenomenology, thus, is the methodical attempt to reach the phenomenon through an investigation of the pure consciousness, the objective content of which is the phenomenon.

1.2 FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS IN HUSSERL’S PHILOSOPHY

Husserl wanted his philosophy to have the scientific rigour and philosophical radicalism. For the modern man scientific ideal is considered as the highest ideal. According to Husserl, Philosophy, being the greatest of the sciences, should employ the ideal of rigorous science. This does not mean that philosophy has to blindly imitate empirical sciences which deal with objects as facts that are measurable. Philosophy is not factual, but ideal or essential (eidos = essence). Philosophy can be a rigorous science, since it is possible to reach truly scientific knowledge of ideal objects, or essences of things. When he speaks of scientific rigour, he had in mind the deductive sciences like mathematics. Science for him is a system of knowledge wherein each step is built upon its precedent in a necessary sequence. Such a rigorous connection requires ultimate clarity in basic insights, and systematic order in building up further on them.

Although philosophy claims to be a rigorous science, it has never been so. It can become a radical science by means of critical reflection and profound methodological investigations. For this, it is necessary to have ultimate clarity and systematic order. Together with the scientific rigour, Husserl craves for philosophical radicalism. It necessitates a return to the roots or foundations of all knowledge. The ultimate foundation of all knowledge is to be found in the things themselves, the original phenomena to which all our ideas refer ultimately. Going deeper into the things, he was convinced that these roots must be sought in the very consciousness of the knowing subject, to whom the phenomena appear.

1.3 DEVELOPMENT OF HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY

Historians of philosophy distinguish three periods in the development of Husserl’s philosophy, and this distinction is based on the varying emphasis he placed on the subject or on the object.

Pre-Phenomenological Period
This was the period of his philosophical infancy, during which he came to a slightly greater emphasis on the ‘objective’. This was occasioned by certain events and persons. A chance-listening to the lectures by Brentano aroused in Husserl interest in scientific psychology and philosophy. Following Brentano, Husserl had given in his *Philosophy of Arithmetic* a psychological foundation to the concept of number. It developed the idea that the concept of number originated in consciousness as a result of the acts of connecting and collecting ‘contents of consciousness’. Thus numbers are entirely of psychical nature. They have only an intentional being. Gottlob Frege, in his review of this book, criticized it, saying that it was a form of psychologism. Husserl took seriously the critique made by Frege. Hence in his *Logical Investigations part I*, Husserl refuted psychologism. ‘Psychologism’ is the view that the theoretical foundation of maths and logic is supplied by psychology, especially by psychology of knowledge. According to this theory, the laws of mathematics and logic have existence and validity only because they have occurred to some consciousness.

Thus, realizing his mistake, Husserl came to the conclusion, i.e., the untenability of psychologism. In his critique he shows the absurdity of its consequences, and the prejudices on which it is based. The axioms and principles of mathematics and logic are true, not because man thinks of them, but valid in themselves. Besides, if logical laws are dependent on the psychological characteristics of human thinkers, we make them relative to these thinkers. Psychologism is now seen as a form of skeptical relativism and anthropologism in philosophy. Relativism is self-contradictory, as it denies the possibility of all knowledge, while asserting its own truth. Mathematics is concerned with numbers, and not with the operation of counting them. Two plus two is four, even if I do not know or think about it. The mathematical and logical objects are ideal objects, and are beyond the limitations of time; whereas psychical acts are real and temporal in nature. Ideal objects are what they are independently of our knowledge about them. Thus during the pre-phenomenological period Husserl could not come to a clear philosophical stand; rather he was looking for a place to stand as a phenomenologist, which he was able to find during the phenomenological period.

Check Your Progress I

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer
b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1) Give a pre-view of Husserlian phenomenology

Phenomenological Period

It is at this period that Husserl reached a philosophical maturity; and he achieved the reconciliation between the subjective and the objective. He had to look for some reconciliation since the problem posed itself as to how the ‘ideal’ objects are given to consciousness. He takes up this task in Vol.11 of Logical Investigations. Some thought that it was a lapse into ‘psychologism’ rejected in Vol. I. He made use of the theory of ‘intentionality’ to work out this reconciliation.

Intentionality Consciousness

In Vol.11 of Logical Investigations, Husserl holds that a separation between logic and psychological phenomena is inadmissible and impossible. Ideal logical entities are given to us in experiences. The relationship between the ‘ideal objects’ of pure logic and the subjective experiences corresponding to them, illustrates an insight into what pervades whole of his philosophy, i.e., ‘intentionality’. According to this, there is a parallelism between the subjective
act and the objective correlate. This parallelism forms the basis for a correlative investigation under which both the aspects of any phenomenon are to be studied and described in conjunction. To study one without the other would be an artificial abstraction. In Husserl’s terms this parallelism came to be known as that between the ‘noetic’ (act) and ‘noematic (content). (Noesis is abstract noun, and noema is concrete noun). His aim has been a reconciliation of the objectivity of truth with the subjectivity of the act of knowledge.

