UNIT 1 REMEMBERING

Contents
1.0 Objectives
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Nature of Memory
1.3 Memory and Remembering
1.4 Remembering and past Experiences
1.5 Role of Memory in Remembering: Philosophers’ view
1.6 Let Us Sum Up
1.7 Key Words
1.8 Further Readings and References

1.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, it is expected that you will be able to

- define remembering
- recognize the relationship between memory and remembering
- analyze how brain accomplishes the task of remembering
- list and describe the factors involved in remembering
- infer that remembering is intricately related to memory
- discuss and construct the relationship between past experiences and remembering
- summarize the role of memory in remembering
- analyze the mind-body problem deliberated upon by various philosophers to arrive at the role of memory in remembering
- summarize the views of Western and Indian philosophers on mind-body and correlate them with remembering.
- formulate your own views on remembering based on the knowledge arrived at from this unit and various other sources

1.1 INTRODUCTION

You must have heard people often saying that this child is good at remembering whatever is taught in the class. Sometimes, you may also have heard that this child is very poor at remembering whatever is taught in the class. What actually do we mean by the former sentence needs pondering upon? It perhaps gives the impression to most people that the child learns with ease or remembers for quite long time whatever is learnt or can recall easily something that has been learnt. In other words, when we talk of remembering by a person, we mean that the person has a “good memory.” What exactly does a “good memory” mean needs analysis. It means that we may be referring to either or all of these things: learning, retaining, recalling, recognizing. Remembering is about memory.

If 'forgetting' is the process of moving information from the conscious mind to the subconscious, the reverse process of moving relevant information from the subconscious to the conscious mind is ‘remembering’. For the ‘higher level’ conscious mind to function properly, it is important for it to have relevant, contextual data. The task of providing such data belongs to the realm of the subconscious mind. Memory is about mind. When we talk of mind, we need to think of body
also. Remembering is, thus, about both mind and body. In this unit, are therefore, discussed philosophies pertaining to mind-body in context of remembering as remembering has a very intricate relationship with mind(memory) and mind with body.

How does the subconscious accomplish this task? The brain is a massively interconnected aggregate of numerous brain cells. The subconscious processes massive amount of data flowing through the network of the brain. The basic building block of information processing is a 'relation' or 'connection'. Relations/connections form 'threads' and 'flows' which keep the sorting processes of the brain/consciousness in check. (If we were to disproportionately exaggerate such a thread and remove it from its context/flow, we could create a 'conditioned process' or 'memory'.) Clarity is achieved by letting the twin aspects of 'perspective' and 'context' fall back into each other. At this point, the 'higher level' conscious mind is empty/full. From this starting point we can once again break the symmetry; by choice, let a 'memory' and 'context' emerge from the subconscious - and we set the 'higher mind' in motion. If your 'identity' is well constructed and in good balance with other aspects of yourself, 'remembering' is a process which emerges naturally by the very defining of the 'identity'.

1.2 NATURE OF MEMORY

All of us understand what memory as a layperson is. Let us now examine some of the definitions given by professionals from the field of psychology. Woodsworth says that “Memory consists in remembering what has previously been learned.” He regards memory as involving learning, retention, recall and recognition of objects, events or things. Let us not be too preoccupied in giving any formal definition to memory. Let us think of memory to be consisting of the collection of previous experiences as they occurred. It can be expressed as a complex process involving the establishment of dispositions, their retentions, and the recalling of experiences that have left the dispositions behind them. It is, thus, easier to understand memory by noting down the factors which are involved in the memory process. The next section deals precisely with the factors involved.

It can be concluded from the above that there are four main factors involved in memory. These are: Learning, Retention, Recall, and Recognition. Each one of these factors is equally important. Let us understand how by pondering on each of these factors one by one. Any event or experience or activity is first learned. Then, it is retained in the mind in some form or the other. The third factor in the memory is recall, that is, any future occasion when the event is brought to the mind. And, the final factor is when it is recognized to be the same experience which is learned again or retained for future recall. This can be understood by a very simple day to day example. You have been introduced to this person on an earlier occasion. When you meet this person on the way some day again and recognize that person's name, you have lived all the four processes of memory. The name of this person has been learnt by you and then retained by you. At the time of meeting this person, you have recalled this person’s name and in recalling, you have recognized that this is the name of a particular person whom you have met earlier.

