UNIT 1  LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY

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### 1.0 OBJECTIVES

Logic is the study of inference and argument. Epistemology is the study of the origin, nature and limits of human knowledge. The main objective of this unit is to give details of logic and epistemology in the different systems of Indian Philosophy. The logic and theory of knowledge of Indian systems are largely coloured by their metaphysical tenets. This unit is concerned with the sources, nature, validity and limits of man’s knowledge. It also deals with the theories of truth and logic and their relevance in the different schools of Indian thought. By the end of this unit you will have a clear cut idea

* of basic understanding of the theories of knowledge;
* to relate it with the theories of truth and error;
* to know about the system of logic in Indian thought;
* of the different means of knowledge accepted in the different schools of Indian thought;
* of the validity and invalidity of knowledge as given in the schools of Indian thought.

### 1.1 INTRODUCTION
The central questions of epistemology include the origin of knowledge, the place of experience in generating knowledge and the place of reason in doing so; the relationship between knowledge and the responsibility of error and changing forms of knowledge that arise from new conceptualisations of the world. All of these issues link with other central concerns of Indian systems. There are four factors involved in any knowledge:

1. The subject who knows (pramata)
2. The object of knowledge (prameya)
3. The means of valid knowledge (Pramana)
4. The resultant of valid knowledge (prama)

Prama is valid knowledge. Knowledge can be valid or invalid; valid knowledge is called prama and non-valid knowledge is known as aprama. Pramana is valid means of knowledge and its important four means include perception (pratyaksa), inference (anumana), verbal testimony (sabda), and comparison (upamana). Different schools of Indian thought accept or reject different ones of these methods. All methods are accepted by Mimamsa; only perception, inference and testimony by Yoga; only perception and inference by Buddhism and Vaisesika; and only perception by Carvaka.

Indian theories of knowledge are divisible into two - Svatahpramanya vada (self validity of knowledge) and Paratahpramanya vada. In the former view knowledge is intrinsically valid. Error occurs only when some outside factors affect it. In the latter case, knowledge by itself is neither valid nor invalid. Its truth or falsity is to be ascertained through some appropriate test.

The general science of inference is logic and its aim is to make explicit the rules by which inferences are drawn. Inferences are rule-governed steps from one or more propositions known as premises, to another proposition, called conclusion. A deductive inference is one that is intended to be valid, where a valid inference is one in which the conclusion must be true if the premises are true. All other inferences are inductive. Hence we can say that logic is the art or philosophy of reasoning. We will be having a detailed study of these concepts of logic and epistemology, introduced above in the context of Indian systems in this unit.

1.2 CARVAKA EPISTEMOLOGY

According to the Carvaka school, pratyaksa or perception is the only source of knowledge; i.e., what cannot be perceived through the senses must be treated as non-existent. They refute all other sources of knowledge. They admit only four elements; i.e., earth, water, air and fire. We experience all the four through perception. So, perception is the only authority. There is no space because we cannot perceive any such element. The world of common sense perception is the only world that exists. Again, the physical body is the self of an individual. There is no mind, no consciousness, no soul, over and above the physical body. We do not perceive mind or soul. Hence they are unreal. Even consciousness is a by-product and epiphenomenon of matter. “Matter secretes mind as liver secretes bile.” A particular combination of elements produces consciousness though the elements separately do not possess it. It is similar to the red colour being produced from the combination of betel leaf, areca nut and lime, none of which is red.
The validity of inference is also rejected by Carvakas. Inference is said to be a mere leap into the dark. We proceed here from the known to the unknown and there is no certainty in this, though some inferences may turn out to be accidentally true. A general proposition may be true in unperceived cases. But there is no guarantee that it will hold true even in unperceived cases. Deductive inferences is vitiated by the fallacy of pettito principii. It is merely an argument in circle since the conclusion is already contained in the major premise, the validity of which is not proved. Inductive inference undertakes to prove the validity of the major premise of deductive inference. But induction too is uncertain because it proceeds unwarrantedly from the known to the unknown. In order to distinguish true induction from simple enumeration, it is pointed out that the former, unlike the latter, is based on casual relationship which means invariable association or Vyapti. Vyapti, therefore is the nerve of all inference. But the Carvaka challenges this universal and invariable relationship of concomitance and regards it a mere guess work. Perception does not prove this Vyapti. Nor can it be proved by inference, for inference itself is said to presuppose its validity. Testimony too cannot prove it, for testimony itself is not a valid means of knowledge. Secondly, if testimony proves Vyapti, inference would become dependent on testimony and then none would be able to infer anything by himself. Hence inference cannot be regarded as a valid source of knowledge. Induction is uncertain and deduction is argument in a circle. The logicians therefore find themselves stuck up in mud of inference.