The central insight in phenomenological analysis is the theory of intentionality. He owed to Brentano for this theory. According to Brentano, all psychical phenomena intentionally contain an object. Husserl objects to this conception of the immanence of the intentional object to consciousness. For him intentionality means the directedness of the act of consciousness to some object. This object is not immanent to the consciousness itself, but remains transcendent to it. For phenomenology it is not of importance whether or not the object of consciousness actually exists. The object is considered from a special point of view, namely as the objective correlate of an intentional act. Thus for Husserl, intentionality means this: consciousness is directedness to an object, as expressed in: conscious of..., joyful at..., desirous of.... etc. All ‘cogito’ contains a ‘cogitatum’. Husserl’s notion of intentionality can be clarified with the help of its four characteristics.

First of all, intentionality objectivates. It presents the given data in such a way that the whole object is presented to our consciousness. The various acts of consciousness are referred to the same intentional object. The sameness of the object is compatible with the various ways of referring to it such as: love, doubt, thought, which are the qualities of ‘intention’ as opposed to the object. When one gives thought to one’s mother, it is the person of one’s mother that is the objective correlate. It is not the fragmentary aspects, like the kindness or generosity of the mother, but the mother as kind or generous is the objective correlate. It is not the fragmentary aspects, like the kindness or generosity of the mother, but the mother as kind or generous is the objective correlate. Secondly, intentionality identifies. It allows us to assign a variety of successive data to the same referent of meaning. Without an identifying function, there would be nothing but a stream of perceptions, similar but never identical. Intentionality supplies the synthetic function by which the various aspects, perspectives and stages of an object are all focused upon and integrated into the identical core. For instance, the various intentional experiences of one’s mother do not take one to different
referents, but to the identical referent: one’s mother. Thirdly, **intentionality connects**. Each aspect of the identical object refers to the related aspects, which form its horizon. An object is apprehended only within the context, or horizon that consists of the possible apprehensions. The actual intentional experience of an object does not stand in isolation, but links itself to the other possible intentional experiences. To give an example from the realm of sense experience: the frontal aspect of the statue refers to the lateral, and the lateral to the rear. Because of this ‘connecting’ function are we able to perceive the ‘statue’. Finally, **intentionality constitutes**. It constitutes the intentional object. The intentional object is not conceived as the pre-existent referent to which the intending act refers as something already given, but as something which originates (is constituted) in the act. The snake as fearsome is constituted in the act of one’s getting frightened.

Husserl, as a phenomenologist, is not interested in the object in itself, but in the intentional object, constituted in the act consciousness. The intentional object is not immanent to consciousness (as Brentano held), but transcendent to it.

**Doctrine of Essence**

The core of Husserl’s philosophy is the notion of essence, as the Husserlian phenomenology tries to attain the knowledge of ‘essence’ of reality. Natural science begins with experience and remains therein. They are sciences of *facts*. The world is not exhausted by ‘facts’, having a spatio-temporal existence, as something existing here and now. Every individual being is contingent, insofar as it is such and such, but essentially could be other than what it is. It belongs to the meaning of every contingent thing and event to have an essential being, an *eidos*, that can be apprehended in all its purity.

In order to come to the knowledge of essences, Husserl proceeds step by step. He distinguishes between ordinary experience and transcendental experience or intuition. The first is the accurate apprehension of the individual fact. In the ordinary experience, man finds himself as a unique person, the empirical ego. The phenomenologist is not interested in the ordinary, but in the transcendental experience, which is the essential intuition proper. In the transcendental experience, one brackets all reference to existence. For the phenomenological reduction of
essences, Husserl proposes to use ‘inductive generalization’ and ‘imaginative variation’ that enable one to eliminate the inessential features in order to come to the essential. Inductive generalization is not anything typically phenomenological; it means nothing other than universalizing from the various particular experiences. ‘Imaginative variation’ can be understood only in the light of the Husserlian notion of ‘horizon’. An object is actually experienced or apprehended only within a setting or horizon, which is the context of the possible apprehensions. It is by imaginative variation that one can move from the limitation of the actual perception to the indeterminacy of what can be perceived. The horizon or the setting of the ‘can be perceived’ is the objective correlate of the ‘can perceive’ or the un-actualized capacity of the perceiver. Thus by a varied and systematic process, Husserlian phenomenology claims to attain a ‘direct essential insight’ or transcendental reduction into the pure eidetic sphere. The essence is the objective content of my transcendentally reduced conscious experience. Looking at the object of consciousness, I reach the essence by a method of variation. I can vary the various view-points. The essence is what remains invariable when I vary the various view-points.

