UNIT 4  HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

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4.0. OBJECTIVES

- To take up some historically significant persons in the philosophy of religion.
- To give a general view of the vast history of this topic.
- To see how some philosophers of religion are critical and other sympathetic to religion.

4.1. INTRODUCTION

Philosophy of religion is philosophical reflection on religion. It is as old as philosophy itself and has been a standard part of Western philosophy in every period. In the last half of the twentieth century, there has been a great growth of interest in it, and the range of topics philosophers of religion have considered has also expanded considerably.

Philosophy of religion is sometimes divided into philosophy of religion proper and philosophical theology. This distinction reflects the unease of an earlier period in analytic philosophy, during which philosophers felt that reflection on religion was philosophically respectable only if it confined itself to mere theism and abstracted from all particular religions; anything else was taken to be theology, not philosophy. But most philosophers now feel free to examine philosophically any aspect of religion, including doctrines or practices peculiar to individual religions. Not only are these doctrines and practices generally philosophically interesting in their own right, but often they also raise questions that are helpful for issues in other areas of philosophy (Stump 1998).
So in the first part of this unit we take up some significant themes as developed by some philosophers (sociologists) of religion and then give a general overview of the philosophers associated with this topic.

4.2. GOD AND/OR THE SACRED

Most textbooks on the Philosophy of God or Religion tend to start with a discussion of proofs for the existence of God and, having dealt with that issue, proceed to talk about the essence of God (i.e. what does the term mean, what qualities or attributes are to be ascribed to the divinity?) However, my approach is just the opposite. I prefer to begin with a critical reflection on our understanding of God and thence take up the debate on whether God's existence can be proved or not. The reason is that I, with many others, am quite convinced that the reason why one believes in God or no depends on the concept of God one has previously formed in life. If that concept is meaningful and seen to be, not just no barrier to human growth and development, but a positive inspiration and support for it, he/she will believe in God, and only then cast about for "proofs" to justify his/her stance. Conversely, if a person has, in the light of his or her experiences and upbringing, formed a negative concept of God (e.g. is convinced that belief in God necessarily degrades human dignity, responsibility and freedom), then such a person will become an atheist and as a result, will assemble arguments against God's existence (Desbruslais 2000).

God or the Sacred?

One naturally tends to think that the notion of God (though conceived differently) would be a kind of “least common denominator” in all religions. But this is not quite true. There are at least two great religions that have existed for thousands of years and are quite capable of an atheistic interpretation; indeed, many of their adherents are “devout atheists” (however paradoxical to some of us that may seem). I am referring to Buddhism and Jainism, the latter being the religion that Gandhi was born into (he, of course was a firm believer in God). But, if these systems are atheistic, why call them religions at all, one might, quite understandably ask? Well, for one thing, they in common with other theistic religions – offer some kind of redemption or salvation from the human condition of ignorance, sin and suffering. They suggest ways and means to overcome our passions and attaining a depth of self-mastery and inner tranquility. And isn’t this part of the goals of all authentic religion (Desbruslais 2000). The most basic concept, common to all religions (including the atheistic variety) is the notion of the sacred. Some religious people interpret this is but a deeper, little-understood and lesser attained aspect of our own selves; others remain equally convinced that this is something totally new and unlike anything that we can experience in ourselves or the world around us, something that cannot be simply identified with any limited, finite thing of this worlds.

4.3. THE SACRED: DURKHEIM AND FRIENDS

Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), a Frenchman who is considered the founding father of contemporary sociology, was a positivist, i.e. a philosopher of the nascent scientific age. Thus, he believed that only things that could be measured, weighed and counted, as in the field of the physical sciences, are real (posita, in Latin, would mean things that can be measured). He set himself the task of explaining religion and religious experiences in terms of posita. He 2umanizing2 the distinction between things sacred and things profane and sought to isolate the “elementary forms of religious life”; in other words, just as a scientist establishes particular elements, molecules and atoms as the “building blocks” of the material world, he was quite
convinced that, with a little effort, we would be able to separate out basic material units as the real elements of the so-called sacred which would then be shown up for what they were: nothing but material things wrongly invested with supernatural qualities. Falling back on the study of Melanesian tribal religious practices pioneered by R. H. Codrington, an English anthropologist, he proposed “mana” as the archaic source of the sacred. With Codrington, he believed that the totemism practiced by the Melanesians was the most primitive expression of human religiosity and all our contemporary sophisticated religious practices and doctrines were no more than more complex elaborations of the same. In tribal worship, there emerged a strange, fearsome force (called mana) – especially in the frenzied ritual dancing around the totem pole – which accrued to the totem, symbol of the tribe or clan. It was believed by the natives that somehow their tribal identity, tribal lore and tribal skill and courage in hunting and fighting accrued to the totem through the dancers and, at the same time, the accumulated wisdom and insights or their ancestors was transferred from there, through them, to the whole tribe. Totemic cult boils down to the cult of the clan and “the gods were the people conceived symbolically.” Thus religion, God, the sacred, are nothing but useful ways to teach primitives how to be loyal to, and integrate themselves fully into, tribal society. Thus, having discovered the empirical identity of mana, Durkheim was quite convinced that he had shown convincingly enough that religion had no extrawordly, supernatural grounds whatever (Desbruslais 2000).