Learning: It broadly means a modification of behaviour through experience to produce temporary or permanent changes in a person. This modification in behaviour happens in an individual’s activity in a given situation due to practice in attempts to achieve certain goals or maybe to solve some problems. Thus, learning may be for conscious purposes to attain a certain goal or it may be for biological and social adjustment.

Retention: Memory depends to a great extent on retention. After you have learnt a thing, it is retained in the mind. The retention powers vary from individual to individual. Retention, to an
extent, depends upon how you have trained your mind to remember things and events. Retention depends upon a person’s mind, health, interest, thinking capacity and reasoning ability. It is said that any event or what you have learnt causes a physiological change in your brain leaving on it an imprint which are termed as memory traces. Memory trace is also referred to as “neurogram” or an “engram”. Of these, Engram is probably the most general term used to represent the neural basis of retention.

**Recall**: Recall is the mental revival of those experiences which have been learned. It is dependent on retention. It is an act of remembering the memory traces. If you have learnt the thing well and retained properly, it will be recalled relatively easily. Sometimes, we find that an idea or concept which we may have deeply retained, we fail to recall it at a suitable time like in an examination hall. One of the likely factors to which this can be attributed is emotional tension. Your recall of an event of a thing may be spontaneous or deliberate. When you are thinking without effort, it is spontaneous recall, but it is deliberate recall when you consciously strive to recall something as in an examination hall while answering the questions in the question paper. Recall depends largely on association of ideas. For example, when we say Taj Mahal, immediately we may also recall that it is made of marble. Thus, marble has also becomes associated with this monument. You must understand that remembering does not necessarily imply recollecting, recollecting always implies remembering, and actualized memory follows (upon the successful act of recollecting).

**Recognition**: Recognition is the act of knowing the object or the thing which has been retained previously. In recognition, there is awareness that the object or thing that was previously known is being known again. Recognition is usually in the shape of a certain or vague feeling of familiarity when you come across the object or thing again. The feeling of familiarity is basic to recognition and plays an essential part in all acts of recognizing. You must also understand this that the act of recognition is much more than the feeling of familiarity. It is not complete till the object or thing that is recognized is definitely placed in our past experience.

### 1.3 MEMORY AND REMEMBERING

Now, let us now connect the above with remembering. Here is given a simple example to connect the relationship between memory and remembering. Imagine that you are reading at 4pm and you suddenly remember that you have a pressing appointment at 5pm. The thought simply pops into your mind, and completely surprises you. What’s curious about this example is that the process of remembering was carried out without your intending it to happen. The point to be noted here is that you did not do the remembering as your conscious mind was focusing on reading and understanding the text. It was the subconscious mind which did the remembering, and then forced the results of its processing into the input-tray for consciousness. As you were reading, your subconscious mind informed the conscious mind that it had just carried out a remembering process and that the result of the process is the content that you have a pressing appointment at 4pm. Your consciousness then completely reroutes itself and starts to focus on the process of getting to the appointment on time.

This example illustrates that there are many mental processes being carried out below the surface of consciousness. We usually think that remembering is something we consciously do. In a way this could be analytically true if we simply defined remembering as requiring our consciousness to be involved. But if we didn’t define remembering in this way, then we get the interesting idea that crucially important mental activities like remembering can happen below the surface of consciousness. Often, the results of these subconscious processes are never even introduced into
consciousness, and directly influence the behavior of the body without our conscious awareness. But sometimes the end-products of the subconscious mental processes are loaded into consciousness and our conscious mind becomes aware of the content and is now able to start performing conscious operations on the content. These operations often involve the arrangement of the content into a mini psychological sequences (this is often causal, involving reasons), which then has top-down effects on the entire behavior of the system. For example, the narration of the subconscious remembering process about the appointment enables the conscious rumination of behavior possibilities and allows for a shortcut in the decision making process through the higher-order linguistic categorization of the appointment in terms of simpler, more abstract categorical structures and schemas like “5:00pm”, “get documents”, “find bus/metro pass”, “get in the bus/metro”, “take blue line”, “third floor,” etc.