**Eidetic Reduction**

The act of grasping the essence has two aspects: one positive, and the other negative. Eidetic reduction is the positive aspect. It is the gradual penetration into the purified essential residue, gradually revealing the pure subjectivity as the exclusive source of all objectivity. Reduction to objectivity is one of the most difficult notions in Husserl, who has not clearly dealt with it in his published works. In his *Ideas*, he makes a distinction between two types of reductions that are complementary. They are *eidetic* reduction and *transcendental* reduction. Eidetic reduction refers to the distinction between ‘fact’ and ‘essence’: factual (particular, historical, existential) is converted into essential (ideal, universal and timeless). This is done by keeping away the ‘this-ness’ or ‘suchness’ from the particular object. The transcendental reduction refers to the distinction between the real and the non-real. Essences as the pure *noemata* of pure consciousness are *real*, whether or not it is reduced from an existent or non-existent object. Thus the intentional presence can be reduced from a situation of physical absence. Husserl speaks of several levels of reduction, on each of which we have a subject of greater purity. When the subject is at its purest form, we have the strict science of phenomenology. Only when the subjectivity is absolutely pure, can it be the universal a priori
source of objectivity. To know the subjectivity that has the function of ‘constitution’ is to know one, which is transcendentally related to the objects, i.e. intentionality.

**Bracketing (Epoche)**

Bracketing is the negative aspect in grasping the essence. It is the radical and universal elimination of any aspect of factual existence. The factual or the existential is kept in parenthesis or in bracket. Things under consideration may have existence, but it has no significance whatsoever with regard to the essence of things. Besides the elimination of ‘existence’, to describe the phenomena correctly, the phenomenologist too must be free from all cultural and philosophical bias. It requires an ascetic neutrality in one’s attitude to the phenomenon of one’s awareness. Phenomenology deals with the insight into the essences, without regard to the empirical conditions of their perceptibility, nor even their existence. It is not a question of making it appear in its factual reality or in its existence, but in its intentional presence as transcendent to consciousness. There is a similarity between Husserl’s epoché and Descartes’ methodological doubt. Descartes doubted everything; only the ego indubitably exists. In Husserl the world is not doubted, but the judgements about it are suspended. The epoche demands that the philosopher takes a distance from the various solutions, which in the course of history have been proposed for different philosophical problems. It aims at eliminating the factuality, the root of all ‘contingency’.

Thus, during the ‘phenomenological period’ Husserl developed the phenomenological method, and succeeded in reaching a reconciliation between the subjective and the objective.

**Period of Pure Phenomenology**

After having come to a more or less satisfactory method of phenomenology, Husserl continued his philosophical thinking and reflection. This ended up in a transcendental (pure) phenomenology. It is called ‘pure’ in order to differentiate it from other pseudo phenomenologies. The distinction is based on the subject matter. The subject matter of pure phenomenology is pure phenomena. The pure phenomena are reached by means of the pure consciousness. Since the publication of *Ideas*, pure phenomenology goes by the name, ‘transcendental phenomenology’. In *Ideas* ‘transcendental’ meant that the phenomenologist
suspends all assertion about reality other than that of consciousness itself. Later on it meant, reaching back to the ultimate source of all knowledge, the subjectivity. Emphasis on the pure subjectivity as the source of all objectivity is the characteristic of this phase.

During the phase of pure phenomenology, Husserl speaks of a universal phenomenology, conceived as the ultimate foundation of all knowledge. His intention was to achieve phenomena in its pure and indubitable form; and for this he bracketed all accidental and incidental aspects, all judgments and interpretations of reality. Husserl started his career with a cry for ‘scientific philosophy’. Phenomenology claims to fulfill the need of a scientific philosophy with ultimate clarity in basic insights and systematic order in building up on them. Such a philosophy must be the foundation of all sciences. Since these are found realized in Husserl’s phenomenology, it claims to be the ‘first philosophy’.

As Husserl moved more towards the subjective, his critics gave him the label of an ‘idealist’, which he hesitatingly accepted; but he insists that his ‘idealism’ must be distinguished from the subjective idealism of Berkeley, that makes all being dependent on the psychological consciousness. By contrast, Husserl ties up Being with the transcendentally reduced consciousness. Being is nothing apart from the ‘meaning’ which it receives in the bestowing act of consciousness. Husserl gives two arguments for his idealism: the self-contradictory nature of realism, and the direct phenomenological evidence, supplied by the analysis of transcendental constitution. According to him, Being, by its very meaning, refers us back to acts which assign such being. In other words, being derives its meaning from consciousness. The idea of reality as unrelated to consciousness is self-contradictory. The next argument is related to the first, i.e., the doctrine of transcendental constitution. ‘Constitution’ does not refer to a static structure of an object, but the dynamic process by which it is built up as an object. It is the intentional consciousness that actively achieves this constitution. Objects exist for me only as objects of consciousness. In his idealism, reality is extra-mental, but the meaning of reality is in the mind. His philosophy is called ‘idealism’ also because it is a search into the eidos (essence, meaning). It is transcendental idealism in the sense that the real world is reduced to its pure, transcendental significance.
Towards the end of his career, Husserl gradually wanted to develop a phenomenological philosophy by applying the method to some of the realities. In this context Husserl developed the idea of a ‘life-world’—the world of our immediate experience in our everyday life, a world of our concrete experience. The scientist conceals the world as our world. It is a vast domain of subjective phenomena, as they are immediately experienced in all colours and practical meaning. Sciences left out the subjective and the practical aspect of the world, and took only the objective aspect. A life-world is to be conceived as an oriented world, with an experiencing self at its centre, designated as such by personal pronouns. Thus the world becomes the one related to life and to the humans, with his human values and aspirations. He tried to make a phenomenological reflection on ‘time’ as well. The inner consciousness of time shows the following structure: a primal impression of a streaming present, surrounded by a horizon of immediate retention of the past (to be distinguished from active recollection) and of immediate protention (to be distinguished from active expectation). Describing retention, Husserl shows how the consciousness of the present sinks off steadily below the surface, and becomes sedimented in such a way that it is accessible only to acts of recollection. He has not given us any evidence of an active ‘constitution’ of time, but only of a passive synthetic genesis.

Thirdly Husserl was forced to consider the ‘Other’, as he was criticized that phenomenology is a purely solipsistic explanation of the intentional constitution. For, when phenomenological reduction brackets, even the belief in the existence of the other subjects too is suspended. In his *Cartesian Meditations* he shows the difficulty of transcendental ego constituting other egos, as equal partners in an inter-subjective community. If the other subjects are to be meaningful, they are to be constituted. But it is not possible, since if the constitution is subjective, it is a constitution of one’s own self; if it is objective, others as subjects cannot be constituted. This problem remains unsolved in his published works. For a phenomenological evidence for the knowledge of others, Husserl makes use of ‘empathy’ giving his own interpretation to it. It is a kind of intentional category, by which I experience another’s experience. When we perceive a body other than our own, as there rather than here, we apperceive it as the body of an ‘alter ego’ by way of an assimilative analogy with our own ego. In this process, the analogizing ego and the analogized ‘alter ego’ are paired in a characteristic ‘coupling’. While the other ego is not accessible as directly as his body, it can be understood as a
modification of our own ‘pure ego’, by which we put ourselves into his, as if we were in his place. The other egos are thus constituted as transcendental, and these form a community, and thus communication is possible. Finally, he gives a thought about God in his phenomenological structure. When Husserl started his philosophical career, although he was a Jew, he kept the Bible away from him. For, he wanted to start a philosophy absolutely presuppositionless. He was not much concerned about bringing God into his philosophy, nor was there a place for God in his philosophy. His philosophy needed only intentional experience, subjectivity and objectivity. Remaining a bit away from his philosophical method, God is placed in between the ego and the world, who creatively constitutes the world, while my subjectivity meaningfully constitutes the world. Since God is the absolutely absolute, he cannot be comprehended within the focus of my ego.

Check Your Progress II

Note:  a) Use the space provided for your answer

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit

1) What is Husserl’s notion of intentionality?

2) What is the role of Epoche in Husserlian phenomenology?
1.4 LET US SUM UP

Husserl’s mature thought begins with a concern for the foundations of mathematics, continues with the development of phenomenological method, and concludes with a kind of idealism that is associated with the doctrine of the transcendental ego. His merit consists in the fact that he introduced for the first time the phenomenological method that brought the subjective and the objective to their right place. Thus the greatest contribution of Husserl is the theory of intentionality, with the help of which the subject and object are brought closer to a reconciliation. Many of the later philosophers who used the phenomenological method deviated from him, regarding the importance given to essence rather than existence. Since Husserl did not develop a philosophy with the application of phenomenological method, he could not see some of the weak-points in his method. All the same, we cannot but admire the unique contribution of his to the philosophical world.

1.5 KEY WORDS

We make mention only of some of the typically phenomenological terms.

**Intentionality**: the necessary connection between subjective act and objective content

**Noesis**: subjective act

**Noema**: objective content

**Epoche**: bracketing the non-essentials to arrive at the pure essence

**Eidetic reduction**: direct intuition of the *eidos* (essence)

**Transcendental**: purified from the ordinary and contingent

1.6 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES


1.7 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress I

1) Give a pre-view of Husserlian phenomenology

Before the detailed clarification of Husserlian phenomenology, it is good to have a pre-view of phenomenological method. The term ‘phenomenology’ reminds us of Kant’s distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. Husserl was opposed to the dualism of Kant. He agrees that only phenomenon is given, but in it is given the very essence of that which is. When one has described the phenomena, one has described all that can be described. This phenomenon is to be found in the reconciling of reality and thought (objective and subjective). Husserlian phenomenology has succeeded in reconciling them; but he too experienced in himself this difference of emphasis in his reconciling consciousness and reality. Phenomenology is a return to the things themselves, as opposed to mental constructions, illusions etc. The phenomenologist is convinced that an analysis of the things themselves can be made by a return to the pure consciousness. Phenomenology, thus, is the methodical attempt to reach the phenomenon through an investigation of the pure consciousness, the objective content of which is the phenomenon.

2) How did Husserl come to the specificity of pre-phenomenological period?

At the period of his philosophical infancy, Husserl came to a slightly greater emphasis on the ‘objective’. This was occasioned by certain events and persons. A chance-listening to the lectures by Brentano aroused in Husserl interest in scientific psychology and philosophy. Following Brentano, Husserl had given in his Philosophy of Arithmetic a psychological
foundation to the concept of number. Numbers are entirely of psychical nature. They have only an intentional being. Gottlob Frege, in his review of this book, criticized it, saying that it was a form of psychologism. Husserl took seriously the critique made by Frege. Hence in his *Logical Investigations* (Part-I), Husserl refuted psychologism. ‘Psychologism’ is the view that the theoretical foundation of maths and logic is supplied by psychology, especially by psychology of knowledge. According to this theory, the laws of maths and logic have existence and validity only because they have occurred to some consciousness. Husserl changed this position and held to the untenability of psychologism. In his critique he shows that axioms and principles of maths and logic are true, not because man thinks of them, but valid in themselves. Besides, if logical laws are dependent on the psychological characteristics of human thinkers, we make them relative to these thinkers. Ideal objects are what they are independently of our knowledge about them. Thus during the pre-phenomenological period Husserl could not come to a clear philosophical stand; rather he was looking for a place to stand as a phenomenologist, which he was able to find during the phenomenological period.

**Check Your Progress II**

1) **What is Husserl’s notion of intentionality?**

There is a parallelism between the subjective act and the objective correlate. To consider one without the other would be an artificial abstraction. In Husserl’s terms this parallelism came to be known as that between the ‘noetic’ (act) and ‘noematic (content). It is in this context that he situates his theory of intentionality. Intentionality means the directedness of the act of consciousness to some object. This object is not immanent to the consciousness itself, but remains transcendent to it, and it is considered as the objective correlate of an intentional act. Thus intentionality means this: consciousness is directedness to an object, as expressed in: conscious of…(something); all ‘cogito’ contains a ‘cogitatum’. Husserl’s notion of intentionality can be clarified with the help of its four characteristics, the most important of which is that *intentionality constitutes*. It constitutes the intentional object. The intentional object is not conceived as the pre-existent referent to which the intending act refers as something already given, but as something which originates (is constituted) in the act. The snake as fearsome is constituted in the act of one’s getting frightened. Husserl, as a phenomenologist, is not interested
in the object in itself, but in the intentional object, constituted in the act consciousness. The intentional object is not immanent to consciousness (as Brentano held), but transcendent to it.

2) What is the role of *Epoche* in Husserlian phenomenology?

Bracketing is the negative aspect in grasping the essence. It is the radical and universal elimination of any aspect of factual existence. The factual or the existential is kept in parenthesis or in bracket. Things under consideration may have existence, but it has no significance whatsoever with regard to the essence of things. Besides the elimination of ‘existence’, to describe the phenomena correctly, the phenomenologist too must be free from all cultural and philosophical bias. It requires an ascetic neutrality in one’s attitude to the phenomenon of one’s awareness. Phenomenology deals with the insight into the essences, without regard to the empirical conditions of their perceptibility, nor even their existence. It is not a question of making it appear in its factual reality or in its existence, but in its intentional presence as transcendent to consciousness.