The Carvaka position has been vehemently criticised by all systems of Indian philosophy all of which have maintained the validity of at least perception and inference. To refuse the validity of inference from the empirical standpoint is to refuse to think and discuss. All thoughts, all discussions, all doctrines, all affirmations and denials, all proofs and disproofs are made possible by inference. The Carvaka view that perception is valid and inference is invalid is itself a result of inference. Carvaka can understand others only through inference and make others understand him only through inference. Thoughts and ideas not being material objects cannot be perceived but can only be inferred.

1.3 JAINA LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY

Jains have also critically examined the valid sources of knowledge. According to Jainism knowledge is of two kinds—Pramana and Naya. Pramana refers to the knowledge of a thing as it is. Naya is that particular standpoint from which we deliver our judgement about a particular thing. Both Pramana and Naya are essential for the full and true knowledge of a thing. Pramana is that knowledge which illuminates itself and others without any hindrance. Hence Jains classify knowledge gained through Pramana into direct (aparoksa) and indirect (paroksa).

Direct knowledge:- Avadhi-jnana, Manah paryaya and kevala jnana are three kinds of direct knowledge which may be called extra-ordinary, and extra-sensory perceptions. Avadhi is clairvoyance, Manah paryaya is telepathy, and kevala is omniscience. Avadhi is direct knowledge of things even at a distance of space or time. It is called Avadhi or limited because it functions within a particular area and up to a particular time. It cannot go beyond spacial and temporal limits. Manah paryaya is direct knowledge of the thought of others. This too is limited.
by sPatial and temporal conditions. In both Avadhi and Manah paryaya, the soul has direct knowledge unaided by the senses or the mind. Hence they are called immediate, though limited. Kevala-jñana is unlimited and absolute knowledge. It can be acquired only by liberated souls. It is not limited by space, time or object.

**Indirect knowledge:** Perceptual knowledge which is ordinarily called immediate, and admitted to be relatively so by Jainism and therefore included in mediate knowledge. Pure perception in the sense of mere sensation cannot rank the title of knowledge. It must be given meaning and arranged into order by conception or thought. Perceptual knowledge is therefore regarded as mediate since it presupposes the activity of thought. Mediate knowledge is divided into mati and shruta. Mati includes both perceptual and inferential knowledge. Mati jñana springs in the following order:

1. *Avagraha*- is the first kind of knowledge produced from the contact of sense organs with the objects.
2. *Iha*- This follows avagraha and in it the soul is able to appreciate the qualities of the visible object.
3. *Avaya*- In this we come to know definitely about the object
4. *Dharanand*- In this, the full knowledge about the object leaves an impression upon the mind of man.

Shruta jñana means knowledge derived from authority. It is to be gained from authoritative books and words of great sages. Perusal of authoritative books and listening to the sermons of saints are essential for this kind of knowledge. Shruta jñana is divided into two categories, i.e., Angavahya and angapravistha. The former is mentioned in the Jaina scriptures while the shruta jñana outside the pale of the religious books of the Jains, fall in the latter category. Thus Mati and Shruta which are the two kinds of mediate knowledge have as their instrument perception, inference and authority- the three Pramanas admitted by Jainism.

According to Jaina epistemology indirect knowledge is of five kinds- Smrti, Pratyabhijna, Tarka, Anumana and Agama.

1. **Smrti**- To reminisce something known directly in the past as a result of the awakening of some samskara is known sruti. For Jains, smrti is valid knowledge because it is the correct form of things perceived in the past.
2. **Recognition** (pratyabhijna)- It is the synthetic knowledge contributed by direct perception and recollection (Smrti). In it we know resemblance (samanata), identity (tadatmya), differences (bhedā), comparison (Tulana), etc. In it we know the general (samanya) in the form of similar change (sadrasparinana) of different jivas and ajivas. Recognition is valid knowledge.
3. **Logic** (Tarka)- It is the knowledge of Vyapti between paksa and sadhya. It depends upon the perception whether two things exist together or not in the past, present, and future. Vyapti is of two kinds- Anavya Vyapti and Vyatireka Vyapti. In the former the concomitance of two tings is established. In the latter Vyapti is shown in the absence. ‘where there is fire, there is smoke’ is an example of Anavya Vyapti. On the other hand. ’where there is no fire, there is smoke’, exemplifies Vyatireka Vyapti. The relationship of universal accompaniment, gradual or concurrent, exists in Vyapti. This relationship is ascertained by logic (Tarka).
(4) Inference (anumana)-It is the knowledge of sadhya with the help of hetu. This inference is either svarthanumana or pararthanumana. The former is the grasp for one’s own self. Hence it needs no amplification. For example, the frequent visibility of fire under smoke together suffices to convince us of their concomitance. Afterwards, when we see smoke, we infer the existence of fire also with the help of Vyapti, which is already known to us. It is, svarthanumana. In it the place of smoke is paks, smoke is paks dharma. In svarthanumana both Vyapti and paks dharma are essential. Pararthanumana is used for convincing others. So it must be more systematised and vivid. It is fivefold. In the fivefold Pararthanumana an inference is drawn in five sentences. These sentences are called the propositions (avayava) of inference; e.g.,

(a) Pratijna-The hill is fiery;
(b) Hetu-because of smoke;
(c) Dristanta-Wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as in the kitchen;
(d) Upanaya-The smoke, which does not exist without fire (Vyaptvisistdhum) is in the hill;
(f) Nigamana-Therefore the hill is fiery;
(5) Agama:- It is the knowledge of a thing through the words of reliable people. A person who knows things in their true form and expresses his views correctly, is a reliable person and an apta. He is free from prejudice. His words befit the object which they are seeking to express. Agama is of two kinds-Laukik and Alaukik.

Naya vada

Naya means a standpoint of thought from which we make a statement about a thing. All truth is relative to our standpoints. Partial knowledge of one of the innumerable aspects of a thing is called ‘Naya’. Judgement based on this partial knowledge is also included in ‘Naya’. There are seven nayas of which the first four are called artha-Naya because they relate to objects or meanings and the last three are called shabda Naya because they relate to words. When taken as absolute, a ‘Naya’ becomes a fallacy or nayabhasa.

Syad Vada

Syad vada or saptabhangi Naya is the most important part of Jaina logic. According to this, we can know only some aspects of reality and so all our judgements are relative. It is a theory of the relativity of knowledge. Therefore, the knowledge of every object is not absolute but relative and Syad vada holds all knowledge to be only probable. Every proposition gives us only a perhaps, a may be or a Syad. We cannot affirm or deny any thing absolutely of any object. There is nothing certain on account of the endless complexity of things. It emphasises the extremely complex nature of reality and its indefiniteness.

Reality has infinite aspects and we can know only some of these aspects. The infinitely complex reality admits of opposite predicates from different standpoints. It is real as well as unreal. It is universal as well as particular. It is one as well as many. Viewed from the point of view of substance, a thing is real, universal permanent and one. Viewed from the point of view of modes, it is unreal, particular, momentary and many. Those who ignore this truth make simple and unqualified statements about reality. Jains are very fond of quoting the story of the blind men and the elephant. The blind men gave different accounts of the elephant. They are right in what they affirmed, but wrong in what they denied. There is no judgement which is absolutely true.
and no judgement is absolutely false. All our judgements are relative, conditional and limited. The statements ‘exists and does not exists’ may be made from different standpoints. Each is true. The stand from which a thing is known is called ‘Naya’. It is this principle of standpoint (Naya) that is made known through the theory of ‘may be ism’ (Syad Vada). It consists of seven steps. Each judgement is meaningful, only if the standpoint from which it is made is taken into account. This is done by adding the expression ‘may be’ or Syad to the judgement. The seven steps are as follows:

1. May be, a thing is (Syad asti);
2. May be, a thing is not (Syad nasti);
3. May be, a thing is and is not (Syad asti nasti);
4. May be, a thing is inexpressible (Syad avaktavya);
5. May be, a thing is and inexpressible (Syad asti avaktavya);
6. May be, a thing is not and is inexpressible (Syad nasti avaktavya);
7. May be, a thing is and is not and is inexpressible (Syad asti nasti avaktavya).

The significance of this doctrine is that our knowledge regarding any thing is relative. Relative knowledge presupposes absolute knowledge. Jainism accepts Kevala jnana as the absolute knowledge.

### 1.4 BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGY

In epistemological ideas also we can see the different opinions among the four schools of Buddhism, Yogacara, Madhyamika, Sautrantika, Vaibhasika. According to Sautrantika the external objects are not known through perception. According to Vaibhasika, on the other hand, the knowledge of the external objects can also be gained through perception. The Vaibhasika philosophers have criticised the Sautrantika view regarding perception.

According to Vaibhasika the inference of things external to knowledge is self-contradictory. If all the external objects are inferred by their knowledge, then nothing can be known by perception. In the absence of perception there can be no relation of concomitance between the major and the minor premise without which no inference is possible. This is opposed to actual experience. The Vaibhasikas accept the presence of the external things and conceive them as subject to perception. According to Vaibhasika that is Pramana by which direct knowledge is possible. The Pramanas are two types: Pratyaksa (perception) and anumana (inferential). Both these Pramanas are known as samyagjñana (right knowledge) and it is by these that all the purusharthas are attained. Pratyaksa is the knowledge devoid of imagination and error. This knowledge is of four types:

1. Indriya jnana—This is the knowledge attained through senses.
2. Mano vijnana—in this knowledge there is the sensual knowledge in the form of samanatara pratyaya after the knowledge through senses. This samanatara pratyaya is a mental modification in the absence of which there is no knowledge even after continued seeing. Thus mano vijnana is born of both the object and the consciousness.
3. Atma samvedana—It is the manifestation of chitta and its dhammas are like pleasure and pain in their real form. This is attributeless, without error and of the nature of self-realisation.
(4) Yogic jnana—It is the ultimate knowledge of the things perceptible through various Pramanas. The object of pratyaksa is svalaksana. Svalaksana is that object in which there is difference in the form of knowledge by the presence and absence of its contact. It is by it that a thing has the capacity to do anything. Hence it is said to be paramartha satya.

Inference is of two types: Svartha (for the self) and parartha (for others). In the former the linga is inferential, i.e., in the inference there is fire on the hill, the hill is linga and the fire is inferential. In it the linga remains in self side (svapaksa), just as the kitchen. The linga does not remain in the opposite side (vipaksa), e.g., a pool of water, etc.

Sautrantika School
According to Sautrantikas they are subject to inference. According to Sautrantikas there are four causes of knowledge.

(1) Alamban—it is the cause of external objects like jug etc., because the form of the knowledge is born from it.
(2) Samanantara—This is so called because it is only after the previous mental stage that the following stage attains consciousness.
(3) Adhipat—the senses have been called as the Adhipati Pratyaya of the knowledge. It is the normative cause. Without the senses there can be no external knowledge even after the presence of the first two causes.
(4) Sahkari Pratyaya—these are the subsidiary conditions necessary for knowledge, e.g., light, form, etc. without which knowledge becomes almost impossible.

The knowledge of the external objects becomes possible due to the above mentioned four causes or conditions. The Sautrantikas do not admit that the external objects have no existence and all knowledge is in the consciousness. Nor do they believe like the Vaibhasikas that we know anything by direct perception. As opposed to Vaibhasikas, the Sautrantikas maintain that we have no direct perception of the external objects but only the knowledge of their appearance. It is by the distinction in these appearances which are the basis of the knowledge. Hence they are in the mind itself, though the things which they represent as external objects are not known by their perception, but by the inference based upon the mental modifications aroused by them. This view is known as Bahayamaneyavad. It is representationalism or indirect realism.

Yogacara School
According to Yogacara the physical world has no existence apart from consciousness. Even if the existence of anything outside consciousness is admitted it cannot be known. Vijnanavadins believe that all things external to mind are mental modifications. Thus the knowledge of the external things is impossible. Hence the thing which appears to be external, should be taken as a mental concept. It can be questioned here that if the object is a mere concept of the mind why it does not appear, disappear and change as desired. To this the Vijnanavadins reply that the mind is a mere stream in which the past experiences remain in the form of expression and whenever there is favourable condition for a certain impression the same impression manifests and results into knowledge. From the multiple point of view Vijnanavadins admit two types of knowledge - Grahana and Adhyavasaya. Grahana is indirect and Adhyavasaya direct inference. The Vijnanavadins believe that the proof of things depends on something else.
Pramanyavada). They made two distinctions in the empirical truth – Paratatra and Pari-kalpa. The former is relative while the latter is imaginary.

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answer

1. Examine the main contributions of Carvaka epistemology to Indian philosophy.

2. Expound the Jain theory of syad vada and evaluate it as an epistemological theory.

1.5 NYAYA-VAISESIKA EPISTEMOLOGY

In the Nyaya philosophy knowledge is spoken of as the manifestation of object. Knowledge lights its objects as does a lamp. Knowledge may be valid or invalid. Valid knowledge (prama) is defined as the right apprehension of an object. It is the manifestation of an object as it is. Nyaya maintains the theory of correspondence. While Nyaya system recognises all the four Pramanas namely perception, inference, verbal testimony and comparison, Vaisesika recognises only two Pramanas- perception and inference and reduces comparison and verbal testimony to inference.

Perception is divided into ordinary (Laukika) and extra-ordinary (Alaukika). In ordinary perception knowledge results from the contact of the sense organs with the external objects (bahya). Extraordinary perception has three distinctions - perception of classes (samanyalaksna), complication (jnana laksnana) and intuition (yogaja). The Naiyayika maintains two stages in perception- Nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and Savikalpa (determinate). Gautama accepts this distinction of perception.
According to Nyaya philosophy, the second source of valid knowledge is *anumana*. The term *anumana* literally means 'after-knowledge' i.e., knowledge that follows other knowledge. It is mediate and indirect and are arranged through the medium of some mark which is called ‘hetu’ and bears the relation of invariable concomitance with the observed feature. The basis of the inference is invariable concomitance. The invariable relation between the *hetu* and the *sadya* is called *Vyapti*. The knowledge of the qualities of the ‘*paksa*’ through the ‘*hetu*’ is called *paramarsa*. Hence inference or *anumana* is said to be knowledge gained through *paramarsa*, or in other words, the knowledge of the presence of *sadya* in the *paksa* through the *linga*, which is in the quality of *paksa* and is invariably related by *Vyapti*.