These abstract categorical structures allow for the construction of a mental narrative-schema through which consciousness acts and is able to influence the world. We become capable of consciously thinking thoughts like “Discussion Meeting! My appointment is at 5pm; I better get ready now and take the bus/metro so I can make it on time.” Thoughts like these provide decision-making shortcuts and start a chain-reaction of reciprocal information exchange between the conscious and subconscious systems. The tight functional loops between these systems give rise to complex and fluid human behaviors, such as scrambling to get ready and reach the metro/bus station to be in time for the pressing official appointment.

As regards the question, therefore, what memory or remembering is; it has now been shown that it is the state of a presentation, related as a likeness to that of which it is a presentation; and as to the question of which of the faculties within us memory is a function, (it has been shown) that it is a function of the primary faculty of Sense-perception, i.e. of that faculty whereby we perceive time.

Correlate this statement with the example given above to understand it better. ‘Remembering’ labels a diverse set of cognitive capacities by which we retain information and reconstruct past experiences, usually for present purposes. Remembering is, therefore, one of the most important ways by which our histories animate our current actions and experiences. Remembering has very much to do with memory. For whenever one exercises the faculty of remembering, they must say within themselves, 'I formerly heard (or otherwise perceived) this,' or 'I formerly had this thought'.

Memory is, therefore, neither Perception nor Conception, but a state or affection of one of these, conditioned by lapse of time. You must understand this that there is no such thing as memory of the present while present, for the present is object only of perception, and the future, of expectation, but the object of memory is the past. All memory, therefore, implies a time elapsed; consequently only those animals which perceive time remember, and the organ whereby they perceive time is also that whereby they remember. Whenever one actually remembers having seen or heard, or learned, something, he includes in this act (as we have already observed above) the consciousness of 'formerly'; and the distinction of 'former' and 'latter' is a distinction in time.

Most notably, the human ability to conjure up long-gone but specific episodes of our lives is both familiar and puzzling, and is a key aspect of personal identity. Memory seems to be a source of knowledge. We remember experiences and events which are not happening now, so memory differs from perception. We remember events which really happened, so memory is unlike pure imagination. Yet, in practice, there can be close interactions between remembering, perceiving, and imagining. Remembering is often suffused with emotion, and is closely involved in both
extended affective states such as love and grief, and socially significant practices such as promising and commemorating. It is essential for reasoning and decision-making, both individual and collective. It is connected in obscure ways with dreaming. Some memories are shaped by language, others by imagery. Much of our moral and social life depends on the peculiar ways in which we are embedded in time. Memory sometimes goes wrong in mundane and minor, or in dramatic and disastrous ways.

Memory also varies with age of an individual. Both very young and very old persons are defective in memory; they are in a state of flux, the former because of their growth, the latter, owing to their decay with age. In like manner, both those who are too quick and those who are too slow have bad memories. The former are too soft, the latter too hard (in the texture of their receiving organs), so that in the case of the former the presented image (though imprinted) does not remain for a considerable time, while on the latter it is not imprinted at all. Hence, as a result remembering gets affected in all the cases given here.

1.4 REMEMBERING AND PAST EXPERIENCES

One of the paradoxes of life is that while we are exploring our past experiences, the exploration of a certain past experience becomes our present experience. Exploration of our present experience of exploring our past experience brings on parallaxes, as we remember ourselves remembering the same experience on multiple occasions. You will remember noticing how strange this feeling is, especially that of you remembering some experience, of recognizing that you had remembered that same experience maybe last month or a week back or even four days ago. Recall how that remembering had felt then, and recognizing that now once again, you were remembering that same experience (perhaps of being an even younger child), and realizing both that that earlier memory of that experience was still and perhaps always will be there to be remembered, and that your remembering of your multiple remembering selves and the experiences of remembering that experience would accumulate. You will notice that though you may remember those experiences, however vividly; you could not revisit in person any of the remembered experiences of remembering, yet they would accumulate around the remembered experience. Just ponder on this point. Has this happened to you many a times?

This is a problem probably for all of us most times - the difficulty of being in the moment when the moment is often one of being in another moment. It seems that that is what philosophy and psychology are really trying to address - in attempting expressions, examinations, and explanations of experience, through thinking about thinking about living as thinking. The Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela have used the word-the term ‘cognition’ to reflect our experience of our experience. Let us take the example from Biology – the process of metabolism to understand this concept. Our view of metabolism is skewed, because we so often start with the experienced existence of the entity as an entity, and then ask what it needs to ingest to be healthy, in terms of nutrition, as though foods were like fuel for a car, a substance consumed by the car quite separately from the car’s own substance maintenance. Grown entities (as everything not technically made technically, for want of a better term) consume environments that become those entities. In fact, the entities emerge in their substance and substantiveness from the environment that is around and become them, like a dust devil or a tornado or a hurricane or mould or rot or fungi, all differently experienced forms of continually
changing combinations of what we call elements and energies. Existentially experienced entities are environmental events, environments events, experiences, and existentials.