Two contemporary scholars both French and both Freudians, offer views along the same lines: Laura Makarius and Rene Girard, both of whom published their research in 1947. The former links her conclusions to issues linked to sex and gender bias, the latter links his findings to the sublimation of our alleged instinct for violence.

Makarius traces the origin of the sacred to the sense of awe with which the primitive mind was accustomed to regard blood and the various taboos associated with it. The efficacy of mana (she uses the same word as Durkheim) stemmed from the ambivalence of blood: the fact that one who shed blood would experience its malefic effect which would render hit impure; at the same time, however, some of its mysterious, ineffable and efficacious power would be also transmitted to the violator of the taboo (Desbruslais 2000). Makarius was sure that her theory would put to rest, once and for all, centuries of “pseudo – theological speculation” and enable us to see truly wherein the secret of religious experience really lay.

Girard suggests that the sacred is nothing but a disguised sublimation of our violent instinct. He adverts to the unabashedly violent element that is present in all religious worship – a victim is slaughtered, its blood is spilt on the altar and sprinkled on the worshippers (though in an “unbloody” manner is some circle). The “scapegoat theory” (i.e. an innocent creature is cruelly slain to exile the sins of the community by taking them on itself) is rejected by him. Rather, it is a “surrogate victim”, which thereby absorbs the violence that men (.), prey to their drive, would otherwise be driven to vent on each other. His thesis, he sees, is confirmed by his claim that “sacrifice languished in societies with a firmly established judicial system – ancient Greece and Rome, for example.” Now that we have an efficient legal system and a well-trained police force to enforce it, we no longer require the sublimatory effects of religion to control our violent drives (Desbruslais 2000).
1. How is God related to the Sacred?

2. What is the significance of “mana”?

4.4 THE SACRED: SODERBLOM AND FRIENDS

Nathan Soderblam (1866 – 1931) was a Swede, one of the pioneers in the study of Comparative Religions, at his native University of Upsala, Sweden. He wrote a significant article, “Holiness” for the “Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics” which proved to be a landmark in the development of the Philosophy of Religion. “The sacred is the most important word in religion; it is even more than God”, he tellingly remarked. He then went on to say why: “For a religion can really exist without any conception of the divinity, but there is no religion without the distinction between the sacred and the profane.” Next, provides us with a kind of descriptive definition of the sacred: it is an “entity, mysterious, and bound up with certain things events or action. Finally, he sub-divided the sacred into two constitutive parts, one with a more positive connotation, “mana,” a beneficial efficacious power and another with a more negative connotation, taboo, “implying the notion of danger, of interdict and prohibition.” Soderblom was an orthodox Christian and rejected any interpretation of the sacred as an impersonal force, a deeper and most often untapped resource of the individual or society. For him an encounter the sacred stemmed from a genuine contact with God. He concluded that all would agree that “the psychological origin of the concept of the sacred seems to have been the reaction of the mind when confronted with something which is new, starting and terrifying.” Since then, most scholars use the term ganz andere as a kind of synonym for the Sacred (Desbruslais 2000).

Rudolf Otto (1869 – 1937), the German savant and mystic was impressed with the work of Soderblom and set out on his studies with the last quoted phrase of the latter ringing in his ears. A profoundly religious man himself, he avowed he was a “Lutheran Benedictine” and made no secret of his love for the beauty. And solemnity of the Roman Catholic liturgy, together with its scope for facilitating an encounter with the divine. But he devoted himself with equal zeal to the study of non-Christian religions as to Christian theology. A visit to India convinced him that the Sacred can be encountered more fully through intuition and symbol and far less adequately through reason. His Indian experience, coupled with his delving into the Upanishads, convinced Otto of the greatness and completeness of Indian mysticism. He was further gratified to discover a tremendous convergence in the mystics of Europe, India, Israel, Iran, China and Greece. But behind the wealth of ideas and practices that he documented in religions across the globe, there seemed to loom one common and incontestable phenomenon, the sense of the Holy. In practice, however das Heilige was also used in Ethics and was applied to certain human beings. In search of a more precise and sumanizing term that could be exclusively used for the encounter with the divine in religion, he decided to leave the “holy” to Ethics and coin a new term for religious language: “(The Latin) omen has given us ‘ominous’ and there is no reason why from
numen (Latin for ‘divinity’) we should not coin, similarly, a word, ‘numinous’.” (Desbruslais 2000).