This may be explained with the help of the typical example of inference, the presence of fire on the perception of smoke. When one sees smoke on distant hill one remembers one’s experience of the universal concomitance (*Vyapti*) between smoke and fire and concludes that there is fire on the distant hill. The character which is inferred (fire) is called sadhya; the mark on the strength of which the character is inferred is the *hetu* (smoke); the subject where the character is inferred is *paksa* (hill). The three terms correspond to the major, the middle and the minor terms in the Aristotelian syllogism. The following is a typical nyaya syllogism.

1. This hill has fire (*pratijna*),
2. Because it has smoke (*hetu*),
3. Whatever has smoke has fire e.g. an oven (*udaharana*),
4. This hill as smoke which is invariably associated with fire (*upanaya*),
5. Therefore this hill has fire (*nigamana*).

The first, the *pratijna*, is the logical statement which is to be proved. The second is *hetu* or reason which states the reason for the establishment of the proposition. The third is *udaharana* which the universal concomitance together with the example. The fourth is *upanaya* or application of the universal concomitance to the present case. The fifth is *nigamana* or conclusion drawn from the preceding propositions. These five members of Indian syllogism are called *Avayavas*.

**Linga paramarsa:** The Nyaya syllogism has five terms. Among them, the middle term works as a bridge between the major and the minor terms. Therefore, the middle term has main responsibility to prove a syllogism valid or invalid. How a middle term is related to major term is *lingaparamarsha*. There are five characteristics of a middle term:

1. It must be present in the minor term (*paksadharmata*); e.g., smoke must be present in the hill.
2. It must be present in all positive instances in which the major terms is present; e.g., smoke must be present in the kitchen where fire exists (*sapaksasattva*).
3. It must be absent in all negative instances in which the major terms is absent; e.g., smoke must be absent in the lake in which fire does not exist (*vipaksasattva*).
4. It must be non-incomPatible with the minor term; e.g., it must not prove the coolness of fire (*abadhita*).
5. It must be qualified by the absence of counteracting reasons which lead to a contradictory conclusion; e.g., ‘the fact of being caused’ should not be used to prove the ‘eternal’ of sound (*aviruddha*).

**Hetvabhasa:** In Indian logic a fallacy is called *hetvahas*. It means that middle term appears to be a reason but is not a valid reason. All fallacies are material fallacies. We have mentioned the
five characteristics of a valid middle term. When these are violated, we have fallacies. Five kinds of fallacies are recognized:

1. Assiddha or sadhyasama- This is the fallacy of unproved middle.
2. Savyabhicara- this is the fallacy of irregular middle.
3. Satpratipaksa- here the middle term is contradicted by another middle term.
4. Badhita- It is the non-inferentially contradicted middle
5. Viruddha- It is the contradictory middle.

Comparison with Western Syllogism:-
There are many important points of difference of resemblances as well as difference between Nyaya syllogism and Aristotelian syllogism. The first we shall note the resemblances. Though the Nyaya syllogism has five and the Aristotelian syllogism as three propositions, the terms in both are only three-the sadhya or the major, the paksä or the minor and the hetu or the middle. The Nyaya syllogism can easily be converted into the usual Aristotelian syllogism. The first and the last propositions are the same. The second coincides with fourth. Hence if we leave out the first two members of the Nyaya syllogism, we find that it resembles the Aristotelian syllogism.

All things which have smoke have fire (Major).
This hill has smoke (Minor).
Therefore, this hill has fire (conclusion).

But there are certain real differences between the Nyaya and Aristotelian syllogism.
1. While Aristotle concentrates only on deduction the Nyaya system combines deduction with induction. The example is a special feature of the Nyaya syllogism and illustrates the truth that the universal major premise is the result of inductive reasoning. The Nyaya regards deduction and induction as inseparably related as two aspects of the same process. The third proposition shows that the universal proposition is derived from the particular instances like the oven. Such observation of particular instances is the work of induction. The third proposition where Nyaya combines the Universal with the particular brings out the inseparable connection between deduction and induction.
2. Again while the Aristotelian syllogism is formal, the Nyaya syllogism is formal as well as material. Nyaya syllogism discusses only facts of experience, since it has to suggest examples.