1.5 ROLE OF MEMORY IN REMEMBERING: PHILOSOPHERS’ VIEWS

Although an understanding of memory is likely to be important in making sense of the continuity of the self, of the relation between mind and body, and of our experience of time, it has often been curiously neglected by philosophers. Contemporary philosophical discussion of memory is continuous with the development of theories in the cognitive and social sciences: attention to these interdisciplinary fields of memory studies is driving renewed work on the topic. Many problems about memory require us to cross philosophical traditions and sub disciplines, touching on phenomenology, philosophy of psychology, epistemology, social theory, and ethics at once.

David Hume

David Hume, a Scottish philosopher had tried to formulate the laws governing the succession of our thoughts in order to understand the concept of memory. However, he was not very successful in arriving at any complete theory of the mind. Newton had shown that the entire material world was governed by the same mechanical laws. Hume’s great project was to base the study of man and society on similar universal principles. Like most philosophers of his time, Hume conceived of thought as a flow of mental images. Seeing a tree, imagining a tree, or remembering a tree, were all thought to consist of our having a mental image, more vivid for the seen tree, less vivid for the imagined or remembered tree. A sentence like ‘The Earth is round’ would have a certain type of mental image as its meaning, and believing that the Earth is round necessarily involved a vivid mental image of that type. This theory also explained why certain beliefs were logically impossible. For example, a four-sided triangle was logically impossible (and a three-sided triangle logically necessary) because we could not form a mental image of a triangle that did not have three sides. (Try it.) Hume’s disturbing insight from this way of thinking about thinking was that all our factual and moral beliefs can therefore only be justified in terms of the psychological laws that govern the succession of images in our minds.

Consider perhaps Hume’s most famous argument, which begins with the question, ‘What justification do we have for our factual beliefs?’ By ‘factual beliefs’, Hume meant those beliefs that we can imagine (that is, form a mental image of) and as a result of these images say are either true or false, occurring or not occurring. For example, when we see two billiard balls collide on a table, we believe that the impact of the first ball will cause the second to move in a particular direction. This belief is ‘factual’ because we can also imagine the second ball not moving at all, or returning in the direction from which the first ball came, or vanishing in a puff of smoke. Since we can imagine any of these things, they are all logically possible. Therefore, Hume concluded, there is nothing in the motion of the first ball from which we can logically infer the motion of the second. That we have an accurate belief as to how the second ball will move is not based on any logical deduction from the movement of the first, but from our past experience of seeing billiard balls collide.

But, Hume persists, what is our justification for drawing conclusions from experience? Only our belief that the future will be like the past. But this too is a factual belief. We can imagine that the future will not be like the past – for example, that tomorrow billiard balls will vanish upon being hit by other billiard balls. So our belief that the future will resemble the past is itself not based on any process of deductive reasoning, but solely on experience. So how is experience itself justified?
To justify anything, you give reasons. And you justify those reasons by giving still other reasons. This implies three possible structures for any chain of justification:

1. Reasons go on forever, without repeating.
2. Reasons go in a circle – that is, eventually a reason is repeated.
3. The chain stops, with a final reason.

Structures (1) and (2) would plainly provide unsatisfactory justifications, which leaves structure (3). But if a chain of justification is to stop in a satisfying way, the last reason given must not require further justification. And since we can imagine the contrary of a factual belief, a factual belief cannot be a final reason. So a factual belief that the present is like the past cannot be the final justifying reason for any conclusions about the world.

For Hume, our beliefs about the motions of colliding billiard balls and other law-like natural behaviors are formed by the psychological principle of ‘habit’. Our minds are so constructed that having experienced a particular motion of one ball, constantly followed by a particular motion of a second, we form the image of the second motion whenever we are presented with the image of the first. The more frequent and invariant the past conjunction of motions, the more vivid our present image of the second motion will be upon being presented with the first; and this vivid image is our belief that the second ball will move in a particular way. There is no decision to believe that the motion of the second ball will follow from the motion of the first. Rather, the belief is forced on us by the associational laws of thought.

Hume thus replaces moral explanations in terms of wants, with psychological laws that, like the principles of Newtonian mechanics, are not framed in terms of wants. The images forced upon us which constitute our most basic factual beliefs cannot be justified by reason, nor can they be escaped from. So rather than our controlling our own thoughts, Hume argues that our thoughts are controlled by unthinking forces. We are not the captains of our mental journey, merely passengers. Hume’s vantage-point is always that of a psychologist attempting to explain human behavior.

According to Hume, just as our reasoning’s concerning matters of fact rest on a principle of association of ideas, there can be no ‘ultimate’ justification for our moral beliefs, beyond psychological laws. Hume and other philosophers like Macnabb have not dealt with the concept of memory due to limitations in their own thinking as can be seen from the description given in the earlier paragraph.

Now, we may question as to why is memory so hard to understand?

The answer, in part, is that the term labels a great variety of phenomena. I remember how to play chess and how to drive a car; I remember the date of Gandhiji’s death; I remember playing in the rain as a child; I remember the taste and the pleasure of this morning’s tea; I remember to feed the dog every morning. “Many very different things happen when we remember,” says Wittgenstein, 1974. Some philosophers take this heterogeneity as reason to be wary of any attempt to explain memory (Malcolm 1977, Deutscher 1989). All the above experiences denote subjective memory experience which need not be neglected or obliterated by careful theorizing. This is to say that an explanatory framework which omitted the phenomenological and interpersonal diversity of memory would fail on its own terms.

Bertrand Russell
Bertrand Russell says that initially he had alluded to Hume’s thinking “all our simple ideas in first appearance are derived from simple expressions which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent.” As per Russell, it is difficult to say whether this principle is liable to exceptions or not. He says that though it is the broad measure truth, it would be more correct to say that ideas approximately represent impressions. Russell raises the following questions: Why do we believe, that images are, sometimes or always, approximately or exactly, copies of sensations? What sort of evidence do we have of this? And what sort of evidence is logically possible? The difficulty of this question arises through the fact that the sensation which an image is supposed to copy is in the past when the image exists and therefore can be known only by memory. He further says that memory of past sensations seems only possible by means of present images. How, then, are we to find any way of comparing the present image with past sensation? This problem is acute in that both cannot be brought together in one experience for comparison. To deal with this problem, he suggests that one needs to have a theory of memory. In this way, the whole status of images as “copies” is bound up with the analysis of memory. In investigating memory-beliefs, there are certain points that need to be borne in mind. In the first place, everything constituting a memory belief is happening now, not in that past time to which the belief is said to refer. It is not logically necessary to the existence of a memory-belief that the event remembered should have occurred, or even that the past should have existed at all. According to Russell, the non-existence of past is logically tenable and that he is merely saying this to be able to analyze what happens when we remember. Russell concludes his observations on memory-beliefs by saying that the act of remembering is present, though its object is past. The process of remembering consists of calling up images with a feeling of belief so as to distinguish between memory-images and mere imagination –images. Sometimes, words may come out without the intermediary of images but in all cases, according to Russell equally the feeling of belief is essential.

René Descartes

Let us observe what Descartes says about mind to understand memory and remembering. René Descartes, a French mathematician, scientist, and philosopher is considered the father of modern philosophy. He is best known for the philosophical statement “cogito ergo sum” This is an interesting statement which reflects that he had a methodical doubt of all knowledge about which it is possible to be deceived, including knowledge based on authority, and also on the senses. He argued that the real source of scientific knowledge lay in the mind and not in the senses. In other words, he aimed to provide a sound basis for scientific method. He aim was to show that science and religion could be compatible. According to him this was possible by splitting the world up into two different types of substances: mind and body. Science will be completely true of body, extended matter; religious truths will deal with the soul or mind was his view. Now, it is for you to ponder whether mind and body are separable entities? Should we do away with the role that senses play in developing our memory and facilitate the process of remembering? Think! Think! Think!

Ryle

According to Ryle (a British philosopher), the classical theory of mind, as represented by Cartesian rationalism, asserts that there is a basic distinction between mind and matter. The classical theory attempts to analyze the relation between "mind" and "body" as if they were terms of the same logical category. This confusion of logical categories may be seen in other theories of the relation between mind and matter. For example, the idealist theory of mind attempts to
reduce physical reality to the same status as mental reality, while the materialist theory of mind attempts to reduce mental reality to the same status as physical reality. Ryle rejects Descartes’ theory of the relation between mind and body on the grounds that it approaches the investigation of mental processes as if they could be isolated from physical processes. According to Ryle, mental processes are merely intelligent acts. There are no mental processes distinct from intelligent acts. The operations of the mind are not merely represented by intelligent acts; he says that they are the same as those intelligent acts. Thus, acts of learning, remembering, imagining, knowing, or willing are not merely clues to hidden mental processes or to complex sequences of intellectual operations; they are the way in which those mental processes or intellectual operations are defined. Logical propositions are not merely clues to modes of reasoning; they are those modes of reasoning.

The rationalist theory that the will is a faculty within the mind, and that volitions are mental processes that the human body transforms into physical acts, is therefore a misconception. This theory mistakenly assumes that mental acts are distinct from physical acts and that there is a mental world distinct from the physical world. This theory of the separability of mind and body is described by Ryle as "the dogma of the ghost in the machine." He explains that there is no hidden entity called "the mind" inside a mechanical apparatus called "the body." The workings of the mind are not an independent mechanism that governs the workings of the body. The workings of the mind are not distinct from the actions of the body; they may rather be described as a way of explaining the actions of the body.

Cartesian theory holds that mental acts determine physical acts, and that volitional acts of the body must be caused by volitional acts of the mind. This theory is "the myth of the ghost in the machine." There is no contradiction between saying that a given action is governed by physical laws and that it is governed by principles of reasoning. The motives of observable actions are not hidden mental processes; they are propensities or dispositions that explain why these behaviors occur. Thus, it may be said that the mind consists of various abilities or dispositions that explain such behaviors as learning, remembering, knowing, feeling, or willing. However, as personal abilities or dispositions are not the same as mental processes or events it can be conclusively said that to refer to abilities or dispositions as if they are mental occurrences is a basic mistake. The nature of a person’s motives may be defined by the actions and reactions of that person in various circumstances or situations. The nature of a person’s motives in a particular situation may not necessarily be determined by any hidden mental processes or intellectual acts within that person. Motives may be revealed or explained by a person’s behavior in a situation.

Ryle criticizes the theory that the mind is a place where mental images are apprehended, perceived, or remembered. Sensations, thoughts, and feelings do not belong to a mental world distinct from the physical world. Knowledge, memory, imagination, and other abilities or dispositions do not reside "within" the mind as if the mind were a space in which these dispositions could be situated or located. Furthermore, dispositions are not the same as behavioral actions; actions may, however, be explained by dispositions. Dispositions are neither visible nor hidden, because they are not in the same logical category as behavioral actions. Dispositions are not mental processes or intellectual acts; they are propensities that explain various modes of behavior. Perceptions, thoughts, emotions, and feelings may be understood as observable behaviors that have various modes of production.

Ryle admits that his approach to the theory of mind is behaviorist in being opposed to the theory that there are hidden mental processes that are distinct from observable behaviors. His approach is based on the view that actions such as thinking, remembering, feeling, and willing are revealed
by modes of behavior or by dispositions to modes of behavior. At the same time, however, he
criticizes both Cartesian theory and behaviorist theory for being overly mechanistic. While
Cartesian theory may insist that hidden mental events produce the behavioral responses of the
conscious individual, behaviorism may insist that stimulus-response mechanisms produce the
behavioral responses of the conscious individual. Ryle concludes that both Cartesian theory and
behaviorist theory may be too rigid and mechanistic to provide us with an adequate
understanding of the concept of mind.

1.6 LET US SUM UP

It is evident from the above discussion that most Western philosophers have dwelt on the
psychology aspects of the Mind. Most of them are Dualistic philosophers in that they believe that
mind and body are separate entities. As a result of this, not much thought has been devoted to
memory which has an intricate relationship with remembering.

1.7 KEY WORDS

Ghost in the machine: Descartes’ description of mind in the body.
Remembering: It is one of the most important ways by which our histories animate our current
actions and experiences. Remembering has very much to do with memory.
Memory: It is neither Perception nor Conception, but a state or affection of one of these,
conditioned by lapse of time.

1.8 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

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