He then sifts through piles of writings of mystics of every race and age and creed to summarise these into four phenomenological steps in the human encounter with the numinous. First, there is elicited, from us a “creaturely feeling” (das Kreaturgefühl). Here is an expression of “the emotion of a creature, submerged and overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that which is supreme above all creatures.” Then comes the stage of the tremendum, holy fear and mystic awe, which makes one tend to draw back in the face of the mystery of the All-Good and the All-Pure. This is practically simultaneous with a kind of contrary movement, which he uses two Greek words to describe, “eusebeia” or “eluabeia” overwhelming urge from deep within to express ones feelings through deep piety and cultic acts. Any authentic cultic rite, Otto unceasingly reminds us, must issue forth in a powerful confession of the Mystery, the Wholly Other, the Totally Transcendent. This, culminates in the final experience of the “fascinans”, the fascinating – that which seduces, enraptures and draws human into bliss.

Mircea Eliade (1907-1986), the celebrated Rumanian scholar of religions, arrived in India in 1928, studied at Calcutta and produced a brilliant doctoral thesis on Yoga. When his country turned Communist after World War II, he assumed voluntary exile, relinquishing his governmental post and settling down in France. From Paris he launched a series of books, articles and conferences On the History of Religions. Later, he shifted to the United States and was attached to the University of Chicago. He agrees that the Sacred is the basis of all religious experience and observes, “Man becomes aware of the sacred, because it manifests itself as something quite different from the profane.” He coins the term hierophany to describe this manifestation of the Sacred. It is significant, he notes, that a hierophany always occurs through the medium of “myths or symbols,” but never completely in an immediate manner in its totality.” In other words, the infinite humbly historicises itself in and through some finite reality. “This is the great mystery, the mysterium tremendum”, he avers, “the fact that the Sacred decided to limit itself” – in a hierophans.

4.5 IN RESPONSE TO DURKHEIM AND OTHERS

Durkheim’s reductionist approach would hardly stand up to contemporary views. Understandably was he so enamoured by the positive sciences as they were just coming into being. Postmodernism would make short shrift to erstwhile claims to found epistemological certainties on the findings of science. Even contemporary philosophers of science, from Capra to Einstein and Heisenberg are wary about any claims to absolutism and naive objectivity that are associated with nineteenth century positivism. Besides, as further anthropological and sociological studies have shown, it is far too simplistic a thesis to hold that all religion is nothing more than souped-up totem dancing.

As for Makarius and Girard, they have certainly made some insightful comments on the phenomenon of religious rites, but can we afford to receive them without serious critical thought? Again, it is sociologists, like Evans-Pritchard who caution us against any hasty tendency to study or explain away one discipline from the perspective of, or in terms of, another. It is not scientific to rule out a priori the reality of any discipline’s subject matter and then proceed to study biology as if it were engineering or vice versa.

More to the point, the American thinker and psychologist, William James (1842-1910) had this to say about people who try to “show up” religion as perverted sexual or sublimated violence: “It
is true that in the vast collection of religious phenomena, some are undisguisedly amatory – e.g., sex deities and obscene rites in polytheism and ecstatic feelings of union with the Saviour in a few Christian mystics. But then, why not call religion an aberration of the digestive function and prove ones point by the worship of Bacchus and Ceres, or the ecstatic feelings of some saints about the Eucharist? Religious language clothes itself in such poor symbols as life affords, and the whole organism gives overtones of comment whenever the mind is strongly stirred to expression. Language drawn from eating and drinking is probably as common in religious literature as is language drawn from sexual life (James 2010).

The quote is from his classic, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. Now, danger of all reductionisms is that they fasten themselves upon a point which may be true, but thence proceed to the simplistic assumption that all instances of anything linked with the fact are to be explained in the same way. This is the traditional fallacy of arguing, “That convicted murderer has red hair, therefore all red-haired people are prone to commit murder.” Trying to maintain that gall religious activity can be explained away as sex and violence would force one to conclude, with equal (il)logic that “the religious life depends just as much upon the spleen, the pancreas and on the kidneys as on the sexual apparatus, and the whole theory has (by now) lost its point in evaporating into a vague general assertion of the dependence, somehow, of the mind upon the body” (James 2010). And no one would quarrel with that last remark – except to note that it is so vague and general as to practically say nothing worth paying attention to.