Classification of inference: Inference is twofold-(1) Svarthanumana-inference for one’s own sake and (2) Pararthanumana-inference for the sake of others. The former is not expressed in the form of a syllogistic argument. The latter is a syllogism which helps to direct the mind of the listener to think in the required manner.

Sabda: It is defined as the statement of a trustworthy person (aptavakya) and consists in understanding its meaning. It is based on the words of trustworthy persons, human or divine. A person is trustworthy if he knows the truth and conveys it correctly. Testimony is of two kinds-Vaidika and secular (laukika). The vaidika testimony is perfect and infallible because the Vedas
are spoken by God. Secular testimony, being the words of human beings who are liable to error, is not infallible.

**Comparison (Upamana):** It is knowledge derived from similarity. It has been defined as the knowledge of the relation between a word and its denotation.

### 1.6 SAMKHYA YOGA EPISTEMOLOGY

Samkhya theory of knowledge: In all knowledge three factors are involved.

(a) The subject who knows,
(b) The object known,
(c) The process of knowledge.

Samkhya admits of three *Pramana* – perception, inference, and verbal testimony.

**Perception:** Samkhya believes in ‘representative perception’. In knowledge the internal organ mediates the *purusa* and objects when an object comes within the range of vision, the internal organ is so modified as to assume the form of an object. The modification of the internal organ into an object is called *vrtti* or mode. Knowledge means that mode as illuminated by the light of *purusa*. Illumination is a constant feature of perceptual knowledge. The mode varies in accordance with the objects presented.

**Inference:** There are varieties of inference generally recognised. The first is syllogistic inference which is based on perception. The second corresponds to analogical reasoning in modern logic. Such inference is called *samanyatodrsta*. For e.g., From the observed fact that an effect like a jar requires for its production, an agent like potter, it is concluded that the world also should have been brought into existence by a competent being God.

**Sabda:** It is interpreted as aptavacana. Testimony is valid if the source is reliable. It may come not only from the scriptures, but also from persons who are trust worthy (*apta*).

### 1.7 PURVA MIMAMSA EPISTEMOLOGY

According to Kumarila Bhatta, valid knowledge is that which provides the experience of an unknown object, that which is not contradicted by other knowledge and which is free from other defects. The Mimamsakas uphold *svatah pramanya vada* or self validity of knowledge. Knowledge is valid by itself. The conditions of freedom from defects and non-contradiction being satisfied, all knowledge arises as self-valid. Coherence and self-consistency is the nature of valid knowledge. Both Prabhakara and Kumarila regard knowledge itself as *Pramana* or means of knowledge. Jaimini admits three *Pramanas* - perception, inference and testimony. Prabhakara adds two more – comparison and implication. Kumarila further adds non-apprehension.

**Arthapathi (presumption):** Prabhakara and Kumarila both, admit *Arthapathi* as an independent means of valid knowledge. Through this *Pramana* we discover a fact as a result of a contradiction
between two facts already known to be well established. A common example is - Devadutta does not take his food during day time. Yet he is quite strong and fat. We presume that he must be taking food at night. The assumption of Devadutta eating at night is a postulation. We have never seen him eating his food at night. Hence the knowledge gained by postulation is not perception. This kind of knowledge is a peculiar or unique kind of knowledge and it has to be considered separately. But some Indian logicians bring this Pramana under inference-disjunctive inference.

All fat persons who do not eat during the day are persons who eat during the night.
Devadutta is a fat person who does not eat during the day
Therefore Devadutta is a fat person who eats during the night.

Anupalabdhi (non-apprehension):- Anupalabdhi is the immediate knowledge of the non-existence of object. Kumarila admits this but Prabhakara rejects it. It is related to the category of abhava. For e.g., an umbrella which is expected to be seen in a particular corner of a room is not seen there. We know about the non-existence of the umbrella through a separate Pramana, anupalabdhi. Nyaya, though it accepts non-existence as a category has no separate Pramana to understand it. According to them, the non-existence of an object can be known by perception itself as in the case of perceiving the bare floor. But according to Mimamsa since there is no sense object contact, we require a new Pramana to know the non-existence of an object. This is a unique feature of Mimamsa epistemology.

1.8 VEDANTA EPISTEMOLOGY

According to Vedanta, there are three Pramanas- Perception (pratyaksa), Inference (tarka), and Scripture (sruti). Perception: In perception the subject and object become identical because in fact both are the same consciousness. The subject and the object remain separate due to the covering of ignorance. But by the direct union of Antakarana through the sense it takes the form of the object and shines in the form of that particular object illumined by the self due to the removal of the covering of ignorance. Tarka (inference): Inference is the knowledge which results by the past impressions based upon the awareness of concomitance. The awareness of concomitance leaves the impressions on the unconscious and when these impressions are awakened by perceiving that object again, the result is inference. Against Nyaya, Sankara admits only three premises of inference-Pratijna, hetu and udaharana. Sruti or Scripture: According to advaita, God is the author of Veda in a special sense. It is not His work in the literal sense. Like everything else, Veda also disappears at the end of the cycle and God repeats it at the beginning of the next cycle. So far as its substance is concerned, it is independent of God, i.e., Apuruṣya. According to Nyaya, God is the sole author of Veda and according to Mimamsa, Vedas are self-existent. In advaita, we find a midway position between these two systems.

According to Ramanuja, all knowledge points to a complex or qualifies object. Knowledge never reveals anything as nirguna. According to Ramanuja, nirguna does not mean having no qualities at all but the absence of evil qualities. Ramanuja admits three Pramanas- perception, inference and verbal testimony. He rejects nirvikalpa stage of perception. Inference is treated in the same manner as in Nyaya. With respect to sabda, there are two points to be noted- (1) all sections of the Veda are equally important. There is no need to distinguish between the ritual portion and the knowledge portion as is done by Sankara. (2) Ramanuja gives much importance to the Agamas as to the Veda and to the Upanishads.
In Dvaita epistemology the process of knowing is explained as a mode of the internal organ. Knowledge always points to a complex or qualified object. It does not recognise the division of three levels of reality as in advaita. Truth is defined as correspondence with outside reality.

**Check Your Progress II**

**Note:** Use the space provided for your answer

1. State the Nyaya View of Syllogism and compare it with the Western View.

2. Give a brief account of the *pramanas* accepted by Purva Mimamsa.

**1.9 LET US SUM UP**

In this unit we have given a detailed study of the Logic and Epistemology in the different schools of Indian philosophy. Through this unit it will become evident that valid knowledge is prama and *Pramana* is the means to it. *Pramana* are mainly four including perception, inference, verbal testimony and comparison. Schools of Indian thought accept or reject these *Pramanas* and an elaborate picture of the same is given in this unit. As the general science of inference is logic, it is also given due importance while dealing with schools which accept inference. The unit makes it explicit that all schools of Indian thought accept perception as one of the chief instruments of knowledge. To the end of the unit, theories of error of different schools are also mentioned.

**1.10 KEY WORDS**

*Pramana:* Criterion of valid knowledge.

*Syllogism:* It is the inference of one proposition from two premises.
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**Fallacy:** Any error of reasoning.

**Antah karana:** Internal organ constituted of mind, ego-sense and intellect.

**Naiyayika:** An adherent of the Nyaya school

### 1.11 REFERENCES AND FURTHER READINGS