**Check Your Progress II**

**Note:** Use the space provided for your answers.

1. Who are the “masters of suspicion”? Why are they called so?

2. How do you respond to Durkheim’s view on God?

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**4.6 THE “MASTERS OF SUSPICION”**

It was Paul Ricoeur, the devout Christian French phenomenologist, who dubbed the atheist trio Nietzsche-Marx-Freud, “Masters of Suspicion”, since they, in effect, have taught us to be suspicious of hastily assuming that we have had mystical experiences: often times, they point out, what we were really encountering was nothing divine or supernatural but some little understood and unhealthy aspect of ourselves. J. P. Stern, in his deceptively slim, masterful work, *Nietzsche*, summed up their perennial critique of religion:

“They saw their undertaking as the solving of a secret, and all opposition to it as a conspiracy; a conspiracy of men with vested social interest, thought Marx; of men with vested space moral and religious interest, thought Freud; of men who chose to be only half alive and resent the few who live generously and dangerously, thought Nietzsche.”

**Karl Marx** (1818 – 18831): According to the father of all leftists, “Religion is the opium of the
people.” This is one of the world’s most famous quotations. What is not so well known, however, is that he held that it was the oppressed people who dose themselves with opium (a pain-killer in Marx’s days) to deaden the pain of their sufferings. It was not the oppressors who gave it to them to make them keep quiet. Now, there’s nothing wrong with making use of a pain-killer when there’s no way of removing the source of ones pain (as in some cases of cancer, or in a post-operation situation). But if one has, say, a thorn in the foot, the proper remedy would be to remove the thorn, not leave it there and take pain-killers. Marx is quite right in attacking all those victims of social injustice who, instead of rising up to challenge their oppressor and demand their just rights, resign themselves to their lot for “pie in the sky when they die”. And when such is the case, we cannot but endorse Marx’s critique and do all we can to extirpate such pseudo-religiosity, conscientising the people to put forward concerted action for justice. However, not all religion functions as an opium, nor are all believers miserable and oppressed people. Authentic religion, far from being the opium of the people, can be a catalyst for revolutionary action for justice, as the activists of liberation theology (and philosophy.) show (Desbruslais 2000).

**Friederich Nietzsche** (1841-1900): Granted, Nietzsche ended his days in an asylum for the insane; granted, many of his strident rantings against God and religion appear to warrant no more attention than we’d give to the babblings of any madman. But, behind and the apparent arrogance and decidedly schizophrenic utterances, there is a solid vein of critical truth that we would be foolish and irresponsible to ignore. His charge is that religion in general, and Christianity in particular, has proved for a good many people a pious subterfuge for cowardice and mediocrity, masquerading under the “virtues” of humility and resignation to God. For too long have religions frowned upon ambition, self-assertion and courageous initiative, overstressing counterfeits for meekness and gentleness. Nietzsche does well to remind us that the former have a positive side and the latter hide a negative aspect. On the other hand a disproportionate emphasis on the “manly” virtues, without situating them in their proper humanizing context, can lead to the worst excesses of colonialism, oppression … and Hitlerism.

**Sigmund Freud** (1856-1939): If Marx qualified religion as an opium, for Freud it was illusion. By this he didn’t mean that it was patently false - in which case he would have qualified it as delusion. What the Austrian father of psycho-analysis meant was that "wish-fulfillment", more than any - thing else was its basis. As an illustration of what he meant by this, he asked us to consider the case of a servant girl, who is badly treated by the family for which she works. She could protest and throw up her job, but instead she carries on her miserable drudgery, hoping all along that a handsome prince will one day came along, marry her and rescue her from her pitiful state, taking her to live happily ever after with him in a glorious castle. Now, handsome princes do exist and it is at least theoretically possible that one of them just might come her way, fall in love with her and take her with him to his fairy palace. But it is highly unlikely and she is pinning her hopes on an idle dream. People in misery fashion for themselves an illusory being called God, who, they hope will one day set them free from their suffering and take them off to heaven. Again, Freud compared religious believers to adults who are afraid to grow up and accept the responsibility for their own lives and futures. Realising that they cannot always be running to their earthly fathers for protection and for solutions to their problems (their earthly fathers die or are discovered by them, to their horror, not to be the strongest and most knowledgeable people on earth), they project their frustration into a "heavenly father" to whom they can run with all their problems and fears. Now, here too we must admit that there is a good
deal of truth in what Freud has said: for many people "god" is nothing but wish-fulfillment and 
& projection of the father Image-very specially for the psychologically disturbed people who 
came to him for counselling and healing. But Freud's mistake was his over-generalisation: not 
every one who believes in God or practices religious worship is psychotic. Henri Bergson (1859 - 
1941), the French thinker and scholar on evolution, joining his research to that of William James 
(whom we have referred to above) has pointed out that in every culture and every age there have 
been- and continue to be – great mystic, people of age and sexes who claim to have encountered 
god.
Now it is possible to study their life and writings and dismiss many of them as cranks, social 
misfits, psychologically deranged people who had - consciously or no - fabricated such "mystical 
experiences" out of their own inadequacies, insecurities and fears, seeking thereby a kind of 
escalist solution to their worries and anxieties. But we can't write off with equal case all the 
claims of all mystics everywhere and at all time. Some of them, when critically examined, 
emerge as personages of obvious and evident psychological maturity and balance, radical 
thinkers who challenged the existing social and religious structures of their times and were 
frequently persecuted and pilloried by the powers that were at the time, both sacred and secular. 
They evince the qualities of gifted administrators, inspiring leaders, launching revolutionary 
movements and gathering around themselves charismatic and radical personalities who have 
helped to keep alive, even to our times, some of the action groups that they built up. These are 
hardly qualities we'd associate with "crazies"; instead, they stand out as psychologically sound as 
the best of us, if not more so. Thus, not all mystics and their writings would wilt and pale before 
the ruthless assault of philosophical "suspicion" (Desbruslais 2000).
4.7 THE HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Two Australian philosophers have brought out a Five-volume set on the history of philosophy of 
religion. Graham Oppy is a Professor in the School of Philosophy & Bioethics at Monash 
University in Australia. Nick Trakakis teaches Philosophy and Religious Studies at Monash and 
Deakin Universities. Their *History of Western Philosophy of Religion* covers Ancient, Medieval, 
Early Modern, Nineteenth Century and Twentieth Century philosophy of religion. Written by an 
international range of leading scholars, the entries, each devoted to a major philosopher of 
religion, have been chosen to reflect the breadth and variety of perspectives in the history of 
Western philosophy of religion. In addition to entries on major philosophers and schools, 
thinkers whose work has greatly influenced the philosophy of religion--notably Darwin, Marx 
and Freud--are also included. Rightly it is claimed to be the “most comprehensive history of the 
philosophy of religion.”

Designed to be accessible to a wide range of readers, the entries focus on the key themes in a 
clear and jargon-free fashion. Each volume works independently to provide an overview of a 
period, opening with an introduction to the period and concluding with a timeline of major 
events and full bibliography. With 100 essays sweeping across the history of Western philosophy 
of religion in five volumes, this set is an indispensable resource for anyone conducting research 
or teaching in one of the most exciting and vibrant fields in philosophy.

Check Your Progress III

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.
1. Who are the “masters of suspicion”? Why are they called so?

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2. Give the significance of the book edited by Graham Oppy and Nick Trakakis?

4.8 LET US SUM UP

In this unit, we have studied a historical overview of the philosophy of religion. In fact, it must be mentioned, that right from the beginning of philosophy, themes related to God and religion has emerged directly and indirectly. We have studied some significant persons, chosen almost arbitrarily, who have contributed to the philosophy of religion and then given a very general list of the important persons involved.

4.9 KEYWORDS

Das Heilige: Rudolf Otto's most famous work is The Idea of the Holy, published first in 1917 as Das Heilige - Über das Irrationale in der Idee des Göttlichen und sein Verhältnis zum Rationalen (The Holy - On the Irrational in the Idea of the Divine and its Relation to the Rational). The book defines the concept of the holy as that which is numinous. Otto explained the numinous as a "non-rational, non-sensory experience or feeling whose primary and immediate object is outside the self". He coined this new term based on the Latin numen (deity). The numinous is a mystery (Latin: mysterium) that is both terrifying (tremendum) and fascinating (fascinans) at the same time. It also sets a paradigm for the study of religion that focuses on the need to realize the religious as a non-reducible, original category in its own right. This paradigm was under much attack between approximately 1950 and 1990 but has made a strong comeback since then, after its phenomenological aspects have become more apparent, and written about by Karl Rahner's presentation of man as a being of transcendence.

Hierophany: A visible manifestation of God to humankind.

Mana: Mana is an indigenous Pacific islander concept of an impersonal force or quality that resides in people, animals, and (debatably) inanimate objects. The word is a cognate in many Oceanic languages, including Melanesian, Polynesian, and Micronesian.

4.10 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